中觀論疏 10.50

10.50

此是第二次破邪見也。問：小乘前明因緣、次破邪見，大乘亦爾不？答：前明八不，即辨十二因緣不生不滅，此是大乘因緣。從〈破四緣〉已後乃至〈涅槃〉名破邪見。問：大小乘明因緣，有生滅無生滅二觀異者，大乘小乘明邪見云何異耶？答：若傳望者，外道望小乘為邪見，小乘望大乘邪見。故《涅槃》明二乘若空若有皆是邪見。如云「若以聲聞辟支佛心言無布施，是則名為破戒邪見。」此是二乘空觀為邪見。又云「若見菩薩八相成道，是則名為二乘邪曲之見。」此是二乘有解名為邪見。故知二乘空有望大乘皆是邪見。就文明異者，大乘法中明諸法實相畢竟空義，一切取相有所得無非邪見，故初〈破四緣〉終〈涅槃品〉，橫洗萬法、竪窮四句稱破邪見；小乘法中但取五見及六十二見為邪見也。就今品意有三種邪見：一者斷常及我為邪見。二者別有我體，如犢子及假有體，亦名邪見。三者若世諦中都無我，亦是邪見。下偈云「非是無受亦復非是都無」也。問：非都無，是何言邪？答：但假名有我，非無假名字我耳。非是有假我體、我假用，故下結云「此是決定義」。決定有二種：一者決定無，即離二我；二者決定有於假名之我也。問：論主何故唱決定耶？答：有二種義，一者令眾生決定破我心、二者諸部邪亂。今欲整理小乘義，故須唱決定也。問：整理何部？答犢子計我、薩婆多計定法，今決定破此二，故明無我無法。問：破我有文，破法出何文也？答：下偈破生死無始破常法，又破無常、亦常亦無常、非常非無常，此四句法並破，故知明決定無法也。問：此品何故破我及斷常？答：我是六十二本中之本，斷常是邊見、是六十二本，今正伐其本，支末自傾。又一切凡夫不離我心，又斷常正障中道，如《二夜經》中常宣中道，故須破斷常也。又此品破三種邪見：一破外道、二破學小乘語意俱失，而自推折所立，亦是邪見。三破得小乘語不得小乘意，如聞十二因緣法計有實性等。就小乘法中凡有四句：一是見非邪、二是邪非見、三亦邪亦見、四非邪非見。是見非邪者，世間諸正見等也。是邪而非見者，五鈍使也。亦邪亦見者，謂五見也。非邪非見者，餘殘法是也。就亦邪亦見中復有通別，通則五見皆名邪見，別則唯撥無因果稱為邪見。以撥無因果其過既重獨受邪名，餘小輕更立稱。所言五見者，謂身見、邊見、邪見、見取、戒取。五陰名身，於中起見名為身見。執我斷常，名為邊見。見取有二：一取前見為第一，故名見取，此足上見取也；二生死中無樂淨計樂淨，獨頭見取也。戒取亦二：一以鷄狗等戒為正道，是獨頭也；二以邪見為道，此足上也。邪見如前釋。六十二見者，上已一釋，今重述異解。一云：即色是我，離色是我，我中有色，色中有我，我有於色。一陰有五，五陰二十五，各除第二離句，唯成二十。欲界二十，色界二十，無色界唯有十六，以除色。除色陰四句，故合成五十六。三界各以斷常為本，故有六十二。數人多用此解。又釋：世出世合論六十二，如前〈涅槃品〉說。於如來上起有無等四見，五陰合二十也，於凡夫上過去世起常等四見，五陰合二十；於未來世起邊等四見，五陰亦二十，斷常為本，名六十二。問：經何故云我見攝六十二見，或云斷常為本、或云一異為本？答：我是本中之本，由起我見故推我一異，一則身滅神滅名為斷見，異則身滅我存名為常見。此之三本即是次第，故經論互說。問：前破大乘迷、次申大乘教，此兩品破學小教迷申小乘教，云何乃破五見六十二見耶？答：小乘障大乘，故前多破小乘執而申於大乘；外道邪見障小乘，故今破邪見即是申於小乘。問：若爾，前但是破小申大，非是破大迷而申大；後但是破外而申內，非是破內迷而申內。答：有所得大猶是小乘，故前破小執則是破於大迷；有所得小即是外道，今破外道即破小乘。問：前破小乘復有別破大乘，今破外道亦應即別破小乘。答：亦有小乘人定執生死無始，下破生死無始，當知亦破定性有所得，但小義也。問：今破邪見，云何是小乘人入道義耶？答：以有邪見，是故不得入見諦道；今破此邪見，即入見諦，乃至證於無學，故是小乘入道。

This is the second refutation of wrong views. Question: In the Hīnayāna, causes and conditions are explained first and wrong views are refuted next; is it also like this in the Mahāyāna? Answer: Previously, the eight negations were explained, which elucidated that the twelve links of dependent origination are neither arising nor ceasing; this is the Mahāyāna's causes and conditions. From "Examination of the Four Conditions" onward up to "Nirvāṇa" is termed the refutation of wrong views. Question: Between the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna in explaining causes and conditions, there is the difference of two contemplations—with arising and ceasing versus without arising and ceasing; how do the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna differ in explaining wrong views? Answer: If considered relatively: non-Buddhists relative to the Hīnayāna hold wrong views; the Hīnayāna relative to the Mahāyāna holds wrong views. Therefore the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] explains that the two vehicles, whether [holding to] emptiness or [holding to] existence, are both wrong views. As it says: "If with the mind of a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha one says there is no giving, this is called the wrong view that violates the precepts." This is taking the two vehicles' contemplation of emptiness as a wrong view. It also says: "If one sees the bodhisattva accomplishing the Way through the eight aspects, this is called the crooked wrong view of the two vehicles." This is taking the two vehicles' understanding of existence as a wrong view. Hence we know that the two vehicles' [views of] emptiness and existence relative to the Mahāyāna are all wrong views. Explaining the difference in terms of the texts: within the Dharma of the Mahāyāna, the real mark of all dharmas and the meaning of ultimate emptiness are elucidated; any grasping at marks with apprehension is nothing other than wrong view. Therefore, beginning with "Examination of the Four Conditions" and ending with the chapter on "Nirvāṇa", horizontally washing clean myriad dharmas and vertically exhausting the four propositions is called refuting wrong views. Within the Dharma of the Hīnayāna, it only takes the five views and the sixty-two views as wrong views. In terms of the purport of the present chapter, there are three kinds of wrong views: First, annihilation, permanence, and the self are wrong views. Second, that there is separately an entity of the self, as the Vātsīputrīyas hold, and [the view that] the provisional has an entity, are also called wrong views. Third, if in conventional truth there were no self at all, this is also a wrong view. The verse below states: "It is not that there is no experiencer, nor is it that it is entirely non-existent." Question: What does "not entirely non-existent" mean? Answer: There is merely a self as a provisional designation; it is not that there is no provisional-name self. It is not that there is an entity of the provisional self or a provisional function of the self. Thus it concludes below: "This is the definitive meaning." There are two kinds of definitive: first, definitively non-existent, which means being free from the two selves; second, definitively existing as the self of provisional designation. Question: Why does the author of the treatise declare "definitive"? Answer: There are two meanings: first, to cause sentient beings to definitively shatter the mind of self; second, the various sectarian schools are erroneously confused, and now wishing to rectify the meaning of the Hīnayāna, it was necessary to declare "definitive". Question: Which schools are rectified? Answer: The Vātsīputrīyas posit a self, and the Sarvāstivādins posit determined dharmas; now definitively refuting these two, it thus elucidates that there is no self and no dharmas. Question: Refuting the self has textual support; from what text does refuting dharmas emerge? Answer: The verse below refutes saṃsāra as beginningless, which refutes permanent dharmas; it also refutes impermanence, both permanent and impermanent, and neither permanent nor impermanent; these four propositions of dharmas are all refuted. Thus we know it elucidates the definitive absence of dharmas. Question: Why does this chapter refute the self and annihilation and permanence? Answer: The self is the root of roots among the sixty-two [views]; annihilation and permanence are extreme views and the root of the sixty-two. Now, directly striking down their root, the branches and tips will collapse on their own. Furthermore, all ordinary beings are not free from the mind of self. In addition, annihilation and permanence directly obstruct the middle way; as constantly proclaimed in the Sūtra of the Two Nights regarding the middle way, it is necessary to refute annihilation and permanence. Moreover, this chapter refutes three kinds of wrong views: First, it refutes non-Buddhists. Second, it refutes those studying the Hīnayāna who lose both the words and the intended meaning, and through their own deductions demolish what is established—this is also a wrong view. Third, it refutes those who grasp the words of the Hīnayāna but do not grasp the intent of the Hīnayāna, such as hearing the doctrine of the twelve links of dependent origination and positing that they have real intrinsic nature, and so forth. Within the Hīnayāna Dharma there are altogether four propositions: (1) It is a view but not wrong; (2) it is wrong but not a view; (3) it is both wrong and a view; (4) it is neither wrong nor a view. "It is a view but not wrong" refers to mundane right views, and so forth. "It is wrong but not a view" refers to the five dull afflictions. "It is both wrong and a view" refers to the five views. "It is neither wrong nor a view" refers to the remaining dharmas. Within "both wrong and a view" there are further general and specific aspects: generally speaking, all five views are called wrong views; specifically speaking, only repudiating causes and effects is called wrong view. Because repudiating causes and effects carries so grave a fault, it alone receives the name "wrong [view]", whereas the other minor and lighter ones receive separate designations. What are called the five views are the view of individuality, extreme views, wrong views, attachment to views, and attachment to precepts. The five aggregates are called the body (kāya); giving rise to views regarding them is called the view of individuality. Grasping at the self as annihilated or permanent is called extreme view. Attachment to views has two types: first, taking a prior view as supreme, hence called attachment to views—this is dependent attachment to views; second, positing bliss and purity where there is no bliss and purity within saṃsāra—this is solitary attachment to views. Attachment to precepts also has two types: first, taking the precepts of dogs, chickens, and so forth as the right path—this is solitary; second, taking wrong views as the path—this is dependent. Wrong view is as explained before. Regarding the sixty-two views, one explanation was already given above; now an alternative explanation is recounted. One says: form is identical with the self; the self is distinct from form; within the self there is form; within form there is the self; the self possesses form. One aggregate has five; the five aggregates have twenty-five. Subtracting the second proposition of "distinct" from each leaves only twenty. The desire realm has twenty, the form realm has twenty, and the formless realm has only sixteen because form is subtracted. Subtracting the four propositions of the form aggregate yields fifty-six in total. The three realms each take annihilation and permanence as their roots, thus making sixty-two. The Abhidharma masters mostly employ this explanation. Another explanation: mundane and supramundane are discussed together to make sixty-two, as explained before in the chapter on "Nirvāṇa". Regarding the Tathāgata, giving rise to four views such as existence and non-existence across the five aggregates totals twenty; regarding ordinary beings, giving rise in the past to four views such as permanence across the five aggregates totals twenty; in future lifetimes giving rise to four views such as finitude across the five aggregates also totals twenty; taking annihilation and permanence as their root, these are called sixty-two. Question: Why do the sūtras state that the view of self subsumes the sixty-two views, or state that annihilation and permanence are the root, or state that identity and difference are the root? Answer: The self is the root of roots; because the view of self arises, one deduces the identity or difference of the self. If identical, then the destruction of the body is the destruction of the spirit, which is called the view of annihilation; if different, then the body is destroyed while the self endures, which is called the view of permanence. These three roots are a sequence, which is why sūtras and treatises explain them interchangeably. Question: Previously, delusion regarding the Mahāyāna was refuted and next the Mahāyāna teaching was elucidated; these two chapters refute delusions of those studying the Hīnayāna teaching and elucidate the Hīnayāna teaching—why then do they refute the five views and sixty-two views? Answer: The Hīnayāna obstructs the Mahāyāna, which is why previously the attachments of the Hīnayāna were mostly refuted to elucidate the Mahāyāna; non-Buddhist wrong views obstruct the Hīnayāna, so now refuting wrong views is precisely elucidating the Hīnayāna. Question: If so, the earlier parts were merely refuting the Hīnayāna to elucidate the Mahāyāna, not refuting delusion regarding the Mahāyāna to elucidate the Mahāyāna; and the later parts are merely refuting non-Buddhists to elucidate internal [Buddhism], not refuting delusion regarding internal [Buddhism] to elucidate internal [Buddhism]. Answer: Mahāyāna with apprehension is still Hīnayāna, so previously refuting Hīnayāna attachments was refuting great delusion; Hīnayāna with apprehension is non-Buddhist, so now refuting non-Buddhists is refuting the Hīnayāna. Question: Previously in refuting the Hīnayāna there was also a separate refutation of the Mahāyāna; now in refuting non-Buddhists there should also be a separate refutation of the Hīnayāna. Answer: There are also Hīnayāna adherents who rigidly grasp saṃsāra as beginningless; the refutation below of saṃsāra as beginningless should be understood as also refuting the determined intrinsic nature and apprehension of the Hīnayāna's doctrines. Question: Now refuting wrong views—how is this the principle of Hīnayāna persons entering the Way? Answer: Because of having wrong views, they cannot enter the path of seeing the truths; now, upon having these wrong views refuted, they immediately enter the seeing of the truths and ultimately realize the stage beyond study (aśaikṣa). Hence it is the Hīnayāna entering the Way.