中觀論疏 3.20.1

3.20.1

「答曰諸法不自生」者，此下正是論主自釋八不。 開為二章：第一〈因緣〉一品釋八不之始、第二〈去來〉一品釋八不之終。 括始領終，中間可類。 釋八不之始為三：第一兩偈舉四門釋無生； 「問曰阿毘曇」下，第二外人立四緣證有生； 「果為從緣生」下，第三破四緣顯無生。 舊分不詣，故今正之也。 就兩偈為二：初偈開章門、第二偈釋章門。 前牒八不即是標方等之中心，今之兩偈吐龍樹之妙悟。 以龍樹撿四句生不得，悟於無生，既不受生亦不受不生，乃至不受亦不受，無得無依，名無生忍。 今為眾生吐其所悟，故作四句覓生不得也。 然直讀此文，未覺其妙； 師子吼以此偈歎佛，佛能悟四不生即是大覺。 又此四不生即是無相之相，名為實相。 凡有二種四句：一無自相等四、二無為自相等四。 外道雖復破麁、未能除細，若無此四句不生，無猶得攝邪歸正明實相耶？ 問：前有八謬、次有九家，論主云何但破四句？ 答：八謬不出有因無因，三句破其有因、一句破無因，則攝八在四。 九計並計有因生，今三句破有因，則三攝於九。 問：誰執自生等四句耶？ 答：眾人立義多墮此四。 如牙有可生之自體故自生，可生之理、可生之義、可生之性，猶是一例義耳。 雖有可生理，復假緣生，即從他生義。 有可生理，復假於緣，即共生義。 考此生遠由無明，無明無因，即無因生義。 生既具四句，滅亦爾。 如或有可滅之理故得滅，是自滅義。 若假治道方滅，是他滅義。 有可滅，復假治道，謂共滅。 從來無滅，因今始滅，是無因滅義。 問：何故不破一異有無而破自他共耶？ 答：有三義。 一者下偈云「因緣所生法，我說即是空，亦為是假名，亦是中道義。 」外人執自性則具失因緣中假，若失其因緣中假則破一切法。 是故命初破自即識因緣，識因緣即是中假，乃至有佛菩薩世間樂具也。 二者破自即苞攝一切，以一切諸法無出自者，指自為他，自無即無他。 三者欲顯一切法本自無生，以一切法本無其自體，是故諸大乘經皆明本自不生今亦無滅。 所以不破有無一異者，自體生是有，他生為無，共生是亦有亦無。 計一是自生，計異是他生，今破自他共則攝得一異有無也。 第八有生、第九無生，還是有無，入自他門破。 偈為二：上三句正破於生、下一句結明無生。 上三句明無生即是中義，下明無生即是觀義，為眾生說之即是論。 論主聞八不即如說行，今此一偈即如行而說。 自有中發於觀、觀發於中。 中發觀者，悟中道發生正觀。 觀發中者，眾生見諸法是自是他則非中道，今以觀撿自他畢竟不可得，則是觀察中也。 又上三句明諸法無生，下句明無生忍。 又上三句是境界性，次句是觀智性。 如是三波若等萬義可知。 問：云何不自生？ 答：下長行自釋。 此既是龍樹偈首，宜寄之遊心。 《智度論》釋〈無生品〉云「以眾生無生，故諸法無生。 悟二種無生，故名無生法忍。 」眾生無生者，依此四門求之不得，是故無生。 五陰內若有眾生自體，可從眾生自體而生眾生； 以五陰內無眾生自體，云何從眾生自體而生眾生？ 又從眾生自體而生眾生，是則眾生不假五陰； 既假五陰，故知不從眾生自體生眾生也。 不他生者，惑者既聞不從眾生自體生於眾生，則謂假於五陰而生眾生。 五陰望眾生則便是他，故是從他生義。 今明陰內若有眾生自體，可望五陰為他； 竟無眾生自體，誰望為他？ 故不從他生。 又五陰內無人，假五方有，此是團空作有。 又五內無人，假五成人； 五中無柱，何不成柱？ 又五中無一能生一者，亦無有多，何不生多？ 又五狗無師子，何不生之？ 不共生者，惑者聞向二關求眾生不得，便謂陰內本有眾生自性，復假五陰而成，故是共生。 今明若是共生，即合有二過：一從眾生自體生眾生過、二有無自有他過，故不共生。

"[Nāgārjuna] answers: 'Phenomena do not arise from themselves...'" From here downward is precisely where the treatise master himself explains the eight negations. It opens into two sections: first, Chapter [1] on "Conