俱舍論疏 6.85

6.85

論「然即彼論至無有過」，第一難云：若未來世無同類因，至現在世方為因者，此即有時作因、有時不作因，云何本論作是問言：若法與彼法為因，或時此法與彼非因耶？彼本論自答言：無時非因。故知未來有同類因。此中因者，四緣中因緣也，依四緣為問故。《婆沙》有七說不同。一云：彼依俱有因作論，以俱有因通有為法，親能辨果，通三世故。二云：彼依相應、俱有二因作論，以此二因俱遍三性，親能辨果，通三世故。三云：彼依相應、俱有、異熟三因作論，以此三因親能辨果，通三世故。四云：彼依相應、俱有、異熟、能作四因作論，以此四因通三世故。五云：彼依五因作論，除能作因，遍一切法皆不遮故。六云：此中有說除遍行因，體用狹故。七云：應說彼依六因作論，因名所表通六因故。解云：此說為正。因名所表通六因者，本論問答既問因緣，因名所表通六因故。能作因中四大、造色五因是因緣故。問既通於六因，答亦兼其六因，謂已作因無時不作因故。如《正理》釋云「能為因後，無時非因。」故准下《正理》云是餘師，非是評家之義此論云「此依俱有、相應、異熟三因作論」，與《婆沙》第三說同。《正理論》云「如本論說，若法與彼法為因，無時此法非彼法因。豈不過、現與彼為因，未來非因，便違此說。無違此過，此依俱有、相應、異熟通三世因密意說故。」有餘師釋：雖此通依六因作論，而無有失。未來既無同類、遍行，如何可說無時非因？未來雖無，而此意說能為因後無時非因。又此未來亦定應有，謂有為法於正生時定能為因，殄諸障故。依此密說，無時非因。然經主言彼非善釋，以未來法正生位前非同類因，後方成故。如是過難前已釋通，謂非未來有前後故。就三世說無時非因，意顯更無第四時故。若爾，等無間緣應同此說，然本論不許故。本論言「若時此法未至已生」，非等無間，無斯過失。所以者何？等無間緣據開避力，非正生位有開避能，要已生時有開避力，若至已滅名已開避。同類因者如種子法，於正生位住種法中，至已生時正能取果，故因非類等無間緣。准上《正理》雖有此救，未能遣難，在未來時因、緣二義俱未來故，何得獨因？「答云無時非因」，正理自釋與此論同，取《婆沙》第三說為正。問：未來正生位法在餘未生法前，如何得說無前後耶？《正理》釋云「過去諸法雖皆是前，而取果時已定前後。非未來法於正生時，作用別餘可立前後。要至現在已生位中，方簡未來令成後位，以已作用取彼為果。」

