俱舍論疏 13.231

13.231

On the Śāstra's statement: "If an intimation did not [depend on]... to ...neutral intimation": The author of the Śāstra, along with the *Vibhāṣā*, resolves the scripture and points out the flaw, directly following the text of the *Vibhāṣā*. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 117, says: "Question: If a mind abandoned by seeing cannot act as the momentary origination that gives rise to bodily and vocal karma, how is that which is stated in the sūtra to be resolved? As a sūtra says: 'Whatever bodily, vocal, and mental karma those with wrong view possess—whether their intentions, aspirations, or deeds—all yield unwelcome, unpleasant, and disagreeable fruits. Why is that? Because this view is fierce and evil, namely, wrong view.' Answer: That was stated relying on the causal origination, not relying on the momentary origination; therefore there is no flaw." The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "It is also said: 'If an intimation did not become wholesome or the like by virtue of the accompanying mind, then it should not be said that that sūtra merely relies on the prior causal origination and does not rely on the momentary [origination], so that in the desire realm there is definitely no veiled-neutral intimation.' He assumes this statement means that an intimation's determination as wholesome or the like is solely due to the power of momentary origination, and therefore although defilements abandoned by seeing act as the causal origination, in the desire realm there is definitely no veiled-neutral karma. This statement was made because the author of the scripture did not comprehend the intended meaning of our school's words. The meaning of this statement is: If defilements abandoned by seeing were to act as the momentary origination and co-occur with the karma, then they would not be separated by the mind of causal origination abandoned by cultivation that is capable of giving rise to intimation-karma; why then would there be no veiled-neutral bodily and vocal intimation-karma in the desire realm? Yet defilements abandoned by seeing cannot even serve as the cause to immediately introduce the consciousness that co-occurs with karma; how could they themselves act as the momentary origination? Stating that they cannot act as the momentary origination demonstrates that they cannot serve as the proximate causal origination. For only that which can act as the proximate causal origination can necessarily act as the momentary origination. Although the view of self-existence and extreme view serve as the remote cause to induce bodily and vocal intimation, through the power of the proximate cause abandoned by cultivation they become unwholesome roots; therefore it is said that that sūtra merely relies on the prior causal origination and does not rely on the momentary [origination], so that in the desire realm there is definitely no veiled-neutral intimation-karma. If it were not so, it should not be said that that sūtra merely relies on the prior causal origination. The word 'prior' is used to show the separation from the proximate cause, and to exclude the proximate cause, which is why 'prior cause' is said. Thus, in this matter he did not comprehend the intended meaning." The *Vibhāṣā* says: "Furthermore, it is possible that when a mind belonging to this same genus acts as the initiator, a mind belonging to this same genus also acts as the accompanying [mind]. It is impossible that when a mind belonging to this same genus acts as the initiator, a mind belonging to another genus acts as the accompanying [mind] to give rise to bodily and vocal karma. Others say: This is also possible. For instance, suppose someone makes a vow to hold a five-year grand gathering, dies in the interim, and by the power of this vow is born into an affluent and noble family; remembering his past lives on his own, he performs everything just as previously vowed. In this case, a mind belonging to this same genus acts as the initiator, and a mind belonging to another genus acts as the accompanying [mind] to give rise to bodily and vocal karma." Yet there is no concluding judgment in the text. Now it is explained: The former master speaks of the proximate causal-origination mind, and the latter master speaks of the remote causal-origination mind; their meanings do not conflict, which is why there is no concluding judgment.