中觀論疏 10.22

10.22

「問曰」下，第二破亦有亦無是涅槃。前問、次答。問為兩：一領前無、二立後有。莊嚴云：今昔涅槃異，昔是斷無、今是妙有。今詳此義，今昔涅槃但是有無二見。昔小涅槃為無，名為無見；今涅槃是有，即是有見。有見即常，無見便斷，有無斷常乃是生死，豈是涅槃？又云：三德圓滿名為涅槃，亦是有無共合名為涅槃。開善云：今昔涅槃只是一句，就體用明異。昔日但示解脫無為，未得辨體，今日始明妙有常樂。此還是顯昔涅槃體耳，此即是有無共合為涅槃。又開善云：至亡彌存義，彌存義為有，至亡為無。亦是有無共合也。「答曰」下，第二四偈即四：初即解脫破、次有受破、三有為破、四相違破。初上半牒、下半破。破意云：縛時無解、脫時無縛，亦有時無無、無時無有，不應有無共合而為涅槃。又經云「涅槃名為解脫」，即脫於有無，云何以有無名為解脫？此乃取縛為解脫耳。又若以有無為脫，亦應脫有無為縛也。又涅槃是解脫異名，而解脫正是無累，非是有無義，不應以解脫為無也。第二偈上半牒、下半破，破意同前也。第三偈上半牒而總非、下半正作有為破。汝受此有所得有無，則皆是有為法，不勉生老死也。又此有無皆是眾累，豈非有為？又因有為有無為，既其有因，則是有為。如《百論》云「汝有因故說常耶？無因故說常耶？若有因，則無常；若無因說常，亦可言無常也。」第四偈上半牒非、下半破。有無相害，都無二法，自破涅槃，以何共合為涅槃耶？下句明闇相違者，《成實》云「明闇共處是安陀會人義」耳。

From "Question:" below is the second [section], refuting [the view that] nirvāṇa is both existent and non-existent. First is the question, followed by the answer. The question has two [parts]: first, it adopts the preceding non-existence; second, it establishes the subsequent existence. Master Zhuangyan says: "Past and present nirvāṇas differ: the past one was nihilistic non-existence, while the present one is wondrous existence." Now, examining this doctrine: the past and present nirvāṇas are merely the two views of existence and non-existence. The past, lesser nirvāṇa was taken as non-existence, which is called the view of non-existence; the present nirvāṇa is taken as existence, which is the view of existence. The view of existence entails permanence, while the view of non-existence entails annihilation; [yet] existence and non-existence, annihilation and permanence, are saṃsāra—how could they be nirvāṇa? Furthermore, it is said: "The perfection of the three virtues is called nirvāṇa," which is also taking the combination of existence and non-existence as nirvāṇa. Master Kaishan says: "The past and present nirvāṇas are merely a single statement, explained as distinct in terms of substance and function. Formerly, [the Buddha] merely showed the unconditioned state of liberation, not yet able to distinguish its substance; today, he first clarifies wondrous existence, permanence, and bliss. This is still merely revealing the substance of the past nirvāṇa." This is precisely taking the combination of existence and non-existence as nirvāṇa. Master Kaishan also says: "The sense of ultimate demise and pervasive preservation: the sense of pervasive preservation is existence, and ultimate demise is non-existence." This is also a combination of existence and non-existence. From "Reply:" below, the second [part consists of] four verses, which comprise four [refutations]: first, refutation through liberation; second, refutation through having appropriation; third, refutation through being conditioned; fourth, refutation through mutual contradiction. In the first [verse], the first half takes up [the opponent's position], and the second half refutes it. The meaning of the refutation is: when bound, there is no liberation; when liberated, there is no bondage; likewise, when there is existence, there is no non-existence; when there is non-existence, there is no existence. One should not combine existence and non-existence to make nirvāṇa. Moreover, the sūtra says, "Nirvāṇa is called liberation," which means liberation from existence and non-existence; how could existence and non-existence be called liberation? This is merely taking bondage as liberation. Furthermore, if existence and non-existence constitute liberation, then liberation from existence and non-existence should conversely constitute bondage. In addition, nirvāṇa is an alternative name for liberation, and liberation is precisely the absence of encumbrance, not the sense of existence or non-existence; one should not take liberation as non-existence. In the second verse, the first half takes up [the position], and the second half refutes it; the meaning of the refutation is the same as above. In the third verse, the first half takes up [the position] and rejects it generally; the second half directly refutes it on the grounds of being conditioned. If you accept these grasped existences and non-existences, then they are all conditioned phenomena, not exempt from birth, old age, and death. Furthermore, these existences and non-existences are all multiple defilements—how could they not be conditioned? In addition, because of the conditioned, there is the unconditioned; since it has a cause, it is conditioned. As the Śata-śāstra states: "Do you speak of permanence because it has a cause, or do you speak of permanence because it lacks a cause? If it has a cause, it is impermanent; if you speak of permanence because it lacks a cause, one could just as well speak of it as impermanent." In the fourth verse, the first half takes up [the position] and rejects it, and the second half refutes it. Existence and non-existence mutually exclude each other, leaving no two phenomena at all; this refutes nirvāṇa on its own terms—how could they combine to form nirvāṇa? The lower line regarding light and darkness mutually contradicting: the Tattvasiddhi states, "Light and darkness abiding in the same place is the doctrine of the Andhaka."