俱舍論疏 13

English (machine translation) 13

Language: English

It is named "karma" due to three meanings: first, activity; second, maintaining the models of Dharma; third, differentiating fruits. First, "activity" means that activity itself is called karma. "Maintaining the models of Dharma" means being able to maintain the Dharma models of the seven assemblies. "Differentiating fruits" means being able to differentiate desirable and undesirable fruits. Because this chapter clarifies it extensively, it is named "Exposition." As for why it follows the Chapter on the World: the Chapter on the World clarifies the differences between internal and external fruits. The causes upon which fruits depend are karma and defilement; defilement is general and karma is specific, hence karma is clarified first.

13.4

The treatise says: "As stated previously... by what are they produced?" Summarizing the preceding and introducing what follows. The main text of this chapter is divided into four parts: first, clarifying the essence of karma; second, clarifying moral discipline and so forth; third, clarifying various karmas in the sūtras; fourth, miscellaneous clarifications on various karmas. Within clarifying the essence of karma: first, four and a half verses clarify the intrinsic nature of karma; second, one and a half verses clarify the great elements that create it; third, two verses clarify the distinctions of appropriated elements; fourth, one verse provides analytical distinctions; fifth, one and a half verses clarify the four kinds of wholesome actions, etc.; sixth, three verses clarify the two origins. Within clarifying the intrinsic nature of karma, the upper line of the first verse answers the preceding question; the next line divides into two karmas; the lower two lines divide into three karmas; the next half-verse divides bodily and vocal action to form five karmas; the next two and a half verses establish the essence of unmanifest action; and the final half-verse clarifies the essence of non-revelation. Within the first text, it first summarizes the preceding question to introduce the topic, and then cites the verse to answer. This is the first part of the text.

13.5

"The treatise says […] arises from differentiation of karma": this explains the first quarter of the verse, "The diversity of the world is born from karma." "It is not produced through prior thought by a single lord": this refutes the assertions of outside traditions. That it solely arises from the differentiation of sentient beings' karma establishes our own tenet. Regarding "produced through prior thought by a single lord," there are various types: some hold Brahmā or Maheśvara to be a single lord who conceived a prior thought and generated the world; others hold an ātman to be a single lord who conceived a prior thought and generated the world. "It is not produced through prior thought by a single lord" completely rejects the above positions. The Nyāyānusāra additionally refutes theories of no-cause and so forth, extensively refuting erroneous attachments, and establishes its own tenet, saying that the diversity of the world is born from karma. How is this known to be so? Because karma's function is seen. That is to say, in the world it is visibly seen that when diverse pleasant and unpleasant fruits arise, it is definitely due to the function of karma. For instance, farmers, by diligently engaging in proper work, have delightful fruits arise, such as harvests. There are foolish ordinary people who perform actions such as theft, and thereby incur unpleasant fruits such as execution and imprisonment. Furthermore, it is also seen that from the initial entry into the womb, without present causes, there is pleasure and suffering. Since in the present it is seen that karma must come first before pleasant and unpleasant fruits can be drawn forth, we know that former pleasure and suffering must have karma as their prerequisite; therefore, it is not without causes that various internal and external affairs spontaneously possess diverse differences. Moreover, it is visibly seen in the world that those who do good are few, while those who do evil are many, and yet among sentient beings in the world, pleasure is little and suffering is great; this can be taken as an approach based on the visibly seen, for it is established from what is visibly seen. That is to say, it is visibly seen in the world that because the performance of various pure and impure karmas acts as causes and conditions, diverse fruits of pleasure and suffering are born. It also says: Yet the unvirtuous, because they see in the world that those who take pleasure in giving are poor and suffering, while those who are stingy are rich and happy, increase their wrong views, claiming that fruits are causeless. This is because they fail to comprehend the differences among vipāka, adhipati, and niṣyanda fruits obtained from the field and from frequent cultivation of intention. That is to say, there are those who in a previous life briefly planted the cause of giving in a fertile field of merit and therefore incur wealth and pleasure, but who did not frequently cultivate the thought capable of renouncing things, and so in their present life are still solely stingy. If there are those who in a previous life frequently gave to what was not a fertile field, then in their present life they will be poor yet take pleasure in giving. Why should one become confused about such an explanation? Therefore, it is well established by reason that through the power of sentient beings' past karma and present human effort, the diverse fruits of the two kinds of world arise. This treatise says "solely arises from differentiation of sentient beings' karma"; the word "solely" completely denies all those [erroneous] doctrines.

13.6

Treatise: "If so, why […] is contrary to that?" This is an objection. If there is difference in fruit because of differences in karma, then, for example, among human beings, both the internal body and external objects are born of karma; why is it that the external objects born of karma, such as saffron and sandalwood, are so very delightful and pleasing, whereas internal physical forms and the like are impure, filthy, and foul?

13.7

Treatise: "Because for sentient beings […] both things are excellent." This is the answer. The classes of karma are different: mixed karma brings birth as a human, resulting in an internal physical form that constantly discharges impurity, and resulting in external scents and the like that can counteract it; pure karma brings birth in the heavens, where both things are pure.

13.8

Treatise: "The karma through which this arises […] is what is done by volition." This explains the two karmas: the first is volition itself, and the second is karma [performed] after having willed. Karma [performed] after having willed refers to what is done by volition, which is bodily and vocal karma.

13.9

Treatise: "These two karmas […] bodily, vocal, and mental karma." This divides the two into three.

13.10

Treatise: "How are they established […] or in terms of origin?" This asks for the reason behind establishing the three karmas.

13.11

Treatise: "Even if that were so, what contradiction is there?" This counter-questions regarding the contradiction.

13.12

Treatise: "If it were based on the basis […] because all are originated by the mind." This sets forth the reason for the contradiction.

13.13

Treatise: "The Vaibhāṣikas […] due to the above three reasons." This is the answer. Bodily karma is named from its basis, vocal karma is named from its own-nature, and mental karma is named from its origin. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Because karma relies on the body, it is called bodily karma; because the nature of the karma is speech itself, it is called vocal karma. This karma relies on the mind, and further, together with the mind, originates body and speech; hence it is called mental karma." According to this passage of the treatise, mental karma is that which originates them.

13.14

Treatise: "However, that which the mind wills […] because it is originated [by it]." This clearly assigns the two karmas to the three karmas.

13.15

Treatise: "What is the own-nature of the two karmas, bodily and vocal?" The following half-verse is the second [section], explaining the entities of the five karmas.

13.16

"The treatise says […] the nature of informatory and non-informatory": this clarifies that bodily and vocal karma both take informatory and non-informatory [matter] as their entities, and according to their nature are divided into five karmas.

13.17

Treatise: "For now, what are the characteristics of bodily and vocal informatory [karma]?" Previously each was divided into two; here their two characteristics are explained, and non-informatory [matter] is explained later, which is why it says "for now." The following two and a half verses are the third [section], identifying the entity of bodily and vocal informatory [karma].

13.18

"The treatise says […] is called bodily informatory karma": this identifies the entity of bodily informatory [karma]. The Nyāyānusāra says: "An aggregation of hair and so forth is collectively called the body. Within this body, there is an effect of the four great elements originated by the mind, a differentiation of shape-matter capable of indicating the mind, which is called bodily informatory [karma]."

13.19

Treatise: "Another school says […] because of being momentary." This refutes the Sammitīya school's attachment to motion being bodily informatory [karma]. "Because when the body moves, it moves due to karma": this is the Sammitīya position. The body is non-momentary; when it moves this body due to volitional karma, this moving body is called bodily informatory [karma]. In order to refute this, it is said that it is not motion; against the school of motion, the school of non-motion is established. The reason is established: because all conditioned dharmas are momentary. Dharmas that are momentary are all devoid of motion, like the flame of a lamp or the sound of a bell.

13.20

Treatise: "What is meant by momentary?" This is the Sammitīya's question.

13.21

Treatise: "To perish immediately upon acquiring its entity […] is called having a staff." This answers regarding the momentary. When dharmas perish immediately upon acquiring their entity, this is called momentary. Possessing moments is called 'possessing the momentary', just as a person who possesses a staff is called 'having a staff.' The Nyāyānusāra criticizes this: "That explanation is unreasonable. Just as a staff is distinct from a person, this cannot be stated here. The analogy does not match the dharma: there is no separate dharma distinct from the nature of perishing immediately upon acquiring its entity; how could it be said that this possesses the momentary just as a person possesses a staff?"

13.22

Treatise: "All conditioned dharmas […] movement is bodily informatory [karma]." This concludes the refutation. All conditioned dharmas are momentary, arising in this very place and perishing in this very place; how could it be said that motion is bodily informatory [karma]?

13.23

Treatise: "If conditioned dharmas […] the meaning could be established." This is the Sammitīya's defense. The doctrine of our school is that consciousness, flames, and the sound of bells may be momentary, but material bodies and the like do not perish momentarily. If all conditioned dharmas were momentary, the meaning of non-motion could be established. Our school does not concede that all are momentary; this reason is unproven, so how can it be established?

13.24

Treatise: "All conditioned dharmas […] cessation does not depend on a cause." The author of the treatise intends that because they must ultimately be exhausted, cessation does not depend on a cause, proving that conditioned dharmas are all momentary.

13.25

Treatise: "Why is that?" The Sammitīya school challenges the claim that cessation does not depend on a cause.

13.26

Treatise: "That which depends on a cause is an effect […] because their nature of existence is equal, and so on." This is the author's refutation. A dharma that depends on a cause must be an effect. "Cessation is non-existent and not an effect, and therefore does not depend on a cause; since it does not depend on a cause, it perishes as soon as it is born. If there were no cessation initially, it should be likewise later, because the later and the initial are equal in their nature of existence, and so on." If a dharma depends on a cause, while the cause is absent it does not perish. Since it does not depend on a cause, how could it not perish at the earlier time, but perish later?

13.27

Treatise: "Since there is exhaustion later, we know there was cessation earlier." This concludes the proof. The Sautrāntika school holds that arising has extraneous causes, but no primary cause; cessation has neither primary nor extraneous causes. The Sarvāstivāda school holds that cessation has a primary cause, but no extraneous cause. The Sammitīya school holds that the cessation of material and other dharmas depends on both primary and extraneous causes, whereas mind, mental factors, flames, sound, and the like perish by virtue of a primary cause and do not depend on extraneous causes. The characteristic of cessation is the primary [cause], and the remaining causes are extraneous.

13.28

Treatise: "If there is an alteration later […] this is logically impossible." This refutes the view that it perishes only after awaiting an alteration. This cites the Sammitīya's defense. The Sammitīya says: After matter and the like are born, they await a subsequent characteristic of alteration before finally perishing; it is not that they perish as soon as they are born. "It is not proper that this very thing should be called altered; that this very thing should be different in characteristic is logically impossible": this is the author's refutation of the characteristic of alteration. Only if the entity of the dharma before and after were conceded to be different could they be altered from one another; if it is one from beginning to end, how can it be said that there is difference in characteristic?

13.29

Treatise: "Is it not seen in the world […] none depends on a cause?" This is the Sammitīya's defense. Previously you refuted me with inference, but this inference does not equal direct perception. It is directly perceived that firewood and the like [perish] due to awaiting conjunction with fire as a cause; it is not that the cessation of dharmas never depends on a cause.

13.30

Treatise: "How is it known that firewood and the like perish due to conjunction with fire?" The author asks in return.

13.31

Treatise: "Because after firewood and the like are conjoined with fire, they are no longer seen." The Sammitīya school answers.

13.32

Treatise: "One should consider together […] they are not seen because they are non-existent." Here the author bids the Sammitīya school to consider carefully: conjunction with fire causes subsequent ones not to arise; it is not that it causes that which has arisen to perish.

13.33

Treatise: "Just as when wind and hand conjoin […] it should be by inference." The author cites proof. Just as when wind conjoins with the flame of a lamp, subsequent flames do not arise, and it is not that it causes the preceding one to perish; the case is also like this when a hand conjoins with a bell. Since direct perception has two possibilities, it cannot yet be taken as definitive. Therefore, the establishment of this principle should be through inference.

13.34

Treatise: "What is the inference?" The Sammitīya school asks.

13.35

Treatise: "It is as previously stated […] therefore does not depend on a cause." The author answers.

13.36

Treatise: "Moreover, if it depended on a cause […] there would be none without a cause." This explains the fifth quarter of the verse, "Because there would be none without a cause." If the cessation of firewood and the like depended on a cause, the cessation of flames and the like should also depend on a cause, just as arising depends on a cause and there is nothing without a cause.

13.37

Treatise: "Yet in the world it is directly seen […] also does not depend on a cause." This cites an example to establish [the point] in conformity [with experience].

13.38

Treatise: "Some hold that for consciousness and sound, the preceding perishes due to the subsequent cause." This is the assertion of a divergent Vaiśeṣika master: the cessation of a preceding consciousness or sound is due to the arising of a subsequent moment, because the subsequent and the preceding are contrary in nature, just as subsequent water presses against preceding water in a stream. Because that master does not maintain the four characteristics, he holds that solely the subsequent arising causes the preceding moment to perish.

13.39

Treatise: "That too is unreasonable […] by what would it be destroyed?" The author refutes this. There are three points of reason: First, because the two do not co-exist. When the subsequent moment arises, the preceding moment has already perished; how could what does not co-exist cause cessation? It is just like pleasure and suffering, or greed and hatred: preceding and subsequent do not co-exist; how could a subsequent moment destroy a preceding moment? Second, from a clear consciousness or sound, how could something unclear destroy something clear? Third, since the final consciousness or sound has no subsequent moment, by what would it be destroyed?

13.40

Treatise: "Some hold that the flame of a lamp perishes with the absence of duration as its cause." This is the assertion of the Sthavira masters. 'Duration' refers to the characteristic of duration. If the characteristic of duration is present, there is no way for a dharma to perish; it is only because duration is absent that a dharma can perish. Therefore, they hold that the cessation of a flame has the absence of duration as its cause.

13.41

Treatise: "Some hold that when a flame perishes, it is by the power of dharma and adharma." This is the assertion of a divergent Vaiśeṣika master. Dharma and adharma are subsumed under the category of quality (guṇa). What is beneficial to human beings is called dharma; what is unbeneficial to human beings is called adharma. By the power of these two, dharmas are born and dharmas perish. For example, in a dark room there is a bright lamp: with regard to the user, the lamp's presence is beneficial, which is dharma producing it; the lamp's extinguishing is unbeneficial, which is adharma destroying it. With regard to a thief, the lamp's presence is unbeneficial, which is adharma producing it; the lamp's extinguishing is beneficial, which is dharma destroying it.

13.42

On the Śāstra's: "Both of these are unreasonable ... because compliant and contrary oppose each other": The author of the Śāstra refutes [them]. Therein are two points: first, refuting the non-existence of abiding as cause; second, refuting dharma and adharma as causes. "Both of these are unreasonable" rejects both positions together. "Non-existence is not a cause" refutes the non-existence of abiding as cause. The non-existence of abiding is not a cause: the reason is that because it is non-existent, it is like a hare's horn. "Dharma and adharma are not the causes of arising and cessation, because moment by moment compliant and contrary oppose each other" refutes the Vaiśeṣika position: with regard to the lamp of a single moment, relative to having utility it is compliant, and relative to having no utility it is contrary. Compliant and contrary oppose each other; how could they arise together? The Nyāyānusāra refutes [it] by saying: "Dharma and adharma are also not causes of cessation, because a flame is seen continuing in an empty cave (explaining: the flame in an empty cave is enjoyed by no one, hence there is neither harm nor benefit; since there is neither harm nor benefit, there is neither dharma nor adharma: what causes the flame to cease?)."

13.43

On the Śāstra's: "Or else, in all ... because moments exist": The author of the Śāstra doubly refutes the assertions of both schools. The non-existence of abiding as cause, as well as dharma and adharma, do not only fail to apply to consciousness, flame, sound, and color: because all conditioned phenomena possess the non-existence of abiding as well as dharma and adharma. Ceasing immediately upon arising without waiting for another cause, because all conditioned phenomena possess moments. Since this agrees with my own [view], the original dispute should cease; there is no need for lengthy explanations.

13.44

On the Śāstra's: "Furthermore, if the cessation of fuel and so on ... would become the cause of cessation": Earlier, by way of contextual relevance, disparate assertions were refuted; now the Sammatīya position that conjunction with fire is the cause is refuted once more—this being the sixth line of the verse. The cause of lower cessation would be the cause of middling arising; the cause of higher arising would be the cause of middling cessation.

13.45

On the Śāstra's: "Why is that?": The Sammatīya queries.

13.46

On the Śāstra's: "Namely, due to conjunction with fire ... or resembling this, does not exist": The author of the Śāstra answers. Therein are two [aspects]: identity and resemblance. Namely, due to conjunction with fire, the fuel is caused to undergo mature transformation: the cause producing middling maturity would be the cause of the cessation of lower maturity, or resemble the cause of the cessation of lower maturity. The cause producing higher maturity would be the cause of the cessation of middling maturity, or resemble the cause of the cessation of middling maturity. If so, "then the substance of the cause of arising would be the cause of cessation" refutes identity. "Or the causes of cessation and arising would have no difference in characteristic" refutes resemblance. "It is not proper that by this very [cause]" means identity of the cause of arising as the cause of cessation, or resemblance. The resemblance of the cause of arising as the cause of cessation: being one and the same fuel undergoing mature transformation by fire, how could this exist due to that, while that does not exist due to this? It is not reasonable.

13.47

On the Śāstra's: "Even if, with regard to the flame of fire ... the causes of arising and cessation are different": Here [the author] hypothetically concedes [this] to refute the Sammatīya. Because the earlier and later moments of a flame differ moment by moment, it is conceivable that the cause of lower cessation differs from the cause of middling arising. But the Sammatīya system maintains that ash, snow, vinegar, sun, water, and earth lack moment-by-moment cessation, their substance being unitary before and after, yet capable of causing mature transformation in fuel and the like. How could the causes of lower and middling cessation differ from the causes of middling and higher arising?

13.48

On the Śāstra's: "If so, then what is actually seen ... what does it accomplish in that regard?": The Sammatīya counter-questions. If the mature transformation of fuel is not due to conjunction with fire, what does the conjunction with fire that is actually seen accomplish in that regard?

13.49

On the Śāstra's: "Due to the conjunction with the entity of fire ... what it accomplishes in that regard": The author of the Śāstra answers. The "entity of fire" is the aggregate of fire with visible color and shape beneath the cauldron. The "fire element" is the hot touch within the water. The "aggregate of water" is the aggregate of water with visible color and shape. The entity of fire produces the hot touch in the water; by virtue of the hot touch, it causes a cause of gradual diminution to arise in the subsequent moments of that aggregate of water, rather than being the cause of cessation for the water that has already arisen.

13.50

On the Śāstra's: "Therefore there is no cause ... definitely there is no movement": The author of the Śāstra concludes by returning to his own tenets. Cessation does not depend on an adventitious cause, because it is the nature of phenomena to perish. Ceasing immediately upon arising, moments therefore exist. Since there is momentary cessation, movement definitely does not exist.

13.51

On the Śāstra's: "Yet, regarding continuous [arising] ... have the overweening conceit of movement": The author of the Śāstra resolves a doubt. The doubt asks: If there is no movement, how is it that phenomena are seen to go from here to there? The author of the Śāstra explains: Just as when observing the flame of burning grass from afar, one sees this flame go from here to there, yet in reality the flame perishes in its very place, but due to unclear perception one thinks there is movement. Rūpa and the like are also like this: in reality they perish moment by moment, but those whose eye of wisdom is dim think there is movement. Conceding existence where none exists is overweening conceit.

13.52

On the Śāstra's: "Since by this reasoning ... its principle is established": Having refuted disparate views, [the author] concludes by returning to his own tenets. That bodily uninformative action is shape is logically established, yet whether shape is nominal or real has not yet been distinguished.

13.53

On the Śāstra's: "Yet the Sautrāntikas state ... should be known accordingly": The author of the Śāstra presents the Sautrāntika position to refute the Sarvāstivādins. In the Sarvāstivāda, shape-color has distinct atomic particles that differ from visible color, and these very atomic particles constitute long and the like. The Sautrāntika school maintains that shape has no separate atoms, but rather the accumulation of visible colors forms long and the like, being nominal and not real. "An aggregate of visible colors arising predominantly on one side is called long color": that is, among the four sides, one side is preponderant, like a banner pole. Arising sparsely on one side is called short color, like a melon clump. The rest of the text is intelligible.

13.54

On the Śāstra's: "Like seeing a firebrand ... a distinct category of rūpa": This cites a simile to conclude the Sautrāntika school['s view].

13.55

On the Śāstra's: "If it were maintained to be real ... grasped by two sense faculties": Objection to the Sarvāstivāda. If shape were a real substance of a distinct category of rūpa belonging to the rūpa-āyatana, there would be the fault of being grasped by two sense faculties—the eye seeing and the body touching—because long and the like are obtained by both eye and body.

13.56

On the Śāstra's: "Yet just as, relying on touch ... grasps shape": The author of the Śāstra explains that there is no distinct shape. Just as, relying on touch, the characteristic of long and the like is grasped, yet it is acknowledged that this is only the accumulation of many verticals and the like, without a distinct "long touch"; relying on visible color to grasp shape, one therefore knows that it is only the accumulation of many visible colors, with no distinct long and the like. The Nyāyānusāra states: "However, the author of the Śāstra says that shape is not real, up to 'thus, relying on visible color, one grasps shape.' This reasoning is incorrect, because the grasped characteristics differ. If on one side only visible color arose in abundance, the grasped characteristic within it should have no difference. Since there are two distinct grasped characteristics, long and white, there is shape-color distinct from visible color. We directly see that touches, though grasped by the same sense faculty, have distinct substances because their grasped characteristics differ, such as solidity and cold, or warmth and solidity. Likewise, although white and long are grasped by the same sense faculty, their grasped characteristics differ, so their substances must be distinct. Therefore one knows that as an aggregate of matter is analyzed finer and finer, down to the point where the cognition of shape can arise within it, there must still arise within it some atomic particles of shape-color that are the cause of producing the cognition of shape. In principle it must be so, because within an aggregate of matter there are cases where only visible color arises while shape-color does not arise, wherein there is only the cognition of visible color and not shape, as when seeing light, clarity, and other colors in the sky. If visible color itself were called shape, then even within visible color devoid of measurement, the cognition of shape would also arise, because they would not be separated, like the warmth of the fire element. That simile of the firebrand is incapable of proving anything, because elsewhere it is fully established [as real], allowing metaphorical designation. That is, elsewhere there exist real causes upon which long, circular, and the like depend, simultaneously and without interval arranged in spatial distinctions, so that the resulting aggregates of matter are fully established as long and so on. Hence, with respect to the color of a firebrand and the like turning continuously at different times and places, one imputes and posits nominal long, circular, and the like. It has never been seen that what is unestablished in both the conventional and ultimate can be conventionally designated. The objection of 'graspable by two sense faculties' also fails, because long and the like are only objects of the mental consciousness. For all nominal existents are only cognitive objects of the mental consciousness, as previously explained. The atomic particles like seeds that can produce long and the like, arranged in this way, are called shape-color; they are grasped by non-conceptual visual consciousness, not graspable by the body. This shape-color is not like knowing solidity, wetness, and so on relying on the body faculty, for knowing long, short, and so on is not like that. For it is not the case that upon knowing solidity, wetness, and so on in the dark, at that very moment or immediately afterward one is able to know the characteristics of long, short, and so on. Only when multiple touches arise on one side, after discriminating the touch relying on the gateway of the body faculty, can one then infer. Knowing that the visual consciousness acting concurrently with touch draws it forth and mental consciousness receives it, such differentiated shape-color of distinct appearance is just like seeing the color of fire and smelling the fragrance of a flower being able to remember the concurrent touch of fire and color of the flower. We directly see that visual consciousness, as appropriate, sometimes grasps both shape and visible color at once. Mental consciousness discriminates earlier or later without fixed order; because visible color and shape are the cognitive objects of a single visual consciousness, while the time of mental discrimination differs and their grasped characteristics differ, their substances are not the same, nor is shape tactile. How could there be any sense in which the body faculty grasps shape? Therefore one should not raise the objection of being graspable by two sense faculties." Now, examining both treatises, each has merits and defects. The author of the Abhidharmakośa says that a single shape-color would be grasped by two sense faculties, and that an aggregation of visible colors forms long and the like; yet saying that the eye can see long and the like is somewhat loose in reasoning. The master of the Nyāyānusāra proves a distinct shape by difference of grasped characteristic, which is also not conclusive: Does the cognition of shape arise associated with visual consciousness, or associated with mental consciousness? If associated with visual consciousness, it could conceivably prove a distinct substance. What reasoning can prove that visual consciousness definitely produces both cognitions of white and long in a single moment? If associated with mental consciousness, how does one know it is not like the cognitions of a procession, a wheel, and the like? Outside of ants and trees, there is no distinct procession or wheel; how can one conclusively prove that there is distinct shape-color? Furthermore, cognitions of long and the like arise regarding shadows and the like: why is shape not admitted therein? Also, as with written characters, where the strokes have diverse twists and curves before and after, producing cognitions of high and low: why is there no high and low shape therein? If one says there is, that contradicts his own school; if one says there is not, on what basis does the cognition arise? Furthermore, saying: "Therefore one knows that as an aggregate of matter is analyzed finer and finer, down to the point where the cognition of shape can arise within it, there must still arise within it some atomic particles of shape-color that are the cause of producing the cognition of shape. In principle it must be so, because within an aggregate of matter there are cases where only visible color arises while shape-color does not arise, wherein there is only the cognition of visible color and not shape, as when seeing light, clarity, and other colors in the sky. If visible color itself were called shape, then even within visible color devoid of measurement, the cognition of shape would also arise, because they would not be separated, like the warmth of the fire element"—this is also without reason. In the light within a room, which has measurement, the cognition of shape arises, yet there is only visible color. Moreover, smoke, clouds, and the like also produce cognitions of shape: how can he himself say there are eight shape-colors and twelve visible colors?

13.57

On the Śāstra's: "Is it not that touch and shape ... can remember the color of the flower?": The Sarvāstivādin rescues [his view]. Namely, touch and shape occur together in a single aggregate; therefore, because of grasping the touch that accompanies that shape, one can remember the shape seen by the eye, not that shape-color is also grasped by the body faculty. Just as seeing the color of fire brings to mind the warmth of fire, and smelling the fragrance of a flower can remember the color of the flower: could it be that the eye sees warmth, or the nose smells color?

13.58

On the Śāstra's: "Here, two phenomena ... can definitely remember shape": The author of the Śāstra refutes the rescue. Seeing fire and knowing warmth, or smelling a flower and knowing color, are invariably non-separate. Only when one has previously known their connection does seeing or smelling make it known; if not previously known, seeing or smelling does not make known the warmth of fire or the color of the flower. Touch and shape are not like this: whether one knows their connection or does not know it previously, if the body follows touch, it immediately knows long and the like. Yet because long and smooth are not invariably connected, how could one remember shape in the dark? Therefore one knows that if there were a distinct shape, it would have to be touched by the body.

13.59

On the Śāstra's statement: "If tactile sensation and shape [... to ...] one can recollect shape": This is an inverse refutation to establish [the author's] own tenet. The Śāstra master's fundamental tenet is: if shape were real, there would be the fault of being grasped by two sense faculties. The Sarvāstivādin rescues [their position], saying: "Because one grasps tactile sensation, one can recollect shape." The Śāstra master inversely refutes them, saying: "Tactile sensation and shape are not invariably unseparated, yet when grasping tactile sensation one can recollect shape—just as when one does not previously know that this has such a fragrance, upon smelling such a fragrance in the dark, one knows that the flower has such a color. But in reality this is not so; therefore one should not say that because one grasps tactile sensation one can recollect shape." The Nyāyānusāra rescues [their position], saying: "This too is unreasonable, for it is visibly observed in the world that shape is determinate within aggregations of tactile sensation. That is to say, although shape is not determinate with respect to tactile sensation, nonetheless, in the arising of many tactile sensations on one side there is determinately long color-form, and in the pervasive arising of tactile sensations in all places there is determinately round color-form; such classes should be known accordingly. Therefore, tactile sensation is determinate with respect to shape, whereas tactile sensation is not determinate with respect to visible color as it is with respect to shape. When feeling a touch, one can recollect visible color, because there is no touch arranged in such a way that it is determinate with respect to such visible color as it is with respect to shape."

13.60

On the Śāstra's statement: "Or within brocade, etc. [... to ...] it does not have a real entity": This is the refutation based on multiple entities in the same locus. For example, on a square piece of brocade there is a round brocade pattern, and within this very pattern there are again various oblique and straight patterns and images in the same locus; [if shape were real,] there would have to be multiple [shapes in one place]. In truth, this is not so: since visible color in the same locus has no multiple visible colors, how could shape in one locus obtain multiple shapes? Examining this refutation now, it does not pertain to the Sarvāstivādin tenet, because the patterns and images of brocade are not shape-matter.

13.61

On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, for all [... to ...] long and so forth are provisionally designated": This is the refutation based on the absence of distinct shape-atoms. For example, when obstructive blue and so forth are broken down into atoms, the distinct atoms are still called blue and so forth. If shape-atoms were real, when broken down into atoms, the atoms would have to be called long and so forth. If shape were distinct [from visible color], there would have to be atoms called long and so forth; therefore we know that "long" and so forth are merely provisional designations for the arrangement of visible color.

13.62

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it is said that precisely through [... to ...] aggregated arrangement": This refutes a further attempt at defense. If one says that aggregating atoms of visible color does not form long and so forth—just as aggregating fragrance and taste is not called "long"—and that distinct shape-atoms with differentiated arrangements are only then called long and so forth, this is merely partisan bias toward the Sarvāstivādin school asserting distinct shape-atoms, which is not universally established. Since shape-atoms are not universally established, who would concede that they arrange to form long and so forth? Someone explained: "'Partisan bias' means partisan bias toward the Vaiśeṣika school." This is incorrect. The Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa refutes the Sarvāstivādin assertion of distinct shape-matter, stating: "Is it a single substance pervading the color-form that is called 'long' and so forth, or is it an accumulation of many atoms that is called 'long' and so forth? If an accumulation of many atoms is called 'long' and so forth, how does it differ from visible color? If it is said that a single substance pervades the color-form, then this is identical to the Śaitīya school." Now [the opponent] speaks of accumulating its long atoms; hence we know that this does not mean the doctrine of non-Buddhists.

13.63

On the Śāstra's statement: "Is it not visibly observed [... to ...] yet their shapes and marks differ?": This is the Sarvāstivādin's rescue. Just as in worldly earthenware, although the yellow and white [colors] may be the same, the marks of jars and basins differ from each other; therefore we know that apart from visible color there are distinct shape-atoms.

13.64

On the Śāstra's statement: "Has it not already been explained [... to ...] the principle should also be so": This is the Śāstra master's explanation. It can be understood from the text.

13.65

On the Śāstra's statement: "Is it not that in the dark [... to ...] arranged as shape?": This is the Sarvāstivādin's rescue. If one says that shape-matter is simply the differentiated arrangement of visible color accumulated into shape, then since one does not see visible color, one should not see shape. Since one sees shape-matter without seeing visible color, we know that apart from visible color there is distinct shape-matter.

13.66

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because in the dark or at a distance [... to ...] one only knows the aggregate": The Śāstra master explains; it can be understood from the text. The Nyāyānusāra says: "How can the Venerable One accept that there are universally established atoms of visible color, but not subtle parts of shape? Just as with visible colors, there is no principle by which individual atoms arise in isolation, and even if they arose in isolation, because of their extreme subtlety they would not be apprehended by the eye, yet when aggregated they are apprehended by the eye, which proves that there definitely are atoms of visible color; shape-matter atoms should also be likewise—why exclusively refuse to accept their self-characteristic as universally established? Wherever obstructive color-matter is aggregated, atoms can definitely be apprehended. Since, when variations of aggregated color-matter arise, a cognition of shape arises without depending on visible color—just as without depending on other visible colors, a cognition of another visible color arises—therefore there definitely must be distinct [atoms], just as seeds can produce long and so forth." As for shape-matter atoms, when now examined, this is unreasonable: if later there is a dimension, one knows that prior to it there is a dimension of the seed; the "seed" would be the shape-atom, but this too is unreasonable. When later there is a line or a circle, could one concede, apart from trees or ants, distinct subtle parts of a line or a circle? It also says: "Because atoms of visible color have physical resistance, they should precisely aggregate and be provisionally designated as long and so forth." This too is unreasonable: atoms of fragrance and so forth should also aggregate into long and so forth, because those atoms of fragrance and so forth also have physical resistance, since physical resistance is named solely based on loci not accommodating one another. If it is said that the atoms of fragrance and so forth lack visible manifestation and therefore do not have that same fault, then the atoms of visible color are also not shape, so how could they form long and so forth? How does one know that the substance of visible-color atoms is not shape? As previously explained: because their apprehended characteristics differ, and because the cognition of shape arises without depending on visible color. Or, because in some aggregates of visible color one does not see shape, their substance is not shape, for when there is a large aggregation without obstruction, could an eye fail to see shape? Therefore, one should know that distinct from visible color there are shape-matter atoms subsumed under the visible-form base (rūpāyatana), and through their aggregation provisional color-forms such as "long" are formed; thus the subtle parts of shape are not without universal establishment. According to the above treatise passage, shape-atoms are real, and "long" and so forth are provisional. The atoms of "long" and so forth are either identical or different, as explained in the "Chapter on Dhātus". However, the Sautrāntika school maintains that color-forms such as "long" are constituted by gathering atoms of visible color, and are provisional, not real, being grasped by the eye-consciousness; this, we fear, is not reasonable, because provisionalities such as lines and circles are objects of the mental faculty alone. Although the master of the Nyāyānusāra offers many defenses, proving distinct shape by the arising of a cognition is not a definitive proof. In the absence of a substance of a line or a circle, there is a cognition of a line or a circle; therefore, when visible color forms "long" and so forth, this visible color itself is called "long" and so forth. The eye sees the substance of shape, not provisional shape; this conforms with the explanation of the school and wonderfully supports the ultimate principle.

13.67

On the Śāstra's statement: "Since it has already been refuted [... to ...] what is bodily intimation?": The Saṃmatīyas and Sarvāstivādins inquire.

13.68

On the Śāstra's statement: "Establishing shape as bodily intimation is merely provisional and not real": The Sautrāntikas answer.

13.69

On the Śāstra's statement: "Since you maintain that it is merely [... to ...] does it constitute bodily karma?": The Sarvāstivādins ask. According to this, for the Sautrāntikas, bodily intimation is not bodily karma.

13.70

On the Śāstra's statement: "If karma relies on the body [... to ...] it should be known that it is also thus": The Sautrāntikas answer. For the Sautrāntikas, the three karmas generally have intention (cetanā) as their substance, which is the same as the Mahāyāna. It is this very mental intention that, relying on the movement of body and speech, is called bodily and vocal karma; when operating solely relying on the mind, it is called mental karma.

13.71

On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, why [... to ...] how do these two differ?": The Sarvāstivādins challenge. The sūtra speaks of "intentional karma" (cetanā-karman), so clearly we know it is intention; the sūtra speaks of "karma having intended" (cetayitvā-karman), so clearly we know it is not intention. How can the three karmas have intention as their substance?

13.72

On the Śāstra's statement: "That is, the prior preparatory application [... to ...] is called karma having intended": The Sautrāntikas answer. There are two kinds of intention: first, deliberative intention; second, actuating intention. The former is called intentional karma, and the latter is called karma having intended.

13.73

On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, then intimation karma [... to ...] becomes a great error": The Sarvāstivādins challenge. That which can indicate the mind is called intimation karma; relying on that intimation karma, non-intimation karma is produced. The two karmas are solely mental intention, and intention is not intimation; therefore there would be no intimation karma. Since there is no intimation karma, non-intimation would also not exist, which becomes a great error.

13.74

On the Śāstra's statement: "Such a great error [... to ...] what fault is there in this?": The Sautrāntikas explain. The Sautrāntika view is that the form and sound of body and speech are called intimation, and their nature is indeterminate, which is the same as the Mahāyāna. The intention that moves body and speech is called bodily and vocal intimation karma, and it encompasses the three moral natures. Because the power of intention perfuses seeds, it is called non-intimation karma. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Does this subsume all karmas entirely, or does it subsume a minor portion of distinct karmas? Some say: It subsumes all karmas here. Others say: It does not subsume the uncontaminated (these are the two Sautrāntika interpretations of the sūtra on intentional karma and karma having intended). This explanation does not accord with the sūtra's meaning, because mental karma should not be subsumed here. Does one give rise to deliberative intention in order to actuate the two, body and speech, and give rise to actuating intention when precisely actuating the two, body and speech? Both of these operate relying on the gates of body and speech, and should both be subsumed under bodily and vocal karma. If so, what is called mental karma here (the above points out errors in the two preceding explanations: if it subsumes all three karmas entirely, since phenomena operate relying on body and speech, how could it subsume mental karma)? If the intention operating relying on the two gates of body and speech is also conceded in one part to be called mental karma, then there would be the fault of confusion in karma (this is: even if one concedes that what operates relying on the gates of body and speech is mental karma, then mental karma would also be bodily and vocal karma, resulting in the fault of confusion). Even if one concedes that giving rise to deliberative intention in order to actuate body and speech is the nature of mental karma, this still does not generally subsume all karmas, because there is contaminated mental karma that does not operate relying on the gates of body and speech. Its extent is boundless, none of which is subsumed in this sūtra (the former showed the fault that mental karma is not established; now, even granting that they have mental karma, there is also the fault that it does not fully subsume mental karma). Furthermore, it certainly does not subsume the various intentions arising based on visual contact and so forth, because those intentions are not subsumed under the two intentions previously mentioned—deliberative and actuating. Based on this, the intention associated with the five consciousnesses is mental karma. This intention associated with the five consciousnesses is not the intention that generates deliberation, nor is it the intention of actuating movement, and so forth." His further shifts in argument are omitted and not related. It also says: "Furthermore, your Sautrāntika school says that when seers killed living beings through mental wrath, under which karma is that subsumed? Is it bodily karma, or mental karma? Yet here there is no distinction between the two intentions arising earlier and later—deliberative and actuating—because the deliberative intention is precisely actuating; thus one cannot escape the fault of confusion in karma." Following this treatise text, the seers' mental wrath lacks the two kinds of intention; since bodily and vocal karma are distinguished by reference to the two intentions, when there is no distinction in intention, the two karmas should not exist, or mental karma would precisely be bodily and vocal, thus resulting in confusion. It also says: "Nor should it be said that the intention relying on body and speech is called bodily and vocal intimation. For by their own statement, shape is bodily intimation, being provisional and not real; however, intention should not be shape and unreal. Furthermore, the sūtra states that rising to welcome, joining the palms, and paying respectful homage are bodily intimation karma; another sūtra also states that intimation is precisely karma. From this it is proven that distinct shapes of the hands and so forth, successively generated by intention to act and so forth, are called bodily intimation, which is precisely bodily karma. Therefore, the Abhidharma school's establishment of bodily and vocal karma accords with teaching and conforms with reason, without the fault of confusion." Now, to defend the Sautrāntikas: when another sūtra states that intimation is precisely karma, it applies the name of the cause to the effect, and it is not that [intimation itself] is precisely karma; or it is named from that which is intimated, because the shapes of hands, feet, and so forth intimate actuating intention.

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese