俱舍論頌疏論本 8.52

8.52

釋曰：前六句依理證，第七、第八句依教證。前兩句立比量破大眾部。如穀等相續者，謂如穀等種春種秋收，中間必有芽等相續。處無間續生者，如穀種果既是相續，要處無間剎那續生。言無間者，謂無間絕種果中間芽莖等也。如穀等相續處無間絕，有情相續理亦應然。有情死生是相續法，如何間絕言無中有？此有比量，如穀等者是同喻也，處無間者是宗法也，續生者是因也。量云：死生是有法，要處無間是宗法；因云：以續生故；同喻云：猶如種果。種果是續生，種果無間絕，死生是續生，死生無間絕。像實有不成不等，故非譬者，破大眾部救也。論云：「豈不現見有法續生，而於其中處亦有間。如依鏡等，從質像現，如是有情死有生有，處雖有間，何妨續生？」解云：此大眾部救也。言續生為因，因中有不定過。死有生有為如種菓子，以續生故必無間絕耶？為如質像，以續生故亦有間絕耶？並曰：質像是續生，質像許間絕。死生是續生，死生亦間絕。為破此救，故有斯頌。此有二理破之，一所立質像實有不成，二像喻不等於法。由此二理，故非譬也。故論云：「謂別色生說名為像，其體實有，理所不成。設成非等，故不成喻，一處無二并者。」釋上像實有不成句也，論有四義，釋一處無二并也。一云：謂於一處，鏡色及像並見現前，二色不應同處並有，依異大種故（解云：於一鏡處不可實有像與鏡色二並生也，既二並生，故像不實也）；第二云：又陜水上，兩岸色形同處一時，俱現二像，居兩岸者互見分明，曾無一處並見二色，不應謂此二色並生（解云：於一水處兩岸像生，二像既是同生，故知像非實有也）；第三云：又影與光未曾同處，然曾見鏡懸置影中，光像顯然現於鏡面，不應於此謂二並生（解云：障光明生名之為影，故知影處不合有光。既見影中鏡之光像，像非實也）；第四云：或言一處無二並者，鏡面、月像謂之為二，近遠別見，如觀井水。若有並生，如何別見？故知諸像於理實無（解云：於一鏡處有面、月二像，看面像則近，觀月像則遠，二像若實，豈容一處近遠別見也）。又論云：「然諸因緣和合勢力，令如是見，以諸法性功能差別，難可思議（解云：令如是見者，謂鏡質等勢力返見本面，實無像）。」

Explanation: The first six lines prove it through reason; the seventh and eighth lines prove it through scripture. The first two lines formulate an inference (anumāna) to refute the Mahāsāṃghikas. "As in the continuity of grain and the like": just as when grain and other seeds are planted in spring and harvested in autumn, there must be a continuity of sprouts and so forth in between. "Arising successively without a break in space": since the fruit from the grain seed is a continuity, it must arise successively moment by moment without a break in space. "Without a break" means there is no gap between the seed and fruit, with the sprout, stalk, and so forth in between. Just as in the continuity of grain and the like there is no spatial gap, the continuity of sentient beings should logically be the same. The death and birth of sentient beings are continuous dharmas; how could there be a gap such that one claims there is no intermediate existence? Here there is an inference: "like grain and the like" is the example (dṛṣṭānta); "without a break in space" is the property of the thesis (sādhya); "arising successively" is the reason (hetu). The formulation is: Death and birth are the subject (pakṣa); necessarily being without a spatial break is the property to be proved; the reason is: because of arising successively; the similar example (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta) is: just like seed and fruit. The seed and fruit arise successively, and seed and fruit are without a spatial break; death and birth arise successively, so death and birth are without a spatial break. "Since an image is not established as real, it is unequal, hence not an analogy": this refutes the defense of the Mahāsāṃghikas. The treatise says: "Do we not visually see that a phenomenon arises in succession, yet among them there is also a spatial gap? Just as, depending on a mirror or the like, an image appears from the original form. In this way, although there is a spatial gap between the death-existence and birth-existence of sentient beings, what prevents them from arising successively?" The explanation says: This is the defense of the Mahāsāṃghikas. They claim that with 'arising successively' as the reason, there is the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika) in the reason. Are death-existence and birth-existence like a seed and fruit, necessarily without a break because of arising successively? Or are they like an original form and its image, which also have a break despite arising successively? They argue: The original form and image arise in succession, yet an image is accepted as having a break. Death and birth arise in succession, so death and birth also have a break. In order to refute this defense, this verse is stated. There are two lines of reasoning that refute it: first, the alleged real existence of the image is unestablished; second, the analogy of the image is not equal to the phenomenon. Due to these two lines of reasoning, it is not a valid analogy. Therefore the treatise says: "What is called an image is the arising of a distinct form; its real entity is logically unestablished. Even if it were established, it is not equal [to the subject], and thus cannot serve as an analogy. Two do not coexist in one place." This explains the line "Since an image is not established as real." The treatise has four points explaining "Two do not coexist in one place." The first says: In one place, the color of the mirror and the image are both seen before us; two forms cannot coexist in the same place, because they rely on different great elements (The explanation says: In the place of a single mirror, it is impossible for the image and the mirror's form to arise simultaneously as real entities; since the two arise together, the image is not real). The second says: Moreover, over narrow water, the forms and shapes of both banks appear simultaneously in the same place as two images; people dwelling on both banks clearly see each other, yet two forms have never been seen together in one place; one should not say that these two forms arise side by side (The explanation says: In the single place of the water, the images of both banks arise; since the two images arise together, one knows that the images are not real entities). The third says: Moreover, shadow and light have never existed in the same place; yet a mirror has been seen suspended within a shadow, and an image of light clearly appears on the mirror's surface; one should not say that these two arise together here (The explanation says: The obstruction of the arising of light is called shadow; therefore one knows that light should not exist in the place of a shadow. Since an image of light in the mirror is seen within a shadow, the image is not real). The fourth says: Alternatively, regarding 'two do not coexist in one place', the surface of the mirror and the image of the moon are spoken of as two, seen distinctly as near and far, like looking into well water. If they arose together, how could they be seen distinctly? Hence one knows that all images are logically non-existent (The explanation says: In the single place of a mirror, there are two images—of the face and of the moon; viewing the face-image it is near, while viewing the moon-image it is far. If the two images were real, how could near and far be viewed distinctly in a single place?). Furthermore, the treatise says: "However, through the power of the combination of various causes and conditions, they are seen like this; because the distinct functions of the nature of dharmas are inconceivable (The explanation says: 'caused to be seen like this' means that through the power of the mirror, the original form, etc., one sees back one's original face; in reality there is no image)."