中觀論疏 10.15

10.15

「若諸法不空」下，第二還其無罪福過。又開為兩別：初明無罪福因果、二明無世俗法，還對前二也。就初文二：前明無造罪福之人、次兩偈明無罪福之法。夫論罪福不出人法，既無，何有罪福？汝云：我說空則無人能殺、亦無所殺、亦無刀杖，故無罪；亦無能施、所施人，亦無物，故無福。若汝今有定性能殺、所殺及刀杖，各住自性不得動，故無罪也；各住性不得施，亦無福也。「汝於罪福中」下，第二明無罪福之法。兩偈為二：初明因果相離無罪福、次明因果不相離亦無罪福。凡有罪福不出此二，此二既無，故知無也。初偈上半牒。言「不生」者，此是未生為不生耳。下半破罪福，因中未有於果，則是因果相離，云何因能生果？又以外人執有定性，故果報不應從罪福。若不從罪福生，則離罪福而有果報。偈文正爾也。第二偈直明因果不相離，則是由因有果，果無自性，是故果空；由果有因，因亦空也。又釋二偈，二開破之。汝言有罪福果者，為從因生果、為不從因而生？初偈破不從、第二偈破從。

From "If all dharmas are not empty" onwards is the second part, returning upon [the opponent] the fault of lacking sin and merit. This is again divided into two distinct sections: first, explaining the lack of the cause and effect of sin and merit; second, explaining the lack of worldly dharmas; these correspond reciprocally to the preceding two [objections]. Regarding the first text, there are two parts: first, explaining the lack of persons who commit sin and cultivate merit; next, two gāthās explaining the lack of dharmas of sin and merit. Now, discussions of sin and merit do not go beyond persons and dharmas; since these are absent, how could there be sin and merit? You say: "If, as I claim, [all things] are empty, then there is no person who can kill, neither is there anything killed, nor are there knives and staves; therefore, there is no sin. Nor is there a person who can give, or a recipient, nor is there any gift; therefore, there is no merit." If, as you now claim, there is a fixed intrinsic nature, then the killer, the killed, and the knives and staves would each abide in their own intrinsic nature and could not be altered; therefore, there would be no sin. Each abiding in its intrinsic nature, giving would be impossible; therefore, there would also be no merit.

From "You, regarding sin and merit" onwards is the second part, explaining the lack of the dharmas of sin and merit. The two gāthās form two parts: first, explaining that if cause and effect are separate, there is neither sin nor merit; second, explaining that if cause and effect are not separate, there is also neither sin nor merit. Any existence of sin and merit cannot go beyond these two [options]; since both are absent, we know they do not exist. The first half of the first gāthā restates the opponent's premise. The word "unproduced" refers to what has not yet arisen being unproduced. The lower half refutes sin and merit: if the effect does not yet exist within the cause, then cause and effect are separate; how then could the cause produce the effect? Furthermore, because the outsider clings to an intrinsically fixed nature, the retributive effect should not come from sin and merit. If it is not produced from sin and merit, then the retributive effect would exist apart from sin and merit. The verse text states exactly this. The second gāthā directly explains that if cause and effect are not separate, then the effect exists by dependence on the cause; the effect lacks intrinsic nature, and therefore the effect is empty. Because the cause exists by dependence on the effect, the cause is also empty. Alternatively, interpreting the two gāthās, they refute [the opponent] by making a twofold division: you say there is an effect of sin and merit—is the effect produced from the cause, or is it not produced from the cause? The first gāthā refutes its not being produced from [the cause]; the second gāthā refutes its being produced from [the cause].