俱舍論疏 15

English (machine translation) 15

Language: English

15.2

Chapter on the Exposition of Karma, Part Four, Section Three.

The treatise states: "This prātimokṣa [...] If not so, how?" This next single verse is the ninth major section, explaining the sources from which the three kinds of restraint are obtained. The first word 'from' applies to three clauses: from all, from two, from the present; the word 'from' in the third line applies to two clauses: from the primary [paths of action], and from all times. In total there are five clauses.

15.4

"The treatise says: [...] and is obtained from subsequent [actions]." This explains the first clause. It means that the prātimokṣa restraint is obtained from all primary, preliminary, and subsequent bases, which are the preliminary, primary, and subsequent [stages] of killing and so forth. Master Tai takes the preliminaries of paying homage to the Saṅgha and so forth, and the subsequent [actions] of confessing grave offenses and so forth. This is likely incorrect. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 120, says: "The prātimokṣa precept is obtained generally from the paths of action, preliminaries, and subsequent actions." This clarifies the bases that engender the precepts. It is only after the precepts have already been engendered that one confesses grave offenses and so forth; how could subsequent actions be the basis that engenders the precepts? Taking the preliminary, primary, and subsequent stages of killing and so forth is superior, because the precepts guard against these three positions.

15.5

The treatise states: "Being obtained from two [...] natural offenses and prohibitory offenses." This explains the second clause. There are two kinds of 'two': sentient beings and insentient things; natural offenses and prohibitory offenses. If it is engendered solely with a defiled mind, it is subsumed under natural offenses, like killing living beings and so forth. If it is common to both defiled and undefiled minds, it is subsumed under prohibitory offenses, like drinking alcohol and so forth. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Regarding sentient beings, natural offenses refer to killing living beings and the like; prohibitory offenses refer to lodging in the same room with a woman and the like. Regarding insentient things, natural offenses refer to stealing external wealth; prohibitory offenses refer to digging the earth, destroying living grass, and the like."

15.6

The treatise states: "Being obtained from the present [...] because they are the basis of sentient beings." This explains the third clause. Namely, by abstaining from the primary, preliminary, and subsequent [stages] of the seven evil karmas, one obtains the prātimokṣa precept. Since the seven evil paths of action and their preliminary and subsequent [stages] are the support and abiding place of sentient beings, engendering the precept must likewise be the same. The past and future are not sentient beings, and are not supports or abiding places; therefore, it is obtained in relation to the present aggregates, elements, and sense-fields. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "'The basis of sentient beings' refers to sentient beings and the support and abiding places of sentient beings. The present aggregates, sense-fields, and elements: internally they are the support of sentient beings; externally they are called the abiding place of sentient beings, because they are not past or future. (Explanation: 'sentient beings' is the collective name for the six elements; 'the support' refers to internal aggregates and elements; 'the abiding place of sentient beings' refers to external vessels, grass, trees, wealth, and food. All these are present conventional aggregations, not past or future)." The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 120, says: "That prātimokṣa precept is obtained only in relation to the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields belonging to the category of present sentient beings, not in relation to the past or future, because [the past and future] fall under the category of [mere] dharmas."

15.7

The treatise states: "If one obtains the restraint of dhyāna [...] how much more so from prohibitory offenses." This explains the fourth clause. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "If one obtains the restraint of dhyāna or anāsrava restraint, one should know that it is only from the primary paths of karma, because in meditative absorption there are only primary paths of karma. It is not obtained from the preparatory stages before or after, because in the state of meditative absorption there are only primary ones, and in the non-meditative state this restraint does not exist. (Explanation: This is because the dhyāna and anāsrava [restraints] in the grounds of the six dhyānas serve as the antidotes of abandonment and so forth against the evil precepts of the desire realm; by reversing these, there are two kinds of restraint. Since the evil precepts are only the seven primary limbs, these also are only the primary paths of karma. A distracted mind is not the antidote of abandonment and so forth against them; therefore, there is no restraint of this kind [in a distracted state], unlike prātimokṣa which is formulated based on distinct conditions)."

15.8

On the Śāstra's: "'From eternal time' means obtained from the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus [of the three times]", this explains the fifth section. The Nyāyānusāra says: "'From eternal time' means obtained from past, present, and future skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus, just as it is for the mind that coexists with this discipline (Explanation: Since the mind takes the three times as its object, the discipline obtained by severing those bad precepts also arises in relation to those bases)." Master Tai says: "If we speak of how it truly is in principle, past skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus themselves give rise to the past discipline that accompanies the mind of meditation or the path; present skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas themselves give rise to the present discipline that accompanies the mind of meditation or the path; future skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus themselves give rise to the future discipline that accompanies the mind of meditation or the path. Because discipline is obtained with respect to present sentient-being bases, they each arise separately in the three times; because the mind of meditation or the path pervades the three times and is obtained simultaneously, the discipline is also obtained simultaneously across the three times. Thus it is said to be obtained from the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus of the three times. Therefore the Nyāyānusāra says: ''From eternal time' means obtained from past, future, and present skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus, just as with the mind that coexists with this discipline.'" This explanation by the Master is erroneous. If it were as the Master explains, then it would be 'obtaining eternal time', not 'eternally obtaining', which would be different from 'the coexistent mind'. Why then does the treatise say 'just as with the coexistent mind', and further say 'because discipline is obtained with respect to present sentient-being bases'? If so, how would it differ from the prātimokṣa-saṃvara?

15.9

On the Śāstra's: "From this distinction... prayoga and pṛṣṭha", below this, it is analyzed into four propositions. The first proposition is: obtaining prātimokṣa-saṃvara and not [the discipline of] meditation or the path; the second proposition is: obtaining [the discipline of] meditation or the path and not prātimokṣa; the third is both; the fourth is neither. It can be understood as the text reads.

15.10

On the Śāstra's: "It is not that upon directly obtaining... protecting against the past and present", the original text of the Vibhāṣā says: "When one directly obtains the three kinds of discipline, the seven branches of unwholesomeness do not presently exist. Saying that it is obtained from the present maula bases is not clear. One should say that it is obtained from the bases that currently give rise to karma, 'bases' being the bases where the karmapathas arise." The Nyāyānusāra says: "Some say that when obtaining wholesome discipline, present unwholesome karmapathas and so on cannot exist; therefore, these four propositions should be formulated differently. That is, one should say: there is a type of dharma in relation to which one only obtains prātimokṣa-saṃvara and not the other two disciplines, and so on at length. The first proposition refers to obtaining the preceding and subsequent preparatory stages and the abstention from pratikṣepaṇāsāvadya in the present; the rest should all be stated accordingly (In accordance with this, prayoga and pṛṣṭha are the prayoga and pṛṣṭha of unwholesome karma, not the prayoga and pṛṣṭha at the time of receiving the precepts). The term 'karmapatha' and so forth is applied to the loci of the karmapathas and so on; thus the meaning of the preceding four propositions is also without error. By this principle, it also covers protecting against past and present karmapathas and so on, not merely protecting against the future, because the term 'karmapatha' and so forth refers to their bases. Were it otherwise, one should only speak of protecting against the future, since discipline can only protect against future offences to prevent them from arising; it cannot protect against the past and present, since having already ceased or already arisen, discipline has no protective function with respect to them."

15.11

On the Śāstra's: "Whoever obtains... what are their different characteristics?", the following one verse is the tenth [section], clarifying the greater or lesser number of branches and causes for saṃvara and asaṃvara.

15.12

On "The Śāstra says: ...the branches and causes are stated to be variable", this generally explains that sentient beings must be uniform, while branches and causes are variable. The eight kinds of discipline must arise universally directed toward the bases of all sentient beings; their branches, however, are variable, being either four or seven, and their causes are either superior, middling, or inferior, and so on.

15.13

On the Śāstra's: "That the branches are variable... are called the branches of discipline", this explains that the branches are variable. Monks and nuns possess all seven branches; the remaining precepts possess only the three of body and one of speech—meaning that the five precepts, eight precepts, and ten precepts differ—because the four maula-karmapathas are called the branches of discipline.

15.14

On the Śāstra's: "That the causes are variable... is spoken with respect to the latter three causes", this explains that the causes are variable. Causes are of two kinds: first, the three causes of non-attachment, non-ill-will, and non-delusion; second, the three causes of superior, middling, and inferior. If it is the three causes such as non-attachment, when explaining their distinction in terms of essence, the discipline generated by the three causes differs. If explaining the discipline in terms of the person, there is no one who abides in discipline who does not generate discipline from all three causes, because they necessarily arise together. If it is the superior, middling, and inferior causes, there is no one who abides in discipline who generates a single discipline from all three causes, because superior, middling, and inferior minds do not arise simultaneously. If considered in terms of distinct disciplines and distinct times, it is indeed possible. When the verse says 'the branches and causes are variable', it is spoken with respect to the superior, middling, and inferior causes.

15.15

On the Śāstra's: "Or there is one class... the precepts of a novice", the analysis of the propositions can be understood as the text reads.

15.16

On the Śāstra's: "There is none that is not universal... evil intention does not completely cease", this explains that it definitely pervades all sentient beings and is never non-universal. If, among all sentient beings, one sentient being is left out with the intention of killing, stealing, engaging in sexual misconduct, and so on, no discipline arises at all, because the evil intention does not completely cease.

15.17

On the Śāstra's: "If a person does not make... the prātimokṣa-saṃvara", this explains the complete cessation of evil intention. If one does not make the five kinds of fixed limitations, then evil intention completely ceases. If one makes the five kinds of fixed limitations, then so long as any one limitation is present, evil intention does not cease.

15.18

On the Śāstra's: "Namely, the limitations of sentient being, branch, place, time, and condition", this enumerates the five designations.

15.19

On the Śāstra's: "The limitation of sentient beings... shall abstain from killing and so forth", this explains the limitation of sentient beings. If one says that one will not kill domesticated animals but will kill wild beasts, or will not kill non-enemies but will kill enemies, and so on, this is the limitation of sentient beings.

15.20

On the Śāstra's: "The statement 'the limitation of branches'... shall uphold without violating", this explains the limitation of branches. That is, if among the five precepts, the two hundred and fifty precepts, and so forth, one singles out any one precept and says one cannot uphold it, then the discipline does not arise.

