俱舍論疏 5.206

5.206

論「設許至現在相」，經部縱有未來難也。生相有用時不得是未來，生相已用時不得名現在。有部之宗約其作用辨三世故，《正理論》云「謂有為法若能為因引攝自果名為作用，若能為緣攝助異類是謂功能，如前已辨。一切現在皆能為因引攝自果，非諸現在皆能為緣攝明異類。謂闇中眼或有功能被損害者，便於眼識不能為緣攝助令起，然其作用非闇所損，定能為因引當眼故，由斯作用、功能有別。然於同類相續果生有定不定，攝引勢力名為作用亦名功能。若於異類相續果生，但能為緣攝助令起，此非作用但是功能。」述曰：準《婆沙》問四大生等五因，為是因？為是緣？一說是因，一說是緣。准此論意，因是因緣、緣是增上。其因緣定有取果，取果作用定在現在。其增上緣攝助異類，於中有取果者、有非取果者。其取果者，即是諸有為法住現在世，於增上果皆有取果用。其未來法及生相法功能雖是攝助，而非是取、與。准《正理論》上下文，一切取果皆是現在。此中說取自類果者，據顯說也。一切法體住現在時定能取果，故無能障也。若因與果及增上緣攝助諸法，即容有被障，如因暗障眼，識不依根也。又餘一切有為住現在時，皆能取其自果名為作用，無力能遮不取果故。一切有為法住現在時，攝助異類即不決定，有法力能遮彼功能不得起故，如眼識等。此釋自類果者，即因緣所取皆是自類。

On the treatise passage: "Even granting … the characteristic of the present": the Sautrāntika concedes for the sake of argument that the future exists and objects. When the characteristic of arising has functional activity, it cannot be future; when the characteristic of arising has already exercised its function, it cannot be called present. The Vaibhāṣika school distinguishes the three times on the basis of functional activity; thus the Nyāyānusāra states: "If a conditioned phenomenon can serve as a cause to attract and apprehend its own effect, it is called functional activity (kāritra); if it can serve as a condition to support and assist a different type, this is called capacity (sāmarthya), as already explained previously. All present phenomena can serve as causes to attract and apprehend their own effects, but not all present phenomena can serve as conditions to assist a different type. For example, when the eye in darkness has its capacity impaired, it cannot serve as a condition to assist the visual consciousness and cause it to arise; yet its functional activity is not impaired by darkness, for it definitely can serve as a cause to induce the subsequent eye. Thus functional activity and capacity are distinct. However, with respect to the arising of a homogeneous, continuous effect, there is certainty and uncertainty: the force of attracting and apprehending is called functional activity and also called capacity. If it concerns the arising of a heterogeneous continuous effect, it can only serve as a condition assisting to cause it to arise; this is not functional activity, but merely capacity." Explanation: According to the Vibhāṣā's question regarding whether the five causes of the great elements producing [derived matter] are causes (hetu) or conditions (pratyaya), one explanation says they are causes, while another says they are conditions. Following the sense of this treatise, "cause" means direct cause (hetu-pratyaya) and "condition" means dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya). The direct cause definitely has the grasping of an effect, and the functional activity of grasping an effect is definitely in the present. As for dominant conditions supporting and assisting different types, among them some grasp effects and some do not. Those that grasp effects are all conditioned phenomena residing in the present world, having the function of grasping an effect with respect to dominant effects. As for future phenomena and the phenomenon of the characteristic of arising, although their capacity is supporting and assisting, it is not grasping and bestowing. Following the context of the Nyāyānusāra, all grasping of effects is in the present. What is spoken of here as grasping effects of its own class is based on the obvious sense. When the essence of any phenomenon resides in the present, it definitely can grasp its effect, and thus nothing can obstruct it. If a cause bestows an effect or a dominant condition supports phenomena, there may be obstructions—just as darkness obstructs the eye, so consciousness does not rely on the faculty. Furthermore, all other conditioned phenomena, when residing in the present, can grasp their own effects, which is termed functional activity, because no power can prevent them from grasping their effects. But for all conditioned phenomena residing in the present, assisting different types is not invariable, because other phenomena may have the power to block that capacity from arising, as in the case of visual consciousness, etc. This explanation of "effect of its own class" means that whatever is grasped by a direct cause is invariably of its own class.