俱舍論疏 26.32

26.32

On the Śāstra's statement: "When the World-Honoured One wishes to know [...] he is capable of knowing all": this explains that the Buddha, without [deliberate] preparation (prayoga), is able to know everything. Question: Why is the entity of the untainted (anāsrava) knowledge of others' minds only the knowledge of the path (mārgajñāna), and not the other [three] knowledges? Answer: The Nyāyānusāra states: "Because untainted knowledge definitely cannot know others' tainted minds and mental factors (Commentary: this refers to the knowledges of suffering and origination being unable to know [them]). The untainted minds and mental factors in another's person, because they are subtle and superior, are not the objective domain of one's own tainted knowledge of others' minds. This principle is reasonable. For what reason is one's own untainted knowledge of others' minds unable to know others' tainted minds and mental factors? Because when untainted knowledge arises with respect to tainted objects, its aspect (ākāra) and objective support (ālambana) are different from this knowledge. That is to say, when untainted knowledge takes the tainted as its objective support, it must be a comprehensive apprehension with an aspect of revulsion; therefore, it definitely cannot distinctively apprehend others' minds and mental factors to constitute knowledge of others' minds. For whenever the noble knowledges take the tainted as their objective support, they must generate deep revulsion toward the objective support, delighting in comprehensive abandonment and not delighting in distinctive observation; whereas when taking the untainted as an objective support, they generate joy and delight. Having already observed comprehensively, they also delight in observing distinctively. Just as when seeing or hearing something disagreeable, one comprehensively apprehends it and then abandons it, not delighting in distinctively apprehending it; but with what is agreeable it is not so: having comprehensively seen or heard it, one also delights in distinctively apprehending it. Therefore, with respect to others' tainted minds and so forth, there is definitely no noble knowledge that observes each one distinctively so as to constitute an apprehension of tainted minds. Untainted knowledge of others' minds, because it is knowledge of others' minds, definitely knows others' minds and mental factors individually and distinctively. Is there not also the patience and knowledge of suffering and origination subsumed within the three foundations of mindfulness (Commentary: if untainted knowledge cannot distinctively apprehend, why do the knowledges of suffering and origination subsumed under the three foundations of mindfulness distinctively apprehend minds, feelings, and mental factors)? Although they exist, they do not merely apprehend a single dharma, because they apprehend multiple entities (Commentary: when knowledge of others' minds arises, it apprehends a single dharma and cannot apprehend two or three minds, etc.; those subsumed under the three foundations of mindfulness apprehend multiple minds, etc., and because they apprehend multiples, they are not subsumed under distinctive apprehension)."