中觀論疏 10.51

10.51

開此品者，多有錯誤，今分為二：前問、次答。問中有二：一者領前；「今欲聞」下，生後。「答曰」下，為二：初兩偈立邪見、次論主破邪見。問：小乘初立邪見，次破邪見別有破邪見品者，大乘何不爾耶？答：小乘邪見局，故初別立後則破；大乘橫收萬法、竪窮四句皆是邪見，故無別品破之也。問：若爾，小乘可別有〈因緣品〉，大乘應無別〈因緣品〉。答：大乘因緣亦通一切法，而別立〈因緣品〉者，欲通別互現。立中初立過去四見、次立未來四見。問：何故不立現在邪見？答：去來冥漠難知，故須別立；現在顯了易解，故略不明。又解：此偈首「我於」之言，即是明現在之我，於過去世為有為無，是故此文具三世邪見。問：下云「略說則五見，廣說則六十二見」，今何故但破邊見耶？答：邊見是斷常，為六十二見本。在本既破，條末自傾。問：五見之中何故不破我見？答：此中破二世見，即破於我也。問：何故不破邪見等耶？答：蓋是存略故耳。「我於過去世為有為無」者，明現在之我，於過去世為已有、於過去世為未有。若現在之我本來已有，則猶是本我，是則為常。若現在之我非是過去本我，今我始生，是則為斷。不得云過去無我、今始有我，若過去無我，則名正見，非邪見也。下半明起見處也。第二偈「為作不作」者，亦據現在之我，為更作未來世我、為不作？若更作則始終不異，則是無邊；若不更作則與身俱盡，便是有邊。下半明起見處也。問：此二偈既是立邪見，是決定義，云何乃言為有為無、為作為不作？答：上半明見本，見本即是邪疑，故云為有為無；下半明世間常等見，始是見也。「何因緣故名邪見」下，生起第二破。開為二別：初一周就理破二世八見、次周指事破二世八見。破此八見不出事理二周。如青目解大乘八不，亦就事理二周；龍樹解八不始末，亦約事理二周。今破小乘八見即小乘八不，亦就此二也。就理破二世八見即為二別：前廣破初偈四見、次略類後偈四見。以世異見同，故略類之耳。就初又三：前六偈破常有句；次四偈破斷無句；後一偈合破亦常亦無常、亦有亦無二句。此三從廣至略者，一者前後互類；二者常為四句之初，在初既破，餘中後易除，故前廣而後略也。初六偈中前偈總非；下五偈別破，即是釋非。初偈為二：上半牒有而非有、下半正明過去不作今。「過去世有我」者，明我遍五道、通於三世，故過去世本有現在之我。今總非之，故云「不可得」。下半明過去不作今者，既古今一，寧有古我作今？若古作今，則不常不遍；若是常遍，便不作也。又若本有此我，可得以本為今；本實無我，故本不為今。又外人謂古我猶是今我，故名為作今。非此作也。又古天應是今人，天人一體、貴賤同質也。

Those who explain this chapter make many errors. Now it is divided into two parts: first the question, and next the answer. The question has two parts: first, it resumes what came before; from "now I wish to hear" onward, it introduces what follows. From "The answer is" onward, it is divided into two: first, two verses formulate the wrong views; next, the author of the treatise refutes the wrong views. Question: In the Hīnayāna, after first formulating the wrong views, there is a separate Chapter on Refuting Wrong Views that refutes them; why is it not so in the Mahāyāna? Answer: The wrong views of the Hīnayāna are narrow, so they are first formulated separately and later refuted; the Mahāyāna horizontally encompasses all phenomena and vertically exhausts the four propositions, all of which are wrong views, so there is no separate chapter to refute them. Question: If so, while the Hīnayāna may have a separate "Chapter on Causes and Conditions", the Mahāyāna ought to have no separate "Chapter on Causes and Conditions". Answer: The Mahāyāna causes and conditions also extend throughout all phenomena; establishing a separate "Chapter on Causes and Conditions" is meant to display the universal and the particular alternately. Within the formulation, it first establishes four views regarding the past, and next establishes four views regarding the future. Question: Why does it not establish wrong views regarding the present? Answer: Past and future are dark and hard to know, hence they must be separately established; the present is manifest and easy to understand, hence it is omitted and not explained. Another explanation: The words "I in [the past]" at the head of this verse explain whether the present self was existent or nonexistent in past lifetimes; therefore, this text completely contains the wrong views of the three times. Question: Below it says: "Briefly explained, there are five views; broadly explained, there are sixty-two views." Why now does it refute only the extreme views? Answer: Extreme views are annihilation and permanence, which are the root of the sixty-two views. When the root is refuted, the branch tips naturally fall. Question: Among the five views, why does it not refute the view of a self? Answer: Refuting the views regarding the two times here is itself refuting the self. Question: Why does it not refute wrong views [proper], and so forth? Answer: This is simply to preserve brevity. "Was I in past times existent or nonexistent?": this clarifies whether the present self already existed in past lifetimes or did not yet exist in past lifetimes. If the present self had originally already existed, then it remains the original self, which is permanence. If the present self is not the past original self, but rather the present self has now first arisen, that is annihilation. One cannot say that the past had no self and the present first has a self; if the past had no self, that would be called right view, not wrong view. The lower half of the verse clarifies the basis from which the views arise. In the second verse, "did it become or not become": this also relies on the present self—does it further become the self of future lifetimes, or does it not become [it]? If it further becomes [it], then beginning and end do not differ, which is boundless; if it does not further become [it], then it ends together with the body, which is bounded. The lower half of the verse clarifies the basis from which the views arise. Question: Since these two verses formulate wrong views, which are determinate doctrines, why do they speak of "being existent or nonexistent" and "becoming or not becoming"? Answer: The upper half clarifies the root of the view; the root of the view is wrong doubt, hence it says "being existent or nonexistent". The lower half clarifies the views of the world as permanent and so forth; only this is the view. From "For what cause and condition are they called wrong views?" onward, it introduces the second section, the refutation. It is divided into two parts: the first round refutes the eight views of the two times in terms of principle; the next round refutes the eight views of the two times by pointing to facts. Refuting these eight views does not go beyond the two rounds of facts and principle. Just as Piṅgala's explanation of the Mahāyāna eight negations also relies on the two rounds of facts and principle, and Nāgārjuna's explanation of the eight negations from beginning to end also relies on the two rounds of facts and principle, now the refutation of the Hīnayāna eight views is just the Hīnayāna eight negations, which also relies on these two. Refuting the eight views of the two times in terms of principle is divided into two: first, it broadly refutes the four views of the first verse; next, it briefly subsumes the four views of the later verse. Because the times differ but the views are identical, it only briefly subsumes them. Within the first part, there are three sections: the first six verses refute the proposition of permanent existence; the next four verses refute the proposition of annihilation and nonexistence; the last single verse combines the refutation of the two propositions of both permanent and impermanent, and both existent and nonexistent. That these three move from broad to brief is because: first, the earlier and later mutually assimilate each other; second, permanence is the first of the four propositions, and once it is refuted at the beginning, the remaining middle and later ones are easily eliminated; hence it is broad earlier and brief later. Among the first six verses, the first verse generally negates, and the five verses below refute individually, which is to explain the negation. The first verse has two parts: the upper half takes up existence and negates existence; the lower half properly explains that the past does not become the present. "In past lifetimes there was a self": this clarifies that the self pervades the five destinies and extends through the three times, so the past lifetimes originally possessed the present self. Now this is generally negated, hence it says: "it cannot be found." The lower half clarifies that the past does not become the present: since past and present are one, how could the past self become the present? If the past becomes the present, then it is neither permanent nor pervasive; if it is permanent and pervasive, then it does not become. Moreover, if this self originally existed, one could take the original to be the present; since originally there is truly no self, the original does not become the present. Furthermore, the outsider thinks that the past self is still the present self, hence it is called "becoming the present"; it is not this becoming. Moreover, the past deva would have to be the present human, so that deva and human would be of one body, and the noble and the base would have the same substance.