中觀論疏 10.19

10.19

問：何故次〈四諦品〉破涅槃耶？答：大小二乘并有四諦一諦。小乘明有量之四，宗歸一滅諦也；大乘說無量之四，亦宗歸一滅諦也。所以大小宗歸一滅者，三諦皆是有為，唯此一滅是無為常住。又此滅是究竟無餘極果，故三諦歸斯一極。故前破四諦，今觀涅槃。又由稟四諦教，生解斷煩惱，故得涅槃。故前觀四諦，後觀涅槃。又成論者云：四諦平等即是涅槃。《大品》盛有此說。故上明四諦空，即謂空是涅槃。是故今品具明四句並非涅槃，何得以空為涅槃耶？問：何故二十五品最後破涅槃耶？答：外謂涅槃是安神之本宅、凡聖所同歸，故肇師云：「九流於是乎交歸，群聖於是乎冥會。」諸方等經亦盛談此說，故《法華》云「究竟涅槃，常寂滅相，終歸於空。」是故最後論於涅槃。二者論佛出世大意，為令眾生捨於生死得大涅槃。若爾，必有生死者可捨、涅槃可得。斯理不差決定有，故最後論之。三者外謂龍樹出世作論破病、申經大宗，亦令眾生脫生死苦得涅槃。若不為脫生死苦令得涅槃，何事破病申佛教耶？故知造論終歸涅槃，故最後論也。四依經說，雙林最後既說《涅槃》，是故論主最後論也。釋涅槃不同，外道七師、小乘二說、方等四計。外道七師者，一執涅槃與無煩惱不異；二計涅槃是無煩惱因；三立涅槃是無煩惱果；四明畢竟無處名為涅槃，此如《百論．破常品》說。次檀提婆羅門計於此身即是涅槃不須更滅，此明欲界為涅槃。次阿羅羅計無想為涅槃，此計色界為涅槃也。欝頭藍弗計非想為涅槃，此計無色界為涅槃也。此三外道以三有為涅槃，合前為七種也。小乘二師者，一毘曇計無為涅槃是常是善，本自有之、在煩惱外，後斷煩惱起得得之，屬於行者。二成實明涅槃但是無法，非三性攝，從善因得，義說為善。大乘四種者，一者明涅槃性體是世諦之法。所以然者，陶練小智終成大覺，累無不寂、德無不圓，故涅槃名為有法。第二釋云：以空為涅槃，即是實相，實相名第一義諦。三釋云：涅槃非真非俗，世諦是麁有、真諦為妙無，涅槃異彼麁有亦不同妙無，故出二諦外。四釋云：四句內並非至極，起出四句方是涅槃。唯四師不同，大明二種：成實者明本始有二種涅槃，十地師明性淨方便淨。方便淨，修因所得；性淨，則古今常有。然方便淨猶是始有異名，性淨則本有殊稱。《攝大乘論》四種涅槃：一本性寂滅、二有餘、三無餘、四無住處。釋無住處二：初依〈三身品〉法身不住生死，應身化身不住涅槃。次用二無我理、三無性理。無所住處，為無住處。又此四師同釋涅槃備於三德，謂法身、般若、解脫。所以立三德為涅槃者，略有四義：生死與涅槃相對，生死有於三障，謂煩惱、業、苦，對報障故明於法身，對業障故辨於解脫，對煩惱障說於般若。二者欲顯如來三業自在，有法身故身業自在，具般若故口業自在，有解脫故意業自在，具如《涅槃．四相品》明。三者德雖無窮，三義足略：無境不照名為般若，無感不應名為法身，無累不盡稱為解脫。四者為對二乘三德不圓，有身智時解脫未足，解脫若足即無復身智，故明如來三德圓滿。問：此品何故破涅槃耶？答：略明四義。一者惑人執非涅槃為涅槃，故須破之。所以然者，涅槃不如惑者所謂種種推拆橫計涅槃，故須破之。二者惑人執涅槃為非涅槃。所以然者，生死本是涅槃，而謂生死非是涅槃，故須破之。故下文云「生死之實際及以涅槃際，如是二際者，無毫釐差別。」《華嚴》云「生死非雜亂，涅槃非寂靜。」三者雖有內外大小不同，同言有涅槃。若爾便成有見，既成有見乃是生死，不名涅槃，故有所得人若生死若涅槃皆是生死。今求此生死涅槃不可得，乃名涅槃。又言有生死則為生死所繫，執有涅槃為涅槃所繫。涅槃名為解脫，既是繫縛，何名涅槃？今此品求生死涅槃不可得？脫於二繫？名為解脫？方是涅槃。四者欲釋諸大乘明涅槃義。如《大品》云「若得有法過涅槃者，亦如幻夢。」所以然者，諸法未曾生死亦非涅槃，但為眾生虛妄故成生死，為止生死故強說涅槃。生死若除，則涅槃亦息。故《華嚴》云「生死與涅槃，二俱不可得。是法不可示，言辭相寂滅」也。

Question: Why does the refutation of nirvāṇa follow the chapter "Examination of the Four Noble Truths"? Answer: Both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna have the four truths and the single truth. The Hīnayāna explains the quantifiable four, with its main principle returning to the single truth of cessation; the Mahāyāna speaks of the unquantifiable four, and its main principle also returns to the single truth of cessation. The reason why both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna return to this single cessation is that the other three truths are all conditioned, while this single cessation alone is unconditioned and permanently abiding. Furthermore, this cessation is the ultimate, remainderless, supreme fruit; therefore, the three truths return to this single ultimate. Hence, having previously refuted the four truths, we now examine nirvāṇa. Moreover, by receiving the teaching of the four truths, one generates understanding and severs afflictions, thereby attaining nirvāṇa. Thus, the four truths were examined first, and nirvāṇa is examined afterward. Furthermore, the master of the Tattvasiddhi says: the equality of the four truths is itself nirvāṇa. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra abounds in this statement. Hence, when the emptiness of the four truths was explained above, it was thought that emptiness is nirvāṇa. Therefore, this present chapter fully explains that none of the four alternatives is nirvāṇa; how could emptiness be taken as nirvāṇa? Question: Why is nirvāṇa refuted at the very end of the twenty-five chapters? Answer: Outsiders consider nirvāṇa to be the original abode where the spirit finds rest and that to which both ordinary beings and sages converge. Thus Master Sengzhao said: "The nine currents meet and return to it; the multitude of sages secretly unite therein." The various vaipulya sūtras also speak of this extensively; thus the Lotus Sūtra says: "Ultimate nirvāṇa, of the mark of perpetual quiescent cessation, ultimately returns to emptiness." For this reason, nirvāṇa is discussed at the very end. Second, regarding the great purpose of the Buddha's appearance in the world: it is to cause sentient beings to abandon saṃsāra and attain great nirvāṇa. If so, there must surely be a saṃsāra to be abandoned and a nirvāṇa to be attained. This principle is unfailing and definitely existent; therefore, it is discussed at the very end. Third, outsiders believe that Nāgārjuna appeared in the world and composed this treatise to refute errors and elucidate the main tenets of the sūtras, also causing sentient beings to escape the suffering of saṃsāra and attain nirvāṇa. If it were not for freeing them from the suffering of saṃsāra and causing them to attain nirvāṇa, for what purpose would he refute errors and elucidate the Buddha's teachings? Therefore, one knows that the composition of the treatise ultimately returns to nirvāṇa; hence, it is discussed at the very end. Fourth, relying on the scriptures: since the Nirvāṇa Sūtra was taught last between the twin śāla trees, the treatise master discusses it last. In explaining nirvāṇa, views differ: there are seven teachers of the non-Buddhists, two explanations in the Hīnayāna, and four tenets in the vaipulya teachings. As for the seven teachers of the non-Buddhists: the first posits that nirvāṇa is not different from the absence of afflictions; the second conceives nirvāṇa to be the cause of the absence of afflictions; the third establishes nirvāṇa as the fruit of the absence of afflictions; the fourth explains that an absolute non-existence of locus is named nirvāṇa, as stated in the "Refutation of Permanence" chapter of the Śata-śāstra. Next, the brāhmaṇa Dandi posits that this very physical body is nirvāṇa and that no further cessation is needed; this identifies the desire realm with nirvāṇa. Next, Ārāḍa conceives the non-conceptual state to be nirvāṇa; this conceives the form realm to be nirvāṇa. Udraka Rāmaputra conceives the neither-conceptual-nor-non-conceptual state to be nirvāṇa; this conceives the formless realm to be nirvāṇa. These three non-Buddhists take the three realms of existence to be nirvāṇa, making seven types together with the previous ones. As for the two masters of the Hīnayāna: the first is the Abhidharma, which posits that unconditioned nirvāṇa is permanent and wholesome, inherently existing from the beginning outside of afflictions; later, when afflictions are severed, an attainment arises to obtain it, belonging to the practitioner. The second is the Tattvasiddhi, which clarifies that nirvāṇa is merely a non-existent dharma, not subsumed under the three natures, but attained through wholesome causes and conventionally spoken of as wholesome. As for the four types in the Mahāyāna: the first clarifies that the intrinsic nature of nirvāṇa is a dharma of conventional truth. Why is this so? Through cultivating and refining lesser wisdom, one ultimately achieves great awakening, wherein no burden is unquelled and no virtue is unfulfilled; hence nirvāṇa is called an existent dharma. The second explanation says: taking emptiness as nirvāṇa, which is itself the real mark, and the real mark is named the ultimate truth. The third explanation says: nirvāṇa is neither ultimate nor conventional; conventional truth is coarse existence, while ultimate truth is subtle non-existence; nirvāṇa is different from that coarse existence and also not identical to subtle non-existence, and therefore lies outside the two truths. The fourth explanation says: nothing within the four alternatives is the supreme ultimate; only when one transcends the four alternatives is there nirvāṇa. Although these four masters differ, they generally clarify two types: the Tattvasiddhi explains two kinds of nirvāṇa, original and newly arisen; the Daśabhūmika masters explain nature-purified nirvāṇa and expediently purified nirvāṇa. Expediently purified is attained by cultivating causes; nature-purified is perpetually existent throughout past and present. However, expediently purified is simply an alternate name for newly arisen, while nature-purified is another designation for original existence. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha lists four kinds of nirvāṇa: first, intrinsically quiescent; second, with remainder; third, without remainder; fourth, non-abiding. There are two explanations of non-abiding: first, according to the "Chapter on the Three Bodies", the dharmakāya does not abide in saṃsāra, while the saṃbhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya do not abide in nirvāṇa; second, applying the principle of the two kinds of selflessness and the principle of the three non-natures, having no locus of abiding constitutes non-abiding. Furthermore, these four masters all explain that nirvāṇa is endowed with the three virtues, namely dharmakāya, prajñā, and liberation. The reason for establishing the three virtues as nirvāṇa has four brief meanings: Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are mutually opposed. Saṃsāra has the three obstacles, namely afflictions, karma, and suffering. Against the retribution obstacle, dharmakāya is clarified; against the karma obstacle, liberation is distinguished; against the affliction obstacle, prajñā is explained. Second, it is intended to reveal the Tathāgata's sovereignty in the three karmas: possessing the dharmakāya, bodily karma is sovereign; being endowed with prajñā, verbal karma is sovereign; having liberation, mental karma is sovereign, as fully explained in the "Chapter on the Four Marks" in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra. Third, although the virtues are boundless, these three meanings are sufficient in summary: illuminating every object is called prajñā, responding to every resonance is called dharmakāya, and exhausting every burden is termed liberation. Fourth, this is to contrast with the two vehicles' lack of complete three virtues: when they possess body and wisdom, liberation is not yet complete; when liberation is complete, body and wisdom no longer exist. Thus, the Tathāgata's completion of the three virtues is clarified. Question: Why does this chapter refute nirvāṇa? Answer: Four points are briefly explained. First, deluded people cling to what is not nirvāṇa as nirvāṇa, and therefore it must be refuted. Why is this? Nirvāṇa is not like what deluded people suppose through various analytical conjectures, arbitrarily conceiving it to be nirvāṇa; hence it must be refuted. Second, deluded people cling to nirvāṇa as not being nirvāṇa. Why is this? Saṃsāra is originally nirvāṇa, yet they claim that saṃsāra is not nirvāṇa; hence it must be refuted. Therefore, the text below states: "The actual limit of saṃsāra and the limit of nirvāṇa—between these two limits there is not the slightest difference." The Avataṃsaka-sūtra says: "Saṃsāra is not chaotic; nirvāṇa is not quiescent." Third, although there are differences between non-Buddhists and Buddhists, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, they all say that nirvāṇa exists. If so, this becomes an existence-view; having become an existence-view, it is just saṃsāra and not called nirvāṇa. Hence, for those who hold to apprehension, whether saṃsāra or nirvāṇa, all is saṃsāra. Now, seeking this saṃsāra and nirvāṇa to be unfindable is precisely what is called nirvāṇa. Furthermore, saying that saṃsāra exists means being bound by saṃsāra; clinging to the existence of nirvāṇa means being bound by nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is called liberation; since this is bondage, how could it be called nirvāṇa? Now, this chapter seeks saṃsāra and nirvāṇa and finds them unfindable; escaping the two bondages is called liberation, and only then is it nirvāṇa. Fourth, it is intended to interpret the meaning of nirvāṇa as explained in the various Mahāyāna sūtras. As the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: "Even if there were a dharma surpassing nirvāṇa, it too would be like an illusion or a dream." Why is this? Dharmas have never been saṃsāra nor are they nirvāṇa; it is merely on account of sentient beings' delusions that saṃsāra is formed, and to stop saṃsāra, nirvāṇa is forcefully spoken of. If saṃsāra is eliminated, nirvāṇa also ceases. Thus the Avataṃsaka-sūtra says: "Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, both are unfindable. This dharma cannot be demonstrated; the marks of verbal expression are quiescently extinguished."