中觀論疏 3.16

3.16

「有人雖聞六種破諸法」下，釋第四對。此中但標立而不出破者，一則例上可知。二〈去來品〉近，其文易見，不煩破也。問：來出中何故不舉即事乃明根本耶？答：此有深旨。上來六不不其現事，而惑者不受。今欲窮其根本都無來處無有出處，是故當知無有生滅及以一異也。問：破來出中何故但明外道立義？答：此論正破於內、傍破於外，以正破內故前三對廣破，以傍破於外故後一對略破。又此是點同破。成實師有流來反去之義，地論師有乖真起妄之來、息妄歸真之去。如此來去悉同外道，今列外道即是破內。問云：何破彼義？答：汝若有眾生曾經得佛，可言至本處；今既未有得佛者，云何言還至本處？彼解云：眾生本有佛性、本有如來藏，為生死作依持建立；今斷煩惱故得佛，故是還至本處。今問：為佛性自作佛、眾生作佛耶？若言眾生作佛者，如經云「昔時鹿王，我身是也。」為鹿至佛耶？不至耶？若至，佛則猶是鹿；若不至佛，鹿滅於前，誰作佛？若佛性自作佛者，眾生應不得佛。問：經亦云「從無住本立一切法」，若了悟還歸無住，乃至顛倒從空而起，了悟還原本淨。與外道何異？答：若必定作此解，與外道亦無異。但今明來無所從、去無所至，蓋是不來來、不去去，未曾二相也。

From "Although some, having heard the sixfold refutation of all phenomena" below, [the commentary] explains the fourth pair. Here he merely indicates their establishment without setting forth a refutation because, first, by analogy with the above it can be known; second, the "Chapter on Going and Coming" is close at hand and its text is easy to see, so there is no need to trouble to refute it. Question: In [discussing] coming and going out, why does he not cite immediate things and instead clarify the root? Answer: This has a profound purport. The preceding six negations did not fail to address manifest things, yet the deluded did not accept them. Now, wishing to exhaust their root as having no place whatsoever of coming and no place whatsoever of going out, one should therefore know that there is no arising or ceasing, nor identity or difference. Question: In refuting coming and going out, why does he merely clarify the positions established by non-Buddhists? Answer: This treatise primarily refutes the internal [Buddhists] and secondarily refutes external [non-Buddhists]. Because it primarily refutes the internal, the first three pairs refute them extensively; because it secondarily refutes the external, the last pair refutes them briefly. Moreover, this is a refutation by pointing out their equivalence. The Tattvasiddhi masters have the doctrine of flowing out and returning; the Dilun masters have [the doctrines of] the coming that deviates from the true to give rise to delusion, and the going that quells delusion to return to the true. Coming and going such as these are entirely the same as non-Buddhists; now enumerating the non-Buddhists is just refuting the internal. Question: How does one refute their doctrine? Answer: If you had sentient beings who had formerly attained Buddhahood, one could speak of arriving at the original place. Now, since there has not yet been one who attained Buddhahood, how can one speak of returning to the original place? They explain: Sentient beings originally possess Buddha-nature and originally possess the tathāgatagarbha, which serves as the support and foundation for saṃsāra; now, because they sever afflictions they attain Buddhahood, and therefore it is returning to the original place. Now I ask: Does Buddha-nature itself become Buddha, or do sentient beings become Buddha? If you say that sentient beings become Buddha, as the sūtra says, "The deer king of the past was myself"—did the deer arrive at Buddhahood, or did it not arrive? If it arrived, the Buddha is still the deer; if it did not arrive at Buddhahood, the deer ceased previously, so who becomes Buddha? If Buddha-nature itself becomes Buddha, sentient beings should not attain Buddhahood. Question: The sūtras also say, "From the root of non-abiding all phenomena are established"; if, through fully awakening, one returns to non-abiding, or even if inversion arises from emptiness, and through fully awakening one returns to the original purity—how is this different from non-Buddhists? Answer: If one definitively forms this interpretation, it is indeed no different from non-Buddhists. But now we clarify that coming has no place from which it comes, and going has no place to which it arrives; it is merely coming without coming and going without going, never having had two marks.