俱舍論疏 6.95

6.95

論「許故無過至果非體果」，答也。然位本無今有，非體本無今有。此論唯有四難。《正理》、《婆沙》皆有六難。《正理》云「又《品類足論》當云何通？如說云何非心為因法？謂彼已入正性離生補特伽羅初無漏心，及餘異生決定當入正性離生者初無漏心。然彼異生未來所有諸無漏心，皆非心為因，何故唯說彼初無漏心？」解云：異生位中諸無漏皆在未來，無同類因，云何偏說初無漏心非心因也。論既唯說初無漏心無同類因，故知未來有同類因。《正理論》云「又作是釋：彼文不辨同類因義。何者？唯辨二種異生，謂有般涅槃法及無般涅槃法。文雖不舉無涅槃法，義准理門顯示知有。謂彼既說有餘異生決定當入正性離生，由此義准，亦有異生決定不入正性離生。」准上論文，有涅槃法名非心為因法；決定當入正性離生名有涅槃法故，亦名非心為因法故。有人引《婆沙》云「有餘師說：彼文不辨同類因義。何者？唯辨二種異生，謂有般涅槃法及無般涅槃法。文雖不舉無般涅槃法，義准理門顯示知有。謂彼既說有餘異生決定當入正性離生，由此義准，亦有異生決定不入正性離生，此即名為無涅槃法，即無涅槃法名非心為因。」有人解云：有般涅槃法有初無漏心與涅槃為證得了因，名心為因。若無般涅槃法，無初無漏心與涅槃為證得了因，名非心為因。今詳此文應是抄寫者誤，應云「有涅槃法名非心為因法」，若作此解文，即與舊《婆沙》同，亦順上論文。論自問云「云何非心因法」，此問非心因法也。論自答云「謂彼已入正性離生補特伽羅初無漏心，及餘異生決定當入正性離生者初無漏心。」准此論文，二種有情初無漏心是非心為因法。餘師釋云：既說有餘異生決定當入正性離生，由此義准，亦有異生決定不入正性離生，此即名為無涅槃法。准此，餘師既云論雖不舉無涅槃法，及云決定當入正性離生是有般涅槃法，又決定當入正性離生是非心為因法。准此故知，非心為因是有涅槃法，如何得說無涅槃法名非心為因？故知說有涅槃法名非心為因也。問：若爾，何故說有涅槃法為非心為因？答：深法師釋云：「涅槃是非心。初無漏心與涅槃為因，名非心因法。」今詳非心為因者，不用心為因，無漏之心唯同類心與心作因緣，初無漏心無心為因。《正理論》云「有餘師釋：彼文亦辨同類因義。然彼唯說若心畢竟非心為因。雖彼未入正性離生者，諸無漏心皆非心為因。然彼若入正性離生，唯有初無漏心是非心為因法，餘心無不以心為因。」《正理》又云「《識身足論》當云何通？如彼論言『於過去染污眼識所有隨眠，彼於此心，或能為因非所隨增、或所隨增不能為因、或能為因亦所隨增、或不能為因亦非所隨增。且能為因非所隨增者，謂諸隨眠在此心前同類、遍行，即彼隨眠若不緣此、設緣已斷及此相應隨眠已斷。為所隨增不能為因者，謂諸隨眠在此心後同類、遍行，即彼隨眠緣此未斷。能為其因亦所隨增者，謂諸隨眠在此心前同類、遍行，即彼隨眠緣此未斷及此相應隨眠未斷。不能為因亦非所隨增者，謂諸隨眠在此心後同類、遍行，即彼隨眠若不緣此、設緣已斷，若所餘緣、若他隨眠、若不同界遍行隨眠，如彼過去染污眼識，未來染污眼識亦爾。』過去四句其理可然，未來如何可立四句？」解云：未來眼識隨眠無前無後，如何得說有四句耶？《正理論》云「又作是釋：彼於未來應作三句，除所隨增不能為因，彼無後故。然說未來如過去者，顯正生時必入現在，望餘未起可立為前，對此可說餘名後故。有餘師釋：此說未來亦有四句。不言未來有心前後同於過去，謂有同類、遍行隨眠在未來世，於彼未來染污眼識，緣而未斷，是所隨增不為因故。」解云：此中說因者，是因緣。五因隨有，皆得是因。隨增者，通相應、所緣，隨有其一皆名隨增。此《正理》文與《婆沙》同。

The treatise says: "Because this is accepted, there is no fault... [the designation of cause belongs to the state of having taken] the fruit, not to the entity of the fruit." This is the answer. That is to say, the state is originally non-existent and now exists, not that the entity is originally non-existent and now exists. This treatise has only four objections. The Nyāyānusāra and the Vibhāṣā both have six objections. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Moreover, how should the Prakaraṇapāda be understood? As it says: 'What are the dharmas not caused by mind? They are the initial uncontaminated mind of a pudgala who has entered the certainty of rightness (samyaktvaniyāma), and the initial uncontaminated mind of other ordinary beings who are definitely destined to enter the certainty of rightness. However, all the future uncontaminated minds of those ordinary beings are not caused by mind; why is it only said that their initial uncontaminated mind [is not caused by mind]?'" The explanation says: During the stage of an ordinary being, all uncontaminated [minds] are in the future and lack a similar cause (sabhāga-hetu); why does it specifically say that only the initial uncontaminated mind is not caused by mind? Since the treatise only says that the initial uncontaminated mind lacks a similar cause, we know therefore that there is a similar cause in the future. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Moreover, this explanation is made: that text does not determine the meaning of similar cause. What does it determine? It only determines two kinds of ordinary beings: namely, those who have the property of parinirvāṇa and those who do not have the property of parinirvāṇa. Although the text does not mention those without the property of nirvāṇa, it is implicitly understood through the reasoning shown. That is, since it says there are other ordinary beings who are definitely destined to enter the certainty of rightness, by this implication there are also ordinary beings who are definitely destined not to enter the certainty of rightness." Based on the above treatise text, having the property of nirvāṇa is called a dharma not caused by mind; because being definitely destined to enter the certainty of rightness is called having the property of nirvāṇa, it is therefore also called a dharma not caused by mind. Someone cited the Vibhāṣā, saying: "Other masters say: That text does not determine the meaning of similar cause. What does it determine? It only determines two kinds of ordinary beings: namely, those who have the property of parinirvāṇa and those who do not have the property of parinirvāṇa. Although the text does not mention those without the property of parinirvāṇa, it is implicitly understood through the reasoning shown. That is, since it says there are other ordinary beings who are definitely destined to enter the certainty of rightness, by this implication there are also ordinary beings who are definitely destined not to enter the certainty of rightness; this is called not having the property of nirvāṇa, and precisely not having the property of nirvāṇa is called not caused by mind." Someone explained: "For those with the property of parinirvāṇa, having an initial uncontaminated mind serves as a cause of illumination (jñāpaka-hetu) for realizing nirvāṇa, which is called 'caused by mind.' If one lacks the property of parinirvāṇa, lacking an initial uncontaminated mind to serve as a cause of illumination for realizing nirvāṇa, this is called 'not caused by mind.'" Now, examining this text, it must be a copyist's error, and should read: "Having the property of nirvāṇa is called a dharma not caused by mind." If one interprets the text this way, it agrees with the old Vibhāṣā and also accords with the text of the treatise above. The treatise asks itself: "What are the dharmas not caused by mind?"—this asks about the dharmas not caused by mind. The treatise answers itself: "They are the initial uncontaminated mind of a pudgala who has entered the certainty of rightness, and the initial uncontaminated mind of other ordinary beings who are definitely destined to enter the certainty of rightness." Based on this treatise text, the initial uncontaminated mind of these two kinds of sentient beings is a dharma not caused by mind. The other masters explain: Since it says there are other ordinary beings who are definitely destined to enter the certainty of rightness, by this implication there are also ordinary beings who are definitely destined not to enter the certainty of rightness; these are precisely called those without the property of nirvāṇa. Based on this, since the other masters say that although the treatise does not mention those without the property of nirvāṇa, and say that being definitely destined to enter the certainty of rightness means having the property of parinirvāṇa, and furthermore that being definitely destined to enter the certainty of rightness is a dharma not caused by mind: based on this, we therefore know that 'not caused by mind' refers to having the property of nirvāṇa. How could it be said that not having the property of nirvāṇa is called 'not caused by mind'? Therefore, we know that saying 'having the property of nirvāṇa' is what is called 'not caused by mind.' Question: If so, why is having the property of nirvāṇa called 'not caused by mind'? Answer: Master Shen explains: "Nirvāṇa is non-mind. The initial uncontaminated mind serves as a cause for nirvāṇa, so it is called a dharma that causes non-mind." Now, examining this: "not caused by mind" means not using mind as a cause; an uncontaminated mind has only a similar mind to serve as its cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya), and the initial uncontaminated mind has no mind as its cause. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Other masters explain: That text also determines the meaning of similar cause. However, it only speaks of a mind that is ultimately not caused by mind. Although for one who has not yet entered the certainty of rightness, all uncontaminated minds are not caused by mind, yet if they enter the certainty of rightness, only the initial uncontaminated mind is a dharma not caused by mind, whereas for the remaining minds, there are none that do not take mind as their cause." The Nyāyānusāra also says: "How should the Vijñānakāya be understood? As that treatise says: 'Regarding all the anusayas of past defiled eye-consciousness, with respect to this mind, they can either serve as cause and not be increased by it, or be increased by it and not serve as cause, or both serve as cause and be increased by it, or neither serve as cause nor be increased by it. First, to serve as cause and not be increased by it refers to the anusayas that are similar and omnipresent (sarvatraga) prior to this mind, provided those anusayas do not have this as object, or even if having this as object they have been abandoned, and the anusayas associated with this have been abandoned. To be increased by it and not serve as cause refers to the anusayas that are similar and omnipresent subsequent to this mind, provided those anusayas have this as object and have not been abandoned. To serve as its cause and also be increased by it refers to the anusayas that are similar and omnipresent prior to this mind, provided those anusayas have this as object and have not been abandoned, and the anusayas associated with this have not been abandoned. To neither serve as cause nor be increased by it refers to the anusayas that are similar and omnipresent subsequent to this mind, provided those anusayas do not have this as object, or even if having this as object they have been abandoned, or the remaining conditions, or anusayas of another, or omnipresent anusayas of a different realm—just as for that past defiled eye-consciousness, so it is for future defiled eye-consciousness.' For the past, the four alternatives are reasonable in principle; how can the four alternatives be established for the future?" The explanation says: For future eye-consciousness, anusayas have neither prior nor subsequent; how can it be said that there are four alternatives? The Nyāyānusāra says: "Moreover, this explanation is made: for the future, one should formulate three alternatives, excluding 'being increased by it and not serving as cause,' because it lacks a subsequent. However, in saying that the future is like the past, it shows that when it is just arising it must enter the present, and relative to the others that have not yet arisen it can be established as prior, and with respect to this the others can be called subsequent. Other masters explain: This says that the future also has four alternatives. It does not mean that the future has prior and subsequent minds identical to the past, but rather that there are similar and omnipresent anusayas in the future realm that, with respect to that future defiled eye-consciousness, have it as object and have not been abandoned; thus they are increased by it and do not serve as cause." The explanation says: What is called "cause" here is the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya). Whichever of the five causes exists, all can be a cause. "Increased by it" applies to both association (saṃprayoga) and object-condition (ālambana); whichever one exists, both are called "increased by it." This text of the Nyāyānusāra is the same as the Vibhāṣā.