俱舍論疏 28

English (machine translation) 28

Language: English

28.2

Chapter 8: Analysis of Meditative Absorption, Part 1

One-pointedness of mind is called meditative absorption (samādhi). This chapter extensively clarifies it, and is named "Chapter on the Analysis of Meditative Absorption". The previous chapter clarified the knowledge chapter as the fruit relying on absorption; this chapter clarifies the absorption chapter as the cause upon which knowledge relies.

28.4

The Śāstra states: "Having explained the knowledges... we will now distinguish next." This concludes what came before and introduces what follows.

28.5

The Śāstra states: "Among them, we first distinguish... what is dhyāna?" This chapter's major text has two parts: first, clarifying the absorptions on which virtues rely; second, clarifying the other merits. This clarifies the absorptions on which virtues rely. Herein there are four: first, clarifying dhyāna; second, clarifying formlessness; third, clarifying meditative attainments (samāpatti); fourth, clarifying concentration (samādhi). This text is the first, clarifying dhyāna. In the text there are three: first, a question; second, an answer; third, an explanation. This raises the question.

28.6

"The Śāstra says: ... differences among dhyānas." This explains the reason for first discussing dhyāna. Many virtues rely mostly on these four; therefore they are distinguished first.

28.7

The Śāstra states: "These in total are of four kinds: namely, the first, second, third, and fourth." This lists the four names. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Do the dhyānas lack unshared nominal concepts like benevolence (maitrī) and so forth, such that distinct names are now established merely with respect to the four numbers of first and so on? Here, it is not that they lack unshared nominal concepts, yet there is no name that exclusively and completely encompasses a single ground. Because the dhyānas each have two kinds, namely meditative absorption and rebirth, there are differences. As for the rebirth dhyānas, as previously stated, the fourth has eight and the preceding three each have three, with no distinct name comprehensively designating an entire ground. The meditative dhyānas have no difference in general characteristics: namely, speaking in general of the intrinsic nature of these four, they are all subsumed under wholesome nature, because one-pointedness of mind takes wholesome concentration (samādhi) as its intrinsic nature. If taken together with their companions, they take the five aggregates as their nature. Since these two are identical, their differences are difficult to know. Although their characteristics have no difference, their grounds differ; in order to reveal the differences of the grounds, names are designated according to numbers, and thus they are stated as the first through the fourth (end of the treatise text)."

28.8

The Śāstra states: "Each of the four has two... taking the five aggregates as their nature." It divides the four dhyānas into two kinds each: namely, rebirth and meditative absorption. Rebirth refers to the seventeen heavens. Meditative absorption is wholesome concentration (samādhi), which is named one-pointedness of mind, together with the five aggregates.

28.9

The Śāstra states: "What is meant by one-pointedness?" This is the Sautrāntika's question.

28.10

The Śāstra states: "It means exclusive focus on a single intentional object." This is the Sarvāstivādin's answer.

28.11

The Śāstra states: "If so, then it is just the mind... other mental factors." This is the Sautrāntika's objection. If exclusive focus on a single intentional object is called meditative absorption, then it is established based on the mind itself focusing exclusively on an object; this primary mind itself is called samādhi, and there should not be a separate other mental factor called samādhi.

28.12

The Śāstra states: "A distinct dharma causes the mind... its entity is not itself the mind." This is the Sarvāstivādin's answer. The mind's exclusive focus on a single intentional object is called concentration (samādhi) because a distinct mental factor can cause the primary mind to proceed upon a single object; its entity is not itself the primary mind.

28.13

The Śāstra states: "Do not all minds... what use is concentration?" This is the Sautrāntika's objection. Because this primary mind perishes moment by moment, all [moments of mind] proceed upon a single object—this is the very nature of phenomena, so what use is concentration to make it proceed upon a single object? This is the first objection.

28.14

The Śāstra states: "If it is said that it causes the mind... concentration is useless." This is the second objection. If it is said that concentration in the preceding moment causes the mind in the second moment also to proceed taking a single object identically with the preceding mind, then this is the preceding mind causing the subsequent mind to proceed on the identical single object; what is the use of concentration associated with the subsequent mind?

28.15

The Śāstra states: "Moreover, due to this... the mind proceeds upon a single object." This is the third objection. Just as meditative absorption among mental factors is present in distracted states, yet distracted states are not meditative absorption, and by force of practice samādhi is accomplished and called one-pointedness of mind—why not simply use this power of practice to cause the mind to proceed upon a single object?

28.16

The Śāstra states: "Furthermore, samādhi... all proceed upon a single object." This is the fourth objection. The mental factor of concentration is a universal mental factor of the great ground (mahābhūmika), present in both meditative absorption and distraction. Why then in distracted states is the mind confused, whereas in states of absorption it is one-pointed?

28.17

The Śāstra says: "Not so, because the concentration of the other categories is inferior." The Sarvāstivādin explains the fourth objection. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Here, the author of the śāstra himself poses the question and answer: 'What is called one-pointedness? It means exclusive focus on a single intentional object.' That answer is unreasonable. If eye-consciousness and mind-consciousness were to share one intentional object, they should be called one-pointedness. Therefore, in this context a different principle should be sought, namely: if it relies upon a single supporting sense-faculty and focuses exclusively on a single intentional object, it is called one-pointedness. Would it not be the case that in a single thought-moment there is no changing of the intentional object, so that one-pointedness should exist in all minds? In principle, all of them do indeed have it, because in each and every kṣaṇa the mind and mental factors proceed on a single intentional object; yet not all receive the designation of concentration. For in this context, one-pointedness is spoken of merely to indicate that through superior concentration, wholesome mind and mental factors are made to proceed in continuity. If so, then the mind itself proceeding in reliance on a single faculty, drawing forth and taking its own object, with subsequent minds arising in continuation—this would simply be called one-pointedness of the mind, and there should be no distinct concentration apart from the mind. This objection is incorrect, because it was already explained earlier. That is, in the earlier comprehensive analysis of the mental factors, concentration was already established; this objection is incorrect, because it was already explained earlier. Namely, if the mind-entity itself were samādhi making the mind balanced, there should likewise be no distinction [between them], for any distinguishing cause or condition cannot be found." Commentary: The Sautrāntika holds that [factors] make the mind balanced, thus allowing that there are distinct mental factors such as volition (cetanā) that make the mind one-pointed. Why do they not grant it [for concentration]?

28.18

The Śāstra says: "Other masters say [...] namely, the four dhyānas." This states the doctrine of the Sautrāntika master. This master cites a sūtra stating that the training in concentration is the training in the higher mind, and stating that the four dhyānas are the utmost purity of mind, to prove that concentration is just the mind itself.

28.19

The Śāstra says: "Based on what meaning is the designation 'dhyāna' established?" This is a question.

28.20

The Śāstra says: "Because through this quietude [...] it takes wisdom as its essence." This is the Sarvāstivādin's answer. 'Through this quietude' is concentration, and 'being able to deliberate' is wisdom. Deliberation is the meaning of knowing truly; knowing is wisdom, as in saying: 'When the mind is in concentration, it can know truly.' As for 'because the dhātu is placed in the meaning of deliberation,' deliberation in Sanskrit is cintā, which is a verbal root. Placing this verbal root into its verbal stem modifies the former cintā to become dhyāna. Dhyāna is translated here as 'quiet deliberation' (靜慮); dhyāna was formerly called channa, which was an error. The Nyāyānusāra says: 'Based on what meaning is the designation 'dhyāna' established? Because relying on this quietude, one is then able to deliberate. Deliberation is the meaning of knowing truly. As in saying: 'When the mind is in concentration, it can know truly,' because the dhātu is placed in the meaning of deliberation. According to the method of etymology, this is calm stillness. The state of contemplating and discerning an intentional object receives the designation 'dhyāna,' because concentration causes wisdom to arise without turbidity or confusion. Some say: this concentration maintains the superior, universally takes intentional objects, and ponders properly; therefore it is called dhyāna. 'Superior' excludes the desire realm; 'universally takes intentional objects' excludes the formless realm; 'ponders properly' distinguishes it from erroneous [thought]. That which can maintain this concentration is wondrous concentration; this wondrous concentration is called dhyāna. This statement demonstrates that only concentration in which calming (śamatha) and discernment (vipaśyanā) proceed in equilibrium without error is called dhyāna.' Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 141, says: 'Question: For what reason are these four called dhyāna? Answer: "Quiet" means quietude; "deliberation" means contemplation. In these four levels, concentration and wisdom are equal, and therefore they are called dhyāna. The others, lacking either of the two, do not receive this name.' This concludes the citation from the treatise.

28.21

The Śāstra says: "If so, all concentrations should be called dhyāna." This is an objection.

28.22

The Śāstra says: "Not so; only the superior [...] also receive the name of the sun." This is the answer.

28.23

The Śāstra says: "Why is dhyāna alone called superior?" This is a question.

28.24

The Śāstra says: "Among all concentrations [...] it alone is called dhyāna." This answers the reason why it alone is called superior.

28.25

The Śāstra says: "If so, how can defiled [states] receive this designation?" This is an objection. If it is only due to such superiority as mentioned above that it is called deliberation, then tasting-concentration is defiled; how does it likewise receive the designation 'dhyāna'?

28.26

The Śāstra says: "Because it also is capable of wrong deliberation." This is the Sarvāstivādin's answer.

28.27

The Śāstra says: "Then there would be the fault of being too broad." Objection: if a defiled mind deliberating is superior to the remaining non-concentrated wholesome [states], there is the fault of being too broad.

28.28

The Śāstra says: "There is no fault of being too broad [...] there are evil dhyānas." This is the answer. Just as a spoiled seed, although lacking generative capability, receives the name of 'seed' and not other things like earth, defilement is also like this: although not deliberating in the manner of the wholesome, because it is dhyāna it receives the designation 'dhyāna.' This is the rational proof. "The World-Honoured One also spoke of evil dhyānas" is citing scriptural proof.

28.29

The Śāstra says: "If one-pointedness [...] first, second, third, and fourth?" This is an objection. If one-pointedness is dhyāna, then their characteristics would be without distinction; based on what distinct characteristics are the first, second, third, and fourth established?

28.30

The Śāstra says: "Possessing investigation, joy, and pleasure [...] but is not accompanied by vitarka." This clarifies that the first dhyāna possesses vitarka, vicāra, prīti, and sukha. The verse only states "vicāra" in order to indicate that it is accompanied by vitarka, because where vicāra has joy and pleasure, it must have vitarka, and because the intermediate dhyāna lacks joy and pleasure. In all other cases where there is vicāra, it indicates the presence of vitarka.

28.31

The Śāstra says: "Gradually relinquishing the preceding factors [...] it is divided into four kinds." This states the reason for establishing the other three: relinquishing vicāra to differ from the first establishes the second; relinquishing both prīti and vicāra to differ from the previous two establishes the third; relinquishing vicāra, prīti, and sukha to differ from the previous three establishes the fourth.

28.32

The Śāstra says: "Dhyāna has been explained; what of the formless [attainments]?" The following two and a half stanzas constitute the second part, explaining the four formless [attainments].

28.33

The Śāstra says: "[...] are also like this." This explains that the four formless [attainments], along with the two modes of rebirth and concentration, are the same in being wholesome in nature and so forth, identical to the preceding dhyānas. Therefore the verse says: "are also like this."

28.34

The Śāstra says: "However, among the concomitants [...] material form concomitant with [mind]." This explains the difference.

28.35

The Śāstra says: "Although one-pointedness [...] is established as the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception." This explains the reason for dividing them into four.

28.36

The Śāstra says: "What is the meaning of the word 'departure' (vairāgya)?" This is a question.

28.37

The Śāstra says: "It means that by this path [...] the meaning of departing from defilement of the lower." This is the answer. As for 'departing from rebirth,' there are two meanings: first, defiled phenomena are called 'raw' (birth), because they can cause affliction, just as raw food in the stomach; second, it means undergoing rebirth: when departing from the defilement of a level, both kinds of faults of 'raw' and 'rebirth' are abandoned.

28.38

The Śāstra says: "These four fundamental [...] are established with the name 'formless.'" This states the similarities and differences. Among these four formless attainments, because the upper three preparatory stages do not take material form as intentional object, they are called 'eliminating the ideation of material form.' The preparatory stage of the sphere of infinite space, because it takes material form as intentional object, is not 'eliminating the ideation of material form.' However, although the four fundamental attainments and the four preparatory stages differ in their taking or not taking material form as intentional object, because they all lack material form, they are equally called 'formless.'

28.39

The Śāstra says: "This reason is unproven, because [we] accept that there is material form." This is an objection by the Mahāsāṃghika, Mahīśāsaka, and others: You state that because they lack material form, they are generally named 'formless.' The reason of 'lacking material form' is not accepted by our school, because we accept that there is material form; thus it incurs the fault of being unproven (asiddha).

28.40

The Śāstra says: "If so, why is the name 'formless' established?" The Sarvāstivādin asks in return: Since you say there is material form, why does the sūtra call them 'formless'?

28.41

The Śāstra says: "Because that material form is subtle [...] is also called 'lacking yellow.'" This is the answer of the Mahāsāṃghika and others.

28.42

The Śāstra says: "What characteristics are accepted for the material form in that realm?" The Sarvāstivādin interrogates the characteristics of this material form.

28.43

The Śāstra says: "If it only has [...] how could there be derived form (upādāya-rūpa)?" This refutes them by provisionally granting their assertion.

28.44

The Śāstra says: "If you say that just as there is [...] because it is also denied that it exists." This refutes their rescue argument. The Mahāsāṃghika and others attempt to rescue their position, saying: Just as there is uncontaminated restraint without uncontaminated primary elements, our school holds that in the formless realm there is bodily and vocal restraint without distinct primary elements. The refutation says: Not so. Although uncontaminated [restraint] lacks [uncontaminated] primary elements, it relies on contaminated primary elements; in your school, it cannot be said that formless restraint relies on primary elements of the form realm, because their realms and levels are distinct. Furthermore, our school also denies that uncontaminated restraint exists in the formless realm.

28.45

The Śāstra says: "If you accept that in that [realm] [...] that material form becomes progressively less." This also refutes an alternative assertion.

28.46

The Śāstra says: "If you say that in that [realm] [...] because it cannot be seen." This refutes their rescue argument.

28.47

The Śāstra says: "If you say that their body [...] should be called formless." This also refutes an alternative assertion.

28.48

The Śāstra says: "If you say that their body [...] because there is superiority and inferiority." This also refutes their rescue argument.

28.49

The Śāstra says: "Furthermore, when reborn in the dhyānas [...] are not called formless." This is a renewed refutation. All can be understood according to the text. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Furthermore, when reborn in the dhyānas, up to the higher levels, in comparison to the lower ones, they become progressively more subtle and refined, and cannot be grasped by the sense-faculties of a lower level; what difference is there with that, such that they are not called formless?"

28.50

The Śāstra says: "If you say that desire and form [...] what principle is there in this?" This also refutes their rescue argument. The Mahāsāṃghika attempts to rescue their position, saying: Although in the form realm the higher levels are subtle and refined, in comparison to the lower levels they should be called formless; yet based on a specific meaning the name is established, and they are not called formless. But that the formless [realm] is not like this—what principle is there in this?

28.51

The Śāstra says: "If you say that the sūtra states [...] the principle that there is material form is established." This cites the Mahāsāṃghika invoking other sūtras as proof. Life-span and heat being joined together constitutes one sūtra. Heat being material form, and material form and consciousness relying upon each other, is the second sūtra. Name-and-form as condition is the third sūtra. Denying that there is coming or going apart from material form and so forth is the fourth sūtra. Through these four, they prove that the formless realm definitely has material form.

28.52

The Śāstra says: "This proof is unestablished, for it must be carefully considered." This is a general rejection for now.

28.53

The Śāstra says: "That is, the cited scripture should be carefully considered together." This urges the Mahāsāṃghika and others to consider it carefully.

28.54

The Śāstra says: "First, as for the sūtra's statement [...] or was it spoken with reference to the desire realm?" This makes them consider the first sūtra.

28.55

The Śāstra says: "Name-and-form and consciousness [...] or was it spoken with reference to the desire and form realms?" This makes them consider the second sūtra.

28.56

The Śāstra says: "Does the stated name-and-form [...] not condition consciousness?" This makes them consider the third sūtra.

28.57

The Śāstra says: "Denying departure from material form [...] or does it deny departure from all?" This makes them consider the fourth sūtra. All four of these sūtras admit of two interpretations, and do not establish the argument as proof.

28.58

The Śāstra says: "If you say that because the sūtra [...] because of a great fault." This briefly refutes their rescue argument.

28.59

The Śāstra says: "That is, external heat should also be joined with life-span." This points out the great fault in their rescue of the first sūtra. If, because the sūtra makes no qualification, all life-span must be joined with heat, then because the sūtra makes no qualification, all heat should be joined with life-span; why is external heat not joined with life-span?

28.60

The Śāstra says: "Furthermore, external name-and-form should rely on consciousness and have consciousness as condition." This points out the faults regarding the second and third [sūtras]. If, because the sūtra makes no qualification, all consciousness must rely on name-and-form, that refutes the second fault. External name-and-form having consciousness as condition is the third sūtra. Since in both cases the sūtra makes no qualification, all name-and-form should rely on consciousness and be conditioned by material form; that would mean external material form and the four characteristics and so forth should rely on consciousness and be conditioned by consciousness, which is a fault.

28.61

The Śāstra says: "Furthermore, it speaks of the four nutriments [...] there should be solid nutriment." This refutes them by drawing a parallel. The sūtra speaks of the four nutriments as being like the four stations of consciousness; since the sūtra makes no qualification, the form and formless realms should have solid nutriment, because they have the four stations of consciousness and the sūtra does not qualify it.

28.62

The Śāstra says: "If you say that the sūtra states [...] there is no such fault." This cites two sūtras used as a rescue argument. Because there is a sūtra stating that a certain class of devas transcends solid nutriment, one knows that the form and formless realms lack solid nutriment. "Furthermore, the sūtra states that those devas take joy as nutriment; therefore, there is no fault of the upper two realms having solid nutriment"—this expresses the Mahāsāṃghika's intention: although the previously cited text had no qualification, these two distinct texts have qualifications, and therefore one knows that the upper two realms definitely lack solid nutriment.

28.63

The Śāstra says: "The desire and formless realms [...] because all are transcended." This cites three sūtras following the analogy of solid nutriment to prove that the formless realm lacks material form.

28.64

The Śāstra says: "If the formless realm [...] transcending the ideation of material form and so forth?" This poses a counter-objection to the Mahāsāṃghika.

28.65

The Śāstra says: "If you say that viewing the lower [...] you should also accept that this is so." This refutes their rescue argument. As for saying 'Lacking ideation of material form and so forth is relative to the gross below; lacking gross ideation of material form is called lacking ideation of material form and so forth'—in speaking of lacking solid nutriment, one should likewise say that there is no gross, but there is subtle solid nutriment.

28.66

The Śāstra says: "Moreover, the dhyānas... [are also called the formless realm]," which again refutes the defense. If it is termed "formless" because one views the gross form below [as absent], then since the form in the four dhyānas is subtle compared to the desire realm, one could also apply the statement of "departure from form" [to them]; and if so, the form realm should also be called the "formless realm."

28.67

The Śāstra says: "Moreover, one should also say... [it is not transcending sensation, etc.]," which is a further refutation. If one says that it is named "departure from form" because one contemplates gross form, then since sensation in the formless realm is subtle while sensation in the form realm is gross, transcending the lower, gross sensation should be termed "departure from sensation, etc." Since the sūtra does not speak of "departure from sensation, etc.," we know that in the formless [realm] one universally transcends the category of form alone, not sensation, etc.

28.68

The Śāstra says: "From this it is definitely known that there is no form in that realm." This summarily concludes and establishes the view of our own school.

28.69

The Śāstra says: "However, a sūtra says... [because it is not an everlasting departure]," which resolves a covert objection. The import of the covert objection is: if the formless realm has no form, then formless existence should depart from existence of form; why then does a sūtra state that existence does not depart from existence? There are three explanations: First, existence of one's own level cannot depart from existence of one's own level; that is, the defiled path of one's own level cannot suppress the defilements of one's own level, and it is necessary to rely on a higher level to be able to sever them. As for "not universally departing": although existence of a higher level departs from existence of a lower level, it cannot depart from the existence of the peak of existence (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana). Although it can depart from the existence of lower levels, because one is certain to regress later, it is not an everlasting departure. It is based on such reasoning that it is said "existence does not depart from existence."

28.70

The Śāstra says: "Moreover, the Bhagavān... [spoke of the category of form]," which again cites scripture as proof.

