俱舍論疏 4.223

4.223

論「如是成就至亦假非實」，經部結宗義也。如文可解。《正理論》破經部種子云「且執何法名為種子」，有部徵也。「謂名與色於生自果所有展轉隣近功能，此由相續轉變差別（經部答也）。名色者何（徵也）？謂即五蘊（答也）。如何執此為種子性？問也。能為善等諸法生因，答也。為總？為別？為自種類（問也。為總一身五蘊為異熟等別？為自類為種）？若言是總，種體應假，假為實因不應正理（若合諸色、心總為種子，即是假法。假法如無，非種子也）。若言是別，如何可執無記色種為善、不善諸法生因（若身中別取色法為種子者，色是無記，如何與善不善為因）？若自種類善法無間不善法生，或復相違，以何為種？」已上三義徵破。已下經部異師釋種子也。「天愛非汝解種子性。前心俱生思差別故，後心功能差別而起，即後心上功能差別說為種子。由此相續轉變差別，當來果生。」此中意說：不善心中有善所引展轉隣近功能差別以為種子，從此無間善法得生。或善心中，不善所引展轉隣近功能差別以為種子，從此無間不善法生。已上經部異師立種子也。自下正理破也。「今汝所執功能差別種子，與彼善、不善心，為有別體？為無別體？此無別體，豈不許善為不善種，及許不善為善種耶？誰有心者，執煖與火無有別體，而復執言唯煖能燒、火不能燒？云何能感那落迦等諸異熟果？不善心中安置能感可愛異熟，善思差別所引功能差別種子。復云何感末奴沙（人也）等諸異熟果？淨善心中安置能感非愛異熟惡思差別所引功能差別種子。」乃至廣說。具如彼也。

The Śāstra says: "In this way, possession […] is also designated and not real." This concludes the Sautrāntika's doctrinal position. It is understandable according to the text. The Nyāyānusāra refutes the Sautrāntika's seed [theory], saying: "Now, what dharma do you hold to be a 'seed'?" (This is the Sarvāstivādin's interrogation.) "It is the mutually reciprocal, immediate efficacy of name and form in producing their own results, which arises from the distinctive transformation of the continuum." (This is the Sautrāntika's reply.) "What are 'name and form'?" (Interrogation.) "They are precisely the five skandhas." (Reply.) "How can you hold these to have the nature of seeds?" (Question.) "They can be the generative causes of wholesome and other dharmas." (Reply.) "Are they taken as an aggregate, as distinct, or according to their own class?" (Question. Are they the aggregate of the five skandhas in a single body? Are they distinct as vipāka and so forth? Or are they seeds according to their own class?) "If you say they are an aggregate, the entity of the seed would be designated; that what is designated could be a cause of what is real is not logical." (If all rūpas and minds are combined together to make a seed, that is a designated dharma. A designated dharma is like nonexistence and cannot be a seed.) "If you say they are distinct, how could one hold that indeterminate corporeal seeds are the generative causes of wholesome and unwholesome dharmas?" (If one separately takes rūpa-dharmas in the body as seeds, rūpa is indeterminate; how could it be the cause of the wholesome and unwholesome?) "If they are of their own class, when an unwholesome dharma arises immediately after a wholesome dharma, or the reverse, what serves as their seed?" The above three points constitute the interrogation and refutation. Below, another master of the Sautrāntika explains seeds: "O Beloved of the Gods, you do not understand the nature of seeds. Due to a distinction in the volition co-arising with the preceding mind, a distinct efficacy arises in the succeeding mind, and it is precisely this distinct efficacy upon the succeeding mind that is called a 'seed'. Through this distinctive transformation of the continuum, future results arise." What is meant here is that within an unwholesome mind there is a distinct, mutually reciprocal, immediate efficacy induced by the wholesome that serves as a seed, from which an immediately subsequent wholesome dharma is able to arise. Or within a wholesome mind there is a distinct, mutually reciprocal, immediate efficacy induced by the unwholesome that serves as a seed, from which an immediately subsequent unwholesome dharma arises. The above is another Sautrāntika master's formulation of seeds. From here on, the Nyāyānusāra refutes it: "Now, is this seed as distinct efficacy that you maintain distinct in substantial entity from that wholesome or unwholesome mind, or is it not distinct in substantial entity? If it is not distinct in substantial entity, do you not concede that the wholesome is the seed of the unwholesome, and that the unwholesome is the seed of the wholesome? Who with a mind would maintain that heat and fire have no distinct entity, yet go on to claim that only heat can burn while fire cannot burn? How could they karmically bring about vipāka results such as the hells—by placing within an unwholesome mind a distinct efficacy induced by a wholesome volition that can bring about agreeable vipāka? Furthermore, how could they karmically bring about vipāka results such as humans (manuṣya) and the like—by placing within a pure wholesome mind a distinct efficacy induced by an evil volition that can bring about disagreeable vipāka?"—and so on at length, fully as in that work.