15.21

On the Śāstra's: "The statement 'the limitation of place'... shall abstain from killing and so forth", this explains the limitation of place. That is, saying: 'If I am in my own country, I will not kill, and so on, but if I am in another country, I will engage in killing, and so on', this is called the limitation of place.

15.22

On the Śāstra's: "The statement 'the limitation of time'... can abstain from killing and so forth", this explains the limitation of time. Only the upavāsa [discipline] is limited to one day and night; the other precepts are all from [the present] until the end of life. If limited to months or years, the discipline does not arise.

15.23

On the Śāstra's: "The statement 'the limitation of conditions'... can abstain from killing and so forth", this explains the limitation of conditions. It can be understood as the text reads.

15.24

On the Śāstra's: "One who receives [precepts] in this way... similar good conduct", this is the summary conclusion. If one makes the above five kinds of fixed limitations, the discipline does not arise, and one only obtains good conduct. Where various sūtras speak of obtaining the precepts, these are words of skillful induction.

15.25

On the Śāstra's: "How can one obtain discipline with respect to objects that are not within one's capacity?", this is a question. If one makes a vow not to kill, and so on, with respect to those sentient beings one is capable of killing, discipline can be obtained. But regarding the noble ones in other realms and all sentient beings in higher realms and stages, one is definitely incapable of killing any of them; how then can one obtain [the discipline of] non-killing and so forth with respect to them? This non-killing and so forth does not stem from a mind of receiving [precepts] that abstains from killing them.

15.26

On the Śāstra's: "Because of the intention universally directed toward sentient beings... therefore discipline is obtained", this is the answer. Because one generates the predominant intention not to harm life regarding all sentient beings, one obtains discipline with respect to all sentient beings.

15.27

On the Śāstra's: "The Vaibhāṣikas... there would be the fault of obtaining and losing", this recounts the Vibhāṣā's explanation. The Vibhāṣā explains by reductio ad absurdum: if one only obtained discipline with respect to objects one is capable of killing, then a sheep here would be an object one is capable of killing, while a deity of a higher realm would not be an object one is capable of killing. In this life, when a deity becomes a sheep, one should obtain the precept on that spot; when a sheep becomes a deity, one should lose the precept. Since these are not conditions for obtaining or losing [precepts], how could there be obtaining and losing? The explanation of the second master in Vibhāṣā 117 is largely identical to this treatise.

15.28

On the Śāstra's: "Their explanation is not correct... by analogy it should also be so", this objects to the Vibhāṣā's explanation. If an increase or decrease in capable objects entailed the obtaining or losing of precepts, then just as grass sprouts and withers, the precepts should likewise increase or decrease.

15.29

On the Śāstra's: "They say this is not so... because their natures are not the same", this is the Vibhāṣā's explanation. Capable and incapable objects share the same nature of being sentient beings; whether killing or not killing, if the objects increase or decrease, the precepts would be obtained or lost. When green grass withers, its nature becomes different; since destroying withered grass entails no offence, there is no obtaining or losing of the precepts.

15.30

On the Śāstra's: "If so, sentient beings... in principle this is not correct", this refutes the explanation again. If one claims that because grass later withers and is different, the precepts do not decrease, then when a sentient being enters parinirvāṇa, since their previous nature no longer exists, how could there not be a decrease? This is the author of the treatise recounting an ancient question and answer. The Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya-śāstra is also identical to this treatise.

15.31

On the Śāstra's: "The reason previously stated is sound in principle", this decisively accepts the earlier explanation, namely the reason that the evil intention is not completely relinquished.

15.32

On the Śāstra's: "If so, the former Buddhas... there is no fault of decreasing as before", this recounts a question and answer from the Vibhāṣā. This is the question.

15.33

The treatise says: "Because for all Buddhas... there is no fault of deficiency relative to the former."
This is the answer. *Vibhāṣā* 120 says: "Question: If the prātimokṣa-saṃvara is acquired only in relation to present sentient beings and not in relation to past or future aggregates, elements, and sense-spheres, then the saṃvara of the Tathāgatas, Arhats, and Samyaksambuddhas would not be equal. Why is that? When the Buddhas of the past appeared in the world, immeasurable sentient beings served as the object of their saṃvara. Those classes of sentient beings have already entered nirvāṇa, and Śākyamuni does not acquire saṃvara in relation to those objects." Now we explain: when Śākyamuni Buddha appeared in the world, immeasurable sentient beings served as the object of his saṃvara. Those classes of sentient beings have already entered nirvāṇa, and Maitreya Tathāgata will not acquire saṃvara in relation to those objects. The objects having breadth and narrowness, the saṃvara would likewise be so. Would not the saṃvara of the Buddhas then be unequal? (This is the objection from the master who holds that precepts are generated individually.) "Answer: It should be said: Although the objective spheres of the saṃvara are more or fewer, the essence of the saṃvara does not differ between earlier and later, because in both cases it is generated and acquired collectively in relation to the objective sphere of all sentient beings. (This is the first master, who answers that the objects differ while the precepts are identical.) Some say: There is no fault even if the saṃvara of the Tathāgatas of the three periods of time are unequal. Question: If so, how do you reconcile what the *Prajñaptiśāstra* says? As it says there: 'All Tathāgatas, Arhats, and Samyaksambuddhas are all entirely equal.' Answer: They are called equal because of equality in three matters. First, equality in practice: that is, all Tathāgatas diligently practiced the four pāramitās over three incalculable eons in the past to ultimate perfection and attained bodhi. Second, equality in benefit: that is, all Tathāgatas equally perform actions that benefit and gladden immeasurable sentient beings who are fit to be converted, and this is ultimate. Third, equality in the Dharma-body: that is, all Tathāgatas possess the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the three applications of mindfulness, great compassion, the eighteen unshared dharmas, and other supreme virtues. It is because of these three meanings that they are spoken of as equal; it does not mean that there is no difference in the quantity of the essence of their saṃvara. Furthermore, they are spoken of as equal because of the equality of their faculties, since all Tathāgatas abide in superior faculties. Furthermore, because of the equality of precepts, all Tathāgatas acquire superior precepts. This refers to distinct sentient beings, with the precepts also being distinct. Other masters say: All the saṃvara possessed by the Tathāgatas, Arhats, and Samyaksambuddhas are acquired in relation to all sentient beings; therefore they are spoken of as equal, not that their essence is without difference. That is to say, if the objective spheres of all the sentient beings from which the past Buddhas derived their saṃvara were still present today, Śākyamuni would also acquire saṃvara in relation to those objects. But this is impossible. If the objective spheres of all the sentient beings from which the saṃvara of Śākyamuni Tathāgata, Arhat, and Samyaksambuddha was derived were to still exist in the future, Maitreya Tathāgata would also acquire saṃvara in relation to those objects. But this is impossible. Therefore, speaking of equality is also without fault. (This is the intent of the third master. The objects in relation to which precepts are generated by earlier and later Buddhas are distinct and different. Just as the aggregates of a single sentient being abiding in the present last year and those abiding in the present this year are different in essence, it is impossible that the objects of the precepts of an earlier Buddha should extend to a later Buddha. Hypothetically, if they persisted until now, they would also be able to generate precepts; and because their capacity is equivalent, they are termed equal. The author of the present treatise agrees with this third explanation.)" Further down, the text says: "In this regard, some say: Each of those seven branches of precepts is acquired in relation to all sentient beings, and that which is acquired is one (and so on; this is the same as the first master above). Some say: Each of those seven branches of precepts is acquired in relation to all sentient beings, but that which is acquired differs in each case; just as there are quantities of sentient beings, so too are the acquired precepts (what this master says is that seven branches are acquired individually for each single sentient being, while the three wholesome roots are identical; this is the second master). Other masters say: Depending on the differences in causes, the prātimokṣa-saṃvara becomes twenty-one kinds. Here, some say: Each of the twenty-one kinds is acquired in relation to all sentient beings, and that which is acquired does not differ (and so on). Some say: Each of the twenty-one kinds is acquired in relation to all sentient beings, but that which is acquired differs in each case; just as there are quantities of sentient beings, so too are the acquired precepts (the above three presentations are all without a definitive assessment in the text)." Further down, the text says: "Question: Is saṃvara acquired in relation to external things? If it is acquired, the acquired saṃvara should increase and decrease: that is, when live grass withers or when the taste of liquor spoils, it should decrease; and when that very [grass] sprouts or [liquor] ferments, it should increase (and so on). The correct opinion is: Saṃvara is also acquired in relation to external phenomena. Question: If so, saṃvara should increase and decrease. Answer: There is neither increase nor decrease, because it is acquired collectively. That is, this saṃvara acquires a single non-informative [form] collectively in relation to all growing grass and the like, and in the world there is never a time without growing grass and the like. It acquires a single non-informative [form] collectively in relation to all grape wine and the like when it has not spoiled; and in the world there is never a time without wines; therefore saṃvara has neither increase nor decrease." In accordance with this definitive assessment, we know that the simultaneous generation of the seven branches in relation to all sentient beings is the correct view. Furthermore, in accordance with reasoning, this explanation is correct. How do we know this? For instance, if sentient beings are boundless, there would be boundless non-informative forms of the seven branches. These non-informative forms are not coexistence-causes (*sahabhū-hetu*), and each is created by distinct great elements. Since the precept-essence in a single thought-moment would be boundless, the creating great elements would also be more numerous than the precepts; and these are obstructive phenomena (*pratigha-dharma*): how could a six-foot body accommodate so many great elements? Therefore, we know that generating them collectively is sound in principle.

15.34

The treatise says: "Having explained that from them... should be understood by analogy with this."
Below this, the branches and causes of non-restraint (*asaṃvara*) are explained. The meaning is clear from the text. *Vibhāṣā* 117 says: "The correct view is: Saṃvara is acquired gradually, but not non-restraint. Why is that? Saṃvara is difficult to acquire; because it is difficult to acquire, it is undertaken gradually and acquired gradually. Non-restraint is easy to acquire; because it is easy to acquire, it is acquired all at once and undertaken all at once."

15.35

The treatise says: "Herein, what is called... is called one who abides in non-restraint."
This distinguishes the person who abides in non-restraint. That is, butchers of sheep and the like, only when they give rise to an intention to harm continuously for the rest of their lives, are called ones who abide in non-restraint; if they limit it by years or months in giving rise to an intention to harm, they are not called ones who abide in non-restraint.

15.36

The treatise says: "Because that class... is called one who abides in non-restraint."
This explains the name. There are two explanations: first, because they abide in the occupation of non-restraint; second, because they possess non-restraint.

15.37

The treatise says: "The expression 'butcher of sheep'... should be known to be likewise."
This is a re-explanation. Because of making a livelihood, making a commitment for the rest of their life to constantly desire to harm sheep is called being a butcher of sheep. Other [occupations, such as] executioners, also make a commitment for the rest of their life to constantly have an intention to harm; hence they are called executioners.

15.38

The treatise says: "Universally in relation to sentient beings... acquiring non-restraint."
This recounts a question and answer from the *Vibhāṣā*. In this there are two parts: first, challenging that non-restraint is acquired universally in relation to all sentient beings; second, challenging that all branches are generated. This is the first challenge.

15.39

The treatise says: "Because toward even their closest kin... they have an intention to harm."
This is the answer. Because their motivation is to harm all sheep, even if their closest kin were to become a sheep they would still give rise to an intention to harm; therefore, they acquire non-restraint universally in relation to them.

15.40

The treatise says: "Since they know their closest kin... how could they have an intention to harm?"
This is a renewed challenge. Originally they wished to harm sheep; since they know their closest kin are not sheep at present, how could they have an intention to harm them?

15.41

The treatise says: "Furthermore, noble ones can never... acquiring non-restraint."
This adduces noble ones as a challenge. Closest kin could become sheep, and in relation to them bad precepts are acquired; but noble ones have no possibility of becoming sheep, so how could one acquire bad precepts [in relation to them]?

15.42

The treatise says: "If considering the future... acquiring non-restraint."
This is another renewed challenge. Closest kin have a future sheep body; considering that one would harm them, one acquires bad precepts. Sheep and the like have future bodies of noble ones and kin; considering that in the future one would have no intention to harm them, one should not acquire bad precepts in relation to sheep.

15.43

The treatise says: "In relation to the present bodies of sheep and the like... acquiring non-restraint."
This is the answer. Since one gives rise to an evil intention toward present sheep, how could one not acquire non-restraint?

15.44

The treatise says: "In relation to the present bodies of mothers and the like... a different reasoning should be sought."
This brings the challenge to an end. In relation to the present body of a sheep one has an evil intention, and without considering its future body, one does not fail to generate non-restraint in the present, but generates non-restraint simply by considering the present sheep. In relation to present close kin one has no evil intention; one should not generate non-restraint by considering a future sheep. Since these two are equivalent, a different reasoning should be sought. The *Nyāyānusāra* rescues [the thesis], saying: "Analogies such as this are not equal in reasoning, because of the absence of a wholesome motivation and the presence of an unwholesome motivation. That is, when one is undertaking non-restraint, one has no wholesome, subdued motivation of proper reflection thinking, 'I will not harm any sentient beings'; rather, one has a fierce and unruly motivation of improper reflection thinking, 'I will harm all sentient beings.' Although the matter primarily concerns sheep, the unwholesome thought is broad and universal; therefore it is possible that, considering future sheep, bad precepts are generated even in relation to present noble ones and kin; but it is not the case that, considering future noble ones and close kin, bad precepts would fail to be generated in relation to the present body of a sheep."

15.45

The treatise says: "Furthermore, sheep butchers and the like... non-restraint complete with all branches."
This is the second challenge: regarding generating all [branches].

15.46

The treatise says: "Because they universally impair the wholesome... hence they acquire [it] complete with all branches."
This is the answer. Because they universally impair the wholesome motivation of the seven branches, they acquire the non-restraint of all seven branches.

15.47

The treatise says: "If so, then that person... generating all seven branches."
This is a renewed challenge. For example, if someone had previously undertaken two or three training rules and has not renounced this goodness, and later becomes a sheep butcher, how could they acquire all seven branches? Now, examining this: such a person does not generate bad precepts, but only acquires intermediate [action], because they do not universally impair wholesome motivations.

15.48

The treatise says: "The Vaibhāṣikas... a person of non-restraint."
This states the Sarvāstivāda tenet.

15.49

The treatise says: "The masters of the Sautrāntika... only excluding the eight precepts."
This states the Sautrāntika tenet. In their school, even if the seven branches of wholesome or unwholesome precepts are incomplete and not universal with respect to objects, in all such cases one may be called a person abiding in restraint or non-restraint; only the eight precepts are excluded, because in their school the eight precepts must be complete in all branches.

15.50

The treatise says: "According to their measure... because they mutually exclude each other."
For example, if one has previously undertaken the five precepts and later makes a vow only to kill, or also to steal, then according to that measure, only violating non-killing and so forth, one acquires the non-restraint of killing and so forth. It cannot also exclude non-lying and so forth, because in accordance with what was restricted, they mutually exclude each other. Thus, both wholesome and unwholesome precepts can be deficient in branches, and one can also be called one who abides in both precepts. Just as it is said that one who breaks the precepts without renouncing them is called both a breaker of precepts and a keeper of precepts. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "If your intention is that just as wholesome saṃvara can be incomplete in branches, this [non-restraint] should also be so—that is, as when someone undertakes the saṃvara of an upāsaka, of an upavāsastha, or of a śrāmaṇera, although it is not complete in branches, they still acquire the precepts subsumed by those deficient branches, and undertaking non-restraint should also be like this—this analogy is not equal, because between saṃvara and non-restraint, applying effort and not applying effort, there is a difference in their acquisition. That is, wholesome precepts require the application of effort and a wholesome disposition (*āśaya*) before one can undertake and acquire them; because they are difficult to acquire, by reasonable calculation they must not be acquired all at once at a single time of undertaking. Unwholesome precepts do not require the application of effort, and through an unwholesome disposition one can undertake and acquire them; because they are not difficult to acquire, by reasonable calculation, whenever one is undertaken, all must be acquired together at that one time. Because in the desire realm the power of the unwholesome is strong, an unwholesome disposition arises spontaneously, and committing various grave evils does not await the application of effort; while a wholesome disposition is easily destroyed; therefore, whenever one type is undertaken, the rest are all acquired together. The wholesome is not like this; therefore the analogy is not equal. In principle, we see that noxious weeds grow without the application of effort, whereas fine sprouts emerge only when toil is applied."

15.51

The treatise says: "Having explained that from them... what has not been explained will now be explained."
Next there is one verse, the eleventh, explaining the preparatory means for acquiring bad precepts and the intermediate.

15.52

"The commentary says … they immediately give rise to the bad precept": this explains obtaining all non-restraints through two causes. They are obtained through two causes: first, being born into a family of non-restraint, by having previously performed preparatory activities such as killing; second, even if born into another family, by initially making a resolution and taking up matters such as killing, one immediately gives rise to the bad precept. In the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 117, there are three different accounts. Some say that it is also obtained through formal acceptance: that is, taking up a killing implement in one's hand and vowing that from this day until the end of one's life, one will constantly perform this work to sustain one's livelihood. At that time, one immediately obtains this non-restraint. Others say that although one holds a killing implement and makes one's own vow, one still does not obtain this non-restraint; it is obtained through two conditions: first, by performing the deed; second, by undertaking the matter. "By performing the deed" means that, born into a family of non-restraint, when one initially performs deeds such as killing living beings, at that time one immediately obtains this non-restraint. "By undertaking the matter" means that, born into another family, with a murderous mind for the sake of livelihood, one goes to where those of non-restraint such as sheep-butchers reside and makes this vow: "From now until the end of my life, I will constantly perform the work that you perform to sustain my livelihood." At that time, one immediately obtains this non-restraint. Still others say that in this case too, only when one initially performs that work does one obtain this non-restraint. This śāstra relies on the meaning of the second master; the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya and the Nyāyānusāra also agree with this.

15.53

On the text "Obtaining the remaining unmanifest … undertakings of meritorious deeds": what follows explains that obtaining the remaining intermediate unmanifest [karma] is due to three causes. This is the first cause, meaning it is due to the field. Without distinguishing whether the mind is light or heavy, merely by initially donating a garden or the like, the unmanifest is immediately produced.

15.54

On the text "Second, by acceptance … constantly giving food, etc.": this is the second cause. "Etc." includes giving clothing and the like, as well as bad deeds and the like. "This being due to acceptance" means that without distinguishing light or heavy, and even before performing the deed, simply by undertaking the vow and accepting it, the unmanifest is immediately produced.

15.55

On the text "Third, by weighty practice … doing good or doing evil": this is the third cause. This deed has no basis [such as a field] and is not accepted through a vow; it requires weighty practice for the unmanifest to be produced.

15.56

On the text "Due to these three causes arise the remaining unmanifest": this summarizes the three causes.

15.57

On the text "Thus having explained … what has not been explained shall now be explained": what follows is the twelfth [section], explaining the differences in abandonment. Within this there are five: first, abandoning the prātimokṣa; second, abandoning the path and absorption [restraints]; third, abandoning the bad precept; fourth, abandoning the intermediate; fifth, abandoning the non-material.

15.58

On the text "Now, how is the prātimokṣa-saṃvara abandoned?": the two stanzas below form the first [part], explaining the abandonment of the prātimokṣa-saṃvara. The first stanza explains the abandonment of the precepts through four or five conditions; the second stanza recounts divergent theories.

15.59

"The commentary says … because the faculties are subdued": this explains the general name "restraint" (saṃvara).

15.60

On the text "Except for the one of approaching the abode … it is abandoned through four conditions": this first explains that the seven assemblies have four conditions, and then explains that the one of approaching the abode (upavāsa) has five conditions.

15.61

On the text "First, through intention … because one abandons the rules of training": "through intention" excludes states of madness and derangement; "facing a person who understands" excludes facing the mad, animals, and the like; "manifesting manifest action" means saying oneself: "From now on, I can no longer maintain [them]," etc. Because these words contradict the time of receiving the precepts, [the restraint] is abandoned.

15.62

On the text "Second, through relinquishing the group-homogeneity": this is abandonment at the end of life, because the support is relinquished.

15.63

On the text "Third, through the simultaneous arising of both sexual characters": this is because the support has transformed, as having both sexual characters is not a support for the precepts.

15.64

On the text "Fourth, through the severance of the wholesome roots that served as the cause": this is abandonment because the cause has been severed. The cause of the precepts refers to the three wholesome roots; once the wholesome roots are severed, the precepts are abandoned accordingly.

15.65

On the text "Abandoning the upavāsa precepts … is abandoned through five conditions": this explains that the upavāsa precepts and the like are abandoned through five conditions, with the addition of the expiration of the time period.

15.66

On the text "For what reason are the precepts abandoned through these five conditions?": this is a question.

15.67

On the text "Because it is contrary to acceptance … because the time period has expired": this is the answer. When receiving them one said one could maintain them; when abandoning them one says one cannot maintain them; therefore it is contrary. The remaining four can be understood.

15.68

On the text "Other schools say … the bhikṣu restraint": this recounts the Sautrāntika doctrine. "Defeating offense" (pātayantikā/pārājika) refers to the four grave offenses: because one falls into hell, it is named "falling/defeating" (pāta). This states that committing a grave offense also abandons the precepts.

15.69

On the text "Other schools say … because they all cease": this recounts the Dharmaguptaka doctrine. This is identical to the doctrine of the Vinaya masters in the Vibhāṣā. This adds the disappearance of the Dharma, upon which the precepts are also abandoned.

15.70

On the text "The master of Kashmir … called keeping and breaking precepts": this recounts the Vaibhāṣika doctrine. "It is not that committing an offense on one side should cause all restraints to be universally abandoned" explains the reason. "It is not that committing the other offenses causes a severance of morality" has two interpretations: first, that an extreme offense is the "other" with respect to non-extreme offenses, and committing another extreme offense does not cause the non-extreme to have its morality severed; second, that "other offenses" are the "other" with respect to what is unbroken, and committing other offenses does not cause what is unbroken to have its morality severed.

15.71

On the text "Just as one who possesses wealth … is only called a rich man": the simile makes it clear and understandable.

15.72

On the text "If so, for what reason … establish the name 'defeat'?": the Sautrāntika objects. Originally, because one possessed the precepts, one was called a bhikṣu, called a śramaṇa, called a son of the Śākyas. The precepts are the substance of a bhikṣu, the nature of a śramaṇa. Since the Buddha said that [such a person] is not a bhikṣu and so forth, being destroyed and ruined, fallen, and established the name "defeat" (pārājika)—since committing the four grave prohibitions is named "defeat," how could one possess the precepts that constitute a bhikṣu?

15.73

On the text "This was spoken with implicit intention, relying on the ultimate bhikṣu": the Vaibhāṣika answers. The statement "he is not a bhikṣu," etc., means he is not an ultimate bhikṣu. "Ultimate bhikṣu" refers to the noble ones.

15.74

On the text "These words are reckless": the Sautrāntika reproaches.

15.75

On the text "What is reckless?": the Vaibhāṣika asks in turn.

15.76

On the text "Namely, regarding the World-Honoured One … serving as a condition for committing grave offenses": the Sautrāntika answers. There are two reckless things: first, interpreting an explicit sūtra so as to turn it into an implicit one; second, providing a condition for those with abundant afflictions to commit grave offenses.

15.77

On the text "How is it known that these words are an explicit teaching?": the Vaibhāṣika asks.

15.78

On the text "Because the Vinaya itself explains … it is an explicit teaching": the Sautrāntika answers. "Bhikṣu by nominal designation" means that the person is physically a layperson but has the name and title of a bhikṣu; hence he is called a bhikṣu by nominal designation. "Bhikṣu by self-designation" means a fully ordained monk who has committed a grave offense, who in reality is not a bhikṣu, yet calls himself, saying, "I am a bhikṣu"; hence he is called a bhikṣu by self-designation. "Mendicant bhikṣu" means a renunciant who maintains his livelihood by begging; hence he is named a mendicant bhikṣu. "Affliction-destroying bhikṣu" refers to the noble ones, because having attained the uncontaminated path, they genuinely destroy afflictions; hence they are named affliction-destroying bhikṣus. An affliction-destroying bhikṣu is precisely an ultimate bhikṣu. Since the Vinaya itself explains that one who has committed a grave offense is in reality not a bhikṣu but merely calls himself a bhikṣu, it is clear that one who commits a grave offense has no precept-substance. In this context, "not a bhikṣu" means not a bhikṣu ordained by a motion and three announcements (jñapti-caturtha-karman); it is not spoken with reference to the ultimate sense. If a person who committed a grave offense had previously been an ultimate [bhikṣu] and then, through committing a grave offense, became not an ultimate [bhikṣu], one could say that it was spoken relying on the ultimate sense when saying "he is not a bhikṣu." But a person who commits a grave offense was not previously an ultimate [bhikṣu] and did not become not an ultimate [bhikṣu] through committing a grave offense; how could one interpret that it was spoken relying on the ultimate bhikṣu? When the sūtra states that one who commits a grave offense is not a bhikṣu, it means he is not a bhikṣu who received full ordination through a motion and three announcements. The ultimate bhikṣu refers to those who have attained the path of seeing and above; because these never retrogress, the five divisions and seven classes of offenses were not laid out for the sake of the ultimate bhikṣu. The five divisions and seven classes belong to those who committed a grave offense among bhikṣus ordained through a motion and three announcements. Since he previously received full ordination through a motion and three announcements, and now breaks these precepts and is called "not a bhikṣu," he is therefore not a bhikṣu of motion and three announcements. It is not that he was previously ultimate and is now not ultimate; how could one say it was spoken in reference to an ultimate bhikṣu? Therefore, we know that this sūtra is an explicit teaching.

15.79

On the text "However, as to what was spoken by him … committing a grave offense is also like this": this refutes the Vaibhāṣika's establishment. The Great Master set forth a simile: just as a tāla tree, if its crown is severed, can never again grow and expand, so it is with the bhikṣus who commit a grave offense. This simile of the Great Master demonstrates that by committing one extreme, the remaining precepts no longer grow and expand. For you now to say that committing an offense on one side does not mean all restraints should be universally abandoned is to challenge the Great Master. The defense in the Nyāyānusāra states: "Could severing the crown of one tāla tree prevent the other three from growing and expanding? The simile and the phenomenon are not parallel."

15.80

On the text "What meaning did the Great Master illustrate with this simile?": the Vaibhāṣika asks.

15.81

On the text "The intention was to demonstrate regarding the precepts … all restraints": the Sautrāntika answers. The intention is to demonstrate that by committing a grave offense, all precepts are abandoned.

15.82

On the text "Furthermore, a person who commits a grave offense … expelled from among the Saṅgha": the Sautrāntika again cites scriptural evidence. (A vihāra means a monastery.)

15.83

On the text "If he is in reality not a bhikṣu … what are its characteristics?": the Sautrāntika asks the Vaibhāṣika.

15.84

On the text "Whatever its characteristics may be, the substance must exist": the Vaibhāṣika answers.

15.85

On the text "Because the World-Honoured One spoke of … the fourth, the śramaṇa who defiles the path": the Vaibhāṣika cites textual proof. Fascicle 66 of the Vibhāṣā explains: "'Victor over the path' refers to the Buddha, because he awakened by himself; one should know that all pratyekabuddhas are also like this. 'Shower of the path' refers to Śāriputra and the like. 'One who lives by the path' refers to those dwelling in the stage of training. 'Defiler of the path' refers to those who have committed grave offenses (Cunda was previously translated as Chunda, which means 'youth')."

15.86

On the text "Although this was said … a firebrand, a dead man": the Sautrāntika resolves this. This is a bhikṣu by nominal designation, not having real existence.

15.87

On the text "If a person who commits a grave offense … the bhikṣu undergoing training": the Vaibhāṣika objects. If a person who commits a grave offense is not a monk, why did the Buddha speak of granting training to a bhikṣu who trains in repentance for the rest of his life?

15.88

On the text "It is not said that a person who commits a grave offense … established in this way": the Sautrāntika resolves this. The Sanskrit name is pārājika, here called 'defeat offense.' Evil is the 'other' of good; because evil conquers good, it is named 'defeat.' If upon initially committing a grave offense one does not have a single thought of concealment, it does not constitute a defeat offense, and thus one does not abandon the precepts. If one conceals it for one thought-moment or more, then it constitutes a defeat offense, and one immediately abandons the precepts.

15.89

On the text "If committing a defeat … go forth and receive the precepts": the Vaibhāṣika objects. If by committing a grave offense one is not called a monk due to lacking precepts, why is one not permitted to receive full ordination again? Since one is not permitted to receive them, we know that they are not abandoned.

15.90

On the text "Because in his mental continuum … to go forth again": the Sautrāntika explains. This can be understood from the text.

15.91

On the Śāstra's statement, "Here there is no point... such types of monks": the Sautrāntika is teasing the Sarvāstivādin. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "The author of the Śāstra explained that although this statement exists, they only possess the outward appearance of a recluse (śramaṇa) and are therefore called a recluse, like burnt wood, a decoy parrot, a dried-up pond, a ruined seed, a whirling firebrand, or a corpse. This is mere talk, for none of the adduced similes has probative efficacy. Because timber that is partially burnt by fire is conventionally called 'burnt timber' in the world, whereas what has completely become charcoal is not called burnt timber. If one claims that whether completely or partially burnt, both are accepted as being called 'burnt timber', then both the simile and the subject are cast into doubt; the simile lacks the efficacy to prove what it illustrates. A so-called dried-up pond may contain a little water, but lacks the function of a pond, and thus the name 'dried-up' is established. If having no water at all were also called dried-up, it would suffer the same doubt as before and lack efficacy in proving the point. By this, the corpse and the ruined seed are already refuted. That is, although a seed still possesses a little capacity, the world also calls it a ruined seed; or, though not rotten, its capacity is damaged so that it no longer sprouts, and it is likewise called a ruined seed. One possessing the attribute of death is also called a corpse, hence the sūtra states that the heedless are ever dead. The two similes of the decoy parrot and the whirling firebrand both contradict what is stated in the sūtras. There are four recluses, and no fifth. If one were called a recluse merely by bodily appearance, then just as when someone in the world requires the appearance of a recluse and contrives by expedient means to assume the form of a recluse, he ought to be called a recluse and spoken of as a fifth. But that decoy bird and the whirling firebrand cannot be called [real] birds or wheels. Their remaining appearances are not real, yet birds and wheels preceded them; similarly, one who was previously not a recluse and assumes the form of a recluse ought to be established as a fifth. However, the Buddha spoke of four and said there is no fifth in order to stop such clinging to a recluse of outward appearance; therefore, none of the adduced similes has probative efficacy."

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese