俱舍論疏 6.36

6.36

論「此中心王至為心俱有因」，指法明因多小。文中有二：一述正義、二敘異說。此文初也。心王極多，謂初定心有十大地，及善地欣、厭隨一，及尋與伺，定共七支。總三十一法，并大、小相總二百七十九法，心已與一百五十八法為因。極少謂二定已上無覆無記心唯有十一法，并大、小相有九十九法，心王與五十八法為俱有因。有人云，心王望九十八法中，極少猶與五十八法為俱有因者，謬也。若爾，九十八法中極多與幾為因？《顯宗》第九云「本相與法其力等故，同其本法為俱有因。隨於一有功能故，唯與所相為俱有因。」《正理論》云「何緣心隨相非心俱有因？不由彼力心得生故，非心與彼互為果故，聚中多分非彼果故。即由如是所說多因，隨相不名心隨轉法。」上文指釋，即此文是。若爾，云何心能與彼為俱有因？由隨心王生等諸位彼得轉故。

On the Śāstra's stating, "Herein, the primary mind [...] serves as a coexistent cause for the mind": This points to the phenomena to clarify the greater and lesser numbers of causes. In the text there are two parts: first, stating the correct doctrine; second, relating the alternative view. This text is the first. The primary mind at its maximum—namely, the mind of the first dhyāna—possesses the ten universal [mental factors], either delight or revulsion among the wholesome universals, initial thought and sustained thought, and the seven factors of absorption. In all, there are thirty-one phenomena, and together with their primary and secondary characteristics there are altogether two hundred and seventy-nine phenomena; the mind already serves as a cause for one hundred and fifty-eight phenomena. At its minimum, namely, the unobscured-indeterminate mind from the second dhyāna upward, there are only eleven phenomena, and together with the primary and secondary characteristics there are ninety-nine phenomena; the primary mind serves as a coexistent cause for fifty-eight phenomena. Someone said that, looking from the primary mind toward ninety-eight phenomena, it still serves at its minimum as a coexistent cause for fifty-eight phenomena; this is an error. If so, toward how many at maximum among the ninety-eight phenomena does it serve as a cause? The ninth fascicle of the *Xianzong lun* says: "Because the primary characteristics and the phenomenon are equal in power, together with their primary phenomenon they serve as coexistent causes. Because a secondary characteristic has efficacy regarding only one, it serves as a coexistent cause only for that which it characterizes." The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "For what reason are the secondary characteristics of the mind not coexistent causes of the mind? Because the mind does not obtain arising through their power; because the mind and they are not mutual fruits; and because the majority within the aggregation are not their fruits. It is precisely due to such many causes as stated that the secondary characteristics are not called phenomena that conform to the mind." The reference and explanation in the text above is precisely this text. If so, how can the mind serve as a coexistent cause for them? It is because they obtain their operation in accordance with the stages of arising and so forth of the primary mind.