中觀論疏 10.16

10.16

「汝破一切法」下，第二還於世俗過。三偈為二：初偈為總、後二為別，偈易知也。今問他義：汝世諦有因果、真無因果，則一邊有、一邊無，一邊破、一邊不破。若說真則破世諦因果，說世則破真諦無因果。若因果、無因果二理並，則如二角，又如畫石。若真俗混成一物，則俱失二諦。「若破於空義」下，第二別明無世俗。初偈明無人法之體；次偈失萬物之相，世俗法中不出體相也。又初偈無造作過、後偈有常住過，偈易知。今問他義：汝因若無果明因生果，則應將無作有，以兔角為牛角。若不將無作有，便將有作有。既已有竟，何須作有？如已有因竟，不應更作因；已有果竟者，何須更生？又若因無果而無作有者，色應作心、心應作色，常作無常、無常作常。若有作有，既已有，何須作？如是無不作有、有不作有，亦有亦無亦不作有。又汝言從生死無常作佛果常，佛果常復應作生死無常。若不爾，豈非定性？他問：我人法是世諦假有，何時是性？問：汝名字為假實，為有此假不？若實有此假，豈非定性？若言非性，可得假作無假義以不耶？次偈明無相，如文。

From "You destroy all dharmas" onwards is the second part, returning upon [the opponent] the fault of destroying worldly conventions. The three gāthās are divided into two parts: the first gāthā is general, and the latter two are specific; the gāthās are easy to understand. Now, questioning the other's position: if according to you conventional truth possesses cause and effect while ultimate truth lacks cause and effect, then one side exists and one side does not; one side is refuted and one side is not refuted. If you speak of the ultimate, you destroy the cause and effect of conventional truth; if you speak of the conventional, you destroy the lack of cause and effect of ultimate truth. If the two principles—cause-and-effect and the absence of cause-and-effect—stand side by side, they would be like two horns, or like a drawing on stone. If the ultimate and the conventional were conflated into a single thing, both truths would be lost.

From "If one destroys the meaning of emptiness" onwards is the second part, specifically explaining the absence of worldly conventions. The first gāthā explains the absence of the substance of persons and dharmas; the next gāthā loses the characteristics of the myriad things. Worldly dharmas do not go beyond substance and characteristics. Furthermore, the first gāthā entails the fault of lacking purposeful action, while the latter gāthā entails the fault of permanent abiding; the gāthās are easy to understand. Now, questioning the other's position: if, when the cause lacks the effect, you explain that the cause produces the effect, then you must make the non-existent become existent, like turning a rabbit's horn into an ox's horn. If you do not make the non-existent become existent, then you would be making the existent become existent. Since it already exists, why is there any need to make it existent? Just as when the cause already exists, one should not produce the cause again; when the effect already exists, why should it arise again? Furthermore, if the cause lacks the effect and the non-existent makes the existent, then form should make mind, mind should make form, the permanent should make the impermanent, and the impermanent should make the permanent. If the existent makes the existent, since it already exists, why is there any need to make it? Thus, the non-existent does not make the existent, the existent does not make the existent, and both-existent-and-non-existent also does not make the existent. Furthermore, you say that from the impermanence of saṃsāra one makes the permanence of the Buddha-fruit; then the permanence of the Buddha-fruit should again make the impermanence of saṃsāra. If not so, how is it not a fixed intrinsic nature? The opponent asks: "My persons and dharmas are provisionally existent within conventional truth; at what point are they intrinsic natures?" We ask: is your name provisional or real? Does this provisionality exist or not? If this provisionality truly exists, how is it not a fixed intrinsic nature? If you say it is not an intrinsic nature, can provisionality make non-provisionality, or not? The next gāthā explains the absence of characteristics, as in the text.