俱舍論疏 20

English (machine translation) 20

Language: English

20.2

Chapter 5: Exposition of the Latent Defilements, Part Two

The Śāstra says: "Sentient beings in regard to this thing..."; from here on is the sixth major section, clarifying the scope—universal or restricted—of binding across the time periods. Within this there are four topics: 1. the scope of binding across the time periods; 2. proving the existence of the three time periods; 3. establishing the three time periods; 4. refuting the existence of the three time periods. The two verses below are the first: clarifying the scope of binding across the time periods. The intended meaning here is: examining the universal or restricted nature of binding by comparing the latent defilements of the three time periods that can bind against the things of the three time periods that are bound. What is now called a "thing" is the object bound. If a latent defilement increases in propensity in regard to this thing, it is termed "bound"; if it does not increase in propensity, it is not termed "bound". Such increasing in propensity does not require an actual present cognitive condition: even if located in the past or the future, as long as it is in an unabandoned state, it invariably increases in propensity. Increasing in propensity has two kinds: 1. increasing in propensity through association; 2. increasing in propensity through the cognitive object. In the unabandoned state, all latent defilements increase in propensity without difference of aspect in regard to their own associated [mental factors]. In regard to their own cognitive objects, they universally increase in propensity without difference of aspect. Because the cognitive object is fixed, one cannot say that there is universality or non-universality in regard to its own cognitive object. Although defilements have specific characteristics and shared characteristics, and the mental consciousness and the five consciousnesses differ in scope and power when grasping cognitive objects, their universal extension over their own cognitive objects has no difference of aspect. If one takes the latent defilements of the three time periods that can bind and compares them to what is bound, then according to whatever thing it may be, in distinguishing whether the defilements of the three time periods bind or do not bind, there are differences of universality and non-universality. Some commentators offer reckless explanations; fearing wordiness, I will not discuss them. Of these two verses, the first verse and a half clarifies defilements of specific characteristics, while the latter half verse clarifies defilements of shared characteristics. Within the first text, the first three lines clarify defilements of specific characteristics of the six consciousnesses in the past and present, while the latter three lines distinguish the differences of the future mental consciousness and the five [sense consciousnesses]. The seven characters at the head of the verse, "if in regard to this thing it is unabandoned", carry over into the sections below that clarify the scope of binding, because it must not yet be abandoned.

20.4

The Śāstra says: "The explanation says [...] carries over to the subsequent section." Although this generally divides latent defilements into two, it specifically explains the seven characters of the verse: "if in regard to this thing it is unabandoned".

20.5

The Śāstra says: "If in regard to this thing [...] because they definitely arise universally." This clarifies the difference in the bound objects of the defilements of specific characteristics of the past and present six consciousnesses.

20.6

The Śāstra says: "If in the future [...] all are able to bind." This explains the defilements of specific characteristics associated with mental consciousness. Although attachment, anger, and pride in the future are constantly and unfailingly fixed throughout their own cognitive objects, continually binding their cognitive objects while unabandoned, they must depend on seeing or hearing before they can actually arise; hence they do not definitely operate universally throughout the three time periods. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Attachment, anger, and pride are defilements of specific characteristics, as explained previously. Clear textual evidence is seen in various places throughout the sacred teachings. As a sūtra states: 'The Buddha told the mother of Civaracāra: "When your eye does not see visual form, does desire and attachment arise with that form as condition?" "No, Venerable One!"' and so forth in detail. Another sūtra states: 'The Buddha told the Great Mother: "What do you think? In regard to all visual forms that you have not seen with your eye, have never seen, will not see, and do not seek to see, do you on their account give rise to desire, give rise to attachment, give rise to affection, give rise to love, and so forth?" "No, Venerable One!"' and so forth in detail" (thus far the Śāstra's text). Because the arising of attachment, anger, and pride is not fixed, in regard to this thing, as long as it has already arisen and is not yet abandoned, it binds this thing. However, in this context there is binding of the three time periods, which may also be termed 'pervading the three time periods'. Past attachment and so forth cannot universally bind all defiled phenomena of the three time periods completely; the present, according to the varying breadth of its cognitive objects, binds whatever it arises in relation to. Although there are those that generally take the phenomena of the three time periods as cognitive objects, there is also no present attachment or the like that can take all defiled phenomena of the three time periods completely as cognitive objects. If they are defilements of specific characteristics associated with the mental consciousness of the future, speaking according to their general class, they take all defiled phenomena of the three time periods as cognitive objects. Even though this one does not bind it, that one does bind it. It is not that there are none that bind only the past and the future: just as a certain class of attachment binds only this visual consciousness and its associated mental factors whose nature is predetermined. When this consciousness does not arise, how could this not take only future phenomena as cognitive objects? By analogy with this, there are also those that take only past and present periods as cognitive objects, and those that generally bind phenomena of all three time periods. In the past and present, if they have arisen and are not yet abandoned, they bind the present and the past; objects that are not seen or heard are not bound by all past and present attachment and so forth.

