俱舍論疏 6

English (machine translation) 6

Language: English

6.2

Chapter 2: Analysis of the Faculties (Indriyanirdeśa), Part 4.

On the Śāstra's statement: "Having thus explained ... is spoken of as causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya)": below this is the third major text section in the present chapter, elucidating causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya). Intending to explain the meaning, it first concludes [the previous topic] and introduces [the new one].

6.4

On the Śāstra's statement: "First, causes are of six kinds": within the text there are two parts: first, the six causes; second, the four conditions. Because conditions are explained right afterward and causes are explained first, it therefore says: "First, causes are of six kinds."

6.5

On the Śāstra's statement: "What are the six?": this first distinguishes the causes. Within this there are three parts: first, elucidating the six causes; second, elucidating the five results; third, elucidating the differences in dharmas possessing the causes. Within elucidating the six causes: first, listing the names of the causes in general; second, explaining them individually according to their names; third, determining their apprehending and bestowing [of results]. The following verse lists the names of the causes in general.

6.6

On the Śāstra's statement: "The Śāstra says ... sixth, the ripening cause": this cites the verse and explains it. The Samayapradīpikā says: "The substance of the efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu) extends to all dharmas, which is why it is explained first. The substance of the coexistent cause (sahabhū-hetu) pervades all conditioned dharmas, which is why it ranks second. The remaining causes, such as of the same class (sabhāga), each subsume a smaller portion among conditioned dharmas as appropriate, and they are explained in order as is convenient and stable in expression." Now, scrutinizing this, those among the six causes that are broader are explained first. Although the substance of the cause of the same class excludes the future and is narrower than the coexistent cause, it nonetheless subsumes all minds, mental factors, material forms, and non-associated formations. Although the substance of the associated cause (samprayuktaka-hetu) extends across the three periods of time, because it is only minds and mental factors it is narrower than the cause of the same class, but it extends to all defiled minds and mental factors, being broader than the omnipresent cause (sarvatraga-hetu). As for the substance of the omnipresent cause, in the desire realm, as [belonging to] one portion of the two divisions [of defilements], it is narrower than the ripening cause (vipāka-hetu), because the substance of the ripening cause extends to all five divisions. In the upper eight planes, the substance of the ripening cause extends only to one portion abandoned through cultivation, whereas the substance of the omnipresent cause belongs to one portion of the two divisions. Therefore, the ripening cause is explained after the omnipresent cause. However, both the six causes and the four conditions extend to the direct and the indirect: the name 'cause' (hetu) is direct, and the name 'condition' (pratyaya) is indirect. The Samayapradīpikā says: "Because the arising of a dharma relies upon it, it is spoken of as a cause; that is, the meaning of directly assisting and benefiting the result produced."

6.7

On the Śāstra's statement: "The masters of Abhidharma ... are just these six kinds": this is because the four conditions are stated in sūtra texts, whereas the six causes have no sūtra text; therefore it says that the Abhidharma masters accept that causes are only of six kinds. This makes clear that there is neither addition nor subtraction. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Such six causes were not spoken by the Buddha; how then could the fundamental treatise establish these names on its own? There is definitely no meaning unspoken by the Great Master that the Abhidharma would rashly assert. They are not presently found in the sūtras because they have been concealed and lost. Their specific characteristics can be obtained, so they must definitely exist. Furthermore, in various sūtras, through the power of those to be converted, the World-Honoured One expediently taught under different presentations. Seeing slight traces of them, the Abhidharma masters knew that they definitely existed and clearly compiled them. Therefore, some say: 'The doctrine of these six causes was stated in the Ekottarika and Chakkottarika sūtras; over a long period of time, their texts were concealed and lost. The Venerable Kātyāyanīputra and others, ceaselessly contemplating and seeking after the characteristics of dharmas, mysteriously moved a deva-ṛṣi to appear and confer them upon them, just as a deva conferred the *Vādya-sūtra. Such an explanation is necessarily so. Just as the meaning of the four conditions, though fully listed in the sūtras of this school, is not recited among other schools.'" ... and so on at length. According to this treatise text, the six causes and four conditions are Hīnayāna doctrines. The four conditions have texts, while the six causes have no text; because there is no direct sūtra text, it therefore says that the Abhidharma masters accept that causes are only these six kinds. The Mahāyāna Abhidharma treatises also have six causes, and the efficient cause contains twenty causes. The Madhyāntavibhāga and Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi each adopt ten of them. It is not yet known from which sūtra texts the Mahāyāna doctrines of the ten causes, six causes, and four conditions derive.

6.8

On the Śāstra's statement: "First, what is the characteristic of the efficient cause?": below this is the second section, explaining them individually according to their names. Because the essences of the causes are different, they are divided into six sections. Intending to explain the first cause, it therefore asks first. The verse reply is understandable.

6.9

The passage from the Śāstra starting with “The Śāstra says” up to “because they abide without obstructing” is the prose commentary. Within it there are two parts: first, the explanation that abiding simply without obstruction and arising with potency is termed an efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu); second, other masters' explanation that all dharmas mutually possess efficacy and function. Within the first text, there are again two parts: first, explaining the verse text; second, analysis by questions and answers. In explaining the verse text, first the essence of the cause is clarified; second, the name of the cause is explained. This text clarifies the essence of the cause. However, positing the essence of the cause is of two kinds: first, positing its essence in general, which takes all dharmas as its essence; second, positing its essence relative to the fruit, [which is] “excepting itself, the rest are efficient [causes].” That is to say, excepting its own self-entity (svabhāva), all remaining [dharmas] are taken as its efficient cause, because when that [fruit] arises, they abide without obstructing. Question: If a dharma never arises at all, do all remaining dharmas, excepting its own self-entity, serve as causes for it or not? Answer: They serve as causes. If that causal dharma has not yet reached its already-arisen state, it is only a cause by nature (prakṛti-hetu). If it has reached its already-arisen state, it is a cause that grasps a fruit (phala-grahaṇa-hetu). If the fruit reaches arising, it is named a cause that gives a fruit (phala-dāna-hetu). Dharmas that do not arise have no cause that gives a fruit. The Nyāyānusāra states: “This efficient cause is briefly of two kinds: first, having the power to produce; second, merely being non-obstructing. When dharmas arise, excepting solely its own self-entity, all dharmas are taken as their efficient cause, because when that [dharma] arises, none act as an obstruction, and among them a minor portion has the power capable of producing. As, for instance, when an eye-consciousness arises, it takes the eye as its supporting cause, the visible form as its establishing cause, the eye-consciousness and so forth like seed-dharmas as its non-interrupting cause, the associated dharmas as its sustaining cause, the co-existent dharmas as its assisting cause, and the ear faculty and so forth as its abiding cause. These are collectively called efficient causes. Among them, one part is named a potent cause, because it possesses superior functional capacity capable of producing. The remaining parts are named impotent causes, because they merely abide without obstructing. Why is an entity’s own self-entity not an efficient cause for itself? Because an efficient cause is absent in its own self-entity. That is, the meaning of non-obstruction is the efficient cause, whereas a self-entity always constitutes an obstruction to itself. Furthermore, all dharmas do not depend on their own self-entities, for [otherwise] there would constantly occur diminution and so forth.” [Fabao] comments: If it depended on this very self-entity, since the self-entity is constantly existent, it should constantly come into being. If it depended on a second self-entity, since a second self-entity is constantly non-existent, there should constantly occur diminution and so forth. Other masters say: If a self-entity were the cause of its own self-entity, then ignorance would again take ignorance as its condition, and so forth. In a single instant, this very [dharma] would be the cause of this very [dharma], which would contradict the dharma-nature of dependent origination. Other masters say: In a self-entity, no function is seen with respect to itself; therefore it is not a cause or condition, just like a fingertip, a knife blade, the eye, and so forth.

6.10

The Śāstra says, “Although the nature of the other causes... the general name is used as the specific designation,” which clarifies the derivation of the name. The Samayapradīpikā (Xianzong lun) explains the name of the efficient cause in four ways: First, it says that the cause itself is efficient, hence it is named the efficient cause, because this cause is potent and capable of making the fruit; although the nature of the other causes is also capable of making [fruits], yet this efficient cause has no other distinct designation, just as the form āyatana and so forth use a general name as a specific designation. Second, it says: Or again, this cause is capable of making two meanings: because of non-obstruction, it can be named a cause; it can also be named not a cause, because it cannot produce. Third, it says: Moreover, the efficient one is the other's close cause; this [cause] can assist that, hence it is named the efficient cause. Fourth, it says: Or this causes another to be able to make something; the other is the fruit, and the cause of what is capable of making is named the efficient cause. Among these four explanations, the first two are karmadhāraya compounds, and the latter two are tatpuruṣa (genitive) compounds.

6.11

The Śāstra says, “Is it not so that an unknown... serves as an efficient cause?” Next, this is the second [part], analysis by questions and answers. This is the question.

6.12

The Śāstra says, “It should be known that when this arises... is an efficient cause,” which is the answer. Although knowledge obstructs the arising of defilements, and light obstructs seeing the stars, at the time when defilements arise, knowledge abides without obstructing, and at the time of seeing stars, light abides without obstructing; if they acted as obstructions, [the fruits] could not arise.

6.13

The Śāstra says, “If, when this arises... it can be established as a cause,” which is an objection. If it was previously capable of obstructing and now does not obstruct, it can be a cause. But if it originally lacked the power to obstruct and now does not obstruct, how can it be a cause?

6.14

The Śāstra says, “Just as a countryman... how could he be a cause?” The analogy of the king is easy to understand.

6.15

The Śāstra says, “Furthermore, like nirvāṇa... lack the function of being able to obstruct,” pointing to things to raise an objection. Such dharmas exist as if they do not exist; previously they could not obstruct, and now they do not obstruct—how can they be causes?

6.16

The Śāstra says, “Although they lack the function of obstructing... they can also be as stated before,” which points to things to give an answer. If something is potent, because it does not obstruct now, it can be its cause. That which is impotent can also be its cause because it does not obstruct now. Although the obstructions of the potent and the impotent differ, their meaning of non-obstruction at the time of arising is identical; therefore, both are equally causes. The Nyāyānusāra explains: “Because all dharmas mutually possess the power of obstruction when viewed against each other, they can be causes. That is, where this one dharma exists, that place cannot accommodate a second. Even if this dharma existed elsewhere, that place could not accommodate other dharmas either. How could such dharmas, viewed against each other, not all be capable of obstructing and yet not obstruct? Therefore, they can all be established as efficient causes. Immaterial dharmas also have determinations of temporal basis and so forth, so when viewed against each other they also possess the power of obstruction. Furthermore, when among all dharmas a single dharma arises, like a dharma granting desire, all the rest are without obstruction. That is, a dharma fails to arise due to two conditions: first, the absence of concordant causes; second, the presence of discordant conditions. The state of arising of all dharmas necessarily depends on superior power and distinct internal conditions, as well as on the rest abiding without obstruction.”

6.17

The Śāstra says, “This is a general explanation... up to sprouts and so forth,” concluding the previous non-obstructing cause and introducing the subsequent potent cause, which can be understood from the text.

6.18

The Śāstra says, “Some raise this objection... all would constitute the karma of killing,” recounting an external objection. Since the cause is constantly present, the fruit should arise all at once. Since all are equally the cause of killing, all should equally incur the transgression of killing.

6.19

The Śāstra says, “This objection is not correct... there is a direct active power,” which is the answer. With a non-obstructing remote cause, if the fruit cannot arise, it is not direct action and does not constitute a path of karma (karmapatha). Although the arising or non-arising of a dharma relies on remote causes, the retribution or non-retribution of karma is due to direct active power.

6.20

The Śāstra says, “Other masters say... has the power capable of producing,” which is the second major section, recounting divergent doctrines. This master’s intended meaning is: all dharmas serve as efficient causes for all dharmas, and mutually they all possess their efficacy and function. This can be understood from the text. Although an adhipati-phala (dominant fruit) is grasped by an efficient cause, the cause is broad while its fruit is narrow. The Nyāyānusāra states: “Past dharmas serve as efficient causes for the other two times, and the dharmas of those two times in turn serve as dominant fruits for the past (here there are both cause and fruit). Future dharmas serve as efficient causes for the other two times due to non-obstruction; because the dharmas of those two times are neither simultaneous nor posterior, they do not serve as dominant fruits for the future. A fruit must be grasped by a cause, hence there are only two [times]; a cause is based solely on non-obstruction, hence it is admitted to apply across all three [times].” Explanation: Grasping a fruit occurs only in the present: the past has already grasped it, and the future has not yet grasped it. What has already grasped a fruit already belongs to itself; what has not yet grasped a fruit does not yet belong to itself. The fruit is based on what is grasped, hence there are only two [times]—namely, either simultaneous or posterior. The cause is based solely on non-obstruction and is not based on the capacity to grasp; hence it is admitted to apply across all three [times]—namely, whether simultaneous, prior, or posterior. Present dharmas serve as efficient causes for the other two times; among the dharmas of those two times, only future dharmas are the fruits of the present (the above is the mutual relation of the three times). Conditioned and unconditioned [dharmas] are neither cause nor fruit: conditioned viewed against unconditioned is not a cause, and because the unconditioned does not arise, it is also not a fruit. Because the unconditioned cannot grasp [a fruit], unconditioned and unconditioned are neither cause nor fruit: unconditioned viewed against unconditioned is not a cause, and because the unconditioned does not arise and is not what is grasped, it is not a fruit. Unconditioned and conditioned are cause and not fruit: because it does not obstruct arising, it is a cause; because its essence does not arise and it is not what is grasped, it is not a fruit. For this reason, it is said: ‘There are many efficient causes that are not dominant fruits, because all dharmas can be efficient causes, whereas only conditioned dharmas are dominant fruits.’”

6.21

The Śāstra says, “In this way, the characteristic of the efficient cause has already been explained.” Next, the second [part], three lines explain the co-existent cause (sahabhū-hetu). As for the co-existent cause, serving as a cause for co-existent dharmas is named the co-existent cause. Or taking co-existent dharmas as a cause is named the co-existent cause. If positing its essence in general, it subsumes all conditioned dharmas entirely. If positing its essence relatively, it is explained in detail below.

6.22

The passage from the Śāstra starting with “The Śāstra says” up to “are co-existent causes” explains the first line and identifies the characteristic of the cause. This differs from the meaning of the sixteenth evaluating master in the Vibhāṣā and the Nyāyānusāra. The Vibhāṣā says: “Having the same single fruit is the meaning of the co-existent cause.” The Nyāyānusāra says: “Conditioned dharmas having one fruit is the meaning of the co-existent cause”; it does not say that being mutually fruits is the meaning of the co-existent cause.

6.23

The Śāstra says, “What is its characteristic?” Although the meaning of being mutually fruits was generally stated before, what is the specific characteristic of being mutually fruits?

6.24

The commentary says: "Such as the primary elements... because they are mutually effects." This points to real instances to analyze the characteristic features. Therefore, the arbitrator in the Vibhāṣā says: "Whether the primary elements are predominantly augmented or not augmented, earth is the cause of three, and the three are the cause of earth. Why is this? Earth does not depend on earth to produce derived matter, because all phenomena do not depend on their own nature or an entity of their own kind to be a cause for others. The other primary elements are also like this. Likewise, the characteristics and the phenomena possessing the characteristics, as well as the mind and the things that conform to the movement of the mind, are also causes for one another." This adduces three classes of phenomena that are mutually causes, analyzing the characteristics of being mutual effects. However, regarding why it does not state here that phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind and the primary characteristics are causes among themselves: The Nyāyānusāra states, "The causal characteristics stated here are too sparse," but itself explains, "Because the fundamental treatise stated it, there is no fault in this." Yet in the fundamental treatise it has never been seen to state that matter conforming to the movement of the mind is a cause for the mind; one must analyze the intention of the treatise master here. The Nyāyānusāra recounts the explanations of two masters and refutes both as having faults. It itself explains: "I see such an intention here: If a phenomenon definitely arises simultaneously with the mind, is ubiquitous to all minds, and moves in dependence on the mind, that phenomenon and the mind depended upon are stated to be coexistence causes mutually in relation to each other. The mental factors do not definitely arise simultaneously, because they are presently observed to be either few or many. The mental factors relative to one another are variable in quantity; thus the treatise does not speak of them. Bodily action and verbal action are not ubiquitous to all minds, because they are entirely nonexistent in conjunction with non-concentrated mind. In non-concentrated mind and the formless absorptions, there are entirely no bodily or verbal actions. The characteristics such as arising all move in dependence on the mind, not mutually depending on one another; because arising and the like all have the phenomenon as their head and mutually assist it, for this reason it does not state that they are causes for one another. Furthermore, here, in order to show only that different categories are coexistence causes, that the same category are causes for one another is established without being stated. Thus the Prakaraṇaśāsana states: 'All mental factors, the two kinds of vows—dhyāna and anāsrava—and the characteristics such as arising of those phenomena and of the mind: all of these are called phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind. For what reason are the secondary characteristics of the mind not phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind? Because the secondary characteristics of the mind are not coexistence causes for the mind. For what reason are the secondary characteristics of the mind not coexistence causes for the mind? Because the mind is not caused to arise by their power, and they have efficacy only regarding a single phenomenon. Furthermore, because they do not have a single effect with the primary mind, and the majority in the collection are not their effect. If so, how can the mind be a coexistence cause for them? Because they are able to move through following the states such as arising of the primary mind. Should it not be like the arising and other characteristics of the primary elements, where the mind also uses them as a coexistence cause? Just as derived matter is not the effect of arising and the other characteristics, yet arising and the other characteristics are not unentitled to be coexistence causes for the primary elements, this too should be so.'" (Following the treatise's intention above: the arising and other characteristics of the primary elements do not share a single effect with the primary elements, yet they are able to be coexistence causes. Although the mind and secondary characteristics do not share a single effect, why not grant that they are coexistence causes?) Comparing them like this is unequal in principle. Reciprocal effects are either a single effect or many effects; because they are not its effect, they are not the derived matters. Within the reciprocal effects of the primary elements, they are subsumed under a single effect; how could derived matter not be the effect of the arising and other characteristics of the primary elements? Therefore, drawing this parallel is an error. Furthermore, it is as stated previously. What was stated previously? Because the mind is not caused to arise by their power. But the primary elements and the characteristics such as arising are produced by mutual power, and thus lack this fault. It also states: "Furthermore, in this collection of simultaneous concordances, there is that which is capable of causing movement but does not conform to the movement, namely, the primary mind; there is that which only conforms to the movement, namely, matter and formations non-concurrent with mind; there is that which is capable of causing movement and also conforms to the movement, namely, mental factors, because they conform to the movement of the mind and are capable of causing the movement of matter and formations non-concurrent with mind; there is that which is neither, namely, excluding the previous characteristics." Following the text of the treatise above, the phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind explained here differ in meaning from what is stated elsewhere regarding "following the conduct" and "conforming to the movement." As in the Abhidharma, where wisdom is stated to be the essential entity and the five skandhas follow its conduct, here the primary mind is subsumed under conforming to the movement. Here, the mind is stated only to be that which causes the movement and is not what conforms to the movement; that is, the primary mind does not conform to the movement. However, what is stated here is based on the principle of king and ministers: the mind is only that which causes movement. What is stated in the Abhidharma is based on the Abhidharma principle: wisdom is that which causes movement. Though the statements differ, their meanings are not in conflict.

6.25

The commentary says: "It encompasses conditioned phenomena comprehensively as appropriate." This clarifies the entity of the coexistence cause. All conditioned phenomena possess the four characteristics; the characteristics and the phenomena possessing the characteristics are causes for one another, and in principle it should encompass all conditioned phenomena comprehensively. The words "mutually effects" here mean simultaneous causes and effects. Among them, the secondary characteristics relative to their fundamental phenomenon are not mutual effects, while the fundamental phenomenon serves as a coexistence cause for them; this is being a cause without being mutual effects. Following this, it means: only where they are mutual effects are they coexistence causes. When there are coexistence causes that are not mutual effects, positing "mutual effects" means the reason does not pervade the subject of the thesis—this is a reason that is narrower than the thesis. The Nyāyānusāra criticizes: "Furthermore, one should not say that only being mutual effects is a coexistence cause, for a phenomenon and its secondary characteristics are not mutual effects, yet they are causes. How this is a cause, they must analyze further; because of this point, one should analyze the statement of characteristics." Conditioned phenomena having a single effect can be a coexistence cause; this agrees in meaning with the Vibhāṣā. The arbitrator in Vibhāṣā fascicle 16 says: "The meaning of sharing a single effect is a coexistence cause." Now, analyzing this reason: if it is simultaneous, it still has its fault. Since the self-entity is not the effect of the self-entity, how could coexistent things obtain a single effect? Furthermore, major arising and minor arising do not share the same effect; how can it be stated to be the cause of a single effect? Thus this reason of a single effect does not pervade the subject of the thesis, the reason being narrower than the thesis, no different from the former. If it is said to be at different times, then the secondary characteristics share the same outflowing and the same fruition with their fundamental phenomenon; why are they not causes for the fundamental phenomenon? Thus this reason of a single effect extends to the dissimilar class, operating in the dissimilar class, and its fault is even graver. The reason posited by the Nyāyānusāra is no different from the former; why did it criticize the Kośa and independently posit another? Furthermore, the Abhidharmāvatāra states: "Conditioned phenomena being effects for one another, or sharing a single effect, is called a coexistence cause." Following this, neither of the two reasons is superior or inferior. Now, analyzing the reasons posited by both treatises, neither has any fault. Just as stating that change and obstruction is called matter posits a reason that does not pervade unmanifest matter; just as stating that rapid eating and rapid running is called a horse, yet there are non-horses that eat rapidly and run rapidly, and also horses that eat slowly and run slowly. Yet these designations do not contradict worldly reality; the reasons of mutual effects and a single effect are also like this. The master of the Nyāyānusāra followed "single effect" because [the other] contradicted the Vibhāṣā; the Abhidharmāvatāra, considering it not contrary to reason, comprehensively cited both reasons; this treatise, being brief, cited only one. Someone asked and answered: Question: If, relying on Vibhāṣā fascicles 16 and 150, which both state: "A single effect means the effect of disconnection," while the Nyāyānusāra further states: "A single effect means the virile effect and disconnection," are they not contradictory? The explanation says: That the Vibhāṣā mentions only the effect of disconnection is stated for the time being on the basis of what is definitive and devoid of ambiguity among these effects; the virile effect is broader and indefinite in name, being either simultaneously arisen, or immediately contiguous, etc. The Vibhāṣā should also have mentioned the virile effect; that it did not mention it was out of fear of confusing it with the reciprocal virile effect arisen simultaneously, because relative to self-entity, self-entity is not a single effect. The reason the Nyāyānusāra stated the virile effect was in order to exhaustively subsume the virile effect within a single effect; therefore it stated it separately. Each relies on one meaning, and neither is contradictory. Now, analyzing the Nyāyānusāra's statement of the virile effect: it is because the effect of disconnection does not exhaustively subsume the unarisen virile effect, not that it seeks to subsume the immediately contiguous or separated virile effects of other conditioned phenomena. The equal-and-immediate condition, the immediate virile effect, and the matter derived from the four primary elements—simultaneous, immediately contiguous, and separated virile effects—none of these are the single effect here, nor are they the meaning of the coexistence cause of a single effect. That is to say, although the mind, mental factors, primary elements, arising, and the like are coexistence causes, they do not share a single effect. Nor are they the virile effect like the spring plowing and autumn harvest of the previous collection of matter inducing [the later]. Although these share a single effect, they are not coexistence causes. Therefore, according to the treatise on the Five Matters, in explaining that mental factors are called "associated," one explanation states: "Furthermore, identical time, identical basis, identical aspect, identical object of focus, identical effect, identical outflowing, and identical fruition: this is the meaning of association." Following this textual passage, those that appropriate the virile effect of the equal-and-immediate condition are all association causes; those that are associated all jointly appropriate the virile effect of the equal-and-immediate condition, which is not the same as the coexistence cause. However, there are those devoid of the virile effect of the equal-and-immediate condition that obtain association, such as the final mind of an arhat. Now, analyzing the single effect clarified in this treatise: it agrees with the Vibhāṣā and differs from the Nyāyānusāra, because the verses were composed relying on the Vibhāṣā. If there were divergent points, the reasons should have been pointed out. That someone claims it also agrees with the Nyāyānusāra is mistaken.

6.26

The commentary says: "The phenomena and the secondary characteristics... but not the secondary characteristics for the phenomenon." This is mutual effect. Because the reason does not pervade this phenomenon, it is adduced separately.

6.27

The commentary says: "Here, it should be analyzed what are named..." The following three lines analyze phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind. Previously it was said that the mind and phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind are also causes for one another, but it was not yet known what are phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind.

6.28

The commentary says: "The commentary says... phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind." This sets forth the entities of the phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind. The words "phenomena associated with the mind" mean all mental factors. "Two kinds of vows" are matter conforming to the movement of the mind. The words "those phenomena" mean those three classes of phenomena. The words "and the characteristics such as arising of the mind" mean the primary characteristics on the above three classes of phenomena and on the mind. "All of these are called phenomena conforming to the movement of the mind" summarizes what precedes. The Nyāyānusāra states: "For what reason are their secondary characteristics not mentioned? The reason they are not mentioned will be analyzed later on its own."

6.29

The commentary says: "How are these phenomena named conforming to the movement of the mind?" The following line asks about establishing the name "conforming to the movement."

6.30

The commentary says: "The commentary says... are named conforming to the movement of the mind." It answers briefly with three meanings, and later unfolds ten meanings in reply. It briefly states they are named conforming to the movement of the mind by three meanings: equality of time, equality of effect, and nature.

6.31

On the Śāstra's stating, "First, in terms of time [...] and falling into one single time period": This expands time into four [aspects], namely: having the same arising, having the same staying, having the same cessation, and falling into one single time period. Question: Why is it that among the four characteristics only three are stated, while the characteristic of difference is not stated? Answer: This is because here, identity of time is manifested through arising, which shows being together in the future and about to enter the present; cessation manifests that activity is in the present and entering into the past; staying manifests that this phenomenon grasps its fruit in the present, thereby demonstrating that the time of the three time periods—future, present, and past—is identical. The single characteristic of difference lacks the ability to manifest time, and therefore it is not stated here. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Does not merely stating 'having the same arising, staying, and cessation' already make it known that they also fall into one single time period? Although it is indeed immediately known that they fall into one single time period, it would still not be understood that this phenomenon and the mind are also not separated in the past and the future. Alternatively, it is to demonstrate those phenomena that do not arise." Commentary: Although one says 'having the same arising, staying, and cessation' and thus being in the same time period, one would not yet know that prior to the characteristic of arising in the future, and subsequent to the characteristic of cessation in the past, this phenomenon and the mind are likewise not separated; or, fearing that one might doubt that phenomena that do not arise—which do not share the same arising, staying, and cessation with the mind—are not coexistent causes, it is therefore said that they 'fall into one single time period.' The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "If so, one should merely say 'falling into one single time period.' Otherwise, it would fail to make it known that they definitely fall into one single time period." Commentary: If one only said 'falling into one single time period,' it would not make it known that they definitely fall into one single time period, because although they are together in the future, if they arise at a later time they would not be in the same time period. Though they were previously in the same time period, they would not be in the same time period later; if one did not speak of sharing arising, cessation, and so forth, it would fail to make it known that they definitely fall into one single time period. By further stating 'having the same arising, cessation,' and so forth, one knows that they are definitely in one single time period and that there is necessarily no before or after.

6.32

On the Śāstra's stating, "In terms of fruit [...] and a single outflow": This expands fruit into three [aspects]. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Are not outflow [fruit] and maturation [fruit] also subsumed under a single fruit? How can one speak of maturation and outflow outside of a single fruit? Truly so; what is called 'a single fruit' here subsumes only the fruit of virile activity and the fruit of disconnection. Does not this phrase, because of its general scope, also subsume outflow and maturation? Although it is said that it also subsumes them, that is not what is being clarified here. However, fruits of virile activity are of four kinds in total: co-arising, immediate, separated, and non-arising. This demonstrates that it is not a coexistent fruit with the cause, in order to refute the view that grasps that a fruit of virile activity exists only within a concordant aggregation that arises simultaneously with the cause; because within this concordant aggregation they are mutual fruits, and an entity itself is not its own fruit of virile activity, this demonstrates that it is not that simultaneously arising concordant aggregation. Within the fruit of virile activity there is the meaning of a single fruit; therefore, outflow and maturation are brought up separately." In accordance with this text of the treatise, it refutes a simultaneous fruit, and it is not that it intends to take immediate and separated fruits of virile activity.

6.33

On the Śāstra's stating, "It should be known that herein [...] their meanings are not the same": This clarifies that the meanings of time and fruit are different: time manifests simultaneity, whereas fruit manifests commonality.

6.34

On the Śāstra's stating, "In terms of being wholesome [...] due to having an indeterminate nature": This clarifies that identity of nature is divided into three, making ten when combined with the preceding.

6.35

On the Śāstra's stating, "Due to these ten causes, they are called mind-concomitant": This is the general conclusion.

6.36

On the Śāstra's stating, "Herein, the primary mind [...] serves as a coexistent cause for the mind": This points to the phenomena to clarify the greater and lesser numbers of causes. In the text there are two parts: first, stating the correct doctrine; second, relating the alternative view. This text is the first. The primary mind at its maximum—namely, the mind of the first dhyāna—possesses the ten universal [mental factors], either delight or revulsion among the wholesome universals, initial thought and sustained thought, and the seven factors of absorption. In all, there are thirty-one phenomena, and together with their primary and secondary characteristics there are altogether two hundred and seventy-nine phenomena; the mind already serves as a cause for one hundred and fifty-eight phenomena. At its minimum, namely, the unobscured-indeterminate mind from the second dhyāna upward, there are only eleven phenomena, and together with the primary and secondary characteristics there are ninety-nine phenomena; the primary mind serves as a coexistent cause for fifty-eight phenomena. Someone said that, looking from the primary mind toward ninety-eight phenomena, it still serves at its minimum as a coexistent cause for fifty-eight phenomena; this is an error. If so, toward how many at maximum among the ninety-eight phenomena does it serve as a cause? The ninth fascicle of the *Xianzong lun* says: "Because the primary characteristics and the phenomenon are equal in power, together with their primary phenomenon they serve as coexistent causes. Because a secondary characteristic has efficacy regarding only one, it serves as a coexistent cause only for that which it characterizes." The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "For what reason are the secondary characteristics of the mind not coexistent causes of the mind? Because the mind does not obtain arising through their power; because the mind and they are not mutual fruits; and because the majority within the aggregation are not their fruits. It is precisely due to such many causes as stated that the secondary characteristics are not called phenomena that conform to the mind." The reference and explanation in the text above is precisely this text. If so, how can the mind serve as a coexistent cause for them? It is because they obtain their operation in accordance with the stages of arising and so forth of the primary mind.

6.37

On the Śāstra's stating, "Some say: [...] along with the primary characteristics of the mind": This is the second part, relating an alternative view. The doctrine transmitted by this master differs from the former, taking only what is immediately adjacent as the cause.

6.38

On the Śāstra's stating, "This statement is not good": This is a general rejection.

6.39

On the Śāstra's stating, "Why is that?": This asks for the reason for the rejection.

6.40

On the Śāstra's stating, "It contradicts the *Prakaraṇapāda* [...] namely, the phenomena that are excluded": This presents the contradictory text. If one does not explain it extensively, the concise meaning is difficult to know, because the meanings of the clauses cited as evidence before and after are different. Relying on Chapter Thirteen, "The Thousand Questions," of the *Prakaraṇapāda-śāstra*, where the view of self-existence is queried against the four noble truths, it says: "How many have the view of self-existence as their cause but are not a cause for the view of self-existence, etc.? Two do not have the view of self-existence as cause, nor are they a cause for the view of self-existence; two should be distinguished (the first two being cessation and the path, the latter two being suffering and the origin). Namely: the noble truth of suffering either has the view of self-existence as cause and is not a cause for the view of self-existence; or has the view of self-existence as cause and is also a cause for the view of self-existence; or does not have the view of self-existence as cause and is not a cause for the view of self-existence. Herein there are only three distinct alternatives. There is no fourth alternative, because the view of self-existence is a universal cause. Among defiled phenomena, which can produce all defiled phenomena, none can produce the view of self-existence without being produced from the view of self-existence; and among undefiled phenomena, there is again none that can produce the view of self-existence. This is because the treatise is composed here based on causal conditions. 'Having the view of self-existence as cause and not being a cause for the view of self-existence' refers to taking up the first alternative, the single-sided alternative. Because these phenomena are numerous, excluding the narrower and taking the broader, there are four passages of text. Excluding the 'both' alternative: namely, excluding past and present anusayas abandoned by seeing suffering, and their associated and coexistent [phenomena], etc. The word 'etc.' refers to possession. These arise from the view of self-existence via similar and universal causes, and act as similar causes to produce the view of self-existence. For the associated and coexistent phenomena of the view of self-existence, associated and coexistent causes are added. Furthermore, excluding past and present universal anusayas abandoned by seeing the origin, and the associated and coexistent truth of suffering—this is the second passage. These are excluded because they arise from the view of self-existence as a universal cause and act as universal causes to produce this view of self-existence. Possession is not a universal cause, so 'etc.' is not said. Furthermore, excluding future truths of suffering associated with the view of self-existence—this is the third passage of exclusion. This cites the view of self-existence and excludes associated phenomena, not excluding the view of self-existence. These are excluded because the associated phenomena act as associated and coexistent causes to produce the view of self-existence. Furthermore, excluding the arising, aging, staying, and impermanence of the future view of self-existence and its associated phenomena, and all remaining defiled truths of suffering—this is the fourth passage of excluded phenomena. This cites the view of self-existence and its associated phenomena and takes arising, aging, staying, and impermanence, because they produce the view of self-existence via coexistent causes, and so they are excluded. All remaining defiled truths of suffering are precisely the truths of suffering that arise from the view of self-existence and do not act as causes for the view of self-existence. 'Having the view of self-existence as cause and also being a cause for the view of self-existence' refers to the aforementioned excluded phenomena. 'Not having the view of self-existence as cause and not being a cause for the view of self-existence' refers to undefiled truths of suffering. The noble truth of the origin is also like this (this concludes the text of the treatise)." The reason why the numbers of alternatives for suffering and the origin are the same is that the truths of suffering and the origin share all contaminated [phenomena] as their essence; in terms of the meaning of cause it is called the origin, and in terms of the meaning of fruit it is called suffering. Just as consciousness and mind have no difference in scope of essence, yet the afflictions that delude one regarding the two truths are different. That is, if fully possessing ten, the origin has only seven. The variant explanations of some masters are all not the intended meaning of the school. When that treatise says: "Some truths of suffering have the view of self-existence as cause and do not act as causes for the view of self-existence," this takes up the first clause of the *Prakaraṇapāda*. Stating: "Excluding the arising, aging, staying, and impermanence of the future view of self-existence and its associated phenomena, and all remaining defiled truths of suffering," skips the preceding three passages and takes up the text of the fourth passage. Since the four characteristics upon the view of self-existence and its associated phenomena are excluded because they constitute the 'both' alternative, one therefore knows that the four characteristics upon phenomena associated with the mind can also produce the mind, because the four characteristics upon phenomena associated with the view of self-existence in the future produce the view of self-existence solely through coexistent causes, having no other cause. Stating: "Some truths of suffering [...] namely, the phenomena that are excluded," takes up the second clause of the *Prakaraṇapāda*. This proves that the four characteristics upon phenomena associated with the view of self-existence constitute the 'both' alternative; by this it is proven and known that [the view of] fourteen [causes] is incorrect.

6.41

On the Śāstra's stating, "Other masters do not recite 'and its associated phenomena'": This relates the textual difference recited by other masters. If one deletes the five characters "and its associated phenomena," it means that only the four characteristics upon the view of self-existence are excluded, and because the four characteristics upon associated phenomena cannot produce the view of self-existence they are not excluded; on this account, only fourteen phenomena act as causes for the mind.

6.42

On the Śāstra's stating, "The Kaśmīra masters [...] one should know that the statement has an omission": The *Vibhāṣā* corrects the recited text of the other masters. Or, one should infer from the principle to know that the statement has an omission. Since the primary characteristics and the phenomenon are equal in power, and since the phenomenon acts as a cause, one knows that arising and so forth also act as causes. In the *Nyāyānusāra* there is yet another master who holds that all members of the same aggregation mutually act as coexistent causes for one another. This is not the correct doctrine.

6.43

On the Śāstra's stating, "All those that are due to coexistent [...] necessarily coexist with it": This establishes that a coexistent cause is necessarily coexistent.

6.44

On the Śāstra's stating, "Or there are those that coexist [...] establishing them as causes due to being causes": Although these possess the condition of necessarily arising together, they are not coexistent causes. There are eight pairs of phenomena.

Linked texts (1)

俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese