俱舍論疏 6.9

6.9

「論曰至無障住故」，長行釋也。就中有二：一釋，但無障住及有力起名能作因；二餘師釋，諸法展轉皆有力用。就初文中復分為二：一釋頌文、二問答分別。就釋頌文中，一明因體、二釋因名。此文明因體也。然出因體有二種：一總出體，即以一切法為體；二對果出體，除自餘能作。謂除自體，以餘一切為能作因，由彼生時無障住故。問：法若畢竟不生，除其自體，餘一切法與作因不？答：與作因。若其因法未至已生，但是性因。若至已生，是取果因。若果至生，名與果因。其不生法，無與果因。《正理論》云「此能作因略有二種：一有生力、二唯無障。諸法生時，唯除自體，以一切法為能作因，由彼生時皆不為障，於中少分有能生力。且如有一眼識生時，以所依眼為依止因，以所緣色為建立因，以眼識等如種子法為不斷因，以相應法為攝受因，以俱有法為助伴因，以耳根等為依住因。此等總說為能作因。於中一分名有力因，以有能生勝功能故。所餘諸分名無力因，以但不為障礙住故。何故自體非自能作因？以能作因於自體無故。謂無障義是能作因，自於自體恒為障礙。又一切法不待自體，應有恒成損減等故。」述曰：若待即此自體，自體恒有，應恒成。若待第二自體，第二自體恒無，應恒成損減等。有餘師說：若有自體因自體者，即應無明還緣無明等。一剎那頃此即此因，是則乖違緣起法性。有餘師說：自於自體不見有用，故非因緣，猶如指端、刀刃、眼等。

The passage from the Śāstra starting with “The Śāstra says” up to “because they abide without obstructing” is the prose commentary. Within it there are two parts: first, the explanation that abiding simply without obstruction and arising with potency is termed an efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu); second, other masters' explanation that all dharmas mutually possess efficacy and function. Within the first text, there are again two parts: first, explaining the verse text; second, analysis by questions and answers. In explaining the verse text, first the essence of the cause is clarified; second, the name of the cause is explained. This text clarifies the essence of the cause. However, positing the essence of the cause is of two kinds: first, positing its essence in general, which takes all dharmas as its essence; second, positing its essence relative to the fruit, [which is] “excepting itself, the rest are efficient [causes].” That is to say, excepting its own self-entity (svabhāva), all remaining [dharmas] are taken as its efficient cause, because when that [fruit] arises, they abide without obstructing. Question: If a dharma never arises at all, do all remaining dharmas, excepting its own self-entity, serve as causes for it or not? Answer: They serve as causes. If that causal dharma has not yet reached its already-arisen state, it is only a cause by nature (prakṛti-hetu). If it has reached its already-arisen state, it is a cause that grasps a fruit (phala-grahaṇa-hetu). If the fruit reaches arising, it is named a cause that gives a fruit (phala-dāna-hetu). Dharmas that do not arise have no cause that gives a fruit. The Nyāyānusāra states: “This efficient cause is briefly of two kinds: first, having the power to produce; second, merely being non-obstructing. When dharmas arise, excepting solely its own self-entity, all dharmas are taken as their efficient cause, because when that [dharma] arises, none act as an obstruction, and among them a minor portion has the power capable of producing. As, for instance, when an eye-consciousness arises, it takes the eye as its supporting cause, the visible form as its establishing cause, the eye-consciousness and so forth like seed-dharmas as its non-interrupting cause, the associated dharmas as its sustaining cause, the co-existent dharmas as its assisting cause, and the ear faculty and so forth as its abiding cause. These are collectively called efficient causes. Among them, one part is named a potent cause, because it possesses superior functional capacity capable of producing. The remaining parts are named impotent causes, because they merely abide without obstructing. Why is an entity’s own self-entity not an efficient cause for itself? Because an efficient cause is absent in its own self-entity. That is, the meaning of non-obstruction is the efficient cause, whereas a self-entity always constitutes an obstruction to itself. Furthermore, all dharmas do not depend on their own self-entities, for [otherwise] there would constantly occur diminution and so forth.” [Fabao] comments: If it depended on this very self-entity, since the self-entity is constantly existent, it should constantly come into being. If it depended on a second self-entity, since a second self-entity is constantly non-existent, there should constantly occur diminution and so forth. Other masters say: If a self-entity were the cause of its own self-entity, then ignorance would again take ignorance as its condition, and so forth. In a single instant, this very [dharma] would be the cause of this very [dharma], which would contradict the dharma-nature of dependent origination. Other masters say: In a self-entity, no function is seen with respect to itself; therefore it is not a cause or condition, just like a fingertip, a knife blade, the eye, and so forth.