俱舍論疏 26

English (machine translation) 26

Language: English

26.2

Chapter Seven: Exposition of Knowledge, Part One

'Exposition of Knowledge': Discernment (prajñā) that reaches a definitive resolution regarding what has previously been observed is called 'knowledge' (jñāna). Alternatively, when the inclination to seek observation of an object has ceased, and the preparatory application has become relaxed, it is called 'knowledge'. The types of knowledge vary, but do not exceed ten kinds; this chapter explains them at length, hence it is called the 'Exposition'. Knowledge is the path itself, and the path is the cause of cessation; the preceding chapter on the Noble Ones explained the persons accomplished through the path. This chapter explains knowledge, setting forth the path that forms the cause for such persons; the fruit comes first and the cause follows, and therefore knowledge is explained here.

26.4

The verse-text states: 'At the beginning of the previous chapter, it was said ... is there knowledge that is not a view (dṛṣṭi)?' This summarizes what came before and introduces what follows. The verse's answer is clear. Below, this same pattern will be followed and not commented upon. Within this chapter, there are two main sections: first, explaining the distinctions among knowledges; second, explaining the virtues accomplished through knowledge. Within the first section, there are again seven divisions: first, explaining the distinctions among receptivity (kṣānti), knowledge (jñāna), and view (dṛṣṭi); second, explaining the distinct characteristics of the ten knowledges; third, explaining the establishment of the ten knowledges; fourth, explaining the distinctions between dharma-knowledge and knowledge in abandonment; fifth, explaining the cognitive modes (ākāra) of the ten knowledges; sixth, analysis by doctrinal categories; seventh, an extensive explanation of the cultivation of knowledge. This single verse is the first, explaining the distinctions among receptivity, knowledge, and view.

26.5

Regarding 'The commentary says ... because of its deliberative nature': this explains that noble receptivities are not subsumed under knowledge. Establishing them with the designation 'noble' excludes receptivities that are defiled (with outflows). 'Doubts of what it personally abandons' excludes doubts of other classes. Because it co-occurs with the acquisition of doubt, it is not called knowledge. The Nyāyānusāra states: 'Or, when the inclination to seek observation of an object has ceased, and the preparatory application has become relaxed, it is called knowledge. Receptivities are just arising with an inclination toward deliberation, and their preparatory application is intense; hence they are not subsumed under knowledge' (thus ends the treatise text).

26.6

Regarding the verse-text, 'Exhaustion (kṣayajñāna) and non-arising (anutpādajñāna) ... because they do not deliberate': this explains that the knowledges of exhaustion and non-arising are not of the nature of views.

26.7

Regarding the verse-text, 'All the remainder are common to both ... because of their deliberative nature': this explains that all remaining knowledges are common to both knowledge and view. Because 'their own doubts have already been severed', they are subsumed under knowledge; because 'they are of a deliberative nature', they are named views. Because they are not the initial observation, they are not named receptivities.

26.8

Regarding the verse-text, 'All contaminated discernment ... worldly right views make six': this explains that all contaminated discernment can be called knowledge, because regarding the observed object it is not the initial observation. Fascicle 44 of the Vibhāṣā says: 'There is not a single sentient being who has not repeatedly observed all objects with contaminated discernment from beginningless time; therefore, contaminated discernment is entirely subsumed under knowledge' (thus ends the treatise text). That is to say, all contaminated discernments, whether defiled or undefiled, are called knowledge. Although what is perceived by the five sense-consciousnesses differs from moment to moment, because they perceive the same category, they are also called knowledge. Moreover, because the apprehended object has been repeatedly observed with contaminated discernment from beginningless time, with the exception of the discernments associated with the five groups of sense-consciousness, all remaining wholesome discernments are named views; that is, they are subsumed under worldly right views. Among defiled discernments, only five are called views; all neutral (avyākṛta) discernments are not views.

26.9

Regarding the verse-text, 'What has thus been stated ... all are subsumed under the nature of discernment (prajñā)': this explains that both contaminated and uncontaminated discernment are everywhere called discernment, because they are all able to select among phenomena (dharmapravicaya).

26.10

Regarding the verse-text, 'How many kinds of knowledge are there, and what are their distinctive characteristics?': below, this is the second division, explaining the distinct characteristics of the ten knowledges. Within this text, it is again divided into four: first, explaining the names and distinct intrinsic natures of the ten knowledges; second, explaining the three knowledges becoming nine knowledges; third, explaining the nine knowledges becoming ten knowledges; fourth, explaining the distinct characteristics of exhaustion and non-arising. These two verses explain the names and intrinsic natures of the ten knowledges.

26.11

Regarding 'The commentary says ... because of the distinction in their natures': this lists the names of the knowledges, first grouping them into two.

26.12

Regarding the verse-text, 'Such two knowledges ... are divided into dharma[-knowledge] and inductive [knowledge]': this opens the two knowledges into three knowledges.

26.13

Regarding the verse-text, 'Among the three, conventional [knowledge] ... has the four truths as its object': this explains that the three knowledges each have distinct objects. The Nyāyānusāra explains: 'The former contaminated knowledge is generally called conventional (saṃvṛti). Things such as vases and clothes are destructible in nature and are manifest in ordinary conventional perception; hence they are called conventional. Because this knowledge predominantly apprehends conventional objects and predominantly proceeds in accord with ordinary worldly affairs, the name conventional knowledge is established from the majority. It is not that it does not apprehend ultimate truth or proceed in accord with ultimate matters; however, it is an object of craving and lacks the superior capacity to quiet the internal defilements, hence it is not uncontaminated.' It also says: 'What is the difference between contaminated and uncontaminated knowledges? The uncontaminated is bright and sharp in its cognitive mode toward objects; contaminated discernment is the opposite of this. It is like the difference in burning and smelting efficacy between charcoal of the khadira wood and other woods, or the difference in perfuming efficacy between superior and inferior incense. Or as the heat intensity differs between flaming iron and grass fire, so too is the difference between the two knowledges when compared.'

26.14

Regarding the verse-text, 'Just within such three kinds of knowledge': the next single verse is the second division, opening them into nine knowledges.

26.15

Regarding 'The commentary says ... the four knowledges of cessation and path': this explains that dharma[-knowledge] and inductive [knowledge] form four according to their objects; combined with the preceding dharma-knowledge and inductive knowledge, they again form six knowledges, and if combined with conventional knowledge, there are seven knowledges in all.

26.16

Regarding the verse-text, 'Such six knowledges ... are named exhaustion and non-arising': this explains that when the six knowledges reach the stage of the non-learner (aśaikṣa), they form the knowledges of exhaustion and non-arising, forming nine knowledges in all.

26.17

Regarding the verse-text, 'When these two are first generated ... because having the four skandhas of the peak of existence (bhavāgra) as their object': this explains that when the knowledges of exhaustion and non-arising are first generated, they take only the four skandhas of the peak of existence as their object. Only these two knowledges extend over multiple moments; their initial moment takes only the suffering and arising of the peak of existence as its object, while the remainder take different objects. Were this not so, why would the initial be distinguished from the later-arisen?

26.18

Regarding the verse-text, 'Is the object of the diamond-like concentration (vajropamasamādhi) the same as this?': this is a question.

26.19

Regarding the verse-text, 'Its object of suffering and arising is the same; its object of cessation and the path is different': this is the reply. According to this treatise text, the diamond-like concentration takes only the four skandhas of [the sphere of] neither-perception-nor-non-perception as its object, because it is identical with the initial [moment of the knowledge of] exhaustion.

26.20

Regarding the verse-text, 'Among the nine kinds of knowledge explained above': the next two verses form the third division, opening them into ten knowledges.

26.21

Regarding 'The commentary says ... the remainder are not so': this explains that among dharma-knowledge, inductive knowledge, path-knowledge, and conventional knowledge, the knowledge of others' minds (paracittajñāna) is distinguished separately; it does not pertain to the knowledges of suffering, arising, cessation, exhaustion, or non-arising.

26.22

Regarding the verse-text, 'This knowledge toward its object ... and past and future minds': this explains the three determinate characteristics of the knowledge of others' minds.

26.23

Regarding the verse-text, 'There are three kinds of superior minds ... the mind of one in a superior state': this explains the inability to know the minds of the three conditions, for it knows only equal and inferior minds. The Nyāyānusāra says: 'However, because the knowledge of others' minds, its known objects, the faculties, and the stages are distinct, its knowing also differs. For the contaminated mind and mental factors that are known, there are fifteen each for the previously attained and the not previously attained, namely the lower, middle, and higher faculties across the desire realm and the four dhyānas; the knowing mind excludes only the three grades of the desire realm, having twelve each for the previously attained and not previously attained. For the uncontaminated that is known and that which knows it, both exclude the three of desire, each having twelve. Now, when the knowledge of others' minds subsumed by the lower faculty arises, whether previously attained or not previously attained, it can know, according to its scope, the mental categories of the three faculties of a lower stage; of its own stage's lower and middle faculties, it also knows its own stage's middle faculty; the higher faculty fully comprehends the three of its own and lower stages. When the uncontaminated knowledge of others' minds of the lower faculty arises, it knows only the lower faculty of its own stage and of lower stages; the middle also knows the middle, and the higher additionally knows the higher. For what reason is there a difference in how many minds of lower stages are known when contaminated and uncontaminated knowledges arise? The three grades of contaminated [faculties] can be accomplished in a single person; the uncontaminated establishes distinctions among noble persons according to their faculties, and there is not even one who accomplishes two grades of faculties, let alone three—hence there is a difference. How is it said that a single person (pudgala) accomplishes the nine grades of the path and abandons nine grades of defilement? This difference in the path is not due to a difference in faculties. Because the causes gradually develop, the subsequent paths progressively increase, and sequentially cause the abandonment of many grades of defilements. Alternatively, each lineage has nine grades, and accomplishing one of the nine grades necessarily precludes accomplishing the others; hence the earlier and later statements do not contradict each other. Therefore, when a lower-faculty mind arises based on a higher stage, or a higher-faculty mind arises based on a lower stage, where stage and faculty are mutually superior, they certainly cannot know each other. The same applies to the relative opposition of stage and state, or state and faculty.' The Vibhāṣā says: 'Question: How many kinds of minds and mental factors produced through supernatural knowledge (abhijñāphala) of the desire realm and the four dhyānas can the knowledge of others' minds of the first dhyāna know? Some say: It can know four kinds. Why? Because all are subsumed under the desire realm. Others say: It can only know what is produced through supernatural knowledge of the first dhyāna, and not the other three. Why? Just as it does not know the cause, so it is with the fruit.' The Vibhāṣā also says: 'Question: A knowledge of which stage can know the minds and mental factors of the dhyānāntara (intermediate dhyāna)? Some say: The superior knowledge of the first dhyāna can know them. Others say: The inferior knowledge of the second dhyāna can know them. Evaluation: It should be said that all three grades of knowledge of the first dhyāna can know them. Why? Because they are subsumed under the same stage' (thus ends the treatise text).

26.24

Regarding the verse-text, 'This knowledge does not know ... because of having [present minds] as its object': this explains the reason why it does not know past and future [minds].

26.25

Regarding the verse-text, 'Furthermore, the categories of dharma and inductive ... because of their objects': this explains that dharma-knowledge and inductive knowledge do not take each other as objects. Because the category of inductive knowledge is not the path of the desire realm, dharma-knowledge does not take it as an object; because the category of dharma-knowledge is not the path of the higher realms, inductive knowledge does not take it as an object. Although the dharma-knowledges of cessation and the path also remedy the higher defilements abandoned through cultivation, they are not of the complete division; hence inductive knowledge does not take them as objects.

26.26

Regarding the verse-text, 'This knowledge of others' minds ... is the object of this knowledge': this explains that there is no knowledge of others' minds in the path of seeing, yet the path of seeing may also be the object of the knowledge of others' minds.

26.27

Regarding the verse-text, 'If sentient beings ... minds in the state of the path of seeing': this generally indicates that disciples (śrāvakas) and solitary buddhas (pratyekabuddhas) cultivate preparatory application in advance to know minds in the path of seeing.

26.28

Regarding the verse-text, 'Those sentient beings ... minds of the first two moments': this specifically explains that disciples know minds of the dharma-knowledge category.

26.29

Regarding the verse-text, 'If in order to know further ... it is not knowing the path of seeing': this explains that because a disciple's preparatory application is inferior, the preparatory application is only accomplished after passing through many moments (kṣaṇas). Although they can also know the sixteenth moment of mind, that sixteenth moment is not subsumed under the path of seeing.

26.30

Regarding the verse-text, 'The rhinoceros-like [solitary buddha] regarding the dharma category ... because of inferior preparatory application': this specifically explains the rhinoceros-like solitary buddha knowing minds of both dharma and inductive categories.

26.31

Regarding the verse-text, 'Some say that they know the first two and the fifteenth mind': this relates another master's explanation of what a solitary buddha's mind knows. The Nyāyānusāra says: 'Some say the rhinoceros-like knows four moments, namely the first two minds, the eighth, and the fourteenth. This statement is reasonable. Why? Having accepted that after knowing the minds of the first two moments, it knows the eighth mind separated by only five moments; if it further cultivates the preparatory application of the dharma category, the preparatory application should be accomplished after five moments, so why not accept that it knows the fourteenth moment? Others also say: It knows four moments, namely the first two moments of mind, the eleventh, and the twelfth' (thus ends the treatise text).

26.32

On the Śāstra's statement: "When the World-Honoured One wishes to know [...] he is capable of knowing all": this explains that the Buddha, without [deliberate] preparation (prayoga), is able to know everything. Question: Why is the entity of the untainted (anāsrava) knowledge of others' minds only the knowledge of the path (mārgajñāna), and not the other [three] knowledges? Answer: The Nyāyānusāra states: "Because untainted knowledge definitely cannot know others' tainted minds and mental factors (Commentary: this refers to the knowledges of suffering and origination being unable to know [them]). The untainted minds and mental factors in another's person, because they are subtle and superior, are not the objective domain of one's own tainted knowledge of others' minds. This principle is reasonable. For what reason is one's own untainted knowledge of others' minds unable to know others' tainted minds and mental factors? Because when untainted knowledge arises with respect to tainted objects, its aspect (ākāra) and objective support (ālambana) are different from this knowledge. That is to say, when untainted knowledge takes the tainted as its objective support, it must be a comprehensive apprehension with an aspect of revulsion; therefore, it definitely cannot distinctively apprehend others' minds and mental factors to constitute knowledge of others' minds. For whenever the noble knowledges take the tainted as their objective support, they must generate deep revulsion toward the objective support, delighting in comprehensive abandonment and not delighting in distinctive observation; whereas when taking the untainted as an objective support, they generate joy and delight. Having already observed comprehensively, they also delight in observing distinctively. Just as when seeing or hearing something disagreeable, one comprehensively apprehends it and then abandons it, not delighting in distinctively apprehending it; but with what is agreeable it is not so: having comprehensively seen or heard it, one also delights in distinctively apprehending it. Therefore, with respect to others' tainted minds and so forth, there is definitely no noble knowledge that observes each one distinctively so as to constitute an apprehension of tainted minds. Untainted knowledge of others' minds, because it is knowledge of others' minds, definitely knows others' minds and mental factors individually and distinctively. Is there not also the patience and knowledge of suffering and origination subsumed within the three foundations of mindfulness (Commentary: if untainted knowledge cannot distinctively apprehend, why do the knowledges of suffering and origination subsumed under the three foundations of mindfulness distinctively apprehend minds, feelings, and mental factors)? Although they exist, they do not merely apprehend a single dharma, because they apprehend multiple entities (Commentary: when knowledge of others' minds arises, it apprehends a single dharma and cannot apprehend two or three minds, etc.; those subsumed under the three foundations of mindfulness apprehend multiple minds, etc., and because they apprehend multiples, they are not subsumed under distinctive apprehension)."

26.33

On the Śāstra's statement: "What is the difference between the two knowledges, of exhaustion and of non-arising?": the one verse below is the fourth [section], explaining the difference in characteristics between the two knowledges.

26.34

"The Śāstra states: [...] this is named the knowledge of exhaustion (kṣayajñāna)": this explains the characteristics of the knowledge of exhaustion. "Knowledge (jñāna), view (dṛṣṭi), clarity (vidyā), awakening (bodhi), comprehension (adhigama), discernment (mati), light (prabhā), and contemplation (vipaśyanā)": this is a comprehensive list of synonyms for knowledge. Decisive determination is called "knowledge"; inquiry and seeking is called "view"; freedom from darkness is called "clarity"; awakening to the principle is called "awakening"; thorough realization is called "comprehension"; selection of dharmas is called "discernment"; "light" means manifesting illumination; "contemplation" means observing. Thus, although the names differ, their entity is one. Therefore the Nyāyānusāra states: "Are not the two knowledges not subsumed under the nature of view? How then can it speak of 'knowledge', 'view', 'clarity', and so forth? Some give this explanation: it is for rhetorical convenience. Yet in reality the two knowledges are the causes of the views that arise at a later time; therefore they are also named 'view'. That is to say, when emerging from contemplation after [the attainment of] the knowledge of exhaustion, scrutinizing views will definitely not be active. When previously of an unshakeable nature, and when subsequently training the faculties to attain the unshakeable state, scrutinizing views will likewise not be active after [attaining] the knowledge of non-arising; therefore, this name 'view' is established from its result. Or, it is metaphorically given the name 'view' because it is like a view, just as the name 'light' is established because it functions as manifesting illumination. Light is the visible base (rūpāyatana), whereas the entity of knowledge is not light; yet its illuminating function is like light, so there is no error in calling it light. Likewise, the two knowledges are not actually the entity of view, but manifesting illumination is like a view, so they are designated with the name 'view' (end of text from the Śāstra)."

26.35

On the Śāstra's statement: "What is the knowledge of non-arising? [...] this is named the knowledge of non-arising (anutpādajñāna)": this explains the activity of the knowledge of non-arising. The knowledge of exhaustion knows: "I have known suffering, abandoned origination, realized cessation, and cultivated the path." If it is the knowledge of non-arising, it knows non-regression. Therefore it says: "Known, etc., and should not be known again, etc." Therefore the Nyāyānusāra states: "For what reason does the treatise, in the knowledge of non-arising, again make this statement: 'I have known suffering, etc.'? In principle it should only say 'I will not know again, etc.', because the two modes of activity should not operate simultaneously. If they operate sequentially, since the former would not differ from the knowledge of exhaustion, it should not be stated redundantly. It should be understood that this statement is intended to dispel doubt. For there might be doubts: just as one who is temporarily liberated first produces the knowledge of exhaustion and later attains the knowledge of non-arising, so one should accept that one who is non-temporarily liberated first produces the knowledge of non-arising and later attains the knowledge of exhaustion. To show that for all [practitioners] the knowledge of exhaustion arises first, it therefore first speaks the words 'I have known, etc.' Or, it first merely says 'I have known, etc.' to show that one who is temporarily liberated has only the knowledge of exhaustion; then it repeats 'I have known, etc.' to show that for one who is non-temporarily liberated, after exhaustion arises non-arising. Thus, although repeated, there is no error." As for the knowledge of non-arising, what is meant by "non-arising"? The masters of the Nyāyānusāra say: "It means that because non-analytical cessation (apratisaṃkhyānirodha) exists, there is non-arising. When this knowledge is enabled to arise, the knowledge relies upon non-arising, so it is named 'the knowledge of non-arising'. Although cessation always exists, its acquisition (prāpti) is not permanent. Only when acquiring that cessation does this knowledge then operate. It is only through the arising of acquisition that it is called 'having cessation'; in the state of having cessation, this knowledge then arises. Or, the word 'non-arising' refers to the acquisition of that cessation, just as the acquisition of nirvāṇa is also named nirvāṇa (end of text from the Śāstra)."

26.36

On the Śāstra's statement: "How can untainted knowledge have such knowledge?": this is a question. All untainted knowledges do not exceed the sixteen aspects; "I have known suffering, etc." are not among the sixteen aspects; how can it have such knowledge?

26.37

On the Śāstra's statement: "The Kaśmīra [...] the difference between the two knowledges": the author of the Śāstra cites the Vibhāṣā to explain. The intention of the root text is that, upon emerging from the knowledge of exhaustion into subsequently attained knowledge, one is able to know: "I have known suffering, etc." If emerging from the knowledge of non-arising into subsequently attained knowledge, one is then able to know: "I will not further know suffering, etc." From this it is proven and known that the two untainted knowledges differ in power and function.

26.38

On the Śāstra's statement: "Some say that untainted [...] knowledge is also view": this relates an alternative explanation.

26.39

On the Śāstra's statement: "Thus the ten knowledges [...] a small portion of six": this explains the mutual subsumption among the ten knowledges. Conventional knowledge subsumes one entirely—namely conventional knowledge—and a small portion of one—namely the knowledge of others' minds. The knowledges of phenomena (dharmajñāna) and of concordance (anvayajñāna) each subsume one entirely—namely the knowledges of phenomena and of concordance—and a small portion of seven—namely the knowledges of the four noble truths, of exhaustion, of non-arising, and of others' minds. The knowledges of suffering, origination, and cessation each subsume one entirely—namely their own respective knowledge—and a small portion of four—namely the knowledges of phenomena, concordance, exhaustion, and non-arising. The knowledge of the path subsumes one entirely—namely its own knowledge—and a small portion of five, adding the knowledge of others' minds. The knowledge of others' minds subsumes one entirely—namely its own knowledge—and a small portion of four—namely conventional knowledge and the knowledges of the path, phenomena, and concordance. The knowledges of exhaustion and non-arising each subsume one entirely—namely their own knowledge—and a small portion of six—namely the knowledges of the four noble truths, phenomena, and concordance.

26.40

On the Śāstra's statement: "For what reason are the two knowledges established as ten?": the following verse is the fourth [section], establishing the ten knowledges.

26.41

"The Śāstra states: [...] taking it as intrinsic nature": first is establishing conventional knowledge (saṃvṛtijñāna). Because conventional knowledge is corruptible in nature and mostly knows conventional truth, it is named conventional knowledge with respect to its intrinsic nature.

26.42

On the Śāstra's statement: "Second, because of antidotes [...] because of the desire realm and the higher realms": second, the knowledges of phenomena and concordance are established on account of antidotes. Because it is the antidote to non-Dharma of the desire realm, it is named the knowledge of phenomena. As the antidote to non-Dharma of the higher realms, it should also be named the knowledge of phenomena; but it cannot be redundantly named the knowledge of phenomena, and can only be named 'concordance' (anvaya), because it is concordant with the antidote to non-Dharma.

26.43

On the Śāstra's statement: "Third, because of aspects [...] because their entities are not distinct": third is establishing the knowledges of suffering and origination. Because suffering and origination are one in entity but divided in function, they are not divided on account of a difference in objective realm; they are divided into two knowledges solely on account of their aspects being different.

26.44

On the Śāstra's statement: "Fourth, because of aspects and objective domains [...] because both are distinct": fourth is establishing the knowledges of cessation and the path. For the two truths of cessation and the path, both entity and activity are distinct; thus, because of the difference in both objective support and aspect, they are divided into two knowledges.

26.45

On the Śāstra's statement: "Fifth, because of preparation [...] establishing the name 'knowledge of others' minds'": fifth is establishing the knowledge of others' minds (paracittajñāna). The Nyāyānusāra further cites the explanation of Venerable Pārśva: "To induce the arising of this knowledge, one must first know the mind, and only thereafter know mental factors; from its beginning, it is solely established under the name 'knowledge of others' minds'. When inducing this knowledge, what preparation is cultivated? First, one should observe visible matter's color and shape, and preferred vocal sounds expressing differences of mind. That is to say, when that practitioner is a beginner, wishing to scrutinize and know the differences in others' minds, he first scrutinizes and observes his own visible matter's color and shape, and why his preferred vocal sounds have differences. He then comes to know that differences in color, etc., are due to the mind. Next, he further scrutinizes and observes that in another's person, color and so forth also arise with differences due to differences in mind. Because of this, at a later time, free from desire and with mindfulness of the body, pliant and purified, he induces the arising of superior samādhi; relying upon samādhi, there arises knowledge endowed with majestic power. This knowledge genuinely perceives others' minds, just as threads of various colors in a clear pearl are clearly discernible. This is called cultivating the preparation for conventional knowledge of others' minds. When cultivating untainted knowledge of others' minds, one takes the knowledge of suffering that contemplates impermanence and so forth as preparation; this preparatory stage comprehensively apprehends both visible matter and mind, but upon reaching fulfillment, it apprehends mind and not visible matter (end of text from the Śāstra)."

26.46

On the Śāstra's statement: "Sixth, because the task is accomplished [...] because it arises first": sixth is establishing the knowledge of exhaustion. Because it arises first in the person of one whose tasks of seeing suffering, abandoning origination, realizing cessation, and cultivating the path are accomplished, it is named the knowledge of exhaustion.

26.47

On the Śāstra's statement: "Seventh, because the causes are complete [...] because it arises with [all] as cause": this explains the knowledge of non-arising. All noble paths within one's own person serve as causes for this, which is called 'causes being complete'; because the causes are complete, the knowledge of non-arising is distinctly established.

26.48

On the Śāstra's statement: "As stated above, the knowledge of phenomena and the knowledge of concordance": the one verse below is the fourth [section], explaining the difference in antidotal function between the knowledges of phenomena and concordance.

26.49

"The Śāstra states: [...] there is none that can counteract desire": this comments on the verse. The Nyāyānusāra states: "For what reason do only the knowledges of phenomena regarding cessation and the path additionally counteract the higher realms, and not those of suffering and origination? Because their objective supports are identical in tranquility and deliverance. That is to say, cessation in the desire and higher realms and the paths that counteract them have no mutual distinction in characteristic. For all analytical cessations are wholesome and permanent, and all noble paths are capable of deliverance. The objective supports of suffering and origination are not the same between the desire and higher realms, because they differ between higher and lower in being fewer or more, subtle or coarse. Furthermore, the knowledges of suffering and origination apprehend objective domains of revulsion; there is no possibility of being repulsed by that [lower realm] while abandoning attachment to this [higher realm]. On down to the two knowledges of cessation and the path, they do not apprehend objective domains of revulsion; apprehending the lower to counteract the higher also entails no fault. It is also like the contemplation of impurity and the desire delighting in nirvāṇa: contemplation of impurity apprehends the objective domain of the desire realm, and can only cause the mind to be repulsed by the desire realm; when the desire delighting in nirvāṇa appears, it is capable of universally causing the mind to be repulsed by the three realms. Likewise, when the knowledges of suffering and origination apprehending the desire realm arise, they can only cause the mind to be free from the defilement of the desire realm; when the knowledges of cessation and the path apprehending the dharmas of the desire realm arise, they universally cause the mind to be free from the defilement of the three realms. Therefore it is accepted that the category of the knowledges of phenomena regarding cessation and the path increases until it achieves the vajropamasamādhi. Thus the Great Sage, through his subtle and excellent understanding, established the knowledges of phenomena and concordance on the basis of the complete antidotal approach."

26.50

On the Śāstra's statement: "Among these ten knowledges, which has what aspect?": below is the fifth [section], explaining the aspects of the ten knowledges. In the text there are three parts: first, explaining the aspects of the ten knowledges; second, explaining the untainted aspects; third, explaining the entity and objective support of the aspects. These two and a half verses constitute the first section.

26.51

"The Śāstra states: [...] will be broadly explained later": this explains that the knowledges of phenomena and concordance possess all sixteen aspects, because there are four knowledges of phenomena and four knowledges of concordance.

26.52

On the Śāstra's statement: "Conventional knowledge has these [...] because of individual and general characteristics, etc.": this explains the aspects of conventional knowledge. "Has these" means having these sixteen aspects, which is to say that heat, summits, and patiences possess the sixteen aspects; the worldly supreme dharmas possess only the aspects under suffering. "And furthermore, others that are capable of apprehending the individual and general characteristics of all dharmas, etc." refers to the comprehensive and distinctive mindfulness of the fivefold stilling of the mind, the contemplation of non-self in the twelve links of dependent origination and eighteen elements, and so forth, in their general and individual characteristics.

26.53

On the Śāstra's statement: "The four knowledges of suffering and so forth [...] four kinds of aspects": this explains that the knowledges of the four truths each have the four kinds of aspects of their own respective truth.

26.54

On the Śāstra's statement: "Within knowledge of another's mind […] is not included among the sixteen": this explains the cognitive modes of the knowledge of another's mind. Untainted knowledge of another's mind is as stated for the knowledge of the path; tainted knowledge of another's mind, because its object is the individual characteristics of mind and mental factors, has cognitive modes that are likewise [of individual characteristics] and are not included among the sixteen cognitive modes.

26.55

On the Śāstra's statement: "These two kinds […] does not take ideation and so forth as object": this explains that it apprehends a distinct object. Both kinds of knowledge of another's mind—whether untainted or tainted—take solely a single phenomenon as their object.

26.56

On the Śāstra's statement: "If that is so, then why […] mind with greed and so forth": this is an objection. If it apprehends only mind and does not apprehend mental factors, why does the sūtra speak of understanding a mind with greed? Greed is a mental factor, while the mind is the primary mind; is this not apprehending two things?

26.57

On the Śāstra's statement: "They are not apprehended simultaneously […] perceiving the garment and the stain": this is the resolution. Mind and greed are apprehended by distinct moments of mind, just as when perceiving a garment one does not immediately perceive the stain.

26.58

On the Śāstra's statement: "A 'mind with greed' […] is bound solely by greed": this generally clarifies the two senses of a mind with greed. [First,] that which is associated with greed is called a "mind with greed"; whether [greed has been] severed or unsevered, it is in both cases called a mind with greed. [Second,] other tainted minds are called "minds with greed" because they are bound by greed; if greed has already been severed, they are no longer called minds with greed. This is the general explanation.

26.59

On the Śāstra's statement: "Some say that when the sūtra states […] should receive the name 'free from greed'": this relates the explanation of one master of the Vibhāṣā. This master holds that only a mind associated with greed is called a mind with greed, and that a wholesome mind that counteracts greed is called a mind free from greed. If one does not take what counteracts greed to be a mind free from greed, but instead takes what is not associated with greed to be a mind free from greed, then minds associated with hatred and so on are not associated with greed, and hence should be called minds free from greed.

26.60

On the Śāstra's statement: "If that is so, then there are minds […] free from delusion is also like this": the author of the Śāstra refutes this master's explanation. If one maintains that counteracting greed is called a mind free from greed, then unpolluted minds that do not counteract greed, because they are not associated with greed, would not be minds with greed; and because they do not counteract greed, they would not be minds free from greed. These two categories of mind would fail to encompass all minds. What other masters say is that because it is bound by greed it is called a mind with greed, and what is not bound by greed is called a mind free from greed. This then encompasses all minds completely; the cases of minds with delusion and so forth are also like this. The author of the Śāstra adopts this master['s view] as correct, and this by analogy also explains minds with hatred and delusion.

26.61

On the Śāstra's statement: "The Vaibhāṣikas […] because it arises in association [with them]": this relates the Vibhāṣā's explanation of collected and distracted minds.

26.62

On the Śāstra's statement: "The Western masters […] is said to be distracted": this relates the explanation of the masters of Gandhāra.

26.63

On the Śāstra's statement: "This is not logical […] the knowledge of the path": the Sarvāstivādins refute the explanation of the Western masters. First, they refute it by reason; second, they refute it by contradiction with the fundamental treatise. All defiled minds, because they are associated with sleepiness, would be called collected minds; but because they are defiled, they should be called distracted minds. This incurs the fault that a single mind has two states of mind, which contradicts reason. If one maintains that a collected mind is that which is associated with sleepiness, it would therefore be solely a tainted mind of the desire realm, which directly contradicts the fundamental treatise['s statement] that it is known by the two knowledges—subsequent knowledge and the knowledge of the path. This is because subsequent knowledge knows the higher realms, and the knowledge of the path knows the untainted path. (The above is the fourth pair.)

26.64

On the Śāstra's statement: "A depressed mind […] because it arises in association [with them] (this is the fifth pair)."

26.65

On the Śāstra's statement: "A small mind […] because it is what is practiced and habituated": this is the first explanation.

26.66

On the Śāstra's statement: "Or due to faculties and value […] therefore it is called small or great": this is the second explanation. (The above is the sixth pair.)

26.67

On the Śāstra's statement: "A defiled mind has few faculties […] receives the names 'small' and 'great'": from here on, the various clauses are re-explained. "Associated with at most two" means it is either associated with delusion, namely anger and so forth; or associated with two, namely greed, hatred, and delusion; none is associated with three. The remaining clauses are easy to understand. Up to "due to this, defiled and wholesome receive the names 'small' and 'great'," which summarizes the sixth pair.

26.68

On the Śāstra's statement: "An agitated mind […] because it is able to counteract that": this is the seventh pair.

26.69

On the Śāstra's statement: "Unquiet and quiet minds should be known to be likewise": this is an analogical explanation (this is the eighth pair).

26.70

On the Śāstra's statement: "An unfocused mind […] because it is able to counteract that (this is the ninth pair)."

26.71

On the Śāstra's statement: "An uncultivated mind […] because it admits of the two kinds of cultivation (this is the tenth pair)."

26.72

On the Śāstra's statement: "An unliberated mind […] because it admits of liberation (this is the eleventh pair)": Vibhāṣā fascicle 190 explains in detail the eleven pairs of minds. A "contracted mind" is precisely this collected mind. Fascicle 189 states: "Question: Why does it not speak here of the knowledge of another's mind? Answer: The knowledge of another's mind knows the minds and mental factors of another's continuity, whereas here the knowledge in accordance with reality knows the minds and mental factors of one's own continuity; therefore it is not spoken of." It is explained at length there. The arbitrated view of the Vibhāṣā corresponds to what is refuted here.

26.73

On the Śāstra's statement: "The explanations given in this way […] the distinct meanings of the various clauses": the author of the Śāstra generally rejects the former masters' explanation.

26.74

On the Śāstra's statement: "How does this explanation fail to accord with the sūtra?": the Sarvāstivādins ask.

26.75

On the Śāstra's statement: "The sūtra states that this mind […] has vipasyanā without śamatha": this answers how it contradicts the sūtra. The sūtra states that a collected mind runs together with lethargy and sleepiness.

26.76

On the Śāstra's statement: "Was it not stated earlier […] the fault of applying to both collected and distracted?": the Sarvāstivādins cite the earlier refutation by reason.

26.77

On the Śāstra's statement: "Although it was said to be illogical […] because it is a distracted mind": the Western masters resolve the earlier objection. Although they said there is the fault of a defiled mind associated with sleepiness being both collected and distracted, we Western masters do not speak of a defiled mind associated with sleepiness as being a distracted mind, but only call it a collected mind; what further fault is there?

26.78

On the Śāstra's statement: "Was it not also stated that it contradicts the fundamental treatise?": the Sarvāstivādins cite the earlier refutation by scriptural authority. That is, the fundamental treatise states that it is known by knowledge of phenomena, subsequent knowledge, conventional knowledge, and the knowledge of the path.

26.79

On the Śāstra's statement: "Better to contradict the treatise than to contradict what the sūtra says": the Western masters cannot reconcile it with the fundamental treatise, and therefore say it is better to contradict the treatise than what the sūtra says.

26.80

On the Śāstra's statement: "How does it fail to distinguish the distinct meanings of the various clauses?": the Sarvāstivādins ask.

26.81

On the Śāstra's statement: "Namely, according to this explanation […] because of the eight distinct characteristics": the Western masters answer.

26.82

On the Śāstra's statement: "According to what I explain […] the distinct meanings of the eight clauses": the Sarvāstivādins entirely reject that they fail to distinguish the eight distinct clauses in the sūtra.

26.83

On the Śāstra's statement: "Namely, although distracted and so forth […] eight names are separately established": the Sarvāstivādins explain again at length.

26.84

On the Śāstra's statement: "Since it cannot resolve […] the principle is also not established": the Western masters object. Since you cannot resolve the passage I cited earlier from the sūtra—"What is inwardly collected? Namely, if the mind runs together with lethargy and sleepiness"—your explanation of the distinct meanings of the eight clauses is not established.

26.85

On the Śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, if a depressed mind […] is called cultivation at the improper time": the Western masters cite again to refute the Sarvāstivādins' eight clauses. If a depressed mind were the agitated mind, the sūtra would not state that the limbs of awakening cultivated at an improper time for depression and agitation are distinct. Because it speaks of cultivating distinct limbs of awakening for depression and agitation, we know clearly that depressed and agitated minds are different.

26.86

On the Śāstra's statement: "Could it be that the cultivation of the limbs of awakening has any principle of distinct separation?": the Sarvāstivādins object. Could cultivating the limbs of awakening involve cultivating them separately? They cite the sūtra to object: if there were separate cultivation, there could be the distinction of cultivating three and not cultivating three. Since there is no principle of separate cultivation, how could there be cultivating and not cultivating?

26.87

On the Śāstra's statement: "This is based on attention […] therefore there is no error": the Western masters answer. When the sūtra speaks of cultivation, it means the desire to cultivate is called cultivation, not actual cultivation. Because the desire to cultivate is called cultivation, there is no error in them being separately distinct.

26.88

On the Śāstra's statement: "Did I not state […] I say their substance is one": the Sarvāstivādins reconcile the sūtra. In that in which laziness predominates, the sūtra speaks of a depressed mind; in that in which agitation predominates, the sūtra speaks of an agitated mind. Because depression and agitation are always associated, I say their substance is one.

26.89

On the Śāstra's statement: "Words according to one's own intention […] the intended meaning is not like this": the Western masters generally reject this as failing to grasp the sūtra's meaning. The Nyāyānusāra states: "The intended meanings of these two sūtras are distinct. In this sūtra, it speaks of minds with greed and so forth in order to make known the distinction between defiled and pure categories of mind. That is, in order to truly understand the rationale of the differences between the dark category and the white category of minds, it speaks of minds with greed and minds free from greed. In that [other] sūtra, it speaks of collected minds and distracted minds in order to make known the obstacles to cultivating the bases of supernormal power. For that sūtra states: 'One should examine one's own mind, let it not be too depressed nor too elevated, let it not be inwardly collected nor outwardly distracted.' That is, when that practitioner cultivates the bases of supernormal power, he should examine for himself the obstacles to cultivating the bases of supernormal power: this mind is lazy, this mind is agitated, this mind has lethargy and sleepiness, this [mind] wanders and disperses driven by improper attention toward visible forms and so forth. Since the purposes of the intentions of this sūtra and that sūtra are distinct, one cannot cite that sūtra to negate the explanation of the characteristics in this sūtra. That sūtra only speaks of the mind being excessively collected or distracted inwardly and outwardly at the time of cultivating the bases of supernormal power, not wishing to distinguish the defiled and pure characteristics of mind. What this sūtra states is contrary to that. Although all defiled minds have laziness and so forth, in order to reveal the distinctions among the faults of defilements, depressed minds and so forth are established according to their predominant state, and uplifted minds and so forth are established as their opposite. Therefore, our school's explanation accords with the sūtra and also distinguishes well the distinct characteristics of the various minds." (The commentary says: "This sūtra" means the one explaining the eleven pairs of minds; "that sūtra" is the sūtra cited by the Western masters to challenge the Sarvāstivādins.)

26.90

On the Śāstra's statement: "As for the earlier statement that all […] what is the meaning of 'bound by greed'?": the author of the Śāstra relates the Western masters' questioning of the Sarvāstivādins' earlier explanation. If it is called a "mind with greed" because it is bound by greed, what is the meaning of being bound by greed? Previously, the author of the Śāstra relied on the correct view of the Vibhāṣā, upholding being bound by greed; subsequently, relying on the Sautrāntikas, he refutes the mind bound by greed.

Linked texts (1)

俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese