俱舍論疏 6.25

6.25

The commentary says: "It encompasses conditioned phenomena comprehensively as appropriate." This clarifies the entity of the coexistence cause. All conditioned phenomena possess the four characteristics; the characteristics and the phenomena possessing the characteristics are causes for one another, and in principle it should encompass all conditioned phenomena comprehensively. The words "mutually effects" here mean simultaneous causes and effects. Among them, the secondary characteristics relative to their fundamental phenomenon are not mutual effects, while the fundamental phenomenon serves as a coexistence cause for them; this is being a cause without being mutual effects. Following this, it means: only where they are mutual effects are they coexistence causes. When there are coexistence causes that are not mutual effects, positing "mutual effects" means the reason does not pervade the subject of the thesis—this is a reason that is narrower than the thesis. The Nyāyānusāra criticizes: "Furthermore, one should not say that only being mutual effects is a coexistence cause, for a phenomenon and its secondary characteristics are not mutual effects, yet they are causes. How this is a cause, they must analyze further; because of this point, one should analyze the statement of characteristics." Conditioned phenomena having a single effect can be a coexistence cause; this agrees in meaning with the Vibhāṣā. The arbitrator in Vibhāṣā fascicle 16 says: "The meaning of sharing a single effect is a coexistence cause." Now, analyzing this reason: if it is simultaneous, it still has its fault. Since the self-entity is not the effect of the self-entity, how could coexistent things obtain a single effect? Furthermore, major arising and minor arising do not share the same effect; how can it be stated to be the cause of a single effect? Thus this reason of a single effect does not pervade the subject of the thesis, the reason being narrower than the thesis, no different from the former. If it is said to be at different times, then the secondary characteristics share the same outflowing and the same fruition with their fundamental phenomenon; why are they not causes for the fundamental phenomenon? Thus this reason of a single effect extends to the dissimilar class, operating in the dissimilar class, and its fault is even graver. The reason posited by the Nyāyānusāra is no different from the former; why did it criticize the Kośa and independently posit another? Furthermore, the Abhidharmāvatāra states: "Conditioned phenomena being effects for one another, or sharing a single effect, is called a coexistence cause." Following this, neither of the two reasons is superior or inferior. Now, analyzing the reasons posited by both treatises, neither has any fault. Just as stating that change and obstruction is called matter posits a reason that does not pervade unmanifest matter; just as stating that rapid eating and rapid running is called a horse, yet there are non-horses that eat rapidly and run rapidly, and also horses that eat slowly and run slowly. Yet these designations do not contradict worldly reality; the reasons of mutual effects and a single effect are also like this. The master of the Nyāyānusāra followed "single effect" because [the other] contradicted the Vibhāṣā; the Abhidharmāvatāra, considering it not contrary to reason, comprehensively cited both reasons; this treatise, being brief, cited only one. Someone asked and answered: Question: If, relying on Vibhāṣā fascicles 16 and 150, which both state: "A single effect means the effect of disconnection," while the Nyāyānusāra further states: "A single effect means the virile effect and disconnection," are they not contradictory? The explanation says: That the Vibhāṣā mentions only the effect of disconnection is stated for the time being on the basis of what is definitive and devoid of ambiguity among these effects; the virile effect is broader and indefinite in name, being either simultaneously arisen, or immediately contiguous, etc. The Vibhāṣā should also have mentioned the virile effect; that it did not mention it was out of fear of confusing it with the reciprocal virile effect arisen simultaneously, because relative to self-entity, self-entity is not a single effect. The reason the Nyāyānusāra stated the virile effect was in order to exhaustively subsume the virile effect within a single effect; therefore it stated it separately. Each relies on one meaning, and neither is contradictory. Now, analyzing the Nyāyānusāra's statement of the virile effect: it is because the effect of disconnection does not exhaustively subsume the unarisen virile effect, not that it seeks to subsume the immediately contiguous or separated virile effects of other conditioned phenomena. The equal-and-immediate condition, the immediate virile effect, and the matter derived from the four primary elements—simultaneous, immediately contiguous, and separated virile effects—none of these are the single effect here, nor are they the meaning of the coexistence cause of a single effect. That is to say, although the mind, mental factors, primary elements, arising, and the like are coexistence causes, they do not share a single effect. Nor are they the virile effect like the spring plowing and autumn harvest of the previous collection of matter inducing [the later]. Although these share a single effect, they are not coexistence causes. Therefore, according to the treatise on the Five Matters, in explaining that mental factors are called "associated," one explanation states: "Furthermore, identical time, identical basis, identical aspect, identical object of focus, identical effect, identical outflowing, and identical fruition: this is the meaning of association." Following this textual passage, those that appropriate the virile effect of the equal-and-immediate condition are all association causes; those that are associated all jointly appropriate the virile effect of the equal-and-immediate condition, which is not the same as the coexistence cause. However, there are those devoid of the virile effect of the equal-and-immediate condition that obtain association, such as the final mind of an arhat. Now, analyzing the single effect clarified in this treatise: it agrees with the Vibhāṣā and differs from the Nyāyānusāra, because the verses were composed relying on the Vibhāṣā. If there were divergent points, the reasons should have been pointed out. That someone claims it also agrees with the Nyāyānusāra is mistaken.