中觀論疏 10.23

10.23

「問曰」下，第三破非有非無是涅槃。前問、次答。問有二：一領前、二立後。是此中假師等用非有非無為涅槃，亦是立涅槃出二諦外名非有非無。又是地論師法界體非有無。又攝論師明無住涅槃有兩解，皆是非有無。「答曰」下，兩偈為二：初偈責分別破、第二偈取意破。初偈上半牒、下半責之。明第四非有非無是愚癡論。如世愚人不知分別好醜善惡，故云「以何而分別」。影師云：「此雙非之言，於亡有餘，存之不足。何者？凡可造心不出斯二，斯二之表無可宅心，無可宅心則應遣之。而復言有，竟是何物？故云以何而分別。」今依長行釋意者，此責非有無所因，破非有無。二偈為四：初半偈牒、次半偈責、第三半偈通、第四半偈破。初牒，易知也。次責者，懸標二關也。若因有無而分別者，已破有無竟，不得因之。若因絕四句者，絕四句不可因也。既不得因此二，云何得分別非有無耶？第二偈上半牒外人之通、下半正破通。意云：因前有無故有非有非無，此即是分別非有無。何故言不可分別是愚癡論耶？下半用前三句破者，若有有無可因，可得分別非有無；竟無有無可因，云何得分別非有非無耶？《智度論》六十五卷釋〈無作品〉以二義破非有非無：一用前三句破，同第二偈；二者用實相門破，實相絕四句故無非有非無。今論云「涅槃絕四句」，即是實相也。今總問汝：為以非有無作藥用、為道理有此非有無耶？若作藥用，病盡則藥消。若道理有非有無，我亦道理有有無；若言求有無不可得者，我亦求非有無不可得也。又所以有四句者，涅槃絕四句，四句是表涅槃之門耳，云何用門為涅槃耶？肇公《涅槃論》破非有非無云「若有此非有無則入有攝，若無此非有無則入無攝。」故唯見有無，無兩非也。「如來滅度」下，第二就人門破涅槃。以能證之人顯所證之法，能證之人既非四句，所證之法義亦同然。又《成論》云「如來在世尚非有無，況滅度。」小乘尚知如來非是有無，況學大乘言佛在四句。問：何故將如來以證涅槃？答：〈如來品〉已顯如來非四句竟，故將已顯之人證未顯之法也。問：何故但明二世如來不在四句？答：過現已起，是故說之。未來末起，是故不說。問：若爾，未來末起者無諸見？答：現在說未來，故於未來見。問：若爾，現在說未來，應言未來如來。答：今論釋迦正辨二世。未來是彌勒，是故不說未來佛也。佛現在說離四句，佛滅後稟教之流執於四句，未來未有人法故不說；亦可存略故耳。

