俱舍論疏 6.299

6.299

論「亦應如是至故此不說」，別釋能作因也。現在取果與五因同，於中無為無果，所以不說。准《正理論》、《婆沙》二說，一許能作因過去取果，《正理論》唯現在取果。《正理論》云「言取果者是能引義，謂引未來令其生等。於同體類能為種子，於異體類由同一果，於非一果由同性類，於異性類而由有是自聚相續，是故一切皆名能引。如是能引名為取果，此取果用唯現在有，非於去、來，唯此可名有為作用。於六因內簡去何因而言五因唯現取果？謂六因內除能作因。此能作因何緣被簡？有餘師說：此能作因取果、與果時無決定，故取、與中俱不分別。彼說非理。所以者何？此因取果無非現在，又非不取而有與義，如何乃言時無決定？然能作因能取果者，定唯現在；與通過、現，應如同類、遍行二因，但非一切有增上果可取或與，故此不說。豈不此因能取果用亦通過去？如何乃言能取果者定唯現在？故本論中作如是說：過去諸法為等無間能生二心。若出無想、滅盡定心，由入定心現在取者，則應二定永不現前。又非不取而有與義，故應取果亦通過去。無如是事，入二定心唯現在時，能取二定及出心果。然由二定是正所求必應先起，由此為障，令出定心非於入心無間即起。此義於後當更分別。故上所言此因取果無非現在，又非不取而有與義，其理極成。然《毘婆沙》有如是說：其能作因取果、與果俱通過、現。理不應然。」

The Śāstra states: "It should also be thus [...] therefore it is not spoken of here." This specifically explains the efficient cause. Its grasping a fruition in the present is identical to the other five causes; among them, unconditioned dharmas have no fruition, which is why it is not spoken of. According to the two accounts in the *Nyāyānusāra* and the *Vibhāṣā*, one permits that the efficient cause grasps fruitions in the past, while the *Nyāyānusāra* holds that it grasps fruitions only in the present. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Saying 'grasping a fruition' has the sense of leading forth, that is, leading what is future so that it is produced, and so forth. In identical categories of entity, it can serve as a seed; in different categories of entity, it functions by having the same fruition; in non-identical fruitions, by having an identical nature and category; and in different natures and categories, by there being its own aggregate continuum. Therefore, all are called 'able to lead forth'. Such leading forth is called 'grasping a fruition'. This function of grasping a fruition exists only in the present, not in the past or future; only this can be called a conditioned function (kāritra). Among the six causes, which cause is excluded when it is said that five causes grasp fruitions only in the present? That is, among the six causes, the efficient cause is excluded. For what reason is this efficient cause excluded? Other masters say: For this efficient cause, the time of grasping a fruition and giving a fruition is indeterminate; therefore, in grasping and giving, it is not differentiated in either. What they say is irrational. Why is that? For this cause, grasping a fruition is never other than present, and there is no sense of giving without having grasped; how then can they say that the time is indeterminate? However, as for an efficient cause being able to grasp a fruition, it is definitely present only; giving extends to past and present, just like the two causes of similar kind and all-pervading. But because not all have a predominant fruition that can be grasped or given, it is not spoken of here. Is it not that this cause's function of grasping a fruition also extends to the past? How can it be said that the one that grasps a fruition is definitely present only? Thus the fundamental treatise (mūla-śāstra) states: Past dharmas, as equal and immediate conditions (samanantarapratyaya), can produce two kinds of mind. If the mind that emerges from the non-conceptual absorption (asaṃjñisamāpatti) or the cessation absorption (nirodhasamāpatti) were grasped by the mind entering absorption while present, then the two absorptions would never become manifest. Moreover, there is no sense of giving without grasping; therefore, grasping a fruition should also extend to the past. There is no such thing. The mind entering the two absorptions, only when present, is able to grasp the two absorptions and the fruition that is the emerging mind. However, because the two absorptions are what is directly sought, they must inevitably arise first; by serving as an obstacle through this, they cause the emerging mind not to arise immediately without interval after the entering mind. This meaning will be further analyzed below. Therefore, what was said above—that this cause's grasping of a fruition is never other than present, and that there is no sense of giving without grasping—is thoroughly established in reason. However, the *Vibhāṣā* has such a statement: 'Its efficient cause's grasping of a fruition and giving of a fruition both extend to past and present.' In reason, this should not be so."