20.7

The śāstra says, 'The [defilements associated with the] future five consciousnesses... can also bind the three time periods.' This explains the defilements associated with the five consciousnesses. If they have already arisen, they immediately bind; in this regard, the mental [consciousness] and the five [consciousnesses] are identical, so they are not mentioned separately. Greedy desire, etc., associated with the mental consciousness, whether arisen or unarisen, are all capable of universally traversing the dharmas of the three time periods. Those associated with the five consciousnesses, when arisen, [bind] only their own time period, whereas when unarisen, they pervade all three, which is why they are explained separately. As for the unarisen pervading the three, this is because the basis and object of the five consciousnesses must be simultaneous. When they arise, they must be simultaneous, but when unarisen, their objective realms can admit the three time periods, because objects such as visible forms move through the three time periods without depending on consciousness. If consciousness arises, it necessarily depends on the object, so although the time periods differ, their intrinsic binding is fixed. Among them there are two [aspects]: either causing the cognitive object to pass through its three time periods, or with respect to a single cognitive object, irregularly demarcating its three time periods. Now one should point to an actual matter to formulate this question and answer. Question: Is it possible that with respect to this one matter of visible form—this merely pointing to this matter without asking about the three time periods—the greedy desire, etc., of the three time periods in this matter binds or does not bind with respect to this matter? Answer: Past and present greedy desire, anger, pride, etc., which arose taking this matter as an object, bind it as long as they are not yet abandoned. If past and present greedy desire, anger, pride, etc., arose taking other dharmas as objects, they do not bind this matter. And even though they arose taking this one matter of visible form as an object, if they have been abandoned by the path of antidotes, they do not bind it. Of binding there is one kind: following what has already arisen and is not abandoned. Of non-binding there are two classes: namely, not having arisen taking this as an object, and having taken it as an object but having been abandoned. This applies across all six consciousnesses; self-characteristic defilements are all identical to this. If they are in the future, there is a difference: those associated with the mental consciousness definitely bind this matter, because in the future there must be numerous [moments of] greedy desire, etc., whose fixed nature regarding their cognitive objects binds this. Therefore, in the future, both arisen and unarisen have universal traversal; both arisen and unarisen bind this one matter of visible form. As for those associated with eye-consciousness, those that are capable of arising are called binding their own time period and are not called universally traversing. Those that do not arise definitely have one class that binds this matter. Because within the same objective realm of visible form at a single moment there must be numerous consciousnesses in general and in particular, among these numerous consciousnesses only one manages to arise while the rest do not arise. There is no single matter of visible form in the past or present that is not bound by the numerous unarisen [moments of] greedy desire, etc., associated with future eye-consciousness; because of this, the unarisen is called universally traversing. Views, doubt, and ignorance in the past and future definitely bind this one matter, because in both time periods they universally traverse. Regarding those that currently arise: if they take it as an object, they bind it; if they do not take it as an object, they do not bind it. Hence the Vibhāṣā, formulating questions and answers by going through six clauses and so on, says: 'With respect to this matter, is it possible that it is bound by the fetter of past craving and also bound by the fetter of future craving? That it is bound by the fetter of future craving, and also bound by the fetter of past craving? This should be answered by conforming to the previous clause.' Thus, wherever there is binding by the fetter of past craving, there must also be binding by the fetter of future craving. The reason it is called 'conforming to the previous clause' is that one goes through six clauses. In every single clause there are two question-and-answer pairs; this is identical to the previous clause, hence it is called 'conforming to the previous clause', and is also called 'answering in conformity with the previous clause'. The second clause: 'The question asks: Is it possible that it is bound by the fetter of future craving, and also bound by the fetter of past craving? The answer says: If previously it did not arise, or if having arisen it has been abandoned, then it does not bind. If previously it arose and has not been abandoned, then it binds.' These words 'abandoned' and 'not abandoned' are not stated with respect to the future as equal grades. Craving has three grades; with respect to this one matter of visible form there can be three grades of craving: not arising taking this one matter of visible form as an object but arising taking other matters as objects. Arising taking other matters as objects, these three grades of craving all do not bind this one matter of visible form. If previously it did not arise and does not bind, in principle this must apply across all three grades. If having previously arisen it has been abandoned and does not bind, among the three grades this is either the superior grade, the middling grade, or the superior and middling spoken together; it certainly cannot be the inferior grade, because it has already been said that the future binds, and the abandonment of defilements must be abandoned simultaneously across the three time periods. If the inferior grade in the past period is abandoned, all three grades in the future are abandoned, and one could not say that there is binding by the fetter of future craving. The principle is definitely as stated above. If previously it arose and has not been abandoned and thus binds, this also applies across the three grades; in principle it must be so. Vibhāṣā fascicle 58, going through six questions, says: 'If with respect to this matter there is binding by the fetter of past craving, is there also [binding by] future [craving]? Answer: Yes. Supposing there is future [craving], is there also past [craving]? Answer: If previously it arose and has not been abandoned, it binds. If previously it did not arise, or supposing it arose it has been abandoned, it does not bind. Question: When the fetter of past craving has already been abandoned, at that very time the fetter of future craving has also already been abandoned. When the fetter of past craving has not been abandoned, at that very time the fetter of future craving has also not been abandoned. Now why do you say that if previously it arose and has not been abandoned it binds, but if previously it did not arise, or supposing it arose it has been abandoned, it does not bind? The foreign masters spoke thus: "If previously it arose and has not been abandoned it binds" refers to the middle three grades of fetters. "If previously it did not arise it does not bind" refers to the lower three grades of fetters. "Supposing it arose it has been abandoned it does not bind" refers to the upper three grades of fetters. The masters of the Kaśmīra country say: "If previously it arose and has not been abandoned it binds" refers to the nine grades of fetters. "If previously it did not arise it does not bind" refers to the latter three grades of fetters. "Supposing it arose it has been abandoned it does not bind" refers to the former six grades of fetters. Just as in the past the former six grades of the fetter of craving have been abandoned, so it is in the future. Although the latter three grades of the fetter of craving have not been abandoned, because they have not arisen, in the future they constitute binding, but not in the past. What is meant here is: If with respect to this matter there is a fetter of future craving that has not been abandoned, and there is also a fetter that arose previously that has not been abandoned, then with respect to this matter there is also the sense of being bound by the fetter of past craving. If with respect to this matter, although there is a fetter of future craving that has not been abandoned, yet previously with respect to this the fetter of craving did not arise—even though it arose elsewhere, with respect to this matter it is also called unarisen—or supposing it arose it has been abandoned, then with respect to this matter there is no sense of being bound by the fetter of past craving.' The above is the first clause; in truth the number of grades should be as explained before. However, the Vibhāṣā says: 'If having arisen it has not been abandoned and thus binds' speaking of nine grades, this is stated based on one who is fully bound. 'If previously it did not arise it does not bind' and 'those that arose have been abandoned and thus do not bind', these are both stated based on the abandonment of six grades. That corresponds to the fruit of a once-returner; this is based on the presence of binding, so it is not the fruit of a non-returner, etc. Because arising elsewhere is called not binding, it is not that they are already abandoned; because of abandonment, one is not fully bound. 'If previously it did not arise it does not bind' speaks of the latter three grades, based on the once-returner. 'Supposing it arose it has been abandoned it does not bind' speaks of the former six grades, which is also the once-returner. One should reflect further on this. 'If with respect to this matter there is binding by the fetter of past craving, is there also present [craving]? Answer: If it is currently present. Supposing there is present [craving], is there also past [craving]? Answer: If previously it arose and has not been abandoned, etc. (and so forth, as before. The above is the second clause). If with respect to this matter there is binding by the fetter of future craving, is there also present [craving]? Answer: If it is currently present. Supposing there is present [craving], is there also future [craving]? Answer: Yes (the above is the third clause). If with respect to this matter there is binding by the fetter of past craving, is there also future and present [craving]? Answer: The future definitely binds; the present [binds] if it is currently present. Supposing there is future and present [craving], is there also past [craving]? Answer: If previously it arose and has not been abandoned, etc. (the above is the fourth clause). If with respect to this matter there is binding by the fetter of future craving, is there also past and present [craving]? Answer: Here there are four clauses (as appropriate). Supposing there is past and present [craving], is there also future [craving]? Answer: Yes (the above is the fifth clause). If with respect to this matter there is binding by the fetter of present craving, is there also past and future [craving]? Answer: The future definitely binds; the past [binds] if previously it arose and has not been abandoned, etc. Supposing there is past and future [craving], is there also present [craving]? Answer: If it is currently present (the above is the sixth clause). Just as the fetter of craving goes through the six, one should know that the fetters of hostility, pride, envy, stinginess, and non-universal ignorance also go through the six in the same way, because the meaning of fetters confused about self-characteristics is similar. Just as views go through the six, one should know that [view-]grasping, doubt, etc., going through the six are also like this, because the meaning of fetters confused about common characteristics is similar. Although there are differences of breadth and narrowness, they are of a similar kind (the above goes through the six clauses). If with respect to this matter there is past craving, is there also binding by the fetter of past hostility? Answer: If previously it arose and has not been abandoned it binds, etc. Supposing there is binding by the fetter of past hostility, is there also binding by the fetter of past craving (the above is the first clause of the lesser seven)? If with respect to this matter there is binding by the fetter of past craving, is there also binding by the fetter of future hostility? Supposing there is binding by the fetter of future hostility, is there also binding by the fetter of past craving (the second clause)? If with respect to this matter there is binding by the fetter of past craving, is there also binding by the fetter of present hostility? Supposing there is binding by the fetter of present hostility, is there also binding by the fetter of past craving (the third clause)? If with respect to this matter there is binding by the fetter of past craving, is there also binding by the fetters of past and present hostility (answer: here there are four clauses)? Supposing there is binding by the fetters of past and present hostility, is there also binding by the fetter of past craving (the above is the fourth clause)? If with respect to this matter there is past craving, is there also future and present hostility (answer: here there are three clauses)? Supposing there is future and present hostility, is there also binding by the fetter of past craving (the above is the fifth clause)? If with respect to this matter there is the fetter of past craving, is there also past and future hostility (answer: here there are three clauses)? Supposing there is past and future hostility, is there also binding by the fetter of past craving (the above is the sixth clause)? If with respect to this matter there is binding by the fetter of past craving, is there also binding by the fetters of past, future, and present hostility? Answer: Here there are five clauses. Supposing there is binding by the fetters of past, future, and present hostility, is there also binding by the fetter of past craving (the above is the seventh clause)? Just as it is matched against the fetter of hostility, matching against the fetters of envy and stinginess is also like this. Matching craving against them forms the lesser seven clauses; just as there are the lesser seven, so there are the greater seven. The difference is: matching two against one, up to matching eight against one. That is, matching past craving and hostility first against past pride, next against future [pride], next against present [pride], next against past and present [pride], next against future and present [pride], next against past and future [pride], and again against past, future, and present [pride]. Question: What is the difference between one-line, traversing six, lesser seven, and greater seven? Answer: Furthermore, formulating questions and answers by matching dissimilar dharmas against dissimilar dharmas without determining by time period is called 'one-line'. Formulating questions and answers by matching similar dharmas against similar dharmas determined by time period is called 'traversing six'. Formulating questions and answers by matching dissimilar dharmas against dissimilar dharmas, determined by time period and matching one against one, is called 'lesser seven'. Formulating questions and answers by matching similar dharmas against dissimilar dharmas, determined by time period and matching two against one up to matching eight against one, is called 'greater seven'. This is the distinction. If they are common-characteristic defilements, they are not answered like this. Is it possible that what is bound by the fetter of past views is also [bound by] future [views]? Answer: Yes. Is it possible that what is bound by the fetter of future views is also [bound by] past [views]? Answer: Yes. This is asking about equals with equals, answered with an affirmative clause. If past and future are matched against the present, the past and future definitely bind, while the present binds if it arises.'

20.8

On the Śāstra's statement: "All the rest […] are able to bind this matter": this explains the defilements possessing a common characteristic. "Views, doubt, and ignorance": ignorance refers to unshared ignorance; associated ignorance is explained according to that with which it is associated. These views, doubt, and so forth throughout the past and future universally bind [dharmas of] all three time periods, while in the present it is indefinite. Because of this, both past and future are universal; this is because they run universally across the three time periods. Now, summarizing further: with greed and so forth associated with the mental consciousness in the future, whether they arise or do not arise, they are all universal, because they run universally across the three time periods; in the past and present, it is indefinite. Greed and so forth associated with the five consciousnesses are universal only when not arising in the future, because they run universally across the three time periods; in the past, present, and when arising, they are definitely not universal. Defilements possessing a common characteristic are all universal in the past and future, because they run universally across the three time periods; in the present, it is indefinite. None of these are spoken of as universal or non-universal with respect to their own objective cognitive spheres.

20.9

On the Śāstra's statement: "One should distinguish among these matters […] and dissociation from binding?": this is a question by the Sautrāntika. If past and future exist, they should be permanent. If past and future do not exist, one cannot speak of binding and non-binding.

20.10

On the Śāstra's statement: "The Vaibhāṣikas […] because they are conjoined with conditioned characteristics": this presents the Sarvāstivāda tenet. Past and future definitely exist yet are not permanent—this establishes their proposition; because they are conjoined with the conditioned characteristics—this establishes the logical reason.

20.11

On the Śāstra's statement: "In order to decisively clarify what has been established here": from here down through one verse is the second part, citing reasoning and scriptural authority to prove the existence of the three time periods.

20.12

"The Śāstra says: The three time periods are real existents": this establishes the thesis.

20.13

On the Śāstra's statement: "Why is this so?": this asks for scriptural authority and reasoning.

20.14

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because the World-Honoured One said so in the sūtras": this answers by citing scriptural authority.

20.15

On the Śāstra's statement: "That is, the World-Honoured One said […] diligently cultivate revulsion and abandonment": this cites the first sūtra to prove the existence of the past.

20.16

On the Śāstra's statement: "If future matter […] diligently sever longing and pursuit": this cites a sūtra to prove the existence of the future.

20.17

On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, endowed with two conditions […] it would lack the two conditions": this cites the second sūtra as proof. If past and future were non-existent, consciousness cognizing past and future would lack the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya), which would contradict what the sūtra states: that consciousness arises from two conditions.

