俱舍論疏 6.40

6.40

論「違《品類足》至即所除法」，出違文也。若不廣述略意難知，前後引證句義別故。依《品類足論》第十三〈千問品〉中，將有身見對四諦為問，云「幾有身見為因非有身見因等者，二非有身見為因，非與有身見為因，二應分別（前二滅、道，後二苦、集），謂苦聖諦或有身見為因，非有身見因；或有身見為因，亦有身見因；或非有身見為因，非有身見因。此中唯有三句別也。無四句者，以身見是遍行因故。能生一切染污法染污法中，無能生身見不從身見生，不染污法中復無能生身見者。此中據因緣作論故。有身見為因非有身見因者，牒第一句偏句。此法多故，除狹取寬，有四節文。除俱句也，謂除過去、現在見苦所斷隨眠，及彼相應、俱有等。等言謂得。此從身見有同類、遍行因生，作同類因生身見也。身見相應、俱有法，加相應、俱有因也。又除過去、現在見集所斷遍行隨眠，及相應、俱有苦諦，是第二節也。此以從身見遍行因生，及作遍行因生此身見故除也。得非遍行因，故不言等也。又除未來有身見相應苦諦，此第三節除也。此舉身見，除相應法、不除身見。此以相應法作相應、俱有因生身見，故除也。又除未來有身見，及彼相應法，生、老、住、無常，諸餘染污苦諦，第四節除法也。此舉身見及相應法，取生、老、住、無常，以俱有因生身見，故除也。諸餘染污苦諦，即是從身見生，不與身見為因苦諦也。有身見為因亦有身見因者，謂前所除法。非有身見為因非有身見因者，謂不染污苦諦。集聖諦亦爾（已上論文）。」所以苦、集句數同者，苦、集諦同以一切有漏為體，因義名集，果義名苦。如識與意體無寬狹，然迷兩諦煩惱有別。謂若具十，集唯有七。有師異釋，皆非宗意。如彼論言「或有苦諦以有身見為因非與有身見為因」者，以牒《品類足》初句也。言「除未來有身見及彼相應法，生、老、住、無常，諸餘染污苦諦」者，越前三節牒第四節文也。既身見及彼相應法上四相，以是俱句故除，故知心相應法上四相亦能生心，以未來世身見相應法上四相唯有俱有因生身見，更無餘因故。言「或有苦諦至即所除法」者，牒《品類足》第二句也。證身見相應法上四相為俱句也，以此證知十四非也。

On the Śāstra's stating, "It contradicts the *Prakaraṇapāda* [...] namely, the phenomena that are excluded": This presents the contradictory text. If one does not explain it extensively, the concise meaning is difficult to know, because the meanings of the clauses cited as evidence before and after are different. Relying on Chapter Thirteen, "The Thousand Questions," of the *Prakaraṇapāda-śāstra*, where the view of self-existence is queried against the four noble truths, it says: "How many have the view of self-existence as their cause but are not a cause for the view of self-existence, etc.? Two do not have the view of self-existence as cause, nor are they a cause for the view of self-existence; two should be distinguished (the first two being cessation and the path, the latter two being suffering and the origin). Namely: the noble truth of suffering either has the view of self-existence as cause and is not a cause for the view of self-existence; or has the view of self-existence as cause and is also a cause for the view of self-existence; or does not have the view of self-existence as cause and is not a cause for the view of self-existence. Herein there are only three distinct alternatives. There is no fourth alternative, because the view of self-existence is a universal cause. Among defiled phenomena, which can produce all defiled phenomena, none can produce the view of self-existence without being produced from the view of self-existence; and among undefiled phenomena, there is again none that can produce the view of self-existence. This is because the treatise is composed here based on causal conditions. 'Having the view of self-existence as cause and not being a cause for the view of self-existence' refers to taking up the first alternative, the single-sided alternative. Because these phenomena are numerous, excluding the narrower and taking the broader, there are four passages of text. Excluding the 'both' alternative: namely, excluding past and present anusayas abandoned by seeing suffering, and their associated and coexistent [phenomena], etc. The word 'etc.' refers to possession. These arise from the view of self-existence via similar and universal causes, and act as similar causes to produce the view of self-existence. For the associated and coexistent phenomena of the view of self-existence, associated and coexistent causes are added. Furthermore, excluding past and present universal anusayas abandoned by seeing the origin, and the associated and coexistent truth of suffering—this is the second passage. These are excluded because they arise from the view of self-existence as a universal cause and act as universal causes to produce this view of self-existence. Possession is not a universal cause, so 'etc.' is not said. Furthermore, excluding future truths of suffering associated with the view of self-existence—this is the third passage of exclusion. This cites the view of self-existence and excludes associated phenomena, not excluding the view of self-existence. These are excluded because the associated phenomena act as associated and coexistent causes to produce the view of self-existence. Furthermore, excluding the arising, aging, staying, and impermanence of the future view of self-existence and its associated phenomena, and all remaining defiled truths of suffering—this is the fourth passage of excluded phenomena. This cites the view of self-existence and its associated phenomena and takes arising, aging, staying, and impermanence, because they produce the view of self-existence via coexistent causes, and so they are excluded. All remaining defiled truths of suffering are precisely the truths of suffering that arise from the view of self-existence and do not act as causes for the view of self-existence. 'Having the view of self-existence as cause and also being a cause for the view of self-existence' refers to the aforementioned excluded phenomena. 'Not having the view of self-existence as cause and not being a cause for the view of self-existence' refers to undefiled truths of suffering. The noble truth of the origin is also like this (this concludes the text of the treatise)." The reason why the numbers of alternatives for suffering and the origin are the same is that the truths of suffering and the origin share all contaminated [phenomena] as their essence; in terms of the meaning of cause it is called the origin, and in terms of the meaning of fruit it is called suffering. Just as consciousness and mind have no difference in scope of essence, yet the afflictions that delude one regarding the two truths are different. That is, if fully possessing ten, the origin has only seven. The variant explanations of some masters are all not the intended meaning of the school. When that treatise says: "Some truths of suffering have the view of self-existence as cause and do not act as causes for the view of self-existence," this takes up the first clause of the *Prakaraṇapāda*. Stating: "Excluding the arising, aging, staying, and impermanence of the future view of self-existence and its associated phenomena, and all remaining defiled truths of suffering," skips the preceding three passages and takes up the text of the fourth passage. Since the four characteristics upon the view of self-existence and its associated phenomena are excluded because they constitute the 'both' alternative, one therefore knows that the four characteristics upon phenomena associated with the mind can also produce the mind, because the four characteristics upon phenomena associated with the view of self-existence in the future produce the view of self-existence solely through coexistent causes, having no other cause. Stating: "Some truths of suffering [...] namely, the phenomena that are excluded," takes up the second clause of the *Prakaraṇapāda*. This proves that the four characteristics upon phenomena associated with the view of self-existence constitute the 'both' alternative; by this it is proven and known that [the view of] fourteen [causes] is incorrect.