俱舍論記 4.241

4.241

「世差別者至三世非得」者，三世分別門。過去法有過去非得者，謂若在法前、若在法後，今時同在過去，總名過去非得。有現在、未來非得者，皆是法後非得。據世橫望雖皆法後，若據起用前後，未來亦有彼法前非得。未來法有未來非得者，謂若是法前、若是法後，今時同在未來，總名未來非得。雖復未來未有前後次第安立，約性類別、約容起用說前後也。有過、現非得者，謂皆法前非得現在法有過去非得者，唯有法前非得。有未來非得者，唯有法後非得。據世橫望雖唯法後，若據起用前後，未來亦有彼法前非得，現在法決定無有現在非得。故《正理》云「以現在法與不成就不俱行故。」有說：現法無現非得，性相違故。舊《俱舍》云「現在法有現在非得者」，此翻謬矣。若依《婆沙》一百五十八解非得云「一切非得總有三種：一在彼法前、二在彼法後、三非彼法前後及俱。所不得法亦有三種：一有所不得法唯有彼前非得，謂未來情數畢竟不生法，及入無餘涅槃最後剎那心等。二有所不得法通有彼前、後非得，謂餘隨應有情數法。三有所不得法無彼前、後及俱非得，而有非得，謂擇滅、非擇滅。必無非得可與法俱，以法現在前時，是所得者必有得故，非所得者無得，無非得故。亦無唯有法後非得，非無始來恒成就彼未捨，必起彼類盡故。然諸非得性羸劣故，唯成就現在一剎那。現在一剎那得已即捨，於未得彼法及已捨位恒有此非得應知。」解云：非得三種可知。言有所不得法，唯有彼法前非得。未來，簡過、現。情數，簡非情。畢竟不生法，謂三類智邊世俗智等。此法既畢竟不生，所以唯有法前非得。及三乘人臨入無餘涅槃時最後一剎那心等，謂未來有一類心，唯作臨入涅槃心。從來未曾起彼種類，所以唯有法前非得，無有法後非得。等者，等取相應法等，及無生智等。此無生智等，一得不退故，亦無有法後非得。問：最後心及無生智等起現前時，未來世中有彼法前非得性類，何不說有法後非得？解云：凡言非得，約容起用說其前、後。未來非得約世前、後，實在彼後。以此非得不起即已，起必在彼最後等前，故說法前，不名法後。第二、第三所不得法，及必無非得下，可知。言「亦無唯有至彼類盡故」者，此是反解，顯無唯有法後非得。若無始來恒成就彼法，於未捨位必起彼種類入過去盡，可得唯有法後非得，非無始來恒成就彼法。於未斷捨位，必起彼法種類，令盡入於過去，以彼種類無量無邊不可起盡故，無唯有法後非得。問：如斷有頂見惑必無有退。已入過去者，豈非唯有法後非得？解云：所不得法，約法種類說有非得。有頂見惑種類眾多已入過去，雖復但有法後非得，在未來者即有法前非得，故彼有頂過去見惑不可得說唯有法後非得。又解：過去見惑，今雖但有法後非得，脫不現前即有法前非得，約容有說言有法前。又解：過去見惑，約世而言唯有法後非得，而無法前非得。由彼過惑有未來法前非得，故亦名法前非得。此未來一類非得，約世橫望，實在過去惑後。而名法前非得不名法後非得者，以此非得不起即已，起必在彼法前。由彼非得約容起用辨前後也，由斯過惑亦有法前非得。此中三解，應知准前道類忍說。