20.18

On the Śāstra's statement: "Having already based oneself on sacred teaching […] to prove the existence of past and future": this concludes the preceding and introduces what follows; it is easy to understand from the text.

20.19

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because when consciousness arises […] consciousness also ought to be non-existent": this is the first line of reasoning.

20.20

On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, an act that has already ceased […] there being a present cause": this is the second line of reasoning.

20.21

On the Śāstra's statement: "Due to this scriptural authority and reasoning […] the two time periods are real existents": this concludes their own school's position. Upon detailed inspection, the Sarvāstivādin position that past and future exist substantially differs from the existence of the present; and the lack of substantiality in past and future differs from the non-existence of a rabbit's horns. If it were the same as the present, it would not be past or future; if it were like a rabbit's horns, it could not serve as an object generating mind. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Establishing the past and future is not like present existence, nor is it like the non-existence of a horse's horns and the like." It also states: "To serve as an object generating awareness is the characteristic of true existence." The Dārṣṭāntikas say: "When the two awarenesses of a fire-wheel and of a self arise, their objects do not exist. If all awarenesses possessed an object, then there would be no application of resolute intention. Furthermore, regarding dreams, clouded vision, and the consciousness of two moons in the mundane world, their objects do not exist." The Nyāyānusāra defends: "The arising of the awareness of a wheel is not entirely without an object. It is the color of the burning fire itself, moving rapidly in circles across other spaces, that serves as the object of this awareness; yet the substance of the burning fire's color is not actually a wheel. When the awareness arises thinking it is a wheel, it is an inversion in the awareness's aspect regarding the object, not that this wheel-awareness arises cognizing a non-existent object. The awareness of a self should be explained in accordance with this: this awareness of a self takes the aggregates such as matter as its object; there is only an aspect, an inverted arising of taking the non-self as self, not that the cognitive object itself is non-existent. The application of resolute intention should be understood to arise accordingly: a yogin, having seen a minor mark, through the power of his own resolute intention generates a vast aspect regarding what has been seen and gives rise to such an awareness; this awareness takes the aggregates as its cognitive object. Those who abide in secluded wilderness say: 'The arising of such marks is the fruit of superior samādhi, meaning that the power of superior samādhi in the state of concentration induces the arising of vast marks.' Just as transformations in dreams cognize objects previously experienced in the past—as when a person dreams of seeing a rabbit with horns, having previously seen a rabbit in one place and horns in another, now in a dream, due to mental confusion, recalls them combined in a single place—so because of cataracts on the sensory organ one grasps objects unclearly, and therefore gives rise to an inverted comprehension regarding the object. Although the aspect is inverted, the object is not non-existent. For a person with clouded vision must see various colors in a place where color exists, not entirely without color; otherwise, they would see them in a place without color. When eye-consciousness arises, it sees only a single moon; through impairment of the sense faculty, the consciousness produced is unclear, and a confused awareness arises thinking there are multiple moons. It is not that this awareness arises cognizing a non-existent thing; it takes the lunar disc itself as its cognitive object. If it were not so, it would be seen where there is no moon. Since this consciousness does not arise where there is no moon, it takes the lunar disc itself as its object." As there are further arguments and refutations, I will not elaborate for fear of prolixity.

20.22

On the Śāstra's statement: "If one considers oneself to be […] one is not subsumed under this school": this distinguishes other schools. As for the Vibhajyavādins, they state that among meanings some exist and some do not, requiring further distinction (vibhajya); hence they are named the Vibhajyavāda school. The old Vibhāṣā says 'Vibhajyavādī' (pipo shepotī), which is erroneous; the new Vibhāṣā says 'Vibhajyavādī' (pipo shefūdī). 'Pipo' (vibha-) here means distinction (vibhajya), and 'fūdī' (-vādī) here means assertion (vāda). The Samayabhedoparacanacakra states: "The Kaśyapīya school posits that if the fruit of an action has already ripened, it does not exist; if the fruit has not yet ripened, it exists. Their tenet is identical to that of the Vibhajyavādins."

20.23

On the Śāstra's statement: "Now, how many differences are there within this school?": from here down through one verse is the third part, establishing the three time periods.

20.24

"The Śāstra says: […] not that there is a difference in substantial entity": this explains the interpretation of Dharmatrāta. The substantial entity of dharmas across the three time periods is without distinction; there is only a difference in their states/modes (bhāva).

20.25

On the Śāstra's statement: "Just as when a golden vessel is broken […] it does not cast aside its visible color": this provides an analogy for clarification.

20.26

On the Śāstra's statement: "Thus all dharmas […] do not cast aside or acquire their substantial entity": this is the application of the analogy. Just as gold is one, yet altering a vase into a basin discards the vase and acquires the basin, without acquiring or discarding the gold.

20.27

On the Śāstra's statement: "Venerable Ghoṣaka […] separate from past and future characteristics": this presents the second position. Ghoṣaka's intention is to say: conditioned dharmas have three kinds of characteristics, namely past, present, and future. When correctly conjoined with one, they are not called separated from the other two. They receive their name from conjunction, not from non-separation.

20.28

On the Śāstra's statement: "Just as a person passionately attached […] is not called free from passion": this provides an analogy for clarification.

20.29

On the Śāstra's statement: "Venerable Vasumitra […] not that there is a difference in substantial entity": this presents the third position. This master's intention is to say: conditioned dharmas have their three states/positions (avasthā), namely past, present, and future; the substantial entity of the dharma is one, and its name differs in accordance with its state.

20.30

On the Śāstra's statement: "Just as moving a single counting token […] placed in the thousand's place it is named a thousand": this provides an analogy for clarification.

20.31

On the Śāstra's statement: "Venerable Buddhadeva […] the designation established is different": this presents the fourth position. That master's intention is to say: in relation to the past and present it is named the future; in relation to the present and future it is named the past; in relation to the past and future it is named the present.

20.32

On the Śāstra's statement: "Just as a single woman is called mother and called daughter": this provides an analogy for clarification.

20.33

On the Śāstra's statement: "Among these four kinds of Sarvāstivādins": from here down the author of the Śāstra critiques and assesses them.

20.34

On the Śāstra's statement: "The first, adhering to [change of] state […] among the faction of the non-Buddhists": this points out the flaw that the first master is identical to non-Buddhists.

20.35

On the Śāstra's statement: "What is established by the second […] the characteristics of the three time periods": this points out the flaw of confusion of the time periods for the second master.

20.36

On the Śāstra's statement: "A man toward his wife […] in what sense is this the same?": this points out the flaw of disparity between the doctrine and the analogy.

20.37

On the Śāstra's statement: "What is established by the fourth […] should also be understood similarly": this points out the flaw in the fourth position. In the past there are three moments—before, middle, and after; relative to the first two, it should be called future; relative to the latter two, it should be called past; relative to before and after, it should be called present. The present, relative to the two preceding moments, should be called future; relative to the two succeeding moments, should be called past; relative to the moments before and after, should be called present. The future should be considered analogously.

20.38

On the Śāstra's statement: "Therefore, among these four, the third is the best": this evaluates the third position.

20.39

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because it establishes them based on activity […] not that there is a difference in substantial entity": this gives the reason why it is the best.

20.40

On the Śāstra's statement: "This has already been fully known […] what is meant by past and future?": this is the fourth part, refuting the existence of the three time periods. This is an objection by the Sautrāntika.

20.41

On the Śāstra's statement: "Was it not stated before that they are established based on activity?": this is the reply of the Sarvāstivādin.

20.42

On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, then present […] what activity does it have?": this is an objection by the Sautrāntika.

20.43

On the Śāstra's statement: "Can it not grasp the fruit and give the fruit?": this is the reply of the Sarvāstivādin. Although it lacks the activity of seeing color and so forth, it possesses the activity of grasping the fruit and giving the fruit.

20.44

On the Śāstra's statement: "Then the past […] the characteristics of the time periods would be confused": this is an objection by the Sautrāntika. If you take grasping the fruit and giving the fruit as activity, past similar causes (sabhāgahetu) and maturation causes (vipākahetu) can only give the fruit and cannot grasp the fruit; present maturation causes and the like can only grasp the fruit and cannot give the fruit. In this case, activity is half-present and half-absent, so they should be called present and also called past or future. Because within a single time period there would be three time periods, the time periods would become confused. The Nyāyānusāra defends: "What our school calls activity refers to grasping the fruit; the activity of grasping the fruit is definitely in the present, while all other capacities are functions (kāritra/sāmarthya). Our school establishes the three time periods based on the presence or absence of activity, not of functions." Now, considering in detail: if the Nyāyānusāra provides this explanation, then an immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya) would grasp its fruit in the present, which incurs the error of contradicting the Vibhāṣā.

20.45

On the Śāstra's statement: "Having briefly scrutinized, we will next broadly refute": from here down is the fourth part, consisting of one verse broadly refuting. The text has four sections: first, refuting the division of the three time periods by activity; second, refuting conjunction with conditioned characteristics; third, resolving the citations of the two sūtras; fourth, refuting the two lines of reasoning.

20.46

"The Śāstra says: […] sometimes present and sometimes absent": this explains the three characters "what hinders activity" in the opening line of the verse. "If it is said that the self-nature of dharmas is permanently existent": this takes up the Sarvāstivāda thesis. "It should be able to produce activity at all times": this challenges the Sarvāstivāda. If you hold that having activity is called present, and lacking activity is called past or future, activity relies upon the substantial entity; since the substantial entity is permanently existent, activity should likewise be so—what hinders this activity so that it is sometimes present and sometimes absent?

20.47

On the Śāstra's statement: "If it is said that the assembly of conditions […] because it is accepted that they are permanently existent": this takes up the defense and rejects it. When the assembly of conditions converges, there is activity; when the assembly of conditions has not yet converged, there is no activity—hence activity is sometimes present and sometimes absent. This defense is illogical: since these conditions themselves are also accepted to be permanently existent, by what means could there be times of convergence and non-convergence?

20.48

On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, this activity […] has another activity": this is a repeated refutation. If having activity is called present and lacking activity is called past and future, by what activity are past, future, and present established? This explains the three characters "how is activity [defined]?" at the end of the opening line of the verse. The character "activity" applies in two directions: pointing upward, it forms "what hinders activity"; pointing downward, it forms "how is activity [defined]?"

20.49

On the Śāstra's statement: "If this activity […] activity exists": this is a defense.

20.50

On the Śāstra's statement: "Then, because it is unconditioned […] dharmas are named past and future": this refutes the further defense. If activity were neither past, future, nor present, yet could be said to exist, it would entail two errors: first, the error of being identical to the unconditioned; second, the error of undermining their established thesis.

20.51

On the Śāstra's statement: "If one accepts that activity […] there is this error": this is the Sarvāstivādin's defense. That is, it explains the two characters "no difference" in the second line of the verse.

20.52

On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, what you establish […] the meaning of the time periods is not established": this is the refutation. It explains the latter three characters, "the time periods are ruined", in the second line of the verse.

20.53

On the Śāstra's statement: "Why is it not established?": this is the counter-question by the Sarvāstivādin.

20.54

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because conditioned dharmas […] is named the past": this gives the reason why the three time periods are not established.

20.55

The Śāstra says: "They should also explain... is called 'already destroyed'": this explains the third line of the verse. If they claim that the substance of an entity exists just as the present does, what was it previously lacking, such that because it did not yet exist it was called 'not yet arisen'? And later, what is it lacking again, such that because it no longer exists it is called 'already destroyed'?

20.56

The Śāstra says: "Therefore, to disallow that entities... all fail to be established": this is the general conclusion. The above refutes distinguishing the three times on the basis of activity.

20.57

The Śāstra says: "However, as for what they say... because the principle of arising and ceasing is impossible": this secondly refutes their union with the conditioned characteristics.

20.58

The Śāstra says: "To accept that the substance always exists... has never occurred": this is the refutation.

20.59

The Śāstra says: "Based on this principle... this is truly the work of Īśvara": this cites a verse to refute it. Within the text there are three points: First, refuting by the impossibility of arising and ceasing. Although united with the characteristics, because the substance always exists, the principle of arising and ceasing is impossible. Second, refuting by the non-difference between nature and substance. Substance and nature are not distinct; that the substance is eternal while its nature is impermanent has never occurred. Third is the concluding verse, which can be understood from the text.

20.60

The Śāstra says: "Furthermore, as for what they say... exists substantially just like the present": this thirdly resolves [the objections based on] citing the two sūtras. Within this there are two parts: first, resolving the World-Honoured One's statement that the past and future exist; second, resolving the World-Honoured One's statement that consciousness arises from two conditions. This is the first. The Sautrāntika masters say: We also say that the past, future, and present exist; that is, having once existed and so forth is called 'existing'. Because the past has causes and the future has fruits, they are called 'existing'. Another explanation: because there are present fruits, one knows that there are past causes; because there are present causes, one knows that there are future fruits. This is unlike the Sarvāstivādins' view that the past and future exist substantially just like the present.

20.61

The Śāstra says: "Who says that their existence is like the present time?": the Sarvāstivādins do not accept this.

20.62

The Śāstra says: "If not like the present, how do they exist?": the Sautrāntikas ask in return.

20.63

The Śāstra says: "They have the intrinsic nature of the two times, past and future": the Sarvāstivādins reply.

20.64

The Śāstra says: "This should again be questioned... is of the nature of the past and future": if all three times exist, how can it be said that they are not present, but rather of the nature of the past and future? The Sautrāntikas refute the Sarvāstivādins.

20.65

The Śāstra says: "Therefore, saying that they exist... their substances do not substantially exist": the Sautrāntikas state their own tenet and negate the Sarvāstivādins.

20.66

The Śāstra says: "In order to avert... whether existing or non-existing": the Sautrāntikas state that the sūtra actually does not intend to state substantial existence, because the word 'exists' generally indicates both existing and non-existing entities.

20.67

The Śāstra says: "Just as in worldly conventions it is said... its meaning should be understood likewise": this brings together the simile and its application. Just as in worldly conventions it is said, 'There is a lamp that was absent the day before', 'There is a lamp that was absent yesterday'—when saying 'there is an absence of a lamp', how could there be a lamp? At that time there is no lamp, yet one says 'there is a lamp'; hence we know that the word 'exists' does not solely indicate an existing entity. 'There is a lamp that has already been extinguished' should also be understood accordingly. Since one says 'already extinguished', this is non-existence of a lamp, yet one speaks of a lamp; hence we know that one speaks of 'existence' with respect to non-existence.

20.68

The Śāstra says: "If it were not so, the nature of past and future could not be established": the Sautrāntika master says: If one does not explain, as I do, that 'having once existed' is called 'existing' and 'bound to exist' is called 'existing', and instead establishes, as the Sarvāstivādins do, that the three times have substances, then the nature of past and future could not be established, because both would equally have substance.

20.69

The Śāstra says: "If so, on what grounds... is nevertheless existing?": the Sarvāstivādins cite a sūtra to raise an objection. If you claim that the past and future have no substance at all, why did the World-Honoured One say that karma has passed away and yet still exists? Hence we know that the past and future are not non-existent.

20.70

The Śāstra says: "Do they not accept... implicitly said to exist?": the Sautrāntikas resolve the sūtra. At the time when karma is performed in the past, it perfumed the continuum with the capacity to give fruit, and within the present body it is implicitly said that the perfuming that has already occurred 'exists'.

20.71

The Śāstra says: "If it were not so... how could the past be established?": the Sautrāntikas question the Sarvāstivādins in return. If past karma exists with a substantial nature at present, how could the past be established? It should be called present.

20.72

The Śāstra says: "In principle it must indeed be so... words such as 'previously non-existent'": the Sautrāntikas cite what is stated in the *Paramārthaśūnyatā-sūtra*. If the past and future visual faculty had substantial nature, the sūtra would not say: 'Having previously been non-existent, it now exists; having existed, it returns to non-existence.'

20.73

The Śāstra says: "If they say that these words... the thesis is already established": the Sautrāntikas proactively refute the Sarvāstivādins' resolution of the sūtra. The Sarvāstivādin resolves it by saying: 'Previously non-existent' means it was previously non-existent as present, and now exists as present; 'previously existent and now non-existent' means it was previously existent as present, and is now non-existent as present. To make such a rescue is unreasonable, because the present nature and the substance of that visual faculty are not distinct. If there is no present nature, there is no visual faculty; this demonstrates that the past and future lack the substance of the visual faculty, and the thesis is already established.

20.74

The Śāstra says: "Furthermore, as for what they say... its substance really exists": this takes up the Sarvāstivādins' citation of the second sūtra to resolve it.

20.75

The Śāstra says: "We should jointly consider... serves as an objective condition": the Sautrāntikas examine the Sarvāstivādins with a dilemma.

20.76

The Śāstra says: "If an entity, like the mind... is not logically sound": this refutes the first horn, that it acts like the mind as a generative condition. For instance, when consciousness takes the future as an object, after hundreds of thousands of kalpas that entity will exist, or it may never exist at all. Since it does not yet have an activity, how could it generate present consciousness? Furthermore, the nature of nirvāṇa is contrary to the arising of all contaminated dharmas; how could it serve as a condition to generate the consciousness that cognizes it?

20.77

The Śāstra says: "If an entity can merely... is also an intentional object": this states the second horn, which accords with the Sautrāntika position.

20.78

The Śāstra says: "If it is non-existent, how can it become an intentional object?": the Sarvāstivādins object. Since your Sautrāntika school states that the past and future are non-existent, how can they become intentional objects of consciousness?

20.79

The Śāstra says: "I say that their existence is just as they become an intentional object": the Sautrāntikas reply. Taking past and future objects as intentional objects is just as taking the present as an intentional object is established.

20.80

The Śāstra says: "How does it become an intentional object?": the Sarvāstivādins, not understanding the intent of the reply, ask again, or raise an objection: Since the past and future are non-existent, how do they become intentional objects?

20.81

The Śāstra says: "Namely, having once existed, or being bound to exist... bound to exist is also like this": the Sautrāntikas explain the objection. If you claim that the past and future exist in the same way as the present, why is it that when recollecting that time, one only recollects the aspect of 'having once existed'? Looking forward [to the future] is also like this.

20.82

The Śāstra says: "That is, just as having once been present... is existent as future": this is a further broad explanation.

20.83

The Śāstra says: "If they exist like the present... the principle is naturally established": the Sautrāntikas press the Sarvāstivādins from both sides. If they claim that the past and future exist like the present, they would become the present time. If their substance is presently non-existent, unlike the present, then they must admit that there is a consciousness that takes a non-existent object, and the principle is naturally established.

20.84

The Śāstra says: "If they say that the past and future... because it is not scattered": the Sautrāntikas take up an alternative hypothesis of the Sarvāstivādins to refute it. If they say that the past and future exist identically to the present, but present matter consists of aggregated subtle atoms, whereas future and past subtle atoms are scattered and different from the present, and are thus termed 'past' and 'future'—when you cognize past and future matter, you do not apprehend a scattered aspect; therefore, we know it is not a difference of aggregation and dispersion.

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese