俱舍論疏 4.242

4.242

論「世差別者至三世非得」，第二、三世門也。過去、未來各有三世，與前得同。現在唯二，無法俱非得，有情之法住現在時必成就故。若現在法，法前為過去、法後為未來。若過去，法前唯過去、法後通三世。若未來，法後唯未來、法前通三世。故《婆沙》一百五十八解非得云「一切非得總有三種：一在彼法前；二在彼法後；三非彼法前、法後及俱。所不得法亦有三種：一唯有法前非得，謂未來情數等畢竟不生法，及入無餘涅槃最後剎那心等；二有法通有法前、法後非得，謂餘隨所應有情數法；三有法無彼前、後、俱非得，而有非得，謂擇滅、非擇滅。必無非得可與法俱，以法現在前時，是所得法必有得故，非所得法無非得故。亦無唯有彼法後非得非無始來恒成就，彼未捨必起彼類盡故。然諸非得性羸劣故，唯成現在，一一剎那得已即捨。於未得彼法及已捨位，恒有此非得應知。」今詳有部畢竟無涅槃法，以時遠故名為畢竟。若不爾，即合有一類法唯有得無非得，謂無涅槃法非想地惑。有一類法唯有非得而無有得，謂無涅槃法三乘聖人道。即違有得必有非得相翻而立。若謂無涅槃法、三乘聖道亦無非得，即應此人非是異生，無異生性故。又世親菩薩《佛性論》釋有部無涅槃法，就位建立，非法爾定言一闡提犯重禁等無涅槃法。故〈聲聞地〉中說法爾者，寄客說本。如《唯識論》釋《攝論》云「聞熏習為無漏因，寄客說本。」又《婆沙論》簡唯法前非得云「謂未來情數畢竟不生法，及入無餘涅槃最後剎那心等。」言未來者，簡過、現也。言情數者，簡非情也。言畢竟不生者，簡暫不生法也。如眼識等闕緣不生，皆亦得名畢竟不生，得非擇滅故。此論云「畢竟礙當生別得非擇滅」，即此不生眼亦是未來情數畢竟不生。如何此文即表定是唯見道邊俗智？若言此唯世俗智者，即是《婆沙》闕字。若通取餘不生諸法，雖無所闕，即與非想過去見惑義同。今解《婆沙》，應改「竟」字為其「定」字。定者即是始、末不生，此即無過，以餘五識等法不是始、末不生法。見道俗智始、末不生，名唯法前；若得非擇已去，即俱名畢竟也。此字應是抄寫者錯耳。又准俱有因，有對造色非俱有因，而名必定俱起；得即或前、或後，不說定俱。若總說者，何不言法俱得雖定俱生，而非因也。前、後、俱得若言決定，如何論言或前、或後。亦不可言總同類說，於此類中有定俱者應須簡故。故知言有法前、後、俱皆是不定，據容有說，非得准此。又《婆沙》釋無唯法後非得云「非無始來恒成就彼，未捨必起，彼類盡故。」准此文意，所不得法約法種類說有非得。「有頂見惑種類眾多已入過去，雖復但有法後非得在未來者，即有法前非得。」然此文是被難之後重改《婆沙》。然此不順得中六句，應云：以不定故容有二種非得。以非想地過去見道煩惱，於過去世中煩惱未起之前皆容入聖。若未起煩惱即斷見惑，即此煩惱即有法前非得。由此說過去煩惱不得名為唯法後非得。若作此釋，即順得中六句，即同自餘通二非得。由不得此意，被將過去見惑唯法後難，應成四句通難不得，遂改《婆沙》以為四句。見今長安多本流行猶作四句，於後數年重改論文云唯有三句，遂加文遮難，云非無始等一十六字通此妨難。由未得《婆沙》意故，由未盡理。

