俱舍論疏 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.2

Chapter 1: Exposition of the Elements, Part 2

The treatise says: "Furthermore, [...] how many are indeterminate?" Below this is the second major division, consisting of nineteen lines of verse, distinguishing the eighteen elements across various conceptual categories. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Because the faculties, objects, and consciousnesses are fully revealed within the elements, the conceptual categories are easily understood." Here they are analyzed provisionally in terms of the eighteen elements. Through this, the conceptual categories of the aggregates and sense bases are also established. This single verse makes distinctions across three categories: first asking, then answering in verse. This text is the question. In the verse, the first line concerns visibility (sanidarśana), the second line resistance (sapratigha), and the last two lines the three moral natures (kuśalāditva), as is clear from the text.

2.4

"The treatise says: [...] the rest are said to be invisible." Prose explanation. The three categories in the verse are divided into three sections; this first explains visibility. Both the Vibhāṣā and the Nyāyānusāra provide two explanations. Nyāyānusāra fascicle 4 says: "Why is this said to be visible? Due to two meanings. First, this matter necessarily occurs together with seeing (vision), hence it is called visible. Because matter arises simultaneously with the eye, like having a companion. Second, this matter can be pointed out, hence it is called visible. Because it can be pointed out differently as being here or being there, like having an intentional object. Some say: this matter can produce a reflection in mirrors and the like, hence it is called visible. Because it can be demonstrated like that, and this is also the case. One cannot say that sound has echoes and so forth, so it should also become visible, because they do not arise simultaneously." The Vibhāṣā is the same. This treatise takes only the second, in that it can be pointed out with a distinction of here and there. By this implication, the remaining invisible ones, excluding matter, refer to the other seventeen, which cannot be pointed out with a distinction of here and there, and are called invisible. According to the Nyāyānusāra, lacking the above three meanings is called invisible. Because this treatise is brief, it provides only one explanation.

2.5

The treatise says: "Having thus explained [...] due to differences in intentional objects." This is the second [section], explaining resistance. First it summarizes the preceding, introduces the heading, and then explains according to the heading. This text is the former.

2.6

The treatise says: "Obstructional resistance [...] or both obstruct each other." This is the second explanation. Within the explanation there are eight parts; this text is the first, explaining obstructional resistance. The five faculties and five sense objects, "being obstructed from arising in the place of another by themselves," is the meaning of obstructional resistance. "Like a hand [...] or both obstruct each other" explains by pointing to concrete facts. By analogy with the hand and stone, all the other ten material dharmas are also like this, such as tiles, wood, and so forth.

2.7

The treatise says: "[Phenomena that have] objective opposition [are those that exercise their activity] with regard to form, and so forth, as their object." This is the second [section], which explains objective opposition (viṣaya-pratighāta). Within the passage there are two parts: first, pointing out their nature; second, citing proof to establish the conclusion. This passage is the first. "The twelve dhātus" refers to the six faculties and the six consciousnesses. "That portion of the dharma-dhātu that possesses objects" refers to mental concomitants (caittas). "With regard to form, and so forth, as their object" refers to the six faculties, the six consciousnesses, and so forth. Because they possess functioning with regard to form and the other objects, these are termed "objective spheres" (viṣaya). And because there is obstruction in this regard, they are said to have [objective] opposition.

2.8

The treatise says: "Therefore the Prajñaptiśāstra says... except for the previous characteristics." This is the second [part], which cites proof. The Prajñaptiśāstra is one among the six pāda treatises, composed by Mahākātyāyanīputra. The four alternatives can be understood. Here "obstruction" (pratighāta) means the seeing of visible form. Obstruction is an alternate name for opposition; that is, with respect to the visible form that is seen, it is called "having opposition." "Piśāca" in Tang language means a flesh-and-blood-eating ghost; its older name was piśāca-ghost. "Śiśumāra" is a type of animal, shaped like a gecko; small ones are two zhang long, and large ones are up to a hundred chi long. "These are termed 'having objective opposition'" is the concluding phrase.

2.9

The treatise says: "[Phenomena that have] cognitive opposition [are those that are obstructed from occurring elsewhere than] with respect to their own cognitive object (ālambana)." This is the third [section], which explains cognitive opposition (ālambana-pratighāta). Mind and mental concomitants, having converged on their own cognitive object, are obstructed [from other objects]; this is called cognitive opposition.

2.10

The treatise says: "What distinction further exists between objective sphere (viṣaya) and cognitive object (ālambana)?" This is the fourth [section], which distinguishes the difference. First is the question, second the answer. This passage is the question.

2.11

The treatise says: "If with respect to that phenomenon this [phenomenon] has functioning... it is called a cognitive object." This is the answer. As for "if with respect to that phenomenon this [phenomenon] has functioning," the Nyāyānusāra states: "Just as when a person has superior functioning with respect to something, one says that that is my sphere." The explanation states: Phenomena possessing an object have the functioning of ranging through seeing, hearing, and so forth, upon their own sphere, and are therefore called "objective spheres." Mind and mental concomitants arise by grasping the object, and are therefore called "cognitive objects." As for the distinction between these two, mind and mental concomitants: Arising by grasping the object is common to both mind and mental concomitants, and is termed "cognitive object." Because they do not operate beyond this or that object or within other objects, they are called "having opposition." The differing functions of taking up the image and determining/holding it differentiate mind and mental concomitants, and are termed "objective sphere." Because they do not operate beyond that with respect to other objects, they are called "having opposition." This is the distinction. A certain master has four explanations. The first says: Objective opposition is based on having capacity, not necessarily the actual arising of activity, just as the eye of the same class (sabhāga) is called having opposition. Cognitive opposition requires grasping the cognitive object for it to arise and present itself, meaning the arising of the activity of taking a fruit; having a cognitive condition it arises, lacking a cognitive condition it does not arise—all are called having opposition. The second explanation: Obstruction of the activity of taking an object is called objective opposition; obstruction of the activity of taking a fruit is called cognitive opposition. The third explanation: In terms of the sense of obstructing the substance, it is called cognitive opposition; in terms of the sense of obstructing the activity, it is called objective opposition. The fourth explanation: Obstruction of the activity of taking an object is called objective opposition; obstruction of the activity of cognizing an object is called cognitive opposition. Examining these four explanations, none of them accords with the treatise's intention.

2.12

The treatise says: "Why are the eye and so forth... said to have obstruction?" This is the fifth [section], which explains the term "having opposition." First is the question, second the answer. This passage is the question.

2.13

The treatise says: "Because beyond that, this does not operate with respect to others." This is the answer. There are two answers; this is the former answer. It clarifies that whether it is an objective sphere or a cognitive object, if among visible forms and so forth it is called "having opposition" with respect to this, then it obstructs the eye, and so forth, and the mind, and so forth, from arising with respect to others; this is the meaning of having opposition.

2.14

The treatise says: "Or furthermore, 'obstruction' means... because they operate having converged." This is the second explanation. This refers to the grasper (cognizer) and the grasped (object). When that which possesses an object and the object arise having converged, it is called having opposition; it is definitely not an obstruction of substance or an obstruction of taking a fruit, and so forth.

2.15

The treatise says: "It should be understood that here... the remainder are said to be without opposition." This is the sixth [section], which harmonizes with the verse, clarifying that lacking the aforementioned forms of opposition is what is meant by "without opposition" (apratigha).

2.16

The treatise says: "If a phenomenon has objective opposition... is the fourth alternative." This is the seventh [section], which analyzes the tetralemma. Within the passage there are two parts: first, the tetralemma of objective opposition against obstructive opposition; second, the subsequent-affirming proposition (anuloma) of objective opposition against cognitive opposition. This is the first. The first alternative is having objective opposition and not obstructive; the second alternative is having obstructive and not objective; the third is both; the fourth is neither; all are readily understood.

2.17

The treatise says: "If a phenomenon has objective opposition... the five faculties of the eye and so forth." This is the second part, the subsequent-affirming proposition. Questioning the broad with the narrow is answered by the subsequent-affirming proposition. This is because if something has cognitive opposition, it definitely has objective opposition. Cognitive opposition and obstructive opposition are unrelated in substance, which is why they do not form a tetralemma.

2.18

The treatise says: "Here the Venerable... this is accepted." This is the eighth [section], presenting the Sautrāntika view. Kumāralāta is translated here as "Noble Youth"; he is an ancestral master of the Sautrāntikas. Within the Sautrāntika school he composed the Dṛṣṭāntamālā, the Mohamālā, and so forth, which contain this verse explaining "having opposition," differing from the Sarvāstivādins. "Where the mind desires to arise" means the mind arising with respect to blue color, and so forth. "Obstructed by another so that it does not arise" means that being blocked by other hindrances, the mind cannot arise with respect to the blue color. "Should be understood as having opposition" is the conclusion. "Without opposition is contrary to this" reverses the above. The Sarvāstivādin view is that arising directly with respect to the blue is called having opposition. "This is accepted" means the master of the treatise endorses the Sautrāntika meaning.

2.19

The treatise says: "Having thus explained... therefore they are called indeterminate." This is the third [topic], the distinction according to the three natures. Within the passage there are two parts: first, explaining the eight dhātus; second, explaining the ten dhātus. This passage is the first. It means that among the ten form dhātus, excluding the two dhātus of form and sound, the remaining eight cannot be determined as wholesome or unwholesome, and therefore are called indeterminate (avyākṛta). Regarding the explanation of indeterminate, there are two theories; this is the first.

2.20

The treatise says: "It is also said... they should be solely indeterminate." It recounts a different theory and refutes it, as can be understood from the text.

2.21

The treatise says: "The remaining ten dhātus... the rest are called indeterminate." This is the second [part], explaining the ten dhātus. Within the passage there are three sections: first, explaining the seven mind dhātus; second, explaining the dharma-dhātu; third, explaining the two dhātus of form and sound. This passage is the first. When the seven mind dhātus are associated with the wholesome [roots] such as non-greed, they are called wholesome; when associated with the three unwholesome roots such as greed, they are called unwholesome; when not associated with either, they are called indeterminate.

2.22

The treatise says: "If the dharma-dhātu is... the rest are called indeterminate." This is the second [section], explaining the dharma-dhātu. "If it is non-greed and so forth" is wholesome by intrinsic nature (svabhāva-kuśala). When ideation, feeling, and so forth, are associated with the wholesome by intrinsic nature, they are called wholesome by association (samprayukta-kuśala). The four characteristics and the possession (prāpti) on unmanifest form are arisen simultaneously with the two kinds of wholesome, and are also called wholesome [by origination] (samutthāna-kuśala). Analytical cessation, being an unconditioned phenomenon, is wholesome in the ultimate sense (paramārtha-kuśala), and therefore is also called wholesome. Thus within the dharma-dhātu, the four kinds of wholesome—intrinsic nature, association, origination, and ultimate sense—are fully present. These four kinds of wholesome and so forth will be explained in detail later.

2.23

The treatise says: "The form dhātu and the sound dhātu... the rest are indeterminate." This is the third [section], explaining form and sound. Among these two, there are only the wholesome and unwholesome of origination (samutthāna).

2.24

The treatise says: "Having explained the wholesome and so forth... bound to the formless realm." This is the second [major topic], a single stanza of verse clarifying bondage to the three realms. The text has three parts: first, the concluding introduction; second, the verse; third, the explanation. This passage is the first. In the verse, the first line clarifies the desire realm, the next two lines the form realm, and the last line the formless realm.

2.25

The commentary says: "The treatise says... fully possesses eighteen." This is the second [part], the prose explanation. The explanation of the three realms is divided into three sections; this is the first, explaining bondage to the desire realm. "Bound" (pratibaddha/saṃyukta) means tied to, namely the sense of being fettered. Prior to analyzing the number of phenomena, it first explains the meaning of "bound." Phenomena bound to the desire realm are fettered by desire-realm greed and so forth, and are therefore called bound to the desire realm. Namely, the four dhātus of nose, tongue, smell, and taste in their entirety, and a portion of the remaining fourteen dhātus, are bound to the desire realm. Because of this, the desire realm fully possesses eighteen.

2.26

The treatise says: "Bound to the form realm... because they lack a cognitive object." This is the second [section], explaining the form realm. Within the passage there are two parts: first, distinguishing the number of phenomena; second, analysis through questions and answers. This passage is the first. Because they lack material food (kavaḍīkārāhāra), there are no objects of smell and taste; and because they lack the objects, they lack nose-consciousness and tongue-consciousness.

2.27

The treatise says: "If so... because its nature is material food." This is the second [part], analysis through questions and answers. Smell and taste have the nature of material food, and since the higher realm lacks material food, it therefore lacks the objects of smell and taste. The tactile dhātu also has the nature of material food, so the form realm should lack it as well.

2.28

The treatise says: "The tactile [phenomena] present there do not have the nature of material food." This is the answer. The form realm has tactile [phenomena], but they are not material food.

2.29

The treatise says: "If so, smell and taste should likewise be of this category." This is an objection. The tactile dhātu has the nature of material food, yet the higher realm has tactile phenomena that are not material food; smell and taste have the nature of material food, so the higher realm should have smell and taste that do not have the nature of material food.

2.30

The treatise says: "Apart from food, smell and taste... therefore the tactile is not absent." This is the answer. Apart from food, smell and taste have no other function; since there is no material food above, smell and taste are also absent. The tactile has functions apart from material food, having the distinct functions of supporting the faculties and supporting clothing, and so forth; therefore, although the form realm lacks material food, it does possess the tactile dhātu.

2.31

The treatise says: "Other masters say... therefore they are absent there." This recounts a different theory. "Abiding here" means abiding in the desire realm. "Relying on that dhyāna and so forth... seeing visible form, hearing sound, and pliancy (prasrabdhi) arising together" means that when one's physical body is in the desire realm, having attained the divine eye and ear clairvoyance to see form and hear sound, at the time of entering concentration pliancy arises together, and this superior tactile object sustains and benefits the body. Because in the cause these three things are together, in the state of the fruit they likewise follow along. Smell and taste are not like this, so they are absent there.

2.32

The treatise says: "If so... because they have no function there." This is an objection. In that [realm] there is no material food, and because the two objects of smell and taste have no function, they are absent. Since the two objects are absent there, the nose and tongue have no function and should also be absent there.

2.33

The treatise says: "Not so... and adorning the body." This is the answer. To say they have no function is not so. The tongue initiates speech and the nose adorns the body; because these are useful functions, they are both present there.

2.34

The treatise says: "If it is for adorning the body... what need is there for the two faculties?" This is an objection. The physical bases (adhiṣṭhāna) of the two faculties are the two objects of form and touch. If it is for initiating speech and adorning the body, one only requires the two objects of form and touch to achieve speech and adorning the body; what need is there for the two faculties?

2.35

The treatise says: "Just as without the male faculty... the physical base is also absent." This is the answer. Because there are the two faculties, there are the two physical bases; if there were no two faculties, the physical bases would also be absent, taking the male faculty as the example.

2.36

The treatise says: "In that case it may be absent... apart from the faculties they should be present." This is an objection. The physical base of the male faculty, because it has no function, does not exist apart from the faculty. The physical bases of the nose and tongue faculties, because they have a function, should exist apart from the faculties.

2.37

The treatise says: "Although some have no function... those destined to die." This is the answer. The presence or absence of faculties is not determined solely by their having a function; they also arise without a function. Just as in the case of one in the womb with the six bases who is destined to die, although these faculties of the eye and so forth have no function, the faculties still arise. The nose and tongue are likewise.

2.38

The treatise says: "Although some have no function... how do they come to have the faculties arise?" This inquires about the cause of their arising. Since they lack craving for the objects, by what cause do they come to arise?

2.39

The treatise says: "Craving for the faculties gives rise to superior karma." This answers regarding the cause. Giving rise to craving for these two faculties of the nose and tongue generates superior volitional karma, which acts as the cause for these two.

2.40

The treatise says: "If, being free from craving for objects... the male faculty would also arise." This is an objection. Within the objection there are two parts: first, objecting to the original explanation; second, objecting to the modified explanation. This passage is the first. Whenever craving for a faculty arises, it is because there is greed for the object; if one is free from greed for the object, craving for the faculty is definitely absent. Since one is free from greed for the object, there is no craving for the faculty; and having no craving for the faculty, the nose and tongue lack a cause and should therefore not exist. If one claims that despite being free from greed for objects, one can have craving for the faculties so that the nose and tongue faculties exist, then the male faculty should also exist just like the nose and tongue.

2.41

On the Śāstra's: "If it is said that they do not arise... the nose and tongue should also be non-existent": this explains the shifted defense. If it is said that the nose and tongue exist for the sake of adorning the body, whereas the male faculty is absent because of ugliness, [then we reply:] the concealed private parts are brought about by wholesome karma, so how could they allow for ugliness? From "Moreover, the arising of faculties..." onwards is the second objection. If the arising of the faculties is not due to utility or lack of utility, ugliness or beauty, but rather they arise wherever the cause exists, why discuss ugliness? Both the nose and tongue and the male faculty are free from attachment to their objects, so by principle they should equally lack attachment to the faculties; thus, if the male faculty does not exist, the nose and tongue should also be non-existent.

2.42

On the Śāstra's: "If so... not deficient in faculties": this further cites a sūtra to raise an objection. Since in the higher realm beings are not deficient in faculties, how could they lack their nose and tongue?

2.43

On the Śāstra's: "According to whichever faculties there are... the male faculty should exist": this first resolves their counter-objection. What the sūtra states about "not deficient in faculties" means that according to however many faculties belong to that level, they are fully possessed of all of them, and have none deficient. If the sūtra is explained in this way, what contradiction is there? If you allow that "not deficient" means according to whatever faculties exist, you would make it so that just as beings in the desire realm possess all faculties and are not deficient in faculties, so too in that higher realm the male faculty should exist.

2.44

On the Śāstra's: "The proper explanation is... the male faculty is non-existent": this is the author's critique. Regarding "Because craving for the six faculties arises dependent upon the internal body, and is not manifested dependent upon objective spheres": that is, craving that takes the six faculties as object arises dependent on one's own body, and does not arise dependent on external objects. Because the cause exists, the nose and tongue faculties exist. As for the entity of the male faculty, it is merely a portion of the body faculty that is capable of tactile contact with the sexual object, and is termed the male faculty. The arising of this craving necessarily depends on craving for the object, unlike the nose and tongue which, depending on the loci of internal faculties, give rise to a general craving for the body. Therefore, because in the higher realm there is craving for the internal body, the nose and tongue are not non-existent; but because there is no craving for sexual objects, the male faculty is non-existent. The rest of the text is intelligible.

2.45

On the Śāstra's: "Bound to the formless realm... bound to the formless realm": this is the third part, explaining the formless realm. In the formless realm there are only the last three, because one must be separated from lust for form in order to be born there. "Form" refers to the five faculties and five objects. Because of detachment from lust for form, there are no faculties or objects there. Although one is not detached from lust for mind, because faculties and objects are absent, the five consciousnesses are also absent. For this reason, there are only the last three dhātus, namely the mind, mental consciousness, and dharma dhātus.

2.46

On the Śāstra's: "Having explained bound to realms... how many are anāsrava": this third half-verse clarifies the āsrava and anāsrava. First a question, then the verse answers, which is intelligible according to the text.

2.47

From the Śāstra's "It is said... are called only sāsrava": this is the explanation. The mind dhātu and mental consciousness dhātu comprise only two kinds: those subsumed under the truth of the path are anāsrava, because the āsravas do not increase [with respect to them]; the remainder are solely sāsrava, because the āsravas increase in accordance [with them]. In the dharma dhātu, conditioned anāsrava is subsumed under the truth of the path; unconditioned anāsrava refers to the three unconditioned phenomena. As for analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha), because the āsravas do not increase when taking it as object, it is anāsrava. Space (ākāśa) and non-analytical cessation (apratisaṃkhyānirodha) are called anāsrava because the āsravas do not take them as object at all. Since they are neither cause nor effect of the two [truths of suffering and origination], defilements do not take them as object. The rest are called sāsrava, because the āsravas increase in accordance [with them]. "The remaining fifteen dhātus are called only sāsrava" because the āsravas increase in accordance [with them]. This differs from the Mahāyāna and other schools.

2.48

On the Śāstra's: "Having thus explained... without vitarka and without vicāra": this fourth half-verse explains having vitarka and having vicāra, and so on. It concludes the previous topic, introduces the verse, and replies, which is intelligible according to the text.

2.49

From the Śāstra's "It is said... therefore it uses the word 'only'": this is the explanation. In the text there are three parts: first, only having vitarka and vicāra; second, presence and absence being indeterminate; third, only without vitarka and without vicāra. This text is the first. Among the eighteen dhātus, the five consciousnesses only have vitarka and vicāra, which gives the names of the dhātus. "Because they are constantly associated with vitarka and vicāra" explains why they only have vitarka and vicāra. "Because their mode of activity is coarse and proceeds through external gates" explains why they are constantly associated with vitarka and vicāra. The Nyāyānusāra states: "The author of the Śāstra explains: 'Because their mode of activity is coarse and proceeds through external gates.' This reason is illogical, for we observe that when mental consciousness proceeds through internal gates, it is also constantly associated with them. The explanation should instead be made as follows: the five consciousnesses exist only in levels accompanied by vitarka and vicāra, and not in the desire realm [or higher without them]. In the first dhyāna, there are no minds and mental factors—apart from vitarka and vicāra themselves—that are unassociated with vitarka and vicāra; what need is there to use the external gates as a reason to qualify them?" The Abhidharmakośa defends its explanation: first, having a coarse mode of activity is the general cause; second, proceeding through external gates is the particular cause. The five consciousnesses possess both. Although mental consciousness functioning at the internal gate lacks proceeding through external gates, it has a coarse mode of activity, and therefore has vitarka and vicāra. Although mental consciousness functioning at the external gate on higher levels has proceeding through external gates, it lacks a coarse mode of activity, and therefore is without vitarka and without vicāra. We examine this: since the presence or absence of vitarka and vicāra is solely determined by the mode of activity, why resort to external or internal gates? For the external gate can lack vitarka and vicāra, and the internal gate can have vitarka and vicāra. Thus we know that the external gate is not the cause. Now we examine further: because the five consciousnesses solely have a coarse mode of activity, they are constantly associated with vitarka and vicāra, and proceed solely through external gates. "To show the definitive meaning, it therefore uses the word 'only'" shows the reason why the five consciousnesses are only associated with vitarka and vicāra, and therefore do not extend to higher levels.

2.50

On the Śāstra's: "The last three... all comprise three categories": this is the second part, explaining that the three dhātus are indeterminate. First it indicates that the three dhātus all comprise three categories, and afterwards explains their differences. This text is the indication.

2.51

On the Śāstra's: "The mind dhātu, the mental consciousness dhātu... without vitarka and without vicāra": this is the explanation. Among these three dhātus, dharmas are of four kinds: first, the other associated dharmas, excluding vitarka and vicāra; second, unassociated dharmas and the vicāra of the dhyānāntara; third, vitarka; fourth, the vicāra of the desire realm and the first dhyāna. This text is the first. Regarding the preceding text, there are again three sections: namely, 1. having vitarka and having vicāra, 2. without vitarka and only with vicāra, and 3. without vitarka and without vicāra. That is to say, among these three dhātus, excluding vitarka and vicāra, if they are in the desire realm or the first dhyāna, they have vitarka and have vicāra; in the dhyānāntara, they are without vitarka and have vicāra; from the second dhyāna upwards up to the summit of existence (bhavāgra), they are without vitarka and without vicāra.

2.52

On the Śāstra's: "Subsumed under the dharma dhātu... vicāra is also like this": this is the second part, clarifying that unassociated dharmas and the vicāra of the dhyānāntara are both without vitarka and without vicāra. Here, saying "having vitarka and having vicāra" refers to existence by association (samprayoga), not existence by coexistence (sahabhū). Therefore, the four characteristics and secondary characteristics are not called having vitarka and vicāra; and because the vicāra in the intermediate dhyāna lacks a second vicāra, and the dharmas of that level lack vitarka, vicāra there is without vitarka and without vicāra.

2.53

On the Śāstra's: "Vitarka at all times... because it is associated only with vicāra": this is the third part, clarifying vitarka. Wherever there is vitarka there is necessarily vicāra, so vitarka has only vicāra. Because there is no second vitarka, it is not called having vitarka. The meaning here is: when vicāra arises in the mental group, because there is no second vicāra, it does not associate [with itself]. Sensation and the like are also like this: although two or three sensations might belong to the same category, when one arises there is no second sensation or the like, and hence they do not associate with themselves. The Nyāyānusāra should not have used two sensations as a parallel; the Nyāyānusāra should be recorded as before.

2.54

On the Śāstra's: "Vicāra in the desire realm... because it is associated only with vitarka": this is the fourth part, explaining vicāra. Vicāra in the intermediate dhyāna is without vitarka and without vicāra; in the desire realm and the first dhyāna it has vitarka and lacks vicāra; the rest is explained by analogy with vitarka. Here there are four alternatives in total: 1. having vitarka and having vicāra, 2. without vitarka and only with vicāra, 3. without vitarka and without vicāra, and 4. without vicāra and only with vitarka. Because the method is formulated according to the levels, the order of the four alternatives differs from other places. Among the eighteen dhātus, the five consciousnesses constitute one alternative: only having vitarka and having vicāra. The mind dhātu and mental consciousness dhātu comprise three alternatives: having vitarka and having vicāra, without vitarka and only with vicāra, and without vitarka and without vicāra; this is due to passing through three levels. The dharma dhātu encompasses all four alternatives: excluding vitarka and vicāra, the other associated dharmas, passing through the three levels, have three alternatives, namely having vitarka and having vicāra, without vitarka and only with vicāra, and without vitarka and without vicāra. Vitarka has only one alternative, namely having vicāra and without vitarka. Vicāra has two alternatives, namely having vitarka and without vicāra, and without vitarka and without vicāra. The remaining ten dhātus have only one alternative: without vitarka and without vicāra.

2.55

On the Śāstra's: "Hence it is said... that is, vicāra": this is the conclusion. The above are the numbers of the alternatives. Dharmas of the level with vitarka and with vicāra have four categories. As for the four categories: the other associated dharmas, excluding vitarka and vicāra, are called having vitarka and having vicāra. Vitarka is called without vitarka and only with vicāra. Vicāra is only with vitarka and without vicāra, or without vitarka and without vicāra. The remaining ten form dhātus, as well as the unassociated dharmas, avijñapti-rūpa, and the three unconditioned phenomena, are all without vitarka and without vicāra.

2.56

On the Śāstra's: "The remaining ten form dhātus... because they are unassociated": this is the third part, explaining that the ten dhātus are without vitarka and without vicāra.

2.57

On the Śāstra's: "If the five consciousness bodies... are without conceptual discrimination?": this fifth single verse generates a treatise from the treatise to clarify the three kinds of conceptual discrimination (vikalpa). First a question, then a verse responds, which can be understood.

2.58

From the Śāstra's "It is said... recollective conceptual discrimination": this is the prose explanation. In the text there are three parts: first, indicating the three conceptual discriminations; second, directly resolving the difficulty; third, taking up the names of the conceptual discriminations to explain them. This text is the first, which is intelligible.

2.59

On the Śāstra's: "Because the five consciousness bodies... is called footless": this is the second part, directly resolving the difficulty. There are three conceptual discriminations, and the five consciousnesses possess only one; hence they are called "without conceptual discrimination." Just as a horse normally has four feet, but if it has only one foot it is also called "footless."

2.60

On the Śāstra's: "Conceptual discrimination by intrinsic nature... recollective conceptual discrimination": this is the third part, taking up the names to explain them. Vitarka is conceptual discrimination by intrinsic nature (svabhāva-vikalpa), which the five consciousnesses constantly possess. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Now, 'conceptual discrimination' refers to an investigative mode of activity; therefore vitarka is called conceptual discrimination by intrinsic nature. Discernment (pravicaya) and clear recollection (smaraṇa) slightly resemble and accord with vitarka; therefore the name 'conceptual discrimination' also applies to prajñā and smṛti. Because these three modes of activity are differentiated and held, they all cause clear differentiated activity regarding the object, and regarding an already discerned object they cause discriminatory activity to arise; therefore the name 'conceptual discrimination' does not apply to perception (saṃjñā). Regarding an unascertained object, [perception] cannot make a definitive determination; therefore the name 'conceptual discrimination' does not apply to resolve (adhimokṣa)." "Distracted prajñā associated with mental consciousness is discursive conceptual discrimination (santīraṇa-vikalpa)," because there is no discursive conceptual discrimination in absorption (samādhi). Mindfulness whether in absorption or distracted is called recollective conceptual discrimination (anusmaraṇa-vikalpa), because mindfulness can retain both in absorption and in distraction.

2.61

On the Śāstra's: "Having thus explained having vitarka and vicāra, and so on... how many are unappropriated": this sixth single verse clarifies the two gates of having an objective support / lacking an objective support, and appropriated / unappropriated. It concludes the previous, introduces the verse, and replies, which is intelligible according to the text.

2.62

From the Śāstra's "It is said... because established by implication": this is the explanation. In the text there are two parts: first, explaining having an objective support; second, explaining having appropriation. This text is the first. "The six consciousnesses, the mind dhātu, and all mental factors are called having an objective support": this points to the substantial entities. "Because they are capable of apprehending objects" explains the reason. Because mind and mental factors can apprehend their objective support, they are called having an objective support. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Just as a person has a child, the terms 'objective support' (ālambana), 'range' (gocara), and 'object' (viṣaya) have differences in meaning." "The remaining ten form dhātus and the unassociated dharmas subsumed under the dharma dhātu are called lacking an objective support": this points to the substantial entities. Unassociated dharmas also subsume avijñapti-rūpa and the three unconditioned phenomena; all are unassociated because they cannot apprehend objects. "Because established by implication" explains the reason. The Nyāyānusāra states: "The five consciousness bodies definitely do not take a composite entity as object. Yet they necessarily have an object, so the fact that they take a real dharma as object is established by implication. If the five consciousness bodies comprehend the ultimate object, for what reason do the five consciousnesses not sever fetters? Because they comprehend only the specific characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), because they proceed through external gates, because they lack equipoise (samāhita), because they are without conceptual discrimination, because they fall upon a single object, and because their objective support is minute—although they comprehend the ultimate, they do not sever the fetters."

2.63

On the text of the treatise: "Having thus explained… all are not appropriated": This second [part] explains the appropriated and the non-appropriated. In the text there are three [points]: first, clarifying the elements that are exclusively not appropriated; second, [clarifying those that] apply to both; third, the meaning of "appropriated." This is the first text. That is, among the eighteen elements, the seven mind elements, the element of mental objects, and the element of sound—these nine elements are exclusively not appropriated. Following from the preceding [discussion] on having an intentional object that included the seven mind elements and the element of mental objects, it separately explains the seven mind elements and the element of mental objects, terming them "the former eight." Sound is not a dharma that possesses an intentional object; hence it says "and sound."

2.64

On the text of the treatise: "The remaining nine elements… because they are not appropriated": This second [part] explains those that apply to both. In the text there are two: first, setting forth [the proposition]; next, explaining it. This is the setting forth.

2.65

On the text of the treatise: "The eye and so forth… are termed not appropriated": This is the explanation. Within the explanation there are two: first, explaining the five sense faculties; second, explaining the four sense objects, form and so forth. This explains the five faculties. Here there are only two [cases]: abiding in the present is called "appropriated"; the past and future are called "not appropriated."

2.66

On the text of the treatise: "Form, smell, taste, and tangibles… are termed not appropriated": This second [part] explains the four sense objects, form and so forth. These comprise three classes: the past and future are unconditionally not appropriated; in the present, combined with the five faculties they are called "appropriated," and not combined with the faculties they are called "not appropriated."

2.67

On the text of the treatise: "Such as inside the body… yet not appropriated": This points to actual instances to explain it, as is intelligible from the text. According to the above explanation of the five faculties and four sense objects, abiding in the present time and not separated from the faculties is termed "appropriated." Hence one knows that in the three mindless states, the five faculties abiding in the present and the four sense objects not separated from the faculties are also appropriated. Because they are subsumed under mind and mental factors as their basis. Although consciousness does not arise because other conditions are lacking, they are subsumed within one's own body.

2.68

On the text of the treatise: "What is the meaning of the word 'appropriated'?… is termed not appropriated": This third [part] explains the meaning of "appropriated." "That which is jointly held by mind and mental factors and subsumed as their basis is termed 'appropriated'" explains the meaning of "appropriated." "Because injury and benefit mutually follow one another" means that because the five faculties and four sense objects are not separate, injury and benefit mutually follow one another. "Namely, what is spoken of in worldly convention as having sensation, wherein being touched by diverse conditions one perceives pain and pleasure" points to actual instances to explain it. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Appropriated dharmas are briefly of two kinds: first, that which is held as one's own through craving and the view of individual existence is termed 'appropriated'; second, that which serves as a cause capable of generating pain and pleasure is termed 'appropriated.'" This corresponds to the second.

2.69

On the text of the treatise: "Having thus explained appropriated and so forth… how many are not accumulated?": The seventh single-line verse clarifies the two gates of being derived from the great elements, being accumulated, and so forth. Concluding, citing the verse, and answering are intelligible from the text.

2.70

On "The treatise says… both are neither": This is the explanation. In the text there are two: first, explaining being derived from the great elements and so forth; second, explaining being accumulated and so forth. Concerning the explanation of being derived from the great elements and so forth, there are two: first, explaining which among the eighteen elements are derived from the great elements, etc.; second, recounting divergent doctrines. This is the first text. Within tangibles there are two: seven tangibles are derived, and the four great elements are the primary creators. The five faculties, the four sense objects, and unmanifest form subsumed under the element of mental objects are exclusively derived; the rest are neither.

2.71

On the text of the treatise: "The Venerable Buddhadeva… is exclusively of the nature of the great elements": This second [part] recounts the divergent doctrine. First it recounts, and then refutes. This text recounts.

2.72

On the text of the treatise: "His statement is not correct… as a matter of principle it is definitely not so": This is the refutation. It cites two sūtras to refute it; this is the first citation of a sūtra as a refutation. "His statement is not correct" is the general negation. "Because the sūtras state only the four characteristics of solidity and so forth to be the great elements": the sūtras only state the characteristic of solidity to be the earth element, the characteristic of moisture to be the water element, the characteristic of heat to be the fire element, and the characteristic of motion to be the wind element; they do not state that the characteristics of smoothness and so forth, blue and so forth, are the earth element and so forth. Therefore we know that characteristics such as smoothness are not the earth element and so forth. "Because these four great elements are subsumed exclusively under tangibles": the four characteristics of solidity and so forth are exclusively the sense-base of tangibles, so we know that the other sense-bases are not the four great elements. "Solidity, moisture, and so forth are not apprehended by the eye and so forth": form and so forth are apprehended by the eye and so forth, so we know they are not the great elements. "Form, sound, and so forth are not sensed by the body faculty": therefore we know that form and so forth are not the four great elements. "His statement is as a matter of principle definitely not so" is the conclusion.

2.73

On the text of the treatise: "Furthermore, the sūtra states… invisible and with resistance": This is the second citation of a sūtra as a refutation. In the text there are four: first, citing the text of the sūtra; second, explaining the sūtra's intent; third, an external objection; fourth, resolving the objection. This is the first text. In the sūtra it states that the five faculties and four sense objects are all exclusively derived, while the tangible element is stated to have both great elements and derived matter. This proves that the four great elements are exclusively primary creators, and are not form and so forth.

2.74

On the text of the treatise: "In this way in the sūtra… are none of them great elements": This second [part] explains the intent of the sūtra. It is intelligible from the text.

2.75

On the text of the treatise: "If so… and so on at length": This is the third [part], where an opponent cites a sūtra to object. "The sūtra says: 'In the fleshy mass of the eye, whatever internal solid nature, class of solidity,' etc."; therefore we know that the eye and so forth are the four great elements.

2.76

On the text of the treatise: "That statement… has no fault of contradiction": This fourth [part] resolves the objection. In the text there are two: first, resolving [the objection from] the cited sūtra; second, harmonizing [it with] the Garbhāvakrānti-sūtra. This is the first text. That [sūtra] speaks of the nature of solidity and so forth being present within the fleshy mass of the eye faculty; it does not mean that solidity and so forth are themselves the eye faculty. Thus there is no fault of contradiction.

2.77

On the text of the treatise: "In the Garbhāvakrānti-sūtra… because of the six contact bases": This harmonizes [it with] the Garbhāvakrānti-sūtra. That sūtra's statement of six elements refers to the four great elements, space, and consciousness, in order to establish the fundamental substance of a person. A person does not consist of only this much, but also has the six sense objects and mental factors. How is this known? Because that sūtra also speaks of the six contact bases of form and so forth.

2.78

On the text of the treatise: "Moreover, all mental factors… because they rely on mind": This is a counter-objection. If, because the sūtra speaks of the four great elements, there were no form and so forth, then when the sūtra speaks of the consciousness element, mental factors should also not exist; nor should one hold that mental factors are simply the mind itself, because the sūtra states that mental factors such as ideation and feeling rely on mind. If feeling, ideation, and so forth were simply the mind itself, why would the sūtra state that "mental factors rely on mind"?

2.79

On the text of the treatise: "Moreover, the sūtra also speaks of a mind with greed, and so forth": This again cites proof. Since it says "with greed," the mind cannot itself be greed.

2.80

On the text of the treatise: "From this, as before… the meaning of their distinction is established": This is the conclusion.

2.81

On the text of the treatise: "Having thus explained… because they are not atoms": The second major section explains being accumulated and so forth. It is intelligible from the text.

2.82

On the text of the treatise: "Having thus explained… how many are weighed?": The seventh single-line verse distinguishes the three gates of that which cuts, that which is cut, and so forth. Concluding, citing the verse, and answering are intelligible from the text.

2.83

On "The treatise says… this dharma is called cutting": This is the explanation. In the text there are three: first, explaining that which cuts and that which is cut; second, explaining together that which is burned and that which weighs; third, explaining together that which burns and that which is weighed. This is the first text. The text has two passages: first, clarifying that which cuts and that which is cut; second, clarifying that which is neither. This is the first text. That is, the external four elements, excluding sound, combined to form the axe and firewood, are that which cuts and that which is cut. What dharma is called "cutting"? Due to the axe separating the firewood so that it becomes two portions that continue to arise separately, this is termed "cutting."

2.84

On the text of the treatise: "The material faculties of the body and so forth… like the light of a jewel": This explains that the five faculties are neither. Because there are no faculties detached from the bodily limbs, they do not become two portions, and thus are not that which is cut. Like the light of jewels and the like, they are therefore not that which cuts.

2.85

On the text of the treatise: "As with that which cuts… because they are not continuous": This second [part] explains together that which is burned and that which weighs. The external four elements are that which is burned and that which weighs; the five faculties and sound are neither.

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese