俱舍論疏 7

English (machine translation) 7

Language: English

7.2

Chapter 2: Analysis of the Faculties, Part 5

On the Śāstra's: "Causes having been extensively explained, what are the conditions?": from here down is the second major section, distinguishing the four conditions (pratyaya). Within this there are two parts: first, clarifying the four conditions; second, clarifying anew the immediately antecedent condition (samanantara-pratyaya). Here, it clarifies the four conditions.

7.4

On "The Śāstra says: […] up to: the nature of the condition as predominant influence": while for causes there is no direct sūtra text, for conditions there is a sūtra exposition. Just as it is stated in the sūtra regarding the natures of the four conditions, namely, the nature of the condition as cause up to the nature of the condition as predominant influence.

7.5

On the Śāstra's: "Herein, 'nature' refers to the types of conditions": this explains "nature" above. The designation "dhātu-nature" carries the meaning of distinctions among types, like the eighteen dhātus, etc. That is, showing that the four conditions are established on the basis of four distinct types. The Nyāyānusāra explains: "Herein, 'condition-nature' refers precisely to the four conditions, just as 'four abodes' refers precisely to the nature of abodes; the word 'nature' is used to show types. The intention is to distinguish that although the conditions have immeasurable individual entities according to their particular functions, when summarizing their meaning, none are not subsumed within these four types; that is, all conditions do not exceed this nature."

7.6

The treatise states: "Among the six causes, […] is the nature of the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya)"; from this point onward, it explains the intrinsic nature of the four conditions. This text first explains the substance of the cause-condition. If one relies on the Vibhāṣā, within the efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu), the five causes by which the four great elements produce derived matter are also the nature of the cause-condition. Here, it is abbreviated, speaking only of the subsumption of entire causes. Thus, Vibhāṣā 107 states: "The cause-condition is like the principle of a seed. The immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya) is like the principle of yielding a way. The objective-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) is like the principle of leaning on a staff. The sovereign condition (adhipati-pratyaya) is like the principle of non-obstruction. According to these four meanings, phenomena are not exhaustively subsumed, for there is an efficacious efficient cause that does not merely refrain from obstructing." Vibhāṣā 16 asks: "Do the causes subsume the conditions, or do the conditions subsume the causes? Answer: They mutually subsume each other. That is, the former five causes are the cause-condition, while the efficient cause is the remaining three conditions. Some say: The conditions subsume the causes, but the causes do not subsume the conditions. That is, the former five causes are the cause-condition, and the efficient cause is the sovereign condition. The immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not subsumed under the causes." However, there is no evaluative judgment [by the compiler of the Vibhāṣā]. Now, in examining the underlying intentions of the difference between these two theories: the former master includes [active] efficacy in the efficient cause, so that apart from the five causes, all functions are subsumed under the efficient cause. Therefore, the functions of yielding a way and leaning on a staff are also subsumed under the efficient cause. The latter master takes the meaning of non-obstruction as the efficient cause; thus, the six causes do not exhaustively subsume all functions. For this reason, non-obstruction is the meaning of the sovereign condition, not the meaning of yielding a way or leaning on a staff. Now, examining the two theories, mutual subsumption is superior. Question: If so, why does the Prakaraṇasāsana-śāstra (*Xianzong lun*) state: "Although the substances of the six causes and four conditions do not differ, their meanings are distinct. Since the immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not subsumed under causes, one knows that the meanings of the remaining two are also distinct. Because their meanings as conditions are alike, they are all distinct from causes; therefore, there are general statements distinguishing causes and conditions. 'Cause' means capable of producing, and 'condition' means capable of nourishing, just like the difference between a natural mother and a foster mother. Furthermore, conditions assist a cause so that it can produce; once produced, the continuation is nourished by the power of conditions. Or some say that a cause is only one, while conditions are manifold, just like the difference between seed, manure, soil, and so forth. Moreover, a cause is uncommon, while that which is common is a condition, like the eye and visible form. Moreover, performing its own task is called a cause, while performing another's task is called a condition, like a seed and manure. Moreover, that which is capable of initiating is called a cause, and that which is capable of upholding is called a condition, like a flower and its stem. Moreover, the proximate is called a cause, and the remote is called a condition, like a jewel and the sun. Moreover, a cause can produce, and a condition can bring about, just as curd produces ghee, and a person's churning implement can bring it about. Moreover, that which possesses the primary meaning is a cause, and that which assists in manifestation is a condition, just as a verbal root (dhātu) and an affix (pratyaya) differ in meaning. Such categories of difference are manifold; therefore, distinct names and concepts are established for cause and condition. This general intention shows that causes are intimate and conditions are remote; therefore, among the intimate causes, five are intimate and one is remote, while among the remote conditions, three are remote and one is intimate. Thus, based on reason and teaching, the conditions have been briefly analyzed." Since the treatise states this, by what principle of proof is mutual subsumption known to be superior? Answer: In general, it is not that there is no difference between causes and conditions: "cause" is a designation for the intimate, and "condition" is a name for the remote. Among the six causes, five are intimate, and are therefore identical under the intimate name; among the four conditions, three are remote, and are therefore identical under the remote name. However, among the causes there is the remote—namely, the efficient cause; among the conditions there is the intimate—namely, the cause-condition. One cannot, because the meaning of condition is remote, make the cause-condition remote from the efficient cause; nor can one, because the meaning of cause is intimate, make the efficient cause intimate to the cause-condition. Therefore, the Prakaraṇasāsana states: "Although the substances of the six causes and four conditions do not differ, their meanings are distinct." Furthermore, based on the Vibhāṣā: "I explain function as cause and effect. The real substances of all phenomena are perpetually changeless and are not cause and effect." Based on this, one knows that causes and conditions take function as their substance. Since their functions are one, one knows there is no difference. Furthermore, the Prakaraṇasāsana states: "Since the immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not subsumed under causes, one knows that the meanings of the remaining two are also distinct, because their meanings as conditions are alike." Now, examining this statement, its meaning is incomplete. Because one master stated that causes do not subsume two conditions, [the treatise] immediately claims that causes also do not subsume the cause-condition and the sovereign condition. Why not, on the grounds that the cause-condition and the sovereign condition are subsumed under causes, also subsume the two conditions under causes? Moreover, regarding these two conditions, both masters in the Vibhāṣā agree that they are subsumed under causes. As for the [other] two conditions, one master says they are subsumed and one says they are not; how can one use the one-sided view of one master to overturn by analogy the view of both masters? Furthermore, that one master says causes do not subsume the immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition has a distinct intention. The efficient cause has two meanings: first, merely not obstructing; second, also having efficacious power. If one takes merely not obstructing, it only subsumes the sovereign condition; if one includes function, it subsumes the three conditions. Hence, the statements of the two masters differ. Furthermore, the Prakaraṇasāsana cites other sources explaining the distinct meanings of cause and condition, saying: "A cause is like a natural mother, a seed, etc.; a condition is like a foster mother, manure, soil, etc." This refers to intimate causes as causes and remote causes as conditions. For example, when the Vibhāṣā asks whether the four great elements producing derived matter have the meaning of a cause or the meaning of a condition, this takes the cause-condition as the meaning of a cause, and the sovereign condition as the meaning of a condition. Could it be that the meaning of a cause is the six causes, and the meaning of a condition is the four conditions? Furthermore, within the efficient cause, the intimate refers to the four great elements producing derived matter, the support of sense-faculties and consciousnesses, etc.; the remote refers to mere non-obstruction, the immediately preceding condition, and the objective-condition. If one says that because it is remote it is not subsumed under causes, could it be that remote merely means non-obstruction? If one says that because it is intimate it is not subsumed under causes, how could it be intimate to the support of sense-faculties and consciousnesses, etc.? Therefore, one knows that the statement saying they are not subsumed is an incomplete statement. All treatises state that, setting aside the efficient cause, the remaining five causes are the nature of the cause-condition. "Nature" has the meaning of substance and category; phenomena of this category are the substance of the cause-condition. Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā states: "The sovereign condition is like non-obstructing phenomena," and in explaining the efficient cause it also speaks of non-obstruction; therefore, one knows they are the same. How could non-obstruction as a cause and non-obstruction as a condition be two different things? Since both are non-obstruction, how could one be intimate and the other remote? Some people do not understand this at all, and set up their own questions and answers: In the two theories, when explaining their mutual subsumption, is it stated in terms of substance or in terms of function? If stated in terms of substance, the efficient cause should subsume the four conditions, and the single sovereign condition should subsume the six causes, since their substances are both broader. If stated in terms of function, the functions of the six causes and four conditions are each distinct; how could they mutually subsume each other? The explanation says: The mutual subsumption of the six causes and four conditions has two meanings: first, explained in terms of substance; second, based on similarity of function. The first master of the Vibhāṣā explains it in terms of substance: the cause-condition subsumes five, and the efficient cause subsumes three. If based on the substance of the efficient cause being broad, it actually subsumes the four conditions, and the substance of the sovereign condition being broad can subsume the six causes. The reason it merely states that the efficient cause subsumes three and the sovereign condition subsumes one is that this master intends to explain mutual subsumption comparatively between the six causes and four conditions, and simply stops when the substance is fully subsumed from a single aspect; thus he says the cause-condition subsumes five and the efficient cause subsumes three. Because apart from the efficient cause there are the other five causes, and apart from the sovereign condition there are the other three conditions, when explaining their mutual subsumption, he does not separately state that the efficient cause subsumes four and the sovereign condition subsumes six. Question: If mutual subsumption is explained based on intrinsic nature, intrinsic nature exists perpetually; this would mean there is no difference between the six causes and four conditions, so how could they mutually subsume each other? Thus the Vibhāṣā says: "I explain function as cause and effect. The real substances of all phenomena are perpetually changeless and are not cause and effect." The explanation says: Based on substance being changeless, causes and conditions are identical. Subordinating substance to function, distinctions are therefore stated. If [we follow] the second master of the Vibhāṣā and this treatise, mutual subsumption is distinguished based on similarity of function. If discussing the functions of the six causes and four conditions, they are each distinct and do not mutually subsume each other. However, stating that the cause-condition subsumes five causes and the sovereign condition subsumes the efficient cause explains mutual subsumption based on similarity of function. The immediately preceding condition and the objective-condition are not similar to causes, and therefore are not subsumed under causes. Examining this explanation, it has not grasped the intent of the treatise. Why have all the venerable masters failed to realize this? Since the treatises all say "the five causes are the nature of the cause-condition," how could one say this is done on the basis of similarity? Furthermore, the meaning of non-obstruction is the efficient cause and is also the meaning of the sovereign condition; what difference is there between the non-obstruction of a cause and the non-obstruction of a condition, that one should speak of them being similar rather than identical? Moreover, on what sūtra or treatise does one rely for saying that they subsume based on similarity, or for saying that one simply stops when the substance is fully subsumed from a single aspect, and what precedent is there? Furthermore, the substance of the efficient cause is the substance of the four conditions; why would the cause-condition be so remote that the efficient cause is only three conditions? Furthermore, the sovereign condition is the substance of the six causes; why would the five causes be so remote that the sovereign condition solely subsumes the efficient cause? According to this, such an explanation is not reasonable. Question: Are the five causes—production, etc.—by which the four great elements produce derived matter the cause-condition or the sovereign condition? Answer: Relying on Vibhāṣā 131, which asks: "For derived matter, how many conditions are the primary elements? Answer: Cause and sovereign [conditions]. Cause refers to the cause of production (janana-hetu), the cause of reliance (niśraya-hetu), the cause of establishment (pratiṣṭhā-hetu), the cause of maintenance (dhṛti-hetu), and the cause of nourishment (upabṛṃhaṇa-hetu). Sovereign refers to non-impediment and mere non-obstruction." Explanation: This explains the text of the Jñānaprasthāna, which frames its discussion in terms of the four conditions. Where it says "cause", it is the cause-condition. Vibhāṣā 127 asks: "Question: What does 'produce' (upādāya) mean? Does it mean a cause, or does it mean a condition? If so, what fault is there? A fault is seen in both. If it means a cause, for derived matter none of the five causes exist in these four great elements; how could one say they produce matter? If it means a condition, with the exception of each derived matter's own substance, all other phenomena are without exception its sovereign condition; why say it is produced only by the great elements? Answer: It should be stated that producing is the meaning of a cause. Question: None of the five causes exist in this with respect to derived matter; how is it the meaning of a cause? Answer: Although none of the five causes, such as the cause of the same class (sabhāga-hetu), exist, there are five other distinct meanings of cause: the cause of production, the cause of reliance, the cause of establishment, the cause of maintenance, and the cause of nourishment; by these they produce [derived matter]. Other masters say: Producing is the meaning of a condition. Question: With the exception of each derived matter's own substance, all other phenomena are its sovereign condition; why say it is produced only by the great elements? Answer: The meaning of sovereign condition has the intimate and the remote, the proximate and the distant, the conjoined and the non-conjoined, existence in this life and existence in another life. The intimate, proximate, etc., are called causes; the remote, distant, etc., are called conditions. By this meaning, saying that the great elements are the cause and sovereign [conditions] for derived matter does not contradict reason. Furthermore, the Pañcavastuka also recounts both theories, with no evaluative judgment." Now, examining both theories, the former master is correct. Why is it known to be so? Since the Jñānaprasthāna frames its questions and answers in terms of the four conditions, how could it answer that it is a cause-condition if it were actually a sovereign condition? There is no other such precedent. If so, why does the treatise state that five causes are the cause-condition? These are not the five causes like the cause of the same class; how could they be subsumed under the cause-condition? Answer: Because their meaning differs from the five causes like the cause of the same class, they are not subsumed under those five causes. Their functional efficacy in producing an effect shares aspects with the five causes and is unlike the other sovereign conditions; therefore, they are the cause-condition. Consequently, the fundamental treatise states that ten causes are the cause-condition, and one is the sovereign condition. Question: If so, why does it not speak of eleven causes, but speaks only of six? Answer: Because the causal meaning of the five causes, such as production, is distinct. If a phenomenon acts as a cause whose effect extends to the three realms and the four or five skandhas, it is stated here. The causes of derived matter are the effect only of two realms and a fraction of one skandha; therefore they are not stated. Furthermore, if a phenomenon acts as a cause whose shared effect extends to multiple skandhas, it is stated here. The four great elements act as a cause whose shared effect is only a fraction of one skandha; therefore they are not stated. For this reason, apart from the five causes such as the coexistent cause (sahabhū-hetu), the five causes of production, etc., are not established separately, and are therefore subsumed under the efficient cause. Consequently, because the efficacy of derived matter surpasses the remaining three conditions, it is subsumed under the cause-condition. If one unfolds the five causes of production, etc., there are ten causes that are the cause-condition. All treatises proceed on the basis of the subsumption of entire causes; therefore they say that five causes are the cause-condition. One should reflect further on this.

