俱舍論疏 4.182

4.182

論「謂心心所至等和合故」者，第二釋眾名也。即心、心所五義。然心王三義別，故立三種名依訓詞釋。心、心所五義亦訓詞釋。以託依根故，名有所依等。又所依等三，亦可說名就多財釋。相應一種，唯訓詞釋，等和合故，名相應故。有所依、有所緣，如文可解。有行相者，即於所緣品類差別起行相故。准此論文，即是能緣心法，於所緣境品類不同，行解心上起品類相。如鏡照物，如其物類於鏡面上有種種像差別之相，與其心法不即不離，非如像色與鏡不同。問：諸心、心所名有行相者，何故十六行相中但言唯慧？答：准《正理》有三解。一解意云：諸心、心所名有行相者，不同十六行相亦以慧為體，但是心、心所等於所緣品類相中有能取義名有行相。又解：諸心：心所亦是有慧行相，名有行相。若爾，慧不自有，如何得說慧有行相？答：此中行相亦以慧為體，而言諸心、心所者與行相等。行相於所緣，起必俱時，相從總名行相。猶如諸漏同時諸法，體非是漏，以同對治總得漏名。此亦如是。又解：或依無間亦說有聲，如有所依，故無有過。謂如心、心所皆名有所依。意識相應諸心所法，與所依識亦俱時生，識之所依唯無間滅，有行相理應知亦然。泰法師云：「依《婆沙》，影像相非蘊、處、界攝，亦非所緣緣。然心、心所皆同取慧所現行相名同行相。」瑜師又云：「不同行相違諸處文。」詳泰法師云非蘊、界、處攝，恐非盡理。若非三科攝，即是無法，不得言其同、異；若是有法，不合不攝。既云是慧之相，理合攝入行蘊。若通諸心、心所，即合攝屬四蘊。如何說全不攝耶？故相應法名同行相。言行相者，行解之相名為行相。或名相應，等和合故。

Regarding the commentary statement, "Namely, because mind and mental factors... are equally concordant": this is the second [part], explaining their various names. That is, the five meanings of mind and mental factors. However, the three meanings of the primary mind differ, so three kinds of names were established, explained according to etymological analysis (nirvacana). The five meanings of mind and mental factors are also explained according to etymological analysis. Because they rely on a supporting basis (indriya), they are called "possessing a supporting basis" (sāśraya), and so forth. Furthermore, three [of these], including "possessing a supporting basis," may also be explained in the sense of a bahuvrīhi compound. The single one, "concordant" (samprayukta), is explained purely according to etymological analysis, because being equally concordant is why it is called "concordant." "Possessing a supporting basis" (sāśraya) and "possessing an objective cognitive object" (sālambana) can be understood from the text. "Possessing an aspect" (sākāra) means arising with an aspect with respect to the distinct classes of objective cognitive objects. Based on this treatise text, it means that the cognitive mental dharma, with respect to the diverse classes of objective cognitive objects, gives rise on the cognizing mind to forms of distinct classes. Like a mirror reflecting objects, with various distinct images appearing on the mirror's surface corresponding to their types of objects, these are neither identical to nor distinct from that mental dharma; they are not like material forms of images that are distinct from the mirror. Question: If all minds and mental factors are called "possessing an aspect," why is it that among the sixteen aspects, it is said to be only prajñā? Answer: According to the Nyāyānusāra, there are three explanations. The first explanation intends: All minds and mental factors being called "possessing an aspect" is not the same as the sixteen aspects which also have prajñā as their essential nature; it is simply that the minds, mental factors, and so forth, in the aspects of the classes of objective cognitive objects, possess the function of apprehending, and are therefore called "possessing an aspect." Another explanation: All minds and mental factors also possess the aspect of prajñā, and are thus called "possessing an aspect." If so, since prajñā does not possess itself, how can prajñā be said to "possess an aspect"? Answer: Here, the aspect also has prajñā as its essential nature; but when speaking of all minds and mental factors, they are equal to the aspect. As for the aspect regarding the objective cognitive object, its arising must be simultaneous; by association they are collectively called "aspect." Just as the various dharmas simultaneous with the āsravas are not in themselves āsravas, but because they share the same counteragent they collectively receive the name "āsrava"; this is also like that. Another explanation: Or, based on the immediately contiguous, the word "possessing" is also spoken, just like "possessing a supporting basis," and thus there is no error. That is, just as mind and mental factors are all called "possessing a supporting basis"; the various mental dharmas concordant with mental consciousness also arise simultaneously with the supporting consciousness; the supporting basis of consciousness is only the immediately past [mind], and the principle of possessing an aspect should be known to be likewise. Master Tai says: "According to the Vibhāṣā, the aspectual image is not subsumed under the skandhas, āyatanas, or dhātus, nor is it an objective condition (ālambanapratyaya). However, minds and mental factors all together apprehend the aspect manifested by prajñā, and are thus called 'having the same aspect'." Master Yu further says: "Not having the same aspect contradicts texts in various places." Examining Master Tai's statement that it is not subsumed under the skandhas, dhātus, or āyatanas, I fear it is not entirely reasonable. If it were not subsumed under the three categories, it would be a nonexistent dharma, and one could not speak of its identity or difference; if it is an existent dharma, it is not fitting that it should not be subsumed. Since it is said to be an aspect of prajñā, it should logically be subsumed into the saṃskāra-skandha. If it extends across all minds and mental factors, then it should be subsumed under the four skandhas. How could one say that it is entirely un-subsumed? Therefore, concordant dharmas are called "having the same aspect." As for the term "aspect" (ākāra), the form of cognitive understanding is called "aspect." Or they are called "concordant" (samprayukta) because they are equally concordant.