俱舍論疏 6.36

6.36

On the Śāstra's stating, "Herein, the primary mind [...] serves as a coexistent cause for the mind": This points to the phenomena to clarify the greater and lesser numbers of causes. In the text there are two parts: first, stating the correct doctrine; second, relating the alternative view. This text is the first. The primary mind at its maximum—namely, the mind of the first dhyāna—possesses the ten universal [mental factors], either delight or revulsion among the wholesome universals, initial thought and sustained thought, and the seven factors of absorption. In all, there are thirty-one phenomena, and together with their primary and secondary characteristics there are altogether two hundred and seventy-nine phenomena; the mind already serves as a cause for one hundred and fifty-eight phenomena. At its minimum, namely, the unobscured-indeterminate mind from the second dhyāna upward, there are only eleven phenomena, and together with the primary and secondary characteristics there are ninety-nine phenomena; the primary mind serves as a coexistent cause for fifty-eight phenomena. Someone said that, looking from the primary mind toward ninety-eight phenomena, it still serves at its minimum as a coexistent cause for fifty-eight phenomena; this is an error. If so, toward how many at maximum among the ninety-eight phenomena does it serve as a cause? The ninth fascicle of the *Xianzong lun* says: "Because the primary characteristics and the phenomenon are equal in power, together with their primary phenomenon they serve as coexistent causes. Because a secondary characteristic has efficacy regarding only one, it serves as a coexistent cause only for that which it characterizes." The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "For what reason are the secondary characteristics of the mind not coexistent causes of the mind? Because the mind does not obtain arising through their power; because the mind and they are not mutual fruits; and because the majority within the aggregation are not their fruits. It is precisely due to such many causes as stated that the secondary characteristics are not called phenomena that conform to the mind." The reference and explanation in the text above is precisely this text. If so, how can the mind serve as a coexistent cause for them? It is because they obtain their operation in accordance with the stages of arising and so forth of the primary mind.