俱舍論疏 2.11

2.11

The treatise says: "If with respect to that phenomenon this [phenomenon] has functioning... it is called a cognitive object." This is the answer. As for "if with respect to that phenomenon this [phenomenon] has functioning," the Nyāyānusāra states: "Just as when a person has superior functioning with respect to something, one says that that is my sphere." The explanation states: Phenomena possessing an object have the functioning of ranging through seeing, hearing, and so forth, upon their own sphere, and are therefore called "objective spheres." Mind and mental concomitants arise by grasping the object, and are therefore called "cognitive objects." As for the distinction between these two, mind and mental concomitants: Arising by grasping the object is common to both mind and mental concomitants, and is termed "cognitive object." Because they do not operate beyond this or that object or within other objects, they are called "having opposition." The differing functions of taking up the image and determining/holding it differentiate mind and mental concomitants, and are termed "objective sphere." Because they do not operate beyond that with respect to other objects, they are called "having opposition." This is the distinction. A certain master has four explanations. The first says: Objective opposition is based on having capacity, not necessarily the actual arising of activity, just as the eye of the same class (sabhāga) is called having opposition. Cognitive opposition requires grasping the cognitive object for it to arise and present itself, meaning the arising of the activity of taking a fruit; having a cognitive condition it arises, lacking a cognitive condition it does not arise—all are called having opposition. The second explanation: Obstruction of the activity of taking an object is called objective opposition; obstruction of the activity of taking a fruit is called cognitive opposition. The third explanation: In terms of the sense of obstructing the substance, it is called cognitive opposition; in terms of the sense of obstructing the activity, it is called objective opposition. The fourth explanation: Obstruction of the activity of taking an object is called objective opposition; obstruction of the activity of cognizing an object is called cognitive opposition. Examining these four explanations, none of them accords with the treatise's intention.