中觀論疏 3.15

3.15

「有人雖聞四種破諸法」下，釋第三不一不異。問：青目何故作四對釋之？答：詳青目意，初破論師生明無生，顯無生破一切法盡。而後更說三對法者，為上中下三種根緣：上根聞不生不滅不悟無生，若聞不常不斷方悟無生；中根聞不常不斷不悟無生，聞不一不異方悟無生；下根聞六種並不悟，聞一切法根本無來無出方悟無生。故知初對正顯無生，破病已周、顯道事足，但為三根人故說餘六不也。就初文為二：「雖聞四種破法」者，領前破也；「猶以四門成諸法」者，此立後義也。此明不受前四破，立後之四法。「是亦不然」者，第二論主答也。又開四句：第一總非。凡有二義：一者明今雖立後四，已漏前四門中，故不應立。二者前四既其虛妄，驗後四亦非真實。「若一則無緣若異則無相續」者，第二略破。釋上總非。因果若一，則不由因有果，亦不由果有因。緣謂緣由義也。又因果既一，但有於果更無別因，故云一則無緣。緣猶是因也。異無相續者，牙與穀種異而牙續穀者，牙與樹異亦應續樹。又因果若異，因時未有果，則有所續、無能續。若有果時，則無復有因，則有能續、無所續也。然異既無續、一亦無續，一既無緣、異亦無緣。穀與牙異，豈是牙緣？若爾，樹與牙異，應是牙緣。成實師云：假有即實義、有異實義。今問：四微為成即實之柱、為成異實之柱？若成即實之柱即是實義，有何因果相成耶？若成異實之柱，實與柱相離，云何相成耶？「後當種種破」者，第三指後品。破一異處處有文，破相續現行業二品。「是故復說不一不異」者，第四總結。

From "Although some, having heard the fourfold refutation of all phenomena" below, [the commentary] explains the third pair: neither identity nor difference. Question: For what reason does Piṅgala explain them in four pairs? Answer: Examining Piṅgala's intention, he initially refutes the thesis-masters' [notion of] arising to clarify non-arising, showing that non-arising refutes all phenomena completely. Yet subsequently he further sets forth three pairs of phenomena for the sake of trainees of three different faculties—superior, middling, and inferior: those of superior faculties, hearing of neither arising nor ceasing, do not awaken to non-arising, but upon hearing of neither annihilation nor permanence they finally awaken to non-arising; those of middling faculties, hearing of neither annihilation nor permanence, do not awaken to non-arising, but upon hearing of neither identity nor difference they finally awaken to non-arising; those of inferior faculties, hearing of all six kinds, do not awaken at all, but upon hearing that all phenomena fundamentally have no coming and no going out they finally awaken to non-arising. Therefore we know that the first pair directly reveals non-arising; refuting errors is already comprehensive, and manifesting the Way is fully accomplished, but only for the sake of persons of three faculties are the remaining six negations stated. Regarding the first passage, there are two parts: "Although some, having heard the fourfold refutation of phenomena" recapitulates the prior refutation; "they still establish all phenomena by means of the four gates" establishes the subsequent position. This clarifies that, refusing to accept the prior fourfold refutation, they establish the subsequent four phenomena. "This too is not so" is the treatise master's second part, replying. Furthermore, four phrases are unfolded: First is the general negation. There are overall two meanings: First, to clarify that although they now establish the latter four, they have already leaked into the prior four gates, and therefore should not be established. Second, since the prior four are false, it is verified that the latter four are likewise not real. "If they were identical, there would be no condition; if they were different, there would be no continuation" is the second part, a brief refutation. It explains the preceding general negation. If cause and effect were identical, then the effect would not exist owing to the cause, nor would the cause exist owing to the effect. "Condition" (yuán) means the sense of causal reason (yuányóu). Furthermore, since cause and effect would be identical, there would only be the effect with no distinct cause; hence it says, "if they were identical, there would be no condition." "Condition" is just "cause." As for "if different, there would be no continuation": if the sprout is different from the grain seed yet the sprout continues the grain, then the sprout is also different from a tree and should likewise continue the tree. Furthermore, if cause and effect were different, then at the time of the cause there would not yet be an effect, so there would be that which is continued, but no continuer. When the effect exists, the cause exists no more, so there would be a continuer, but nothing that is continued. However, just as with difference there is no continuation, with identity there is likewise no continuation; just as with identity there is no condition, with difference there is likewise no condition. If the grain is different from the sprout, how could it be the condition for the sprout? If it were, since a tree is different from the sprout, it should also be the condition for the sprout. The Tattvasiddhi masters say: "Provisional existence is identical to the real; there is also [the sense that it] is different from the real." Now I ask: Do the four subtle particles constitute a pillar that is identical to the real, or do they constitute a pillar that is different from the real? If they constitute a pillar that is identical to the real, it is just the real; what cause and effect mutually constituting each other is there? If they constitute a pillar that is different from the real, the real and the pillar are separate from each other; how could they mutually constitute each other? "[This] will be refuted in various ways later" is the third part, pointing to later chapters. Refutations of identity and difference are found everywhere in the text; refutations of continuation appear in the Chapters on Action (Karma) and on the Already-Per-formed. "Therefore, it is further said: neither identity nor difference" is the fourth part, the general conclusion.