俱舍論疏 5.238

5.238

論「應知此中至壹伊等字」，會異名也。「名謂作想」者，由於色等念色等名，令於色等起色等想。名是想因，名為作想。此是因取果名，說名為想。論既不言想謂作名，不可釋言從因受稱。因取果名者，即是名之異目，亦不可別為一釋。或是名之異目，亦可名如作想。詮法相狀，義與想同，故名為想。梵云那（去聲）摩，此云名，是歸義、赴義、隨義、趣義，謂隨音聲歸赴於法趣其自相。㘝有異求表呼專一，即歸之義，由斯呼召能引自體。梵云僧若（日何反），此云想，是能取像專執之義，或是共立契約之義。梵云鉢陀，此云迹，如一象身有四足跡，亦如一頌總四句成，今就義翻名之為句。梵云縛迦（去何反），此云章，是詮辨終竟義，如說諸行無常等章。直言諸行是名非句，直言諸行義未究竟，更云無常方成究竟。故名詮義究竟，名之為章，如立蘊章詮蘊究竟。若爾，何故外典章、句義別？答：詮義究竟名之為章。詮義之中有廣有狹，極狹名句，廣名為章。即於章中分其二義：一句義、二章義。即句同章，故名為章。「或能辨了業用德時相應差別」者，如說善能招愛果、刀能割物等，此是業用；寂滅為樂，此是德也；三無數劫，此是時也。相應，謂詮諸法相隨順也。差別，謂詮諸法義不同也。或差別是其總義，即是對其自性名差別也。如說諸行是其自性，無常是其差別。《對法論》云「名詮自性，句詮差別。」其義同也梵云便杜那，此云文，是能彰顯義。西方俗呼醬酢、鹽、扇等物為便社那，以醬、酢、鹽等能顯於味，扇能顯風，故名便社那。舊譯為味，誤也。以文顯故，與名、句為依，故《對法》云「彼二所依是文。如綾、錦文由起於絲顯異餘處，即依此顯安布以為龍、鳳。又合龍、鳳以作錦窠、根本皆依文、絲顯成。絲如其聲，文如其字，龍、鳳如名，句如其窠。壹、伊等字顯在聲上，即將此顯能目自性，別更生名目差別義，別更生句。此名、句皆依於文。」

The Śāstra states: "It should be known that herein... letters such as *a* and *i*." This synthesizes the different names. Regarding "a word means to produce a concept": because on account of matter and so forth one brings to mind words such as "matter", this causes one to form concepts such as "matter" regarding matter and so forth. A word is the cause of a concept, so it is called "producing a concept". This is applying the name of the result to the cause, calling it "concept". Since the Śāstra does not say that a concept produces a word, it cannot be explained as taking its designation from the cause. Applying the name of the result to the cause is simply an alternative name for a word, and need not be given a separate explanation. Alternatively, it is an alternative name for a word, or a word can be said to be like producing a concept: it explains the characteristics of dharmas, its meaning being the same as a concept, hence it is called "concept". In Sanskrit it is called *nāma*, translated here as "word" (*ming*); it has the meaning of bending toward, heading toward, conforming to, and proceeding toward: that is, conforming to sounds, it turns toward a dharma and proceeds to its specific characteristic. Having a distinct request to express a designation in an exclusive manner is the meaning of "turning toward"; through this calling out, it can indicate the self-nature [of the thing]. In Sanskrit it is called *saṃjñā*, translated here as "concept" (*xiang*); it has the meaning of grasping an image and exclusively apprehending it, or the meaning of mutually establishing a convention. In Sanskrit it is called *pada*, translated here as "footprint" (*ji*): just as an elephant's body has four footprints, so a stanza is composed of four lines (*pada*); here, translating according to meaning, it is called a "phrase" (*ju*). In Sanskrit it is called *vākya*, translated here as "sentence" (*zhang*); it has the meaning of bringing an explanation to completion, such as saying sentences like "all conditioned formations are impermanent". Simply saying "all conditioned formations" is a word, not a phrase; simply saying "all conditioned formations" leaves the meaning incomplete; only when one further says "impermanent" is it complete. Therefore, expressing a meaning completely is called a sentence, like establishing a chapter on the aggregates that completely explains the aggregates. If so, why do external texts distinguish the meanings of *zhang* (sentence/chapter) and *ju* (phrase)? Answer: expressing a meaning completely is called a sentence. Within the expression of meaning there is broad and narrow: the most narrow is called a phrase (*pada*), the broad is called a sentence (*vākya*). That is, within a sentence two meanings are distinguished: first, the meaning of a phrase; second, the meaning of a sentence. A phrase being identical to a sentence, it is called a sentence. "Or it can fully distinguish the differences associated with activity, attribute, and time": for example, saying that wholesome [karma] can bring about desirable results, or that a knife can cut objects, and so forth—this is activity; "cessation is bliss"—this is attribute; "three incalculable eons"—this is time. "Associated" means expressing dharmas in accordance with each other. "Differences" means expressing the distinct meanings of dharmas. Or "difference" is its general meaning: namely, in contrast to their self-nature it is called difference. For example, saying "all conditioned formations" is their self-nature, and "impermanent" is their difference. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says: "A word expresses self-nature; a phrase expresses differences." Its meaning is the same. In Sanskrit it is called *vyañjana*, translated here as "phoneme" (*wen*); it has the meaning of revealing. In the colloquial speech of the Western regions, things like vinegar sauce, salt, fans, and so forth are called *vyañjana*, because sauce, vinegar, salt, etc., can reveal flavors, and a fan can reveal wind; hence they are called *vyañjana*. Old translations rendered it as "flavor" (*wei*), which was an error. Because phonemes reveal, they serve as the basis for words and phrases; hence the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* says: "The basis of those two is phonemes." For instance, patterns in damask and brocade, being raised by silk threads, are distinct from other places, and based on this clear display they are arranged into dragons and phoenixes; furthermore, combining dragons and phoenixes to make brocade medallions, all fundamentally rely on the pattern and silk threads to become manifest. Silk threads are like sounds; patterns are like letters; dragons and phoenixes are like words; and phrases are like the medallions. Letters such as *a* and *i* are revealed upon sounds; then taking this revealing, they can designate self-nature, separately giving rise to words that designate distinct meanings, separately giving rise to phrases. These words and phrases both rely on phonemes.