俱舍論疏 27.7

27.7

[On the phrase in] the treatise, "From 'the treatise says' up to 'having the nature of the ten knowledges'": This explains the first power. Herein there are two [parts]: first, presenting the intrinsic nature of the power; second, analysis through doctrinal categories. This [passage] presents its intrinsic nature. The Nyāyānusāra says: "On what basis is the name of this power established? The Buddha himself said in the sūtras: 'Monks, listen attentively! The Tathāgata truly knows the possible as the possible; the Tathāgata truly knows the impossible as the impossible,' and so forth at length. The knowledge that the intrinsic nature and function of all phenomena are logically certain to exist is called the knowledge of the possible. The knowledge that the intrinsic nature and function of all phenomena are logically certain not to exist is called the knowledge of the impossible. This knowledge applies to both sentient and insentient objects, and it is not in contradiction with omniscience. Fearing that in a concise explanation those of lesser ability would find it difficult to understand, the remaining nine [powers] were extracted from it. As the Bhagavān himself broadly analyzed the meaning of the possible and the impossible in the Bahudhātuka-sūtra: 'That evil conduct of body and so forth should produce undesirable results is certainly possible; that it should produce desirable results is strictly impossible,' and so forth at length." According to the above treatise passage, everything that accords with principle is called 'the possible' (sthāna), and what does not accord with principle is called 'the impossible' (asthāna). It also says: "Does not the knowledge of the possible already know the impossible, and all knowledges of the impossible also know the possible? Why bother to state both names, 'possible' and 'impossible'? Although this is indeed true in principle, stating both is done because of the wish to refute the theory of uncaused origination (ahetuvāda), hence the term 'the possible' is spoken, and because of the wish to refute the theory of improper cause (viṣamahetuvāda), hence the term 'the impossible' is spoken. There is no fault in speaking of both on the basis of a single entity of knowledge. How is it known that within the single power of the possible and impossible, the other nine powers were extracted for fear that a concise [presentation] would be difficult to comprehend? Because the others all share the meaning of this power. That is to say, truly knowing that evil conduct can produce desirable ripening and good conduct can produce undesirable ripening is strictly impossible. Contrary to this, it is certainly possible. And so forth, up to: also truly knowing that improper attention (ayoniso-manasikāra) can attain the exhaustion of the outflows is strictly impossible; contrary to this, it is certainly possible. In each of these powers, I have briefly raised a corner to reveal the possible and the impossible. If one were to exhaust the matters, the discourse would be endless; therefore they should all be named powers of the possible and impossible. Fearing that a concise [presentation] would be difficult to comprehend, separate and different names were established (thus far the treatise text)."