中觀論疏 10.20

10.20

品開三章：第一論涅槃、第二論生死、第三總結。初二：第一論所證涅槃邪之與正、第二論能證之人邪之與正。初又二：第一略破邪涅槃申正涅槃、第二廣破邪涅槃申正涅槃。所以開此二章者，諸方等經大明涅槃橫絕百非、竪超四句，累無不寂、德無不圓。初略破邪涅槃申正涅槃，明橫絕百非；次廣破邪涅槃辨正涅槃，竪超四句。初門為二：一者略破邪涅槃、二者略申正涅槃。初又二：初寄外破空非涅槃、次就論主顯有非涅槃。所以破此二者，空有是諸見根，又是障道本，又是大小所執。大乘人多執空、小乘人多執有，盛行於世。初偈上半牒空義、下半正破空。若一切法空則無煩惱生，故無所斷，則無有餘；若一切空則無五陰生，何所滅？故稱為無餘。此難通大小乘人。小乘斷四住惑，滅分段身，名二涅槃。大乘斷五住惑，滅二生死，名大涅槃。今既言無生無滅，則無此大小二種涅槃，是為邪見。問：上品已云一切無生滅，今何故復問？答：畢竟空義難解難入，作論將竟故數數論之。如《大品》下帙已去說般若將竟，善吉頻問：「若諸法畢竟空，云何有六道？若諸法畢竟空，云何有三乘？」今亦然矣。「答曰」下，第二就論主破有非涅槃。上半牒有、下半破有。若爾，大小內外裁有一毫法即是定性，不可斷滅，故亦無二涅槃也。長行云「所名涅槃者」，發下略示正涅槃。然前破邪亦即是申正，以破有無二見、得脫二見即是解脫，名為涅槃。今申正涅槃，亦是破邪涅槃。所以然者，正涅槃既成，邪涅槃即破。如諸方等經直明因緣無所得義，而有所得即破。又上是就緣假破，就其覓有無涅槃皆不成；今是對緣假破，申正涅槃對破邪說，在邪既去，正亦不留也。又前破其有涅槃故言無，即無汝所見；今破其無，是故言有，皆是對緣假破也。「無得亦無至」者，就小乘義，有為果名得，無為果名至盡。相續為斷，不遷名常。諸行始起為生，諸行終為滅。今皆不爾，故云無得無至，乃至不生不滅也。若破大乘者，如來是能得之人，三德涅槃為所得之法。金剛心道諦因為能至，佛果為所至。五住惑斷為斷，常樂果為常。二死盡前心為滅，佛果起為生。涅槃皆悉不爾，是故云無得無至等也。涅槃既橫絕百非，亦應云非餘非無餘、非性淨非不性淨、非本非始。今但非此六，破病略周，類如八不也。

The chapter opens with three sections: first, discussing nirvāṇa; second, discussing saṃsāra; third, the concluding summary. The first section has two parts: first, discussing whether the realized nirvāṇa is perverse or correct; second, discussing whether the person capable of realization is perverse or correct. The first part also has two divisions: first, briefly refuting perverse nirvāṇa to elucidate correct nirvāṇa; second, extensively refuting perverse nirvāṇa to elucidate correct nirvāṇa. The reason for opening these two divisions is that the various vaipulya sūtras broadly explain that nirvāṇa horizontally cuts off the hundred negations and vertically transcends the four alternatives, wherein no burden is unquelled and no virtue is unfulfilled. The first briefly refutes perverse nirvāṇa and elucidates correct nirvāṇa, explaining the horizontal cutting off of the hundred negations; next, it extensively refutes perverse nirvāṇa and distinguishes correct nirvāṇa, explaining the vertical transcending of the four alternatives. The first division consists of two parts: first, briefly refuting perverse nirvāṇa; second, briefly elucidating correct nirvāṇa. The first of these also has two: first, relying on the opponent to refute emptiness as not being nirvāṇa; second, based on the treatise master, revealing that existence is not nirvāṇa. The reason for refuting these two is that emptiness and existence are the root of all views, the foundation of obstacles to the Path, and what is clung to by both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna. Mahāyāna followers mostly cling to emptiness, while Hīnayāna followers mostly cling to existence, and these are widespread in the world. The first half of the opening verse restates the meaning of emptiness, and the second half directly refutes emptiness. If all dharmas are empty, then afflictions do not arise, and thus there is nothing to sever, which means there is no nirvāṇa with remainder; if everything is empty, then the five aggregates do not arise, so what could be extinguished? Hence it is called without remainder. This objection applies equally to both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna followers. The Hīnayāna severs the delusions of the four abodes and extinguishes the body of mortal transmigration, which is called the two nirvāṇas. The Mahāyāna severs the delusions of the five abodes and extinguishes the two kinds of saṃsāra, which is called great nirvāṇa. Now, since you say there is neither arising nor ceasing, these two kinds of nirvāṇa in both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna would not exist; this is a wrong view. Question: The previous chapter already said that all dharmas have no arising and ceasing; why ask again now? Answer: The meaning of ultimate emptiness is difficult to understand and difficult to enter. Since the composition of the treatise is nearing its end, it is discussed repeatedly. Just as in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, from the later scrolls onward when the teaching of prajñā was nearing its end, Subhūti repeatedly asked: "If all dharmas are ultimately empty, how can there be the six paths? If all dharmas are ultimately empty, how can there be the three vehicles?" It is just the same here. From "The reply says" onward is the second part, based on the treatise master refuting existence as not being nirvāṇa. The upper half restates existence, and the lower half refutes existence. If so, if the Mahāyāna, Hīnayāna, Buddhists, or non-Buddhists have even the slightest hair of a dharma, it constitutes intrinsic nature and cannot be severed or extinguished, and thus there would also be neither of the two nirvāṇas. The prose stating "What is called nirvāṇa" introduces below the brief indication of correct nirvāṇa. However, the previous refutation of the perverse is itself the elucidation of the correct, because by refuting the two views of existence and non-existence and obtaining liberation from these two views, that is liberation and is called nirvāṇa. Now, elucidating correct nirvāṇa also refutes perverse nirvāṇa. Why is this so? Once correct nirvāṇa is established, perverse nirvāṇa is overthrown. Just as the various vaipulya sūtras directly clarify the meaning of dependent origination being free from apprehension, and whatever has apprehension is immediately refuted. Furthermore, the above was a provisional refutation in terms of conditions, showing that seeking nirvāṇa in terms of existence or non-existence both fail; now it is a provisional refutation confronting conditions, elucidating correct nirvāṇa to confront and refute perverse doctrines; when the perverse is eliminated, the correct does not remain either. Moreover, previously, to refute their idea that nirvāṇa exists, it was said to be non-existent, meaning that your view does not exist; now, to refute their view of non-existence, existence is spoken of; both are provisional refutations confronting conditions. As for "neither attained nor arrived at": according to the Hīnayāna meaning, conditioned fruits are called attainment, while unconditioned fruits are called arrival. Continuity is called annihilation, and non-transmutation is called permanence. The initial arising of conditioned formations is arising, and the end of conditioned formations is ceasing. Now, none of these is so; hence it is said, "neither attained nor arrived at", up to "neither arising nor ceasing". If refuting the Mahāyāna: the Tathāgata is the person capable of attainment, and the three virtues of nirvāṇa are the dharmas attained. The cause of the truth of the path in the adamantine mind is that which is capable of arriving, and the fruit of buddhahood is that which is arrived at. The severance of the delusions of the five abodes is severance, and the fruit of permanent bliss is permanence. The mind preceding the exhaustion of the two deaths is ceasing, and the arising of the fruit of buddhahood is arising. Nirvāṇa is entirely not like this; hence it is said, "neither attained nor arrived at", and so forth. Since nirvāṇa horizontally cuts off the hundred negations, it should also be said to be neither with remainder nor without remainder, neither nature-purified nor not nature-purified, neither original nor newly arisen. Here, only these six are negated; the refutation of errors is broadly comprehensive, analogous to the eight negations.