俱舍論頌疏論本 13.19

13.19

應無無因故者，破彼轉救。彼許法滅待因而滅，故論云：「豈不世間現見薪等，由與火合故致滅無。定無餘量過現量者，故非法滅皆不待因（薪待火滅，即是待因。薪等現見，現量證也）。」為破此救，故言應無無因故。汝許薪等若待因滅，應一切滅無不待因，如生待因，無無因者。並曰：生法待因生，無有無因生。滅法待因滅，無有無因滅。現見覺焰等不待因而滅，明知薪等滅亦不待因滅。應立量云：又薪等滅定不待因，有為攝故，如覺焰等。覺焰是有為，不待因而滅。薪等是有為，亦不待因滅。心、心所法總名為覺，能覺境故。焰是燈焰。生因應能滅者，更以理逐之。又若薪等火合為因，有熟變生，下中上別，下熟初黃，中熟次黑，上熟最黑。然中熟生，下熟即滅；若上熟生，中熟亦滅。應生中上熟因，體即是滅下中熟因，生滅相違，豈容生因即能為滅？故以此理顯彼成非。論云：「故無有因令諸法滅，法自然滅，是壞性故。自然滅故，纔生即滅。由纔生即滅故，剎那滅義成。有剎那故，定無行動。身表是形，理得成立。」

'Because there would be no causeless [destruction]' refutes their subsequent rescue. They accept that the cessation of a phenomenon depends on a cause to cease, and so the treatise says: 'Is it not that in the world it is perceptually observed that firewood and the like are brought to non-existence through cessation because of contact with fire? There is definitely no other means of valid cognition superior to direct perception; therefore it is not the case that the cessation of phenomena is entirely independent of causes (firewood depends on fire to cease, which is dependence on a cause; firewood and the like are directly seen, proven by direct perception).' To refute this rescue, it is said 'because there would be no causeless [destruction].' If you accept that firewood and the like depend on a cause to cease, then no cessation whatsoever should fail to depend on a cause, just as arising depends on a cause and there is none without a cause. Correspondingly: an arising phenomenon depends on a cause to arise, and there is no arising without a cause; a ceasing phenomenon depends on a cause to cease, and there is no cessation without a cause. Yet one directly observes that consciousness, flames, and the like cease without depending on a cause; clearly one knows that the cessation of firewood and the like also does not depend on a cause to cease. A syllogism should be established: Furthermore, the cessation of firewood and the like definitely does not depend on a cause, because it is subsumed under the conditioned, like consciousness, flames, and the like. Consciousness and flames are conditioned and cease without depending on a cause; firewood and the like are conditioned and likewise cease without depending on a cause. Mind and mental factors are collectively called 'consciousness' because they can be conscious of objects. 'Flame' is the flame of a lamp. 'A cause of arising would have to be able to destroy': [this] further pursues it with reason. Moreover, if contact with fire is the cause for firewood and the like, transformation by heat arises, differing as low, medium, and high: low heat is first yellow, medium heat is next black, and high heat is blackest. Yet when medium heat arises, low heat immediately ceases; if high heat arises, medium heat also ceases. Then the cause that produces medium and high heat would itself in essence be the cause that destroys low and medium heat; arising and ceasing are mutually contradictory—how could a cause of arising possibly be capable of destroying? Therefore, by this reasoning it is demonstrated that they are mistaken. The treatise says: 'Therefore there is no cause that makes phenomena cease; phenomena cease spontaneously because they are of a destructible nature. Because they cease spontaneously, as soon as they arise they cease. Because as soon as they arise they cease, the meaning of momentariness is established. Because there are moments, motion definitely does not exist. That bodily informative [karma] is shape is logically established.'