7.7

On the Śāstra's statement: "Excepting the arhat['s final mind] … is the nature of an equal-and-immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya)": this is the second [section], explaining the equal-and-immediate condition. This passage presents the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of the equal-and-immediate condition. That is, all arisen [dharmas] are past and present minds (citta) and mental factors (caitta), exclusively excepting the mind of an arhat immediately prior to nirvāṇa; although that [mind] has arisen, it is not an equal-and-immediate [condition] because there is no subsequent mind.

7.8

On the Śāstra's statement: "The dharmas arisen from this condition … the name 'equal-and-immediate'": this explains the name of the equal-and-immediate condition.

7.9

On the Śāstra's statement: "Due to this, matter and so forth … because they do not arise equally": this determines and establishes the substance of the condition. That is, the preceding and succeeding natures of mind and mental factors are uniform, which is termed "equal" (sama); there being no intervening gap between them is termed "immediate" (anantara); being equal and without an intervening gap is termed "equal-and-immediate" (samanantara). Matter (rūpa) and non-concomitant [formations] (viprayukta-saṃskāra) are not like this: although they arise without an intervening gap, their substances are not uniform; arising confusedly, they are not equal-and-immediate. The Nyāyānusāra cites the Vibhāṣā as stating: "Mind and mental factors are obstructed with respect to their basis (āśraya), objective support (ālambana), and cognitive aspect (ākāra); on this basis, an equal-and-immediate condition is established. Matter and non-concomitant [formations] have no such characteristic; hence they are not established as the substance of this condition." Below, it explains of itself: "That is, with respect to a single basis, objective support, and cognitive aspect, two consciousnesses or [mental factors] definitely cannot arise together side by side; thus, [the subsequent] must necessarily arise only by the preceding one giving way. If the preceding one acts as an obstruction, the subsequent cannot arise; from this it is proven that only mind and mental factors can have the preceding act as the equal-and-immediate condition for the subsequent." It also says: "However, the substance of this condition is established in terms of clearing the way (giving place) and on the basis of having the power to induce arising. Therefore, although subtle atoms and so forth clear the way for what succeeds them, they are not this condition. The mutual arising of minds and so forth has definite and indefinite aspects; hence we know that it is also based on having the power to induce arising. It is directly observed that a single mind continues from before to after; although their clearing the way from before to after is the same in principle, their arising or non-arising is definite or indefinite. As for being definite in arising: immediately after the mind of the supreme mundane dharma (laukikāgradharma), the patient acceptance of the dharma of suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñāna-kṣānti) arises, and so forth in broad detail." Question: If the preceding and succeeding substances are uniform without any intervening gap, and the subsequent can only arise when the preceding gives place to the subsequent, and the subsequent definitely arises—proving that it has the power to induce—then the mutual succession of the life-faculty (jīvitendriya) is also uniform in preceding and succeeding substance without any intervening gap, where the subsequent can only arise when the preceding gives place to the subsequent, and it definitely arises. This life[-faculty] would thus possess the power to induce arising; why is it not established as an equal-and-immediate condition? The Nyāyānusāra explains: "This analogy is not correct. Both the life[-faculty] and the substance of birth are induced by the force of prior actions (karman). That is, this life-faculty is not induced by the power of the immediately perished life[-faculty]; it must be induced by the force of action performed in a previous state. If that were so, the life-faculty ought to arise completely all at once in a single moment, because they would all equally rely on being induced by the force of the action of a single moment. Furthermore, when mind and mental factors induced by prior action arise, they would not need to depend on an equal-and-immediate condition. Now, the various [moments of the] life-faculty do not incur the fault of arising all at once, precisely because the order of arising is fixed by the force of karma; it is the principle of cause and effect that an action of one kṣaṇa induces the arising of fruition (vipāka) of many kṣaṇas. Furthermore, because it would be purposeless, the life[-faculty] does not arise all at once: the life-faculty is induced to arise in order to sustain the generic similarity of living beings (nikāya-sabhāga); the succession of a single life[-faculty] is fully able to sustain it, and multiple ones would be purposeless. Although mind and mental factors are induced by prior karma, it is not that they do not depend on an equal-and-immediate condition, because they can only arise by relying on the sense faculties and sense objects. Since they arise through relying on the conjunction of faculties and objects, even if many were to arise together side by side it would not be purposeless; yet, because there is no second equal-and-immediate condition, within the same category two never arise simultaneously. Furthermore, mind and mental factors are not induced solely by the force of prior karma, because fruitions and other [types of mind] arise mixed together. If they did not further depend on an equal-and-immediate condition, then many would arise together in a single kṣaṇa. That is to say, the substance of the life-faculty is purely fruition, induced solely by the force of prior karma, so it can be said to arise in a fixed sequence within the same category. Mind and mental factors have no such characteristic: after a fruition has ceased, an outflow (niṣyanda) arises; immediately after an outflow, an instantaneous [dharmic realization] arises, or a fruition arises, not being of a fixed identical category. Therefore, although mind and mental factors have fruition-born [states], it cannot be said that they are equal to the life-faculty. For this reason, only that which is equal and continuously arises without an interval is called 'equal-and-immediate'. It is spoken of because this acts as a condition for that." Based on the treatise's text above, the equal-and-immediate condition generally has multiple meanings that screen out other dharmas: first, there is clearing the way and giving place, after which the subsequent can arise—if it does not clear the way for the subsequent, the subsequent does not arise; second, having the power to induce what follows; third, being equal in substance; fourth, having arising without interval and acting as a condition for what follows, which excludes the life-faculty and so forth. For these reasons, only mind and mental factors are established as equal-and-immediate conditions. The Nyāyānusāra says: "The Dārṣṭāntikas say that all material dharmas, like mind and mental factors, have an equal-and-immediate condition: seeing that milk, yeast/seeds, and flowers produce curds, vinegar, sprouts, and fruits, just as preceding minds and mental factors cease and succeeding ones arise, we therefore know that matter has the meaning of this condition. Furthermore, no sūtra says that only mind and mental factors can act as this condition; therefore, establishing that this condition definitely cannot be matter is a false clinging." The Nyāyānusāra refutes this clinging extensively. Now, when this treatise clarifies that matter is not an equal-and-immediate condition, it also refutes the clinging of the Dārṣṭāntikas.

7.10

On the Śāstra's statement: "Namely, desire-realm matter … equal-and-immediate condition": this explains by pointing to actual cases. As for "or after desire-realm [matter], desire-realm and form-realm unmanifest matter (avijñapti-rūpa) arise": this refers to one whose body is in the desire realm entering the six impure dhyānas. As for "or desire-realm and pure (anāsrava) unmanifest matter [arise]": this refers to the six pure dhyānas. Because the two restraints of the Path and of concentration do not arise together, there is no arising of three types of unmanifest matter after the desire realm.

7.11

On the Śāstra's statement: "Venerable Vasumitra … equal-and-immediate condition": this recounts a divergent explanation. Because within a single body, there is first an unbroken continuity of a single nourished matter (aupacayika-rūpa), and subsequently a second nourished matter arises without obstructing or harming [the first], it is not established as an equal-and-immediate condition. The intention of this master's explanation is that because it lacks the sense of clearing the way and is confused and unequal, it is not established as an equal-and-immediate condition.

7.12

On the Śāstra's statement: "The Bhadanta further said: … many are overshadowed": this Bhadanta holds that because the preceding and succeeding, and the many and few, are unequal, it is not an equal-and-immediate condition.

7.13

On the Śāstra's statement: "Do not mental factors … samādhi, and so forth?": this is an objection. If matter is not an equal-and-immediate condition because of being unequal before and after, mental factors are also unequal before and after; how then can they be equal-and-immediate conditions?

7.14

On the Śāstra's statement: "This, with respect to different classes … no fault of inequality": this is the explanation. Saying that it is "equal" is stated in terms of its own class, not of disparate classes.

7.15

On the Śāstra's statement: "Is it only one's own class … equal-and-immediate condition?": this is an objection. Could it be that only one's own class acts as an equal-and-immediate condition? On what basis is the meaning of "equal" stated solely in terms of one's own [class]?

7.16

On the Śāstra's statement: "If not, how then … to explain the meaning of 'equal'": this is the reply.

7.17

On the Śāstra's statement: "Only clinging to the same class … arising with that as condition": this recounts a divergent clinging. That [position holds that] similar dharmas of the same class act as the equal-and-immediate condition, not different classes.

7.18

On the Śāstra's statement: "What they say is not good … because it can arise": this refutes the divergent clinging. Since beginningless time, a pure mind has never arisen; [under their view,] the initial pure mind would lack an equal-and-immediate condition.

7.19

On the Śāstra's statement: "Non-concomitant formations … because they manifest together": this clarifies that because non-concomitant [formations] are mixed together, they are not equal-and-immediate conditions.

7.20

On the Śāstra's statement: "For what reason is it not accepted … because there is no before and after": this clarifies that the future period has no equal-and-immediate condition.

7.21

On the Śāstra's statement: "How then could the World-Honoured One … this dharma should arise?": this is an outside objection. Since the future has no before and after, how could the Buddha know that they arise in sequence?

7.22

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because he directly knows by inferring from past and present dharmas": this is the Sarvāstivādin's brief reply.

7.23

On the Śāstra's statement: "The tradition says that the World-Honoured One … and yet it is not inferential cognition": although he knows the future by inferring from the past and present, it is not inferential cognition; it is direct realization.