28.71

The Śāstra says: "Therefore, the established reason is free from the fallacy of being unestablished (asiddha)," which summarises the above statement. Because it lacks form, it is called "formless"; thus the reason is not flawed by being unestablished. That your school does not accept it goes against reason and teaching. Since you go against the teaching, our [reason] is not unestablished.

28.72

The Śāstra says: "Residing there for many kalpas... [from what does form arise?]," which is an objection raised by the Mahāsāṃghika and others.

28.73

The Śāstra says: "This arises from mind... [arises from that mind]," which is the Sautrāntika answer. It means that it arises from the seeds of capability that are the causes of the vipāka of form.

28.74

The Śāstra says: "Lacking a physical body there, on what does the mind depend to function?" which is another objection from the Mahāsāṃghika and others. If that [realm] lacks form, on what does the mind depend to function?

28.75

The Śāstra says: "Apart from a body, why would it not function?" which is the Sarvāstivādins and others questioning the Mahāsāṃghika in turn.

28.76

The Śāstra says: "Because it has never been seen below," which is the Mahāsāṃghika's answer.

28.77

The Śāstra says: "The form realm lacks material food... [because it functions apart from material food]," which adduces a parallel to counter the Mahāsāṃghika.

28.78

The Śāstra says: "Moreover, the support on which that mind functions has already been explained," pointing to the earlier explanation; it was explained earlier that the mind functions depending on life-span (āyus), etc.

28.79

The Śāstra says: "The general name has already been explained," concluding the names of the four formless [attainments] above.

28.80

The Śāstra says: "Do infinite space, etc.,... [obtain their distinct names?]," which asks about the distinct names.

28.81

The Śāstra says: "Not so; how then... [establishing the three names]," which answers. The first three formless attainments take their names from their preliminary application (prayoga); because in the preparatory stage one contemplates space, etc., with resolve (adhimukti), they are called infinite space, etc. When the stage of completion is reached, one also takes other phenomena as cognitive objects. Thus the Nyāyānusāra says: "If there is a dharma that, though accompanied by form, does not in its own essence depend on form, those seeking departure from form must first contemplate that dharma. That is, although the essence of space is accompanied by form, it becomes apparent only depending on the absence of form; it is subsumed under external dharmas and its aspect is infinite. When contemplating it, one can easily leave form behind; therefore, in the preparatory stage one contemplates space, and upon completion one also takes other dharmas as objects as appropriate, establishing this name solely from the preliminary application. That is to say, among the capacities of discernment of the six entirely pure consciousness-aggregates, having properly grasped the signs, one abides in resolute faith, and by the power of conceptual representation one contemplates and observes the infinite aspect of consciousness. Because this preliminary application is what first accomplishes it, one also takes other dharmas as objects as appropriate, establishing this name solely from the preliminary application. That is, seeing the aspect of infinity to be gross and agitated, in order to cultivate revulsion and abandonment one initiates this preliminary application; hence this state is called supreme abandonment. Because here one no longer delights in producing the aspect of infinity, the mind abandons all possessions with respect to the cognitive object and abides in stillness (the above is from the treatise)."

28.82

The Śāstra says: "Establishing the fourth name... [it is called neither-perception-nor-non-perception]," which establishes the fourth name. Because its perception is dim and weak, lacking clear and prominent perception, it gets the name "neither perception"; because a dim and weak perception still exists, it is named "nor non-perception."

28.83

The Śāstra says: "Although at the time of preliminary application... [named from the preliminary application]," which clarifies that at the time of preliminary application one contemplates the fundamental [attainment] with the understanding of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, but it is not named from the preliminary application; it is named from the dim and weak perception of the fundamental state.

28.84

The Śāstra says: "For if one should question... [is the true reason for establishing the name]," which explains the reason it is not named from the preliminary application. During the preliminary application of the first three formless attainments, the mind contemplates infinite space, etc., but the fundamental state does not truly always take space as its object; because of this, they are named from their preliminary application and not from the fundamental state, since the preliminary application does not contemplate the fundamental state in its cognitive activity. In the preparatory stage of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, one takes the dim and weak perception of its fundamental level as an object and thinks: 'Lacking clear and prominent perception, it has a dim and weak perception.' This thought arises relying on the fundamental state, and is itself the true reason for establishing the name. Because its perception is dim and weak, it takes its name from the fundamental state and not from the preliminary application.

28.85

The Śāstra says: "Having analyzed the formless [realms], what are the meditative attainments (samāpatti)?" The two stanzas below constitute the third section, explaining meditative attainments. The text has twelve parts: 1. explaining the three distinctions of pure, etc.; 2. explaining the number of limbs possessed; 3. explaining immobility (āneñja); 4. explaining the number of feelings; 5. explaining the borrowing of consciousness; 6. explaining the two acquisitions; 7. explaining mutual arising; 8. explaining the support of the body; 9. explaining cognitive objects; 10. explaining the severing of defilements; 11. explaining the threshold states (sāmantaka); 12. explaining the intermediate dhyāna. This first part explains the three types: pure, etc.

28.86

The commentary says: "...because there is no anāsrava [state]," which provides an overall explanation of the eight stages. The first seven possess all three; the summit of existence possesses only two, lacking the anāsrava [type].

28.87

The Śāstra says: "First, the attainment with relish... [this obtains the name 'relish']," which explains the first, the concentration with relish (āsvādana-samāpatti). This means that concentration (samādhi) is associated with craving (tṛṣṇā); because craving can relish [the state], the concentration is also called "relish." The Nyāyānusāra says: "The statement 'associated with craving' is made with reference to its intrinsic nature, because this has concentration as its intrinsic nature. If spoken together with its companions, one should say: dharmas concomitant with craving are termed the 'attainment with relish.'" Question: Why are associations with other defilements not called concentration? Answer: The Nyāyānusāra says: "Only when focused unwaveringly is it called concentration. Concentration associated with craving is also focused on a single object; hence it obtains the name 'concentration.' Associations with other defilements are not like this, for other defilements cannot cause the mind to be focused on their cognitive objects as craving does. Therefore, if samādhi is concomitant with craving, being focused on a single object, it resembles the wholesome."

28.88

The Śāstra says: "The attainment called pure... [this obtains the name 'pure']," which secondly explains the pure concentration (śuddhaka). "Because it is defiled (sāsrava), it is distinct from the uncorrupted (anāsrava)"—this is qualified by the term "mundane" (laukika). Because it is pure, it is not relishing; this is qualified by the term "wholesome." "Because it is associated with white dharmas such as non-greed, it is called pure," which explains the name "pure."

28.89

The Śāstra says: "Namely, associated with relish... [deeply produces relish]," describing the pure as the object of relish. Relish takes only the pure as its object; within taking the pure as an object, it takes only the past pure concentration from which one has regressed as its object. It does not take the present or future as its object, because in the present there is no pure concentration, and future purity has not yet been experienced. This speaks of the capacity to give rise to a concentration with relish, but it does not arise in all cases; it arises only from the part belonging to regression and that portion of the abiding type which resembles regression. Its cognitive object is also like this. Furthermore, a concentration of the regressive type does not necessarily regress, for the first five spiritual lineages do not definitively regress, yet such people all possess concentrations of the regressive type.

28.90

The Śāstra says: "At that time, although it is called... [it obtains the name of 'entering']," which describes entering and emerging. A concentration with relish is not truly a concentration, but being similar to concentration it is called concentration; hence it is also called "entering a concentration with relish." The Nyāyānusāra says: "Emerging from concentration has five varieties in all: 1. emerging from a level; 2. emerging from a moment; 3. emerging from an aspect; 4. emerging from an object; 5. emerging from a category. Entering the second dhyāna, etc., from the first dhyāna is called emerging from a level. In the phase where aspects and objects continue to function in succession within the same level, the immediately following moment entering after the preceding moment is called emerging from a moment. Entering from the aspect of impermanence into the aspect of suffering, etc., is called emerging from an aspect. Entering from taking the form-aggregate as an object into taking sensation, etc., as an object is called emerging from an object. Entering from the defiled into the uncorrupted, or from the undefiled into the defiled, is called emerging from a category. Based on emerging from a category, it is said here that 'emerging from what is relished, one enters the concentration that relishes.' Do these two statements not contradict each other? What relishes is craving, not the concentration entered; what is entered is concentration, which is not called relishing. How then can one speak of 'entering the concentration that relishes'? There is no contradiction. We commonly see that in association, mentioning one name designates the entire concomitant category. Just as in admonishing an elder to produce the mental application of determination, because they are intermingled, both receive the two names. Because it is associated with craving, concentration is called relish, and by the power of concentration, craving obtains the name 'concentration'; therefore there is no contradiction between the two terms."

28.91

The Śāstra says: "The uncorrupted concentration... [is not what is relished]," which thirdly describes the anāsrava concentration. This can be understood from the text.

28.92

The Śāstra says: "Among the eight meditative attainments so explained..." Below is the second part, explaining the number of limbs possessed. In this text there are two parts: 1. explaining the four and five limbs; 2. explaining that defilement lacks limbs. Under explaining the possession of limbs there are two parts: 1. explaining how many limbs the four concentrations possess; 2. explaining the substance of the limbs. These two lines of verse are the first, explaining how many limbs the dhyānas possess.

28.93

The commentary says: "...[and fifth,] concentration (samādhi)," which explains the pure and anāsrava [dhyānas]. The first dhyāna possesses five limbs.

28.94

The Śāstra says: "Here, concentration... [the meaning is as explained before]," which correlates the name and substance.

28.95

The Śāstra says: "The tradition says that only concentration... [is not a dhyāna]," which describes the Vibhāṣā school's position.

28.96

The Śāstra says: "As for the real meaning... [one should know that the others are also like this]," which is the author's own correct explanation. Just as with an army of four limbs (caturaṅgabala), one cannot speak of a single limb as being the entire army, yet it is also a limb of the army. One should know that the remaining limbs of the dhyānas are also like this. The Nyāyānusāra says: "The Vibhāṣā masters, in order to show that samādhi is supreme on the level of dhyāna, spoke in this way. Samādhi is dhyāna and also a limb of dhyāna, just as with an army of four limbs, so there is no fault. Just as the king and his host assist each other, yet among them the king is supreme."

28.97

The Śāstra says: "In the second dhyāna... [the distinct four are concentration]," which explains the limbs of the second dhyāna. As for "faith is called internal purification (adhyātmasaṃprasāda)," the Nyāyānusāra explains: "Faith has the characteristic of purity, hence it is established under the name 'purification,' just as the water-clearing jewel purifies water. It arises with the internal mind's serenity (samatā) as its condition; therefore this faculty of faith is called 'internal purification.' Or else, all the merits of the second concentration equanimously act as conditions to induce this purification; hence the name 'internal purification' is established (the above is from the treatise)."

28.98

The Śāstra says: "In the third dhyāna... [and fifth, concentration]," which explains how many limbs the third dhyāna possesses.

28.99

On the treatise passage: "In the fourth dhyāna [...] four samādhis": this explains the factors of the fourth dhyāna. Regarding "equanimity and mindfulness are called pure": the sense in the Nyāyānusāra is that because one further abandons pleasure in the fourth dhyāna, its equanimity and mindfulness obtain the name "pure." It also states: "What meaning do the names of the factors signify here? They signify making manifest and bringing to completion. What do they make manifest and bring to completion? Namely, making manifest and bringing to completion that 'this is the first dhyāna,' up to 'this is the fourth dhyāna.' Or, these factor names signify conformity, meaning that the eighteen factors each conform to their own level. Or, they are called factors in the sense of requisites, just as the factors of a sacrificial ritual are cattle, horses, and the like; meaning that vitarka, vicāra, and the rest mutually assist one another." It also states: "For what reason do the first and third [dhyānas] each have five factors, while the second and fourth have only four factors each? It may be because the desire realm contains many bad phenomena and exquisite fivefold desires that are difficult to sever and difficult to abandon, [while] the second dhyāna possesses the joy of a profound level whose characteristic is turbulent leaping, the culmination of joy, which induces the five categories of craving and is difficult to abandon and difficult to sever. To counteract these, the first and third each have five factors; since the first and third [states to be abandoned] are not like this, the remaining [two dhyānas] have four each. Another explanation is: it conforms to skipping over attainments." It also states: "Pliancy and equanimity pervade all four dhyānas; for what reason is pliancy alone established in the first two, while equanimity alone is established in the latter two levels? Because they uniquely conform to those levels: namely, in the desire realm there are bad phenomena, and in the level of the first dhyāna there are notions of vitarka and vicāra that afflict the mind like poisoned arrows; because the first and second are free from these, pliancy is predominant. In the second dhyāna, joy is exceedingly turbulent and leaping, and in the third dhyāna, pleasurable feeling is exceedingly heightened; both can serve as superior points of origin for craving; because the third and fourth abandon them, equanimity is predominant." It also states: "Equanimity and pliancy mutually obscure one another; where one is present, the second is absent. Pliancy counteracts sluggishness, its characteristic being uplifted; equanimity counteracts restlessness, its characteristic being stillness; thus pliancy and equanimity mutually obscure one another." It also states: "For what reason are mindfulness and discernment present in all levels, yet mindfulness is established as a factor only in the upper two dhyānas, and discernment only in the third dhyāna? Because they uniquely conform [to them] as appropriate. Namely, joy and pleasure within the three existences are what sentient beings most intensely relish. The relishing in the third dhyāna is the culmination, because it has the most supreme pleasure within saṃsāra. Properly, discernment should be established to contemplate, become revulsed, and abandon it; without discernment, one would not even be able to accomplish the roots of good of one's own level, much less advance to seek what is superior. To counteract such faults of its own level, discernment is established as a factor in the third dhyāna; the other levels are not like this, hence discernment is not established [as a factor in them]. The second dhyāna possesses the most supreme joy, fickle and disruptive like a rākṣasī; the third dhyāna possesses the most supreme pleasure, extremely difficult to abandon like exquisite divine desires. In the third and fourth dhyānas, although one has already abandoned them as appropriate by means of the factor of equanimity, fearing that they might regress and arise [again], mindfulness is established to block and prevent them; the other levels are not like this, hence mindfulness is not established [as a factor in them]. However, the power and function of mindfulness in the third [dhyāna] are firm and strong: it not only assists equanimity but can also assist discernment, universally able to guard against the faults of its own and other levels. The fourth is not like this, because it has no faults of its own; therefore, the factor of discernment is not established in the fourth." Question: For what reason is internal serenity established as a factor only in the second [dhyāna]? The Nyāyānusāra explains: "Therefore, internal serenity is inherently the faculty of faith. Namely, if one attains the second dhyāna, profound faith arises that one can also become separated from [attachments] in the levels of meditative absorption; this is called internal serenity. Thus, although the faculty of faith exists in all levels, it can be established as a factor only in the second dhyāna, because one has newly gained faith that the phenomena of all levels of meditative absorption and the phenomena of levels of distraction can alike be separated from" (end of treatise citation).

28.100

From the treatise passage: "Since there are eighteen names of dhyāna factors," down through the next one-line verse, is the second part: explaining the entities of the factors.

28.101

"The treatise says [...] are five real entities": this explains the factors of the first dhyāna. Since the five each have distinct entities, there are five real entities: first, vitarka; second, vicāra; third, joy; fourth, pliancy; fifth, samādhi.

28.102

On the treatise passage: "In the second dhyāna [...] bringing the previous [total] to six": this explains that the second dhyāna adds only one factor, namely internal serenity, which is faith.

28.103

On the treatise passage: "In the third dhyāna [...] bringing the previous [total] to ten": this explains that the third dhyāna adds four factors. First, equanimity, which is equanimity among wholesome [dharmas]. Second, right mindfulness, which is mindfulness among universal [dharmas]. Third, right discernment, which is discernment among universal [dharmas]. Fourth, pleasurable feeling. If feeling is explained in terms of the seventy-five dharmas, then feeling across all four levels is identical. If explained in terms of the five feelings, joy, pleasure, and equanimity are distinct. Here it is explained in terms of the five feelings; therefore, pleasurable feeling is added as one [more entity].

28.104

On the treatise passage: "In the fourth dhyāna [...] bringing the previous [total] to eleven": as for adding neither-painful-nor-pleasurable [feeling], although neutral feeling is just the previous feeling, when the meaning is explained in terms of the five feelings, it is added to the previous ones as neither-painful-nor-pleasurable [feeling]. If the feelings of the four levels are combined as one, then nine dharmas constitute the entities of the factors.

28.105

On the treatise passage: "From this it is said [...] should be considered as is proper": the analysis into four alternatives can be understood from the text.

28.106

On the treatise passage: "Why is it said that the third adds pleasurable feeling?": this is a question by the Sautrāntika.

28.107

On the treatise passage: "Because the pleasure in the first two is subsumed under pliancy": this is the Sarvāstivādin's answer. In the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, joy and pleasure in the first and second [dhyānas] are a single feeling; because the bodily and mental gladdening differ, two names are established.

28.108

On the treatise passage: "By what reasoning is there proof to know that it is pliancy?": this questions the Sarvāstivādin.

28.109

On the treatise passage: "Because there is no faculty of pleasure in the first two absorptions": this is the Sarvāstivādin's summary answer. Since there is no faculty of pleasure in the absorptions, one knows that the mention of pleasure refers to the pleasure of pliancy.

28.110

From the treatise passage: "It is not that the first two absorptions [...] because there are no five consciousnesses": below, investigating through assertion and concession shows that there is no pleasurable feeling. There are two kinds of pleasure: first, bodily pleasure; second, mental pleasure. Bodily pleasurable feeling is associated with the five consciousnesses. In meditative absorption there are no five consciousnesses, hence there is no bodily pleasurable feeling.

28.111

On the treatise passage: "Nor is there mental pleasurable feeling [...] hence there is no pleasurable feeling": this clarifies that there is no mental pleasurable feeling. Although the names of the two feelings of joy and pleasure differ, both are feelings alike. Two feelings cannot arise together in a single mind; since joy-feeling is present, how could there be pleasure?

28.112

On the treatise passage: "It is not admissible that joy and pleasure [...] and having four factors": this refutes an alternative proposition. If one says that joy and pleasure become manifest alternately and that is called pleasurable feeling, then when pleasure is present there is no joy-feeling; how then could it be said to possess four factors or five factors?

28.113

On the treatise passage: "Some say there is no [...] faculty of pleasure subsumed under": this recounts the tenet of the Sautrāntika masters.

28.114

On the treatise passage: "If so, why [...] bodily and mental pleasurable feelings?": this is the Sarvāstivādin's objection. The sūtra says: "What is the faculty of pleasure? [...] up to inducing bodily and mental pleasurable feelings"; therefore, one knows that the faculty of pleasure includes both bodily and mental pleasurable feelings.

28.115

On the treatise passage: "Others in this matter [...] because it speaks only of body": the Sautrāntika corrects the sūtra text. It is your Sarvāstivāda school that added the word "mental." How is this known? Because in the sūtras of other schools, the word "mental" is absent. The Nyāyānusāra states: "For what reason are the sūtras of other schools rejected? Others deleted the word 'mental' from them, because the sūtras state that in the second absorption and above there are no other consciousness-bodies, since the mind has a single orientation. If one stubbornly says that there is bodily pleasurable feeling in them, it contradicts reasoning. This will be analyzed later."

28.116

On the treatise passage: "Furthermore, the third absorption [...] because it is pleasure felt by the body": the Sautrāntika points out to the Sarvāstivādin the error of contradicting the sūtras.

28.117

On the treatise passage: "If it is said that here [...] what virtue would it have?": this refutes the Sarvāstivādin's harmonizing interpretation of the sūtra. If the Sarvāstivādin interprets the sūtra by claiming that when the sūtra says "body" it means the mental faculty as the body, not the five sense faculties, then what superior virtue would this have over saying "mind"? The Nyāyānusāra states: "The sūtra says 'pleasure felt by the body,' yet this cannot prove that the faculty of pleasure of that level is not subsumed under mental feeling, because it also says that 'joy born of separation is realized through the body.' How could one grasp from this that the faculty of joy is not subsumed under mental feeling? If it is claimed that 'body' is not spoken of in the formless realm, this is not definitive, for bodily view is spoken of in the formless realm. Moreover, we see it said that the body is destroyed there, and it is also said that their bodies are born inferior." It also states: "As for asking what virtue there is in using the name 'body,' it is to show that that pleasurable feeling is realized within oneself. That is to say, the pleasure of that level is not manifested by basis or object, but is realized solely within oneself. This demonstrates the culmination of that pleasurable feeling. We also see that the word 'body' is used for 'oneself,' just as when it is said 'realizing the deathless realm with the body,' which means realizing the deathless realm by oneself" (end of treatise citation).

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese