俱舍論疏 7.45

7.45

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because mind and mental factors do not intervene": this is the answer. As for the word "uninterrupted" [or contiguous], it is because mind and mental factors do not intervene; it does not mean that the two absorptions do not intervene. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 111, states: "Question: Why is non-conception retribution not mentioned? There are many answers. One explanation says: If a dharma is led forth uninterruptedly without confusion by the power of mind, it can be named a dharma immediately contiguous with mind. Non-conception retribution is led forth by the power of retribution causes and proceeds spontaneously; it is not led forth by the force of the mind entering that state, and therefore it is not called a dharma immediately contiguous with mind. Question: If so, then retribution mind and mental factors are also led forth by the power of retribution causes and proceed spontaneously, so should they not also be called dharmas immediately contiguous with mind? Answer: Homogeneous dharmas leading one another forth have superior strength, not being like that [non-conception retribution]. Both are associated, have bases, and so forth, and thus are said to be homogeneous. Question: Why are the two mindless absorptions dharmas immediately contiguous with mind, yet are not equal-and-immediate conditions of mind? Answer: Because they are obtained by being led forth through the effort, exertion, and toil of the mind's preparation (prayoga), they are called dharmas immediately contiguous with mind. Because they are contrary to mind and obstruct and sever mind, they are not equal-and-immediate conditions of mind. Another explanation says: Because they are led forth by the force of mind, they are called immediately contiguous dharmas. Because they are unassociated, without bases, without cognitive modes, and without cognitive objects, they are not equal-and-immediate conditions of mind. Question: Why is it that the two mindless absorptions continue to arise without confusion, resembling each other before and after, yet the preceding is not the equal-and-immediate condition of the succeeding? Answer: Because they are led forth by the force of the mind entering absorption and are not led forth and produced by the force of the preceding moment; therefore, the preceding is not the equal-and-immediate condition of the succeeding. Question: If so, then since retribution mind and mental factors are led forth by the force of retribution causes and proceed spontaneously, the preceding should not be the equal-and-immediate condition of the succeeding. Answer: Because mind and mental factors are associated, have bases, have cognitive modes, and have cognitive objects, the preceding moment has superior strength in relation to the succeeding to initiate and make way [for it]; therefore, all are equal-and-immediate conditions for the succeeding. Unassociated conditioning factors are contrary to this and cannot serve as an analogy." Furthermore, fascicle 196, in explaining the equal-and-immediate condition, states: "Herein, some say: If a preceding dharma has not yet reached the stage of having already arisen, it does not serve as the equal-and-immediate condition for a succeeding dharma; if it has reached it, it serves as such. If so, this may be admissible for states with mind, but how could it be admissible for mindless states? Answer: Here it speaks of states with mind, not of other states. Some say: Even if it is explained based on mindless states, there is no fault. That is to say, when the mind entering absorption is present, it grasps at once the fruits of all the moments of absorption and the mind emerging from absorption, and it also gives the fruit of the very first moment of absorption. When the subsequent moments and the mind emerging from absorption arise, it gives the fruit without grasping it, because it has already grasped it previously. The Evaluator says: One should not make this statement. Why is this? There is no equal-and-immediate condition that grasps the fruit at a different time and gives the fruit at a different time. If it grasps the fruit at this time, it gives the fruit at this very time." According to this Evaluator, the mind entering the two absorptions grasps its fruit in the past. If it were not so, then when the second moment of the two absorptions and the mind emerging from absorption have not yet reached the point of currently arising, how could it grasp the fruit? If so, then the Nyāyānusāra and the Vibhāṣā contradict each other. The Nyāyānusāra states: "For those who make this assertion: 'Only when the mind entering the two absorptions has ceased and passed into the past can it gradually grasp the absorption of the second moment onwards and the emerging mind'—that mind entering absorption should not be in the past. Now, grasping a fruit is the name for drawing forth a fruit; all capacities to draw forth a fruit are the activity of conditioned factors, and the distinction among the three time periods is established based on the activity of conditioned factors. If there were an activity that is not present, would that not destroy the basis on which the distinction of time periods is established?" According to this, that treatise contradicts the correct doctrine of the Vibhāṣā. Examining it now in detail, the explanation of the Nyāyānusāra does not equal that of the Vibhāṣā. Passages everywhere state that with the equal-and-immediate condition, once it has grasped the fruit, the fruit is definitely produced, and nothing can alter it. If the equal-and-immediate condition only grasped the fruit in the present, then once it grasped the fruit, the fruit would definitely be produced. Take, for example, one who makes an intention to emerge from absorption upon hearing the sound of a bell: originally, the intended emergence from absorption was set only for midday. Later, meeting with other circumstances, the bell was not sounded, and so that absorption lasted for a long time without emergence. When the mind entering absorption was present, did it grasp an absorption of long duration, or did it grasp an absorption of short duration? If it grasped an absorption of long duration, then it should not emerge in a short time, since an immeasurable number of moments of absorption would not have arisen. If it grasped an absorption of short duration, then it should not fail to emerge for a long time, since an immeasurable number of moments of absorption had not been grasped beforehand. Therefore, one knows that the reasoning of the Vibhāṣā is superior. When grasping a fruit is called "present", it is stated in reference to cause-conditions (hetupratyaya) and the like, not in reference to the equal-and-immediate condition and the like.