俱舍論頌疏論本 13.18

13.18

以諸有為法，有剎那盡故者，立理正破。以諸有為有剎那故，定無行動。何以得知皆有剎那？以有盡故。既後有盡，知前有滅，故知有為法皆剎那滅。故頌盡故二字，釋上有剎那故也。頌中故字兩度言之，有剎那故、盡故，此應立量：身表業色是有法；定無行動，是宗法；因云：有剎那故；同喻云：如心所等。並曰：心等有剎那，心等無行動。身表有剎那，身表無行動。故論云：「若此處生，即此處滅，無容從此轉至餘方故，不可言動名身表業。」彼宗救云：「我許身表無剎那滅，故有行動。」即顯論主剎那為因，有不成過。為破此救，應立量云：身表業色定有剎那，以有盡故，如心所等。並曰：心所後有盡，心所有剎那。身表後有盡，身表有剎那。故以盡故二字成立有為皆有剎那，其理極成也。故論云：「諸有為法皆有剎那，其理極成，後必盡故。謂有為法滅不待因。所以者何？待因謂果，滅無非果，故不待因（解云：果法待因，滅是無法，無法非果，故不待因。應立量云：滅不待因，以是無故，猶如兔角。既有為法滅不待因，明知有為皆剎那滅也）。」

'Because all conditioned phenomena end in a single moment': [this] establishes the reasoning to formally refute [them]. Because all conditioned phenomena are momentary, they definitely have no motion. How is it known that they are all momentary? Because they have an end. Since there is an end later, one knows that there was cessation before; therefore one knows that conditioned phenomena all perish momentarily. Thus, the two words 'end, because' in the verse explain 'momentary, because' above. The word 'because' is spoken twice in the verse: 'because they have moments' and 'because of ending.' Here a syllogism should be established: Subject: the matter of bodily informative karma; Thesis property: definitely has no motion; Reason: because it is momentary; Similar example: like mental factors, etc. Correspondingly: mental factors and the like are momentary, and mental factors and the like have no motion; bodily informative [karma] is momentary, and bodily informative [karma] has no motion. Therefore the treatise says: 'If it arises at this place, it perishes right at this place; there is no possibility of it moving from here to another place, and so it cannot be said that motion is called bodily informative karma.' That school rescues [its thesis] by saying: 'We accept that bodily informative [karma] does not perish momentarily, and therefore motion exists.' This points out that the author of the treatise's reason of being momentary has the fallacy of being unestablished. To refute this rescue, a syllogism should be established: [Subject:] the matter of bodily informative karma definitely has moments, [Reason:] because it has an end, [Similar example:] like mental factors, etc. Correspondingly: mental factors have an end later, and mental factors have moments; bodily informative [karma] has an end later, and bodily informative [karma] has moments. Therefore, by the two words 'because of ending,' it is established that conditioned phenomena are all momentary, and the reasoning is extremely well established. Thus the treatise says: 'All conditioned phenomena are momentary, and the reasoning is extremely well established, because they must end later. That is to say, the cessation of conditioned phenomena does not depend on a cause. Why is this? That which depends on a cause is an effect; non-existence as cessation is not an effect, so it does not depend on a cause (Explanation: An effect-phenomenon depends on a cause; cessation is a non-existent phenomenon, and a non-existent phenomenon is not an effect, so it does not depend on a cause. A syllogism should be established: Cessation does not depend on a cause, because it is non-existence, just like a hare's horn. Since the cessation of conditioned phenomena does not depend on a cause, it is clearly known that conditioned phenomena are all momentarily destroyed).'