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "As for the distinction of time periods: [… non-possession of the three time periods]," this is the second section, the gate of the three time periods. Past and future each have three time periods, which is the same as the earlier discussion of possession. Present has only two; there is no non-possession simultaneous with the state, because when a phenomenon of sentient beings abides in the present, it is necessarily possessed. If it is a present phenomenon, prior to the state is past, and subsequent to the state is future. If it is past, prior to the state is only past, and subsequent to the state connects to all three time periods. If it is future, subsequent to the state is only future, and prior to the state connects to all three time periods. Therefore the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 158, in explaining non-possession, states: "All non-possessions are of three kinds in total: first, prior to that state; second, subsequent to that state; third, neither prior, subsequent, nor simultaneous with that state. States not acquired are also of three kinds: first, states having only non-possession prior to the state, namely, future states included among sentient beings that will definitively never arise, and the final thought-moment when entering nirvāṇa without residue, etc.; second, states that generally have non-possession both prior to and subsequent to the state, namely, other states included among sentient beings as applicable; third, states that have neither prior, subsequent, nor simultaneous non-possession, yet have non-possession, namely, analytical cessation and non-analytical cessation. Non-possession can never be simultaneous with the state, because when a state is present, if it is an acquired state, it must have possession, and if it is an unacquired state, it cannot have non-possession. Nor is there any [state] having solely non-possession subsequent to that state, because it is not from beginningless time constantly possessed, and prior to its abandonment it must arise, until its type is exhausted. However, because the nature of all non-possessions is weak, they are established only in the present: acquired moment by moment, they are immediately abandoned. In the state of not yet acquiring that phenomenon and in the stage where it has already been abandoned, it should be known that this non-possession constantly exists." Now examining this, the Sarvāstivāda's 'phenomenon definitively without nirvāṇa' is called 'definitive' because the time is far off. If it were not so, there would have to be a class of phenomena that has only possession and no non-possession, namely, the afflictions of the stage of Neither-Perception-Nor-Non-Perception for one without the phenomenon of nirvāṇa. And there would be a class of phenomena having only non-possession and no possession, namely, the path of the noble ones of the three vehicles for one without the phenomenon of nirvāṇa. This would contradict the principle that where there is possession, non-possession is necessarily established in opposition to it. If one says that for the state without nirvāṇa, the noble path of the three vehicles also lacks non-possession, then this person should not be an ordinary being, because they would lack the nature of an ordinary being. Furthermore, Bodhisattva Vasubandhu in the Treatise on Buddha-Nature explains that the Sarvāstivāda's 'state without nirvāṇa' is established with reference to stage, not by intrinsic nature definitively saying that an icchantika who commits the grave prohibitions lacks the state of nirvāṇa. Therefore, when it speaks of 'intrinsic nature' in the Śrāvakabhūmi, it is referring to the incidental to explain the fundamental. Just as the Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi explains the Mahāyānasaṃgraha by saying: "Perfuming through hearing is the uncontaminated cause; this is referring to the incidental to explain the fundamental." Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā, in singling out that which has only non-possession prior to the state, says: "namely, future states included among sentient beings that will definitively never arise, and the final thought-moment when entering nirvāṇa without residue, etc." Saying 'future' excludes the past and present. Saying 'included among sentient beings' excludes insentient things. Saying 'definitively never arising' excludes states that temporarily do not arise. For example, when the eye-consciousness and so forth do not arise due to a lack of conditions, they can all also be called 'definitively never arising', because they obtain non-analytical cessation. As this Śāstra states: "Definitively obstructing future arising, a separate non-analytical cessation is obtained." Then this non-arising eye[-consciousness] is also a future phenomenon included among sentient beings that definitively never arises. How could this text specifically indicate only the worldly wisdom at the threshold of the Path of Seeing? If one says that this is solely conventional wisdom, then the Vibhāṣā is missing characters. If one comprehensively takes other non-arising phenomena, although nothing is missing, it then shares the same meaning as past afflictions of the view in Neither-Perception-Nor-Non-Perception. In currently interpreting the Vibhāṣā, the character 'definitively' (竟) should be emended to 'determined' (定). 'Determined' means never arising from beginning to end; this is without fault, because other phenomena such as the five consciousnesses are not phenomena that never arise from beginning to end. The conventional wisdom of the Path of Seeing never arises from beginning to end and is called 'only prior to the state'; once non-analytical [cessation] is obtained, they are all called 'definitive'. This character is probably an error by a copyist. Moreover, based on the coexistence cause: derivative matter with resistance is not a coexistence cause, yet it is called 'definitely arising together'; possession is either prior or subsequent, and is not said to be definitely simultaneous. If speaking in general, why not say that although possession simultaneous with the state definitely arises together, it is not a cause? If prior, subsequent, and simultaneous possessions are said to be definite, how can the Śāstra say 'either prior or subsequent'? Nor can it be said to be spoken of in terms of the whole genus, because within this class those that definitely arise together would have to be singled out. Therefore one knows that the statement that there is prior, subsequent, and simultaneous is in all cases indefinite, spoken based on possibility; non-possession should be understood in the same way. Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā explains the absence of non-possession solely subsequent to the state, saying: "because it is not from beginningless time constantly possessed, and prior to its abandonment it must arise, until its type is exhausted." According to the intent of this text, the states not acquired are spoken of as having non-possession with reference to the type of phenomenon: "The afflictions of the view in the Summit of Existence are many in kind and have already entered the past; although they have only non-possession subsequent to the state, for those in the future, they have non-possession prior to the state." However, this passage is an emendation made to the Vibhāṣā after it met with objections. Yet this does not accord with the six propositions within possession; one should say: because it is indefinite, it admits two kinds of non-possession. For with the past defilements of the Path of Seeing in the stage of Neither-Perception-Nor-Non-Perception, in the past time period prior to the arising of the defilement, it was entirely possible to enter noble status. If one severed the defilements of the view without the defilements having arisen, then these defilements would have non-possession prior to the state. Because of this, it is said that past defilements cannot be termed non-possession solely subsequent to the state. If one makes this interpretation, it accords with the six propositions within possession, and is identical to the other states that connect to both kinds of non-possession. Through failing to grasp this intention, when challenged that past afflictions of the view must be solely subsequent to the state, which should form four propositions, unable to resolve the challenge, they then altered the Vibhāṣā to make four propositions. We see that currently in Chang'an many circulating manuscripts still make four propositions; several years later they re-altered the Śāstra text, saying there are only three propositions, and thereupon added text to ward off the objection, using the sixteen characters beginning with 'because it is not from beginningless time' to resolve this difficulty. Because they did not grasp the intention of the Vibhāṣā, they did not reach the thorough principle.