Regarding the section from "As for the distinctions of the periods of time: ... non-possession of the three time periods": This is the section distinguishing the three time periods. Past dharmas having past non-possession means: whether it is before the dharma or after the dharma, because at the present time they are both in the past, it is collectively called past non-possession. That which has present and future non-possession is entirely non-possession after the dharma. Considered horizontally across the time periods, although they are all after the dharma, if considered in terms of the prior and subsequent arising of function, there is also non-possession before that dharma in the future. Future dharmas having future non-possession means: whether it is before the dharma or after the dharma, because at the present time they are both in the future, it is collectively called future non-possession. Although in the future there is not yet an established prior-and-subsequent sequence, priority and subsequence are spoken of in terms of differences in nature and category and in terms of the admissibility of the arising of function. That which has past and present non-possession is entirely non-possession before the dharma. Present dharmas having past non-possession have only non-possession before the dharma. Having future non-possession has only non-possession after the dharma. Considered horizontally across the time periods, although it is only after the dharma, if considered in terms of the prior and subsequent arising of function, there is also non-possession before that dharma in the future; a present dharma definitely does not have present non-possession. Therefore, the Nyāyānusāra says: "Because a present dharma and non-acquisition do not operate simultaneously." Some say: "A present dharma does not have present non-possession because their natures are mutually contradictory." The old Kośa says: "A present dharma has present non-possession"; this translation is an error. If we rely on fascicle 158 of the Mahāvibhāṣā explaining non-possession, it says: "All non-possessions are broadly of three kinds: first, before that dharma; second, after that dharma; third, neither before, after, nor simultaneous with that dharma. The unpossessed dharmas are also of three kinds: first, there are unpossessed dharmas that have only non-possession before them, namely, dharmas among sentient beings in the future that will never arise, and the final momentary mind and so forth of entering nirvāṇa without remainder. Second, there are unpossessed dharmas that generally have non-possession both before and after them, namely, the remaining dharmas belonging to sentient beings as appropriate. Third, there are unpossessed dharmas that have non-possession neither before, after, nor simultaneous with them, yet they have non-possession, namely, analytical cessation and non-analytical cessation. There is definitely no non-possession that can be simultaneous with the dharma, because when a dharma is present, if it is an object of acquisition it must have acquisition, and if it is not an object of acquisition it has no acquisition, so there is no non-possession. Nor is there that which has only non-possession after the dharma, for it is not the case that since beginningless time one always acquires it without having abandoned it, and must have caused that category to arise completely. However, because the nature of non-possessions is weak and feeble, they are acquired only in a single present moment. Having been acquired in a single present moment, it is immediately abandoned; it should be known that this non-possession always exists in the state where one has not yet acquired that dharma and the state where one has already abandoned it." The explanation says: The three kinds of non-possession can be understood. As for saying 'there are unpossessed dharmas that have only non-possession before that dharma': 'Future' excludes past and present. 'Belonging to sentient beings' excludes non-sentient things. 'Dharmas that will never arise' refers to conventional knowledge on the verge of the three categories of knowledge and so forth. Since these dharmas will never arise, they have only non-possession before the dharma. 'And the final momentary mind and so forth when persons of the three vehicles are about to enter nirvāṇa without remainder' means that in the future there is a category of mind that functions solely as the mind about to enter nirvāṇa. Because one has never before produced that kind, it has only non-possession before the dharma, and has no non-possession after the dharma. 'And so forth' includes associated dharmas and the like, as well as the knowledge of non-arising and so forth. Because once this knowledge of non-arising and so forth is acquired one does not fall back from it, it also has no non-possession after the dharma. Question: When the final mind, the knowledge of non-arising, and so forth arise in the present, in the future period of time there is the category of non-possession before that dharma; why is it not said that there is non-possession after the dharma? The explanation says: Whenever non-possession is spoken of, its priority and subsequence are discussed in terms of the admissibility of the arising of function. Regarding the priority and subsequence of the future non-possession across the time periods, it is actually after it. Because if this non-possession does not arise, that is all, but if it arises it must be before that final [mind] and so forth; therefore it is called 'before the dharma' and not named 'after the dharma'. The second and third unpossessed dharmas, as well as the text from 'There is definitely no non-possession' downwards, can be understood. As for the statement 'Nor is there that which has only ... caused that category to arise completely': this is an explanation by inversion to show that there is nothing that has only non-possession after the dharma. If one had constantly possessed that dharma since beginningless time and in the state before abandoning it had necessarily caused that category to arise and enter the past entirely, then it would be possible to have only non-possession after the dharma; but one has not constantly possessed that dharma since beginningless time. In the state before severing and abandoning it, one cannot necessarily cause the categories of that dharma to arise so as to make them enter the past entirely, because those categories are immeasurable and boundless and cannot be made to arise completely; hence there is nothing that has only non-possession after the dharma. Question: For instance, when the defilements of view of the Bhavāgra are severed, there is definitely no falling back. Regarding those that have already entered the past, how could they not have only non-possession after the dharma? The explanation says: For the unpossessed dharma, non-possession is spoken of with respect to the category of the dharma. The defilements of view of the Bhavāgra have many categories that have already entered the past; although they have only non-possession after the dharma, those in the future have non-possession before the dharma. Therefore, the past defilements of view of the Bhavāgra cannot be said to have only non-possession after the dharma. Another explanation: Although the past defilements of view now have only non-possession after the dharma, if peradventure they do not become present, then there is non-possession before the dharma; it is said to have 'before the dharma' based on the possibility of its occurrence. Another explanation: Regarding the past defilements of view, in terms of the time periods there is only non-possession after the dharma, and no non-possession before the dharma. Because those past defilements have future non-possession before the dharma, they are therefore also called non-possession before the dharma. This future category of non-possession, considered horizontally across the time periods, is actually after the past defilements. Yet it is called non-possession before the dharma and not named non-possession after the dharma because if this non-possession does not arise, that is all, but if it arises it must precede that dharma. Because that non-possession distinguishes priority and subsequence based on the admissibility of the arising of function, by this [reasoning] past defilements also have non-possession before the dharma. These three explanations here should be understood as analogous to the earlier explanation of the knowledge of the categories of the path.