From "Question:" below is the third [section], refuting [the view that] nirvāṇa is neither existent nor non-existent. First is the question, followed by the answer. The question has two [parts]: first, it adopts the preceding [views]; second, it establishes the subsequent [view]. This is where masters of the middle and provisional and others take neither existence nor non-existence as nirvāṇa, and also establish that nirvāṇa transcends the two truths, calling it neither existent nor non-existent. Furthermore, for the masters of the Dilun, the substance of the dharma-realm is neither existent nor non-existent. Again, the masters of the Shelun explain unlocated nirvāṇa with two interpretations, both of which are neither existent nor non-existent. From "Reply:" below, the two verses comprise two [sections]: the first verse refutes it by demanding an articulation, and the second verse refutes it by addressing its underlying intention. In the first verse, the first half takes up [the position], and the second half rebukes it, explaining that the fourth [thesis], neither existence nor non-existence, is foolish talk. Just as a foolish person in the world cannot discern between ugly and fair, or good and bad, it says, "By what means could it be articulated?" Master [Tan]ying says: "These words of double negation leave more than enough in clearing away, but are insufficient in preserving. Why? Whatever can be conceived by the mind does not go beyond these two [of existence and non-existence]; beyond these two, there is nothing for the mind to settle upon. If there is nothing for the mind to settle upon, it ought to be dismissed. Yet to speak again of existence—what thing could it possibly be? Hence it says, 'By what means could it be articulated?'" Now, explaining the intention in accordance with the prose commentary: this questions that upon which neither existence nor non-existence is based, refuting neither existence nor non-existence. The two verses comprise four [parts]: the first half-verse takes up [the position]; the second half-verse rebukes it; the third half-verse provides the rejoinder; the fourth half-verse refutes it. The first [part], taking up [the position], is easily understood. As for the second, rebuking it, it sets up two checkpoints: if it is articulated on the basis of existence and non-existence, existence and non-existence have already been refuted and cannot be depended upon; if it is based on the transcendence of the four propositions, that which transcends the four propositions cannot be depended upon. Since it cannot be based on either of these two, how could one articulate neither existence nor non-existence? In the second verse, the first half takes up the opponent's rejoinder, and the second half directly refutes the rejoinder. The meaning is: because of the preceding existence and non-existence, there is neither existence nor non-existence; this is precisely articulating neither existence nor non-existence—why say it cannot be articulated and is foolish talk? The second half refutes it using the preceding three propositions: if there were an existence and non-existence to rely upon, one could articulate neither existence nor non-existence; but since ultimately there is no existence or non-existence to rely upon, how could one articulate neither existence nor non-existence? The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, in its sixty-fifth fascicle explaining the "Chapter on Non-Action," refutes neither existence nor non-existence with two arguments: first, refuting it using the preceding three propositions, identical to the second verse; second, refuting it using the approach of the true nature of reality, for because the true nature of reality transcends the four propositions, there is no neither existence nor non-existence. Now this treatise states, "Nirvāṇa transcends the four propositions," which is precisely the true nature of reality. Now I generally ask you: do you use neither existence nor non-existence as a medicine, or does this neither existence nor non-existence exist as a principle? If it is used as a medicine, when the disease is exhausted, the medicine dissolves. If neither existence nor non-existence exists as a principle, then for me, existence and non-existence also exist as principles; if you say that searching for existence and non-existence yields nothing, then for me, searching for neither existence nor non-existence also yields nothing. Furthermore, why are there four propositions? Nirvāṇa transcends the four propositions; the four propositions are merely gateways that express nirvāṇa—how could one take the gateway to be nirvāṇa? Master [Seng]zhao's Treatise on Nirvāṇa, in refuting neither existence nor non-existence, states: "If there is this neither existence nor non-existence, it is subsumed under existence; if there is no such neither existence nor non-existence, it is subsumed under non-existence." Therefore, one only sees existence and non-existence; there is no double negation. From "The Tathāgata having passed into extinction" below, the second [section] refutes nirvāṇa from the perspective of the person. Through the person who can realize, the dharma that is realized is revealed; since the person who can realize does not belong to the four propositions, the principle of the dharma that is realized is also the same. Furthermore, the Tattvasiddhi states: "While the Tathāgata was in the world, he was not even existent or non-existent, how much less so after his passing into extinction." Even the Hīnayāna understands that the Tathāgata is neither existent nor non-existent, how much less should students of the Mahāyāna say that the Buddha exists within the four propositions! Question: Why use the Tathāgata to verify nirvāṇa? Answer: The "Chapter on the Tathāgata" has already fully revealed that the Tathāgata is beyond the four propositions; therefore, through the person who has already been revealed, the dharma that has not yet been revealed is verified. Question: Why explain only that the Tathāgatas of the two times are not within the four propositions? Answer: The past and present have already arisen, therefore they are spoken of; the future has not yet arisen, therefore it is not spoken of. Question: If so, do those of the future that have not yet arisen lack these views? Answer: The present speaks of the future, hence views arise regarding the future. Question: If so, when the present speaks of the future, one should mention the future Tathāgata. Answer: In the present treatise, Śākyamuni specifically examines the two times. The future [Buddha] is Maitreya; therefore, the future Buddha is not mentioned. When the Buddha was in the world, he taught freedom from the four propositions; after the Buddha's extinction, the followers who received the teachings grasped at the four propositions; since the future does not yet have persons or dharmas, it is not mentioned. Alternatively, it is simply kept brief.