俱舍論疏 5.16

5.16

論「毘婆沙師至於多轉故」，論主引婆沙答。《正理》釋云「此應顯同勝論所執總同句義、同異句義。若勝論執此二句義，其體非一，剎那無常，無所依止展轉差別。設令同彼亦無多過，非勝論者執眼等根能行色等，即令釋子捨如是見別作餘解，故彼所難是朋黨言，求正理人不應收採。」述曰：若如勝論，一法遍於多法，其體是常，依和合諦，是為有過。若彼外道計二句義其體非一，剎那無常無所依止展轉差別，設令同彼亦無多過。

On the text of the Treatise, "The Vaibhāṣikas [reply]... because it applies to many": The author of the Treatise cites the Vibhāṣā to answer. The Nyāyānusāra explains: "This would seem to make it identical to the categories of universal generality and generality-cum-particularity posited by the Vaiśeṣikas. Yet if the Vaiśeṣikas posit these two categories, their substance is not one, it is momentary and impermanent, and has no substrate, being mutually distinct. Even granting that it is similar to their [view], there is still no great fault. It is not because the Vaiśeṣikas posit that the sense faculties such as the eye act upon visible matter and so forth that the sons of the Śākya must abandon such a view and fashion another explanation. Therefore, their objection is partisan speech; one who seeks the correct principle should not adopt it." Explanation: If, as the Vaiśeṣikas hold, a single dharma pervades many dharmas, its substance is eternal, and it relies on the category of inherence (samavāya), this would be faulty. But if that non-Buddhist school posits that the substances of these two categories are not one, are momentary and impermanent, without a substrate, and mutually distinct, then even granting that it resembles their view, there would be no great fault.