7.24

On the Śāstra's statement: "Due to the Buddha's inference … therefore it is not inferential cognition": this is the explanation. Although he knows the future by inferring from the past, it is direct perceptual knowledge. It is not like seeing smoke and inferring fire without seeing the fire; it is like seeing the smoke, following the smoke, and seeing the fire.

7.25

On the Śāstra's statement: "If so, the World-Honoured One … should not be able to know": the author of the Śāstra refutes this.

7.26

On the Śāstra's statement: "Others further say: … the supernormal knowledge of dhyāna": this again recounts a divergent explanation.

7.27

On the Śāstra's statement: "If so … it is not direct realization": the author of the Śāstra refutes this.

7.28

On the Śāstra's statement: "Therefore, as the Sautrāntikas [say] … this statement is good": the author of the Śāstra refutes the two explanations of the Sarvāstivāda and evaluates and adopts the Sautrāntika position.

7.29

On the Śāstra's statement: "As the World-Honoured One said: … is inconceivable": future dharmas have no before and after, yet the Buddha knows their before and after; this is inconceivable. It is like a mustard seed containing Mount Sumeru, or a pore containing rivers and oceans. Why? A small thing cannot contain a large one; this is inconceivable and inexplicable. This is just like that: the dharmas have no before and after, yet he knows their before and after; this is inconceivable and also inexplicable.

7.30

On the Śāstra's statement: "If in the future … other dharmas do not arise?": this is an outside objection. If so, since the future period has no before and after, why is the future in such a sequence?

7.31

On the Śāstra's statement: "If when this dharma arises … equal-and-immediate condition": this is the explanation. That is, although dharmas have no before and after, they have mutual connection. Because dharmas such as the vajropama-samādhi and kṣayajñāna are mutually connected, they arise one right after the other. For instance, prior to the stage of the supreme mundane dharma and the patient acceptance of the dharma of suffering, the state of affairs is fixed, but not the kṣaṇas. There are many [moments of] patient acceptance of the dharma of suffering whose before and after are not yet fixed; only upon reaching the supreme patient acceptance are the kṣaṇas fixed. This shows that the supreme mundane dharma is definitely prior to all patient acceptances of the dharma of suffering, because upon reaching the phase of arising, the supreme mundane dharma is definitively in front.

7.32

On the Śāstra's statement: "The arhats' … not an equal-and-immediate condition": this is a question.

7.33

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because no further mind arises continuing after this": this is the reply.

7.34

On the Śāstra's statement: "Could it not be that in this manner … it should not be called the mind-faculty (manas)?": this is an objection.

7.35

On the Śāstra's statement: "The mind-faculty is manifested as a basis … equal-and-immediate condition": this resolves the objection.

7.36

On the Śāstra's statement: "If a dharma is equal-and-immediate to a mind … is it immediate to that mind?": below are two sets of fourfold alternatives (catuṣkoṭi). This text is the question of the fourfold alternative proponent. "If a dharma is equal-and-immediate to a mind" means that it is born from a mind as an equal-and-immediate condition. "Is that dharma also immediate to the mind?" means that it arises continuing after the mind, with no other entity intervening between them.

7.37

On the Śāstra's statement: "One should frame the four alternatives … the kṣaṇas of the two absorptions": this is the reply. This [first alternative] is born from a mind as an equal-and-immediate condition, but is not immediate to the mind. The mind emerging from the two absorptions is separated by the two absorptions. The word "second and so forth" includes the third state and so on, up to hundreds of thousands of kṣaṇas. Because these are separated by the first kṣaṇa of absorption and so forth, they are not immediate to the mind.

7.38

On the Śāstra's statement: "As for the second alternative … arising, abiding, decay, and cessation": this is immediate to the mind, but not born from the mind as an equal-and-immediate condition, because the four characteristics [of conditioned existence] are not born from an equal-and-immediate condition. Because the initial kṣaṇa of absorption and the four characteristics in the state of mind have no interval separating them from the mind, they are immediate to the mind, but not equal-and-immediate to the mind.

7.39

On the Śāstra's statement: "As for the third alternative … minds and mental factors": this is born from the mind as an equal-and-immediate condition, because it is a mind or mental factor. It is immediate to the mind because it arises from the mind with no interval between them.

7.40

On the Śāstra's statement: "As for the fourth alternative … arising, abiding, decay, and cessation": this is not equal-and-immediate to the mind, because it is non-concomitant. It is not immediate to the mind, because it is separated in between by the two absorptions.

7.41

On the Śāstra's statement: "If a dharma to a mind … is it immediate?": this is the question for the second fourfold alternative.

7.42

On the Śāstra's statement: "One should frame the four alternatives … the second alternative": this is the reply. In accordance with the previous third alternative, which was born from an equal-and-immediate condition and also immediate to the mind, this first alternative is born from the mind as equal-and-immediate, but not immediate to the absorption. The initial kṣaṇa of absorption and the state of mind are both born from the mind as equal-and-immediate, but because they do not arise immediately after the absorption, they constitute the present first alternative. The previous fourth was neither born from the mind as an equal-and-immediate condition nor immediate to the mind. The second kṣaṇa of the two absorptions and the four characteristics on the mind emerging from absorption are both not equal-and-immediate to the mind, but because they arise immediately after the absorption, they constitute the present second alternative.

