俱舍論疏 20.6

20.6

The Śāstra says: "If in the future [...] all are able to bind." This explains the defilements of specific characteristics associated with mental consciousness. Although attachment, anger, and pride in the future are constantly and unfailingly fixed throughout their own cognitive objects, continually binding their cognitive objects while unabandoned, they must depend on seeing or hearing before they can actually arise; hence they do not definitely operate universally throughout the three time periods. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Attachment, anger, and pride are defilements of specific characteristics, as explained previously. Clear textual evidence is seen in various places throughout the sacred teachings. As a sūtra states: 'The Buddha told the mother of Civaracāra: "When your eye does not see visual form, does desire and attachment arise with that form as condition?" "No, Venerable One!"' and so forth in detail. Another sūtra states: 'The Buddha told the Great Mother: "What do you think? In regard to all visual forms that you have not seen with your eye, have never seen, will not see, and do not seek to see, do you on their account give rise to desire, give rise to attachment, give rise to affection, give rise to love, and so forth?" "No, Venerable One!"' and so forth in detail" (thus far the Śāstra's text). Because the arising of attachment, anger, and pride is not fixed, in regard to this thing, as long as it has already arisen and is not yet abandoned, it binds this thing. However, in this context there is binding of the three time periods, which may also be termed 'pervading the three time periods'. Past attachment and so forth cannot universally bind all defiled phenomena of the three time periods completely; the present, according to the varying breadth of its cognitive objects, binds whatever it arises in relation to. Although there are those that generally take the phenomena of the three time periods as cognitive objects, there is also no present attachment or the like that can take all defiled phenomena of the three time periods completely as cognitive objects. If they are defilements of specific characteristics associated with the mental consciousness of the future, speaking according to their general class, they take all defiled phenomena of the three time periods as cognitive objects. Even though this one does not bind it, that one does bind it. It is not that there are none that bind only the past and the future: just as a certain class of attachment binds only this visual consciousness and its associated mental factors whose nature is predetermined. When this consciousness does not arise, how could this not take only future phenomena as cognitive objects? By analogy with this, there are also those that take only past and present periods as cognitive objects, and those that generally bind phenomena of all three time periods. In the past and present, if they have arisen and are not yet abandoned, they bind the present and the past; objects that are not seen or heard are not bound by all past and present attachment and so forth.