俱舍論疏 7.45

7.45

論「中間不隔心心所故」，答也。言「無間」者，不隔心、心所故，非謂不隔二定。《婆沙》一百一十一云「問：何故不說無想異熟耶？有多答。一說云：若由心力無間引起不雜亂者，可名為心等無間法。無想異熟是異熟因力所引起任運而轉，非入彼心勢力所引，故不名心等無間法。問：若爾，異熟心、心所法，亦異熟因力所引起任運而轉，應不名心等無間法。答：自類相引有勝勢力，不同彼故。俱是相應有所依等，說名自類。問：何故二無心定是心等無間法，而非心等無間緣耶？答：彼由心加行功用勤勞所引得故，名心等無間法。與心相違，遮斷心故，非心等無間緣。又說：彼由心勢力所引起故，名等無間法。不相應、無所依、無行相、無所緣故，非心等無間緣。問：何故二無心定，前後相似無亂續生，而前非後等無間緣？答：由入定心勢力所引，不由前念力所引生，故前非後等無間緣。問：若爾，異熟心、心所法，由異熟因勢力引起任運而轉，前應非後等無間緣。答：心、心所法，是相應、有所依、有行相、有所緣故，前念於後有勝勢力引發開避，故皆是後等無間緣。不相應行與此相違，不可為例。」又一百九十六解等無間緣中云「此中有說：若前法未至已生位，然不與後法作等無間緣，若至便作。若爾者，有心位可爾，無心位云何可爾？答：此中說有心位，不說餘位。有說：設依無心位說，亦無有過。謂入定心現在前時，頓取諸定及出定心果，亦與最初剎那定果。後諸剎那及出定心生時，與果非取，先已取故。評曰：彼不應作是說。所以者何？無有等無間緣異時取果、異時與果。若此時取果，即此時與果故。」准此評家，入二定心過去取果。若不爾者，第二剎那二定及出定心未至正生，如何取果？若爾，即《正理》與《婆沙》相違。《正理論》云「諸作是說：入二定心滅入過去，方能漸取第二念等定及出心，彼入定心應非過去。夫取果者是牽果名，諸牽果能是行作用，依行作用立三世別。若有作用非現在者，豈不便壞世別所依？」准此論與《婆沙》正義相違。今詳《正理》所說不及《婆沙》。處處文說等無間緣，若取果已決定果生，無能迴者。若等無間緣唯現取果者，若取果已果決定生。如有期心聞鐘聲而出定者，本期心出定唯至齋時。後遇別緣，遂不聲鐘，其定即經多時不出。當入定心現在前時，為取多時定？為取少時定？若取多時定，即不應少時出，無量剎那定不生故。若取少時定，即不應多時不出，無量剎那定先不取故。故知《婆沙》理長。取果名現在者，據因緣等說，不據等無間緣等。

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because mind and mental factors do not intervene": this is the answer. As for the word "uninterrupted" [or contiguous], it is because mind and mental factors do not intervene; it does not mean that the two absorptions do not intervene. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 111, states: "Question: Why is non-conception retribution not mentioned? There are many answers. One explanation says: If a dharma is led forth uninterruptedly without confusion by the power of mind, it can be named a dharma immediately contiguous with mind. Non-conception retribution is led forth by the power of retribution causes and proceeds spontaneously; it is not led forth by the force of the mind entering that state, and therefore it is not called a dharma immediately contiguous with mind. Question: If so, then retribution mind and mental factors are also led forth by the power of retribution causes and proceed spontaneously, so should they not also be called dharmas immediately contiguous with mind? Answer: Homogeneous dharmas leading one another forth have superior strength, not being like that [non-conception retribution]. Both are associated, have bases, and so forth, and thus are said to be homogeneous. Question: Why are the two mindless absorptions dharmas immediately contiguous with mind, yet are not equal-and-immediate conditions of mind? Answer: Because they are obtained by being led forth through the effort, exertion, and toil of the mind's preparation (prayoga), they are called dharmas immediately contiguous with mind. Because they are contrary to mind and obstruct and sever mind, they are not equal-and-immediate conditions of mind. Another explanation says: Because they are led forth by the force of mind, they are called immediately contiguous dharmas. Because they are unassociated, without bases, without cognitive modes, and without cognitive objects, they are not equal-and-immediate conditions of mind. Question: Why is it that the two mindless absorptions continue to arise without confusion, resembling each other before and after, yet the preceding is not the equal-and-immediate condition of the succeeding? Answer: Because they are led forth by the force of the mind entering absorption and are not led forth and produced by the force of the preceding moment; therefore, the preceding is not the equal-and-immediate condition of the succeeding. Question: If so, then since retribution mind and mental factors are led forth by the force of retribution causes and proceed spontaneously, the preceding should not be the equal-and-immediate condition of the succeeding. Answer: Because mind and mental factors are associated, have bases, have cognitive modes, and have cognitive objects, the preceding moment has superior strength in relation to the succeeding to initiate and make way [for it]; therefore, all are equal-and-immediate conditions for the succeeding. Unassociated conditioning factors are contrary to this and cannot serve as an analogy." Furthermore, fascicle 196, in explaining the equal-and-immediate condition, states: "Herein, some say: If a preceding dharma has not yet reached the stage of having already arisen, it does not serve as the equal-and-immediate condition for a succeeding dharma; if it has reached it, it serves as such. If so, this may be admissible for states with mind, but how could it be admissible for mindless states? Answer: Here it speaks of states with mind, not of other states. Some say: Even if it is explained based on mindless states, there is no fault. That is to say, when the mind entering absorption is present, it grasps at once the fruits of all the moments of absorption and the mind emerging from absorption, and it also gives the fruit of the very first moment of absorption. When the subsequent moments and the mind emerging from absorption arise, it gives the fruit without grasping it, because it has already grasped it previously. The Evaluator says: One should not make this statement. Why is this? There is no equal-and-immediate condition that grasps the fruit at a different time and gives the fruit at a different time. If it grasps the fruit at this time, it gives the fruit at this very time." According to this Evaluator, the mind entering the two absorptions grasps its fruit in the past. If it were not so, then when the second moment of the two absorptions and the mind emerging from absorption have not yet reached the point of currently arising, how could it grasp the fruit? If so, then the Nyāyānusāra and the Vibhāṣā contradict each other. The Nyāyānusāra states: "For those who make this assertion: 'Only when the mind entering the two absorptions has ceased and passed into the past can it gradually grasp the absorption of the second moment onwards and the emerging mind'—that mind entering absorption should not be in the past. Now, grasping a fruit is the name for drawing forth a fruit; all capacities to draw forth a fruit are the activity of conditioned factors, and the distinction among the three time periods is established based on the activity of conditioned factors. If there were an activity that is not present, would that not destroy the basis on which the distinction of time periods is established?" According to this, that treatise contradicts the correct doctrine of the Vibhāṣā. Examining it now in detail, the explanation of the Nyāyānusāra does not equal that of the Vibhāṣā. Passages everywhere state that with the equal-and-immediate condition, once it has grasped the fruit, the fruit is definitely produced, and nothing can alter it. If the equal-and-immediate condition only grasped the fruit in the present, then once it grasped the fruit, the fruit would definitely be produced. Take, for example, one who makes an intention to emerge from absorption upon hearing the sound of a bell: originally, the intended emergence from absorption was set only for midday. Later, meeting with other circumstances, the bell was not sounded, and so that absorption lasted for a long time without emergence. When the mind entering absorption was present, did it grasp an absorption of long duration, or did it grasp an absorption of short duration? If it grasped an absorption of long duration, then it should not emerge in a short time, since an immeasurable number of moments of absorption would not have arisen. If it grasped an absorption of short duration, then it should not fail to emerge for a long time, since an immeasurable number of moments of absorption had not been grasped beforehand. Therefore, one knows that the reasoning of the Vibhāṣā is superior. When grasping a fruit is called "present", it is stated in reference to cause-conditions (hetupratyaya) and the like, not in reference to the equal-and-immediate condition and the like.