俱舍論疏 27.7

27.7

「論曰至十智為性」，釋初力也。於中有二：一出力體性、二義門分別。此即出體。《正理論》云「為依何義立此力名？佛於經中自作是說：『苾芻諦聽！如來於處如實知處，如來於非處如實知非處』，乃至廣說。知一切法自性功能理定是有，名為處智。知一切法自性功能理定非有，名非處智。此智通緣情、非情境，與一切智皆不相違。恐於略說少功難悟，故復此中析出餘九。如薄伽梵《多界經》中自廣分別處、非處義。『身等惡行感非愛果定有是處，感可愛果必無是處』」，乃至廣說。准上論文，即是一切應理之事名為是處，不應理者名非處也。又云「豈不處智已知非處，諸非處智亦已知處，何勞雙說處、非處名？雖理實然，而雙說者，為欲遮止無因論故說是處名，為欲遮止惡因論故說非處名。依一智體雙說無失。寧知於一處、非處力中，恐略難悟析出餘九力，以餘皆有此力義故。謂如實知惡行能感可愛異熟、妙行能感非愛異熟，必無是處。與此相違，定有是處。云云乃至又如實知非理作意能得漏盡必無是處，與此相違定有是處。我於如是一一力中，略舉方隅顯處、非處。若盡其事言論無窮，故應皆名處、非處力。恐略難悟，別立異名（已上論文）。」

[On the phrase in] the treatise, "From 'the treatise says' up to 'having the nature of the ten knowledges'": This explains the first power. Herein there are two [parts]: first, presenting the intrinsic nature of the power; second, analysis through doctrinal categories. This [passage] presents its intrinsic nature. The Nyāyānusāra says: "On what basis is the name of this power established? The Buddha himself said in the sūtras: 'Monks, listen attentively! The Tathāgata truly knows the possible as the possible; the Tathāgata truly knows the impossible as the impossible,' and so forth at length. The knowledge that the intrinsic nature and function of all phenomena are logically certain to exist is called the knowledge of the possible. The knowledge that the intrinsic nature and function of all phenomena are logically certain not to exist is called the knowledge of the impossible. This knowledge applies to both sentient and insentient objects, and it is not in contradiction with omniscience. Fearing that in a concise explanation those of lesser ability would find it difficult to understand, the remaining nine [powers] were extracted from it. As the Bhagavān himself broadly analyzed the meaning of the possible and the impossible in the Bahudhātuka-sūtra: 'That evil conduct of body and so forth should produce undesirable results is certainly possible; that it should produce desirable results is strictly impossible,' and so forth at length." According to the above treatise passage, everything that accords with principle is called 'the possible' (sthāna), and what does not accord with principle is called 'the impossible' (asthāna). It also says: "Does not the knowledge of the possible already know the impossible, and all knowledges of the impossible also know the possible? Why bother to state both names, 'possible' and 'impossible'? Although this is indeed true in principle, stating both is done because of the wish to refute the theory of uncaused origination (ahetuvāda), hence the term 'the possible' is spoken, and because of the wish to refute the theory of improper cause (viṣamahetuvāda), hence the term 'the impossible' is spoken. There is no fault in speaking of both on the basis of a single entity of knowledge. How is it known that within the single power of the possible and impossible, the other nine powers were extracted for fear that a concise [presentation] would be difficult to comprehend? Because the others all share the meaning of this power. That is to say, truly knowing that evil conduct can produce desirable ripening and good conduct can produce undesirable ripening is strictly impossible. Contrary to this, it is certainly possible. And so forth, up to: also truly knowing that improper attention (ayoniso-manasikāra) can attain the exhaustion of the outflows is strictly impossible; contrary to this, it is certainly possible. In each of these powers, I have briefly raised a corner to reveal the possible and the impossible. If one were to exhaust the matters, the discourse would be endless; therefore they should all be named powers of the possible and impossible. Fearing that a concise [presentation] would be difficult to comprehend, separate and different names were established (thus far the treatise text)."