The Śāstra states: "However, that treatise itself ... there is no fault." The first objection says: If there is no sabhāga-hetu in the future and it becomes a cause only upon reaching the present, this means that at some times it acts as a cause and at other times it does not act as a cause. Why does the fundamental treatise ask: "If a dharma is a cause for that dharma, is there ever a time when this dharma is not a cause for that?" The fundamental treatise itself answers: "There is no time when it is not a cause." Therefore we know that there is a sabhāga-hetu in the future. The "cause" here is the hetu-pratyaya among the four pratyayas, because the question is asked based on the four pratyayas. In the Vibhāṣā there are seven different explanations. The first says: That treatise formulates its discussion based on sahabhū-hetu, because sahabhū-hetu applies throughout conditioned dharmas, directly produces the fruit, and applies across the three times. The second says: That treatise formulates its discussion based on the two causes of saṃprayuktaka-hetu and sahabhū-hetu, because these two causes both pervade the three natures, directly produce the fruit, and apply across the three times. The third says: That treatise formulates its discussion based on the three causes of saṃprayuktaka-hetu, sahabhū-hetu, and vipāka-hetu, because these three causes directly produce the fruit and apply across the three times. The fourth says: That treatise formulates its discussion based on the four causes of saṃprayuktaka-hetu, sahabhū-hetu, vipāka-hetu, and kāraṇa-hetu, because these four causes apply across the three times. The fifth says: That treatise formulates its discussion based on five causes, excluding kāraṇa-hetu, because it pervades all dharmas and is entirely unobstructed. The sixth says: Here some say it excludes sarvatraga-hetu, because its essence and function are narrow. The seventh says: It should be said that that treatise formulates its discussion based on the six causes, because the name 'cause' refers across the six causes. Explanation: This [seventh] explanation is the correct one. That the name 'cause' refers across the six causes is because, since the question and answer in the fundamental treatise inquire about the hetu-pratyaya, the name 'cause' refers across the six causes; among kāraṇa-hetus, the five causes between the four mahābhūtas and derived form are hetu-pratyayas. Since the question applies across the six causes, the answer also encompasses the six causes, meaning that what has already acted as a cause at no time does not act as a cause. As the Nyāyānusāra explains: "After being capable of being a cause, there is no time when it is not a cause." Thus, following the Nyāyānusāra below, it says this is an alternative teacher, not the position of the evaluators. This treatise states: "This treatise formulates its discussion based on the three causes of sahabhū-hetu, saṃprayuktaka-hetu, and vipāka-hetu," which is identical to the third explanation in the Vibhāṣā. The Nyāyānusāra states: "As the fundamental treatise states: 'If a dharma is a cause for that dharma, there is no time when this dharma is not a cause for that dharma.' Could it not be that past and present are causes for it, while the future is not a cause, which would contradict this statement? There is no fault of contradiction here, because this is stated with esoteric intent based on the causes that apply across the three times: sahabhū-hetu, saṃprayuktaka-hetu, and vipāka-hetu." Another teacher explains: Although this treatise formulates its discussion based universally on the six causes, there is no fault. Since in the future there are no sabhāga-hetu or sarvatraga-hetu, how can it be said that there is no time when it is not a cause? Although they do not exist in the future, the intention here is to state that after being capable of being a cause, there is no time when it is not a cause. Furthermore, this must also definitely exist in the future, meaning that conditioned dharmas, at the precise time of arising, are definitely capable of being causes because they destroy all obstacles. Based on this esoteric intention, it is said that there is no time when it is not a cause. However, the author of the treatise (Vasubandhu) states that this is not a good explanation, because prior to the stage of precisely arising, future dharmas are not sabhāga-hetus, and only become so later. Such an objection was already resolved earlier, namely that in the future there is no before and after. Speaking of "no time when it is not a cause" with respect to the three times is intended to show that there is no fourth time. If so, samanantara-pratyaya should also share this explanation, but the fundamental treatise does not accept this. The fundamental treatise states: "When this dharma has not yet reached the state of having arisen," it is not samanantara; so there is no such fault. Why is this? Samanantara-pratyaya depends on the power of clearing the way; at the precise time of arising, it does not have the capacity to clear the way; it must be at the time of having already arisen that it has the power to clear the way, and if it reaches having already ceased, it is called having already cleared the way. A sabhāga-hetu is like a seed dharma; at the precise time of arising it abides in the seed dharma, and when it reaches having already arisen it precisely can grasp its fruit; therefore, this cause is not analogous to samanantara-pratyaya. Following the above Nyāyānusāra, although there is this rescue, it cannot dispel the objection: while in the future, both aspects of cause and condition are future, so how could it exclusively be a cause? The answer says: "There is no time when it is not a cause." The Nyāyānusāra's own explanation agrees with this treatise, taking the third explanation of the Vibhāṣā as correct. Question: Dharmas at the precise time of arising in the future precede other dharmas that have not yet arisen; how can it be said that there is no before and after? The Nyāyānusāra explains: "Although past dharmas are all prior, when grasping their fruit, their before and after are already fixed. It is not the case that future dharmas, at the precise time of arising, have an activity distinct from the others that could establish before and after. They must reach the stage of having already arisen in the present before they can set apart the future, making it the subsequent stage, because by means of their already [exercised] activity they grasp that as their fruit."