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俱舍論記 6.71

俱舍論記 6.71

Language
Classical Chinese

6.71

「許故無過至非體果」者,此即通難。許同類因本無今有,故無過。同類因約過、現作用位建立,非約體立。體雖無有,無前後故而不建立。由至過、現位和合作用名同類因,能生後等流果。是後等流果,是前位果,非是體果。上來依文通四難。此下通文外後二難,即是第五非心因法難、第六染污眼識難。通第五非心因法難者,《婆沙》云「又若無者,《品類足論》復云何通?如說云何非心為因法?答:已入正性離生補特伽羅初無漏心,及餘異生決定當入正性離生者初無漏心。然彼異生未來所有諸無漏心,皆非心為因。何故但說初無漏心耶?答:彼唯說畢竟非心為因法。雖彼未入正性離生者諸無漏心皆非心為因,然彼若入正性離生,唯有初無漏心是非心為因法,餘心無不以心為因。有餘師說:彼文不辨同類因義。何者?唯辨二種異生,謂有般涅槃法及無般涅槃法。文雖不舉無般涅槃法,義准理門顯示知有。謂彼既說有餘異生決定當入正性離生,由此義准亦有異生決定不入正性離生,此即名為無般涅槃法。即無涅槃法,名非心為因(解云:有般涅槃法,有初無漏心,與涅槃為證得了因,名心為因。若無涅槃法,無初無漏心,非與涅槃為證得了因,名非心為因。餘文可解。前解心因,因是因緣,即同類因,無餘四因)。」通第六染污眼識難者,《婆沙》云「又若無者,《識身足論》復云何通?如說於過去染污眼識所有隨眠,彼於此心或能為因非所隨增,或所隨增不能為因,或能為因亦所隨增,或不能為因亦非所隨增。且能為因非所隨增者,謂諸隨眠在此心前同類、遍行。即彼隨眠若不緣此、設緣已斷,及此相應隨眠已斷。為所隨增不能為因者,謂諸隨眠在此心後同類、遍行,即彼隨眠緣此未斷。能為其因亦所隨增者,謂諸隨眠在此心前同類、遍行,即彼隨眠緣此未斷,及此相應隨眠未斷。不能為因亦非所隨增者,謂諸隨眠在此心後同類、遍行,即彼隨眠若不緣此、設緣已斷,若所餘緣、若他隨眠、若不同界遍行隨眠,如彼過去染污眼識,未來染污眼識亦爾。過去四句其理可然,未來如何可作四句?若有前後如何無因?答:彼於未來應作三句,除所隨增不能為因,彼無後故。然說未來如過去者,有別意趣。謂正生時必入現在,定為同類或遍行因,望餘未起可說為前,對此可說餘名後故。有餘師說:彼未來亦有四句,不說未來有心前後同於過去。且能為因非所隨增者,謂此相應隨眠已斷。為所隨增不能為因者,謂有同類、遍行隨眠在未來世,於未來世染污眼識,緣而未斷。能為其因亦所隨增者,謂此相應隨眠未斷。不能為因亦非所隨增者,謂有同類、遍行隨眠在未來世,若不緣此、設緣已斷,若所餘緣、若他隨眠、若不同界遍行隨眠(解云:因謂因緣,隨其所應是相應、俱有、同類、遍行因;無異熟因,染污眼識是修所斷。所隨增者,謂此隨眠是彼眼識所隨順、所增長心。前修所斷為同類因,苦、集一切遍行為遍行因,心俱隨眠為相應、俱有因,此竝能為因。於中心前不緣、設緣已斷,及彼相應隨眠已斷,是非所隨增,第一句攝。若心前緣及相應不斷是所隨增,第三句攝。自餘隨眠皆不為因。於中心後同類、遍行緣而不斷,是所隨增,第二句攝。若餘心後同類、遍行,不緣及已斷,此等已攝同類、遍行因盡。若所餘緣,謂滅、道所斷。苦、集不遍,以彼決定所餘緣故。若他隨眠,謂他地一切隨眠。若不同界遍行隨眠,謂自地九上緣隨眠。此等竝是第四句攝。餘文思之可解)。」

Regarding "Because it is accepted, there is no fault ... not a fruit of the substance": this resolves the objection. Because it is accepted that the similar cause does not exist originally and now exists, there is no fault. The similar cause is established with reference to the stages of functioning in the past and present, not established with reference to its substance. Although its substance is never non-existent, because there is no before-and-after, it is not established [in the future]. Only through reaching the stages of the past and present, where it functions in combination, is it called a similar cause, capable of producing the subsequent fruit of outflow. This subsequent fruit of outflow is a fruit of the preceding stage, not a fruit of the substance. Up to this point, following the text, four objections have been resolved. Below this, the text resolves two further objections not in the root text: namely, the fifth objection on dharmas not having mind as cause, and the sixth objection on defiled eye-consciousness. Resolving the fifth objection on dharmas not having mind as cause: The Mahāvibhāṣā states: "Furthermore, if it does not exist, how can the Prakaraṇapāda be interpreted? As it states: 'What are the dharmas that do not have mind as cause? Answer: The initial uncontaminated mind of a pudgala who has entered into the realization of the absolute (samyaktva-niyāma), and the initial uncontaminated mind of other ordinary beings who are determined to enter into the realization of the absolute.' However, all uncontaminated minds of that ordinary being in the future do not have mind as cause. Why does it speak only of the initial uncontaminated mind? Answer: That [text] speaks only of dharmas that ultimately do not have mind as cause. Although all uncontaminated minds of one who has not entered the realization of the absolute do not have mind as cause, nevertheless, if they enter the realization of the absolute, only the initial uncontaminated mind is a dharma that does not have mind as cause, while no other mind lacks mind as cause. Other masters say: That text does not analyze the meaning of similar cause. What [does it do]? It only distinguishes two kinds of ordinary beings: namely, those with the dharma of attaining parinirvāṇa and those without the dharma of attaining parinirvāṇa. Although the text does not mention those without the dharma of attaining parinirvāṇa, the implicit logic demonstrates that they exist. That is, since it states that there are other ordinary beings determined to enter into the realization of the absolute, it implicitly follows that there are also ordinary beings determined not to enter into the realization of the absolute; these are called those without the dharma of attaining parinirvāṇa. Those without the dharma of nirvāṇa are called 'not having mind as cause.' (Commentary: Those with the dharma of attaining parinirvāṇa possess the initial uncontaminated mind, which serves as a causative condition of realization (adhigama-hetu) for nirvāṇa, and are called 'having mind as cause.' If one lacks the dharma of nirvāṇa, one lacks the initial uncontaminated mind, which does not serve as a causative condition of realization for nirvāṇa, and this is called 'not having mind as cause.' The rest of the text is intelligible. In the previous explanation of 'mind as cause', 'cause' is the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya), namely the similar cause, not the other four causes.)" Resolving the sixth objection on defiled eye-consciousness: The Mahāvibhāṣā states: "Furthermore, if it does not exist, how can the Vijñānakāya be interpreted? As it states: 'Regarding the anuśayas belonging to past defiled eye-consciousness, toward this mind they may be capable of being a cause but not an object of increase; or an object of increase but not capable of being a cause; or capable of being a cause and also an object of increase; or not capable of being a cause and also not an object of increase. As for capable of being a cause but not an object of increase: it refers to anuśayas prior to this mind that are similar or omnipresent causes; if those anuśayas do not take this as an object, or supposing they do, have been abandoned, and the anuśayas associated with this have been abandoned. As for being an object of increase but not capable of being a cause: it refers to anuśayas subsequent to this mind that are similar or omnipresent causes, where those anuśayas take this as an object and have not been abandoned. As for being capable of being its cause and also an object of increase: it refers to anuśayas prior to this mind that are similar or omnipresent causes, where those anuśayas take this as an object and have not been abandoned, and the anuśayas associated with this have not been abandoned. As for not capable of being a cause and also not an object of increase: it refers to anuśayas subsequent to this mind that are similar or omnipresent causes, where those anuśayas do not take this as an object, or supposing they do, have been abandoned; or the remaining conditions; or other anuśayas; or omnipresent anuśayas of a different realm. Just as with that past defiled eye-consciousness, so it is with future defiled eye-consciousness.' The four alternatives for the past are theoretically reasonable; how can four alternatives be made for the future? If there is before-and-after, how could there be no cause? Answer: For the future, three alternatives should be made, excluding 'being an object of increase but not capable of being a cause', because there is no 'subsequent' in it. However, the statement that the future is like the past has a different intention. Namely, when it is just arising, it will certainly enter the present, and is definitely a similar or omnipresent cause; looking toward the rest that have not yet arisen, it can be said to be 'prior', and in contrast to this, the rest can be called 'subsequent'. Other masters say: In the future there are also four alternatives, without saying that the future has minds prior and subsequent like the past. As for capable of being a cause but not an object of increase: it refers to anuśayas associated with this being abandoned. As for being an object of increase but not capable of being a cause: it refers to there being similar and omnipresent anuśayas in the future realm that take defiled eye-consciousness in the future realm as an object and have not been abandoned. As for being capable of being its cause and also an object of increase: it refers to the anuśayas associated with this not being abandoned. As for not capable of being a cause and also not an object of increase: it refers to there being similar and omnipresent anuśayas in the future realm that do not take this as an object, or supposing they do, have been abandoned; or the remaining conditions; or other anuśayas; or omnipresent anuśayas of a different realm. (Commentary: 'Cause' means cause-condition, which according to the case is associated, coexistent, similar, or omnipresent cause; there is no maturation cause, because defiled eye-consciousness is abandoned by cultivation. 'Object of increase' means that this anuśaya is a mind conformed to and increased by that eye-consciousness. What is abandoned by cultivation prior to this is the similar cause; all omnipresent [anuśayas] of duḥkha and samudaya are the omnipresent cause; anuśayas coexisting with the mind are associated and coexistent causes; all of these are capable of being causes. Among them, those prior to the mind that do not take it as object or, supposing they do, are abandoned, and anuśayas associated with it that are abandoned, are non-objects of increase, subsumed under the first alternative. If those prior to the mind that take it as object and those associated with it are not abandoned, they are objects of increase, subsumed under the third alternative. All other anuśayas do not act as causes. Among them, similar and omnipresent ones subsequent to the mind that take it as object and are not abandoned are objects of increase, subsumed under the second alternative. If other similar and omnipresent ones subsequent to the mind do not take it as object and are abandoned, these fully encompass the similar and omnipresent causes. 'The remaining conditions' refers to what is abandoned by nirodha and mārga, and non-omnipresent ones of duḥkha and samudaya, because they are definitively the remaining conditions. 'Other anuśayas' refers to all anuśayas of other planes. 'Omnipresent anuśayas of a different realm' refers to the nine upper-object anuśayas of one's own plane. All of these are subsumed under the fourth alternative. The rest of the text can be understood upon reflection.)"

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