俱舍論疏 5.150
俱舍論疏 5.150
- Language
- Classical Chinese
5.150
「論曰至是無為法」,總釋四相名也。《正理論》云「如是四種是有為相,顯彼性故,得彼相名。」述曰:此四種相顯諸有為性是無常,從其所顯名有為相,無此相者表是無為。《婆沙》三十八云「何故作此論?有執諸有為相皆是無為,如分別論者。或復有執三相是有為、滅相是無為,如法密部。或復有執相與所相一切相似,如相似相續沙門。彼作是說:色法生、老、住、無常,體還是色,乃至識亦爾,顯有為唯是有為,唯不相應行蘊所攝。或復有執色等五蘊出胎時名生,相續時名住,衰變時名異,命終時名滅,如經部師。為遮彼計,顯彼唯是眾同分相,非有為相。有為相者,諸有為法一一剎那皆具四相。」《婆沙》三十九云「謂或有執三有為相非一剎那,如譬喻者。彼作是說:若一剎那有三相者,則應一法一時亦生、亦老、亦滅。然無此理,互相違故。應說諸法初起名生,後盡名滅,中熟名老。為遮彼執,顯一剎那具有三相。問若如是者,則應一法一時亦生、亦老、亦滅。答:作用時異,故不相違。謂法生時生有作用,滅時、老時方有作用。體雖同時,用有先後。一法生、滅作用究竟,名一剎那,故無有失。或生、滅位非一剎那,然一剎那具有三體,故說三相同一剎那。由此因緣,故作斯論。」准上兩釋,相用皆是異時。前釋三相同一剎那,後釋生、滅異剎那也。然異、滅相用同、異時,文不決定。「問:四相為是共相?為是自相?一說自相、一說共相。評曰:應作是說,此是共相。然共相有二種:一者自體共相,謂一一有為法自體各有生等四義;二者和合共相,謂一一有為法各與生等四相和合。此四但是和合共相。復作是釋:剎那住相微細難知,難可施設,故說不住。謂剎那量是佛所知,非諸聲聞、獨覺等境。如乘神通屈申臂頃,從此處沒至色究竟,於其中間非不相續,可有從此往至彼義;亦非一法移轉至彼,又無從此越至彼義。是故決定剎那剎那生滅相續從此至彼。於其中間諸剎那量,最極微細唯佛能知。由此故言諸行有住。一說無住。評曰:既不能通,應信有住。由有住相力,諸行生已能取自果、能取所緣。由異、滅力,一剎那後無復作用。若無住相,諸行應無因果相續,心、心所法應無所緣,故必有住。」
On the passage in the śāstra from “The commentary says…” to “…is an unconditioned dharma”: This provides a general explanation of the names of the four characteristics. The Nyāyānusāra states: “These four are characteristics of the conditioned, because they manifest its nature and thereby receive the name of its characteristics.” The commentary explains: These four characteristics reveal that the nature of all conditioned phenomena is impermanent. From what they reveal, they are termed “characteristics of the conditioned”; one lacking these characteristics is indicated to be unconditioned. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 38, states: “Why is this treatise composed? Some maintain that the characteristics of the conditioned are all unconditioned, as do the Vibhajyavādins. Others maintain that three characteristics are conditioned and the characteristic of cessation is unconditioned, as does the Dharmaguptaka school. Still others maintain that the characteristics and that which is characterized are similar in all respects, as do the Saṃsṛṣṭa-santāna-śramaṇas. They say: ‘The arising, aging, duration, and impermanence of material phenomena are themselves still material phenomena in substance, and so forth up to consciousness being likewise,’ [wishing to] show that the conditioned is solely conditioned and is subsumed only under the skandha of non-associated formations. Still others maintain that the five skandhas of matter and so forth are called ‘arising’ at the time of emergence from the womb, called ‘duration’ during continuity, called ‘difference’ at the time of decline and deterioration, and called ‘cessation’ at the end of life, as do the Sautrāntikas. To refute their position, it is shown that these are merely characteristics of the generic resemblance (nikāya-sabhāga) and not characteristics of the conditioned. As for the characteristics of the conditioned, every single conditioned phenomenon in each single moment is fully endowed with the four characteristics.” The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 39, states: “Some maintain that the three characteristics of the conditioned are not in a single moment, as do the Dārṣṭāntikas. They say: ‘If a single moment possessed the three characteristics, then a single phenomenon at one time would simultaneously arise, age, and cease. Yet there is no such principle, because they are mutually contradictory. One should say that the initial origination of phenomena is called arising, their subsequent exhaustion is called cessation, and their intermediate maturation is called aging.’ To refute that position, it is shown that a single moment fully possesses the three characteristics. Question: If so, then a single phenomenon at one time would simultaneously arise, age, and cease. Answer: Their operations take place at different times; hence there is no contradiction. That is to say, when a phenomenon arises, arising has its operation; only when it ceases and when it ages do they then have their operations. Although their substantial entities are simultaneous, their operations occur earlier and later. The completion of the operations of arising and cessation of a single phenomenon is called a single moment; therefore, there is no error. Alternatively, the states of arising and cessation are not in a single moment, yet a single moment fully possesses the three substances; hence it is said that the three characteristics share a single moment. It is on account of this reason that this treatise is composed.” According to the above two explanations, the characteristics and their operations both occur at different times. The former explanation takes the three characteristics to share a single moment, whereas the latter explanation takes arising and cessation to belong to different moments. However, as to whether the characteristics and operations of difference and cessation occur at the same time or at different times, the text is not definitive. “Question: Are the four characteristics common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) or specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa)? One view says they are specific characteristics; another says they are common characteristics. Evaluation: One should state that they are common characteristics. Yet common characteristics are of two kinds: first, common characteristics inherent in their own nature, meaning that the nature of each conditioned phenomenon inherently possesses the four meanings of arising and so forth; second, common characteristics of association (saṃprayukta), meaning that each conditioned phenomenon is associated with the four characteristics of arising and so forth. These four are merely common characteristics of association. Another explanation is made: The characteristic of duration in a moment is subtle and difficult to know, difficult to designate conceptually; therefore it is said not to endure. For the measure of a moment is known by the Buddha, not an object of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and so forth. Just as, when using supernormal powers to bend or stretch an arm, one disappears from this place and reaches the Akaniṣṭha realm, in the interval between these it is not that there is no continuum, and the meaning of going from here to there is admissible; yet it is not that a single phenomenon moves and shifts to there, nor is there any meaning of leaping from here to there. Therefore, it is definitive that momentary arisings and cessations continue from here to there. In the interval between, the measure of these moments is exceedingly subtle and known only to the Buddha. For this reason, it is said that conditioned formations have duration. One view says there is no duration. Evaluation: Since [the opponent] cannot resolve this, one should believe that there is duration. By the power of the characteristic of duration, conditioned formations, having arisen, are able to seize their own fruit and seize their intentional object (ālambana). By the power of difference and cessation, after a single moment there is no longer any operation. If there were no characteristic of duration, conditioned formations would have no continuity of cause and effect, and mind and mental factors would have no intentional object; therefore, there must be duration.”
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