7.43

On the Śāstra's statement: "That which was the former first [alternative corresponds to the third here], up to the fourth alternative": the former first alternative refers to the second and subsequent moments of meditative absorption and the mind emerging from absorption; because these are born in immediate succession to mind and also arise directly following absorption, they constitute the third alternative here. The former second alternative refers to the four characteristics upon the first moment of absorption, and the four characteristics upon the mind and mental factors in states with mind; because these are not born in immediate succession to mind and do not arise directly following absorption, they constitute the fourth alternative here.

7.44

On the Śāstra's statement: "When one emerges from the two absorptions ... are they immediately contiguous?": this is a question.

7.45

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because mind and mental factors do not intervene": this is the answer. As for the word "uninterrupted" [or contiguous], it is because mind and mental factors do not intervene; it does not mean that the two absorptions do not intervene. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 111, states: "Question: Why is non-conception retribution not mentioned? There are many answers. One explanation says: If a dharma is led forth uninterruptedly without confusion by the power of mind, it can be named a dharma immediately contiguous with mind. Non-conception retribution is led forth by the power of retribution causes and proceeds spontaneously; it is not led forth by the force of the mind entering that state, and therefore it is not called a dharma immediately contiguous with mind. Question: If so, then retribution mind and mental factors are also led forth by the power of retribution causes and proceed spontaneously, so should they not also be called dharmas immediately contiguous with mind? Answer: Homogeneous dharmas leading one another forth have superior strength, not being like that [non-conception retribution]. Both are associated, have bases, and so forth, and thus are said to be homogeneous. Question: Why are the two mindless absorptions dharmas immediately contiguous with mind, yet are not equal-and-immediate conditions of mind? Answer: Because they are obtained by being led forth through the effort, exertion, and toil of the mind's preparation (prayoga), they are called dharmas immediately contiguous with mind. Because they are contrary to mind and obstruct and sever mind, they are not equal-and-immediate conditions of mind. Another explanation says: Because they are led forth by the force of mind, they are called immediately contiguous dharmas. Because they are unassociated, without bases, without cognitive modes, and without cognitive objects, they are not equal-and-immediate conditions of mind. Question: Why is it that the two mindless absorptions continue to arise without confusion, resembling each other before and after, yet the preceding is not the equal-and-immediate condition of the succeeding? Answer: Because they are led forth by the force of the mind entering absorption and are not led forth and produced by the force of the preceding moment; therefore, the preceding is not the equal-and-immediate condition of the succeeding. Question: If so, then since retribution mind and mental factors are led forth by the force of retribution causes and proceed spontaneously, the preceding should not be the equal-and-immediate condition of the succeeding. Answer: Because mind and mental factors are associated, have bases, have cognitive modes, and have cognitive objects, the preceding moment has superior strength in relation to the succeeding to initiate and make way [for it]; therefore, all are equal-and-immediate conditions for the succeeding. Unassociated conditioning factors are contrary to this and cannot serve as an analogy." Furthermore, fascicle 196, in explaining the equal-and-immediate condition, states: "Herein, some say: If a preceding dharma has not yet reached the stage of having already arisen, it does not serve as the equal-and-immediate condition for a succeeding dharma; if it has reached it, it serves as such. If so, this may be admissible for states with mind, but how could it be admissible for mindless states? Answer: Here it speaks of states with mind, not of other states. Some say: Even if it is explained based on mindless states, there is no fault. That is to say, when the mind entering absorption is present, it grasps at once the fruits of all the moments of absorption and the mind emerging from absorption, and it also gives the fruit of the very first moment of absorption. When the subsequent moments and the mind emerging from absorption arise, it gives the fruit without grasping it, because it has already grasped it previously. The Evaluator says: One should not make this statement. Why is this? There is no equal-and-immediate condition that grasps the fruit at a different time and gives the fruit at a different time. If it grasps the fruit at this time, it gives the fruit at this very time." According to this Evaluator, the mind entering the two absorptions grasps its fruit in the past. If it were not so, then when the second moment of the two absorptions and the mind emerging from absorption have not yet reached the point of currently arising, how could it grasp the fruit? If so, then the Nyāyānusāra and the Vibhāṣā contradict each other. The Nyāyānusāra states: "For those who make this assertion: 'Only when the mind entering the two absorptions has ceased and passed into the past can it gradually grasp the absorption of the second moment onwards and the emerging mind'—that mind entering absorption should not be in the past. Now, grasping a fruit is the name for drawing forth a fruit; all capacities to draw forth a fruit are the activity of conditioned factors, and the distinction among the three time periods is established based on the activity of conditioned factors. If there were an activity that is not present, would that not destroy the basis on which the distinction of time periods is established?" According to this, that treatise contradicts the correct doctrine of the Vibhāṣā. Examining it now in detail, the explanation of the Nyāyānusāra does not equal that of the Vibhāṣā. Passages everywhere state that with the equal-and-immediate condition, once it has grasped the fruit, the fruit is definitely produced, and nothing can alter it. If the equal-and-immediate condition only grasped the fruit in the present, then once it grasped the fruit, the fruit would definitely be produced. Take, for example, one who makes an intention to emerge from absorption upon hearing the sound of a bell: originally, the intended emergence from absorption was set only for midday. Later, meeting with other circumstances, the bell was not sounded, and so that absorption lasted for a long time without emergence. When the mind entering absorption was present, did it grasp an absorption of long duration, or did it grasp an absorption of short duration? If it grasped an absorption of long duration, then it should not emerge in a short time, since an immeasurable number of moments of absorption would not have arisen. If it grasped an absorption of short duration, then it should not fail to emerge for a long time, since an immeasurable number of moments of absorption had not been grasped beforehand. Therefore, one knows that the reasoning of the Vibhāṣā is superior. When grasping a fruit is called "present", it is stated in reference to cause-conditions (hetupratyaya) and the like, not in reference to the equal-and-immediate condition and the like.

7.46

On the Śāstra's statement: "Having thus explained [the equal-and-immediate condition, we should explain the object-condition] ... according to what is appropriate": the third [section] explains the object-condition (ālambanapratyaya). This presents the essential nature of the dharma.

7.47

On the Śāstra's statement: "Namely, just as the visual consciousness ... serves as its object-condition": this explains by pointing to actual instances.

7.48

On the Śāstra's statement: "If a dharma to that dharma ... because its characteristic is uniform": this clarifies that all dharmas serve as cognitive objects.

7.49

On the Śāstra's statement: "Just as firewood and the like ... because their characteristics are not different": this clarifies by adducing an analogy.

7.50

On the Śāstra's statement: "Are mind and mental factors ... determined in this way?": this clarifies the three determinations. This is a question: As there are three determinations regarding the cognitive object, are there also three determinations regarding the basis?

7.51

On the Śāstra's statement: "It should be said that they also exist ... separated from the basis": this is the answer.

7.52

On the Śāstra's statement: "Some say that even in the past it adheres closely to the basis": this relates an alternative explanation. The Nyāyānusāra states: "What should the nature of the object-condition be said to be? It refers to the cognitive objects of the mind, which are all dharmas. Outside the cognitive objective sphere of mind and mental factors, no other dharma whatsoever can definitely be found. That is, all dharmas are that to which mind and mental factors adhere upon arising; hence they are called cognitive objects (ālambana). Because this very cognitive object is the condition that generates mind and mental factors, it is called the object-condition (ālambanapratyaya)." According to this treatise, it is called the object-condition because it takes the cognitive object as a condition. Except for mind and mental factors, all other arisen dharmas do not arise by adhering to a cognitive objective sphere; therefore they have no cognitive object. Now we should briefly explain the meaning of the three determinations. What is called determination of āyatana means that visual consciousness and the like perceive only the form āyatana and not other āyatanas. What is called determination of individual entity means the distinctions of perceiving blue, yellow, and so forth, or the difference between this mountain, this tree, and so forth. Determination of moment means that for each single moment of mind and mental factors that cognize this individual entity, all are entirely determined. The general sense is the same for the five consciousnesses. As for the mental consciousness's determination of āyatana, it means that the mental consciousness perceiving the twelve āyatanas differs in each case, not looking solely toward the dharma-āyatana. Determination of individual entity means that within each single āyatana, each differs according to its respective individual entity. Determination of moment means that within each individual entity, its cognitive object is distinct from moment to moment. As for determination of basis, each of the five consciousness-bodies relies on its own sense-faculty; this is called determination of āyatana. As for determination of individual entity, within a single sense-faculty there are further multiple categories, namely having four natures, male, female, neither-male-nor-female, and the faculties of the six destinies, acquired through cultivation, innate by birth, and so forth, each being distinct. Determination of moment means that the faculty on which this entity relies is distinct from moment to moment. As for the mental faculty's determination of āyatana, it means relying solely on the mind and not on other faculties. As for determination of individual entity, it means that the supreme worldly dharmas serve as the basis only for the receptivity to the cognition of suffering, and the adamantine-like concentration serves as the basis only for the cognition of exhaustion. As for determination of moment, it means that although the supreme worldly dharmas endure for many moments, they have no determination of moment prior to the stage of receptivity; when reaching the supreme receptivity, they have determination of moment.

7.53

On the Śāstra's statement: "Having thus explained [the object-condition, we should explain the sovereign condition] ... because it is the sovereign condition": this presents the essence of the sovereign condition (adhipatipratyaya). According to this treatise saying "that is the sovereign condition", we know that the condition is precisely the cause. If it were only an analogy/resemblance, how could it say "is precisely"?

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese