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俱舍論疏 7.54

English (machine translation) 7.54

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English

7.54

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because the essence of this condition is broad ... because it is the sovereign condition": this explains its name. The Nyāyānusāra states: "The nature of the sovereign condition is precisely the efficient cause (kāraṇahetu). Because the causal meaning of the efficient cause is subtle and boundless, it subsumes all dharmas. If this [dharma] does not obstruct that [dharma] from arising, this is the meaning of the efficient cause as the sovereign condition." According to the text of this treatise, there is no difference between cause and condition. In comparison with the meaning of the other three conditions, this category is the most numerous and its operations are truly vast; therefore it is named "sovereign". Would not the sovereign condition subsume dharmas universally—why then compare it to the three? It is said: This sovereign condition is not given the name "sovereign" in comparison to the essences of the other three. Why? It is established in comparison to their meanings and functions. The meanings and functions of the various conditions do not interpenetrate one another, whereas the essential natures of the conditions are mutually mixed. Just as the sovereign condition has immeasurable semantic categories and its operations are vast and extensive, while the other three are not so, this one alone is designated with the title of sovereign condition. According to the treatise text above, the function of the efficient cause is precisely the sovereign condition. Furthermore, cause and condition are established solely on the basis of activity; although their essences are mutually mixed, their functions are distinct—namely, the functions of the six causes are grouped together to form the four conditions. Although the name "condition" is broad, it is not a function separate from the causes. Furthermore, to say that cause and condition subsume each other does not discuss it based on essence, nor does saying they subsume functions refer to resemblance: they are all said to be mutually identical, and it is said that therefore non-obstruction of arising is named the efficient cause, which is precisely saying that non-obstruction is the sovereign condition. Someone gave two explanations: one says that the mutual subsumption of cause and condition is verified with respect to essential nature, and ends simply upon considering full subsumption; this is entirely without textual evidence. And they say: If functions are mutually subsumed, this is stated based on resemblance; this too is unreasonable. Being alike in non-obstruction, what difference is there between cause and condition that their mutual subsumption should be explained differently as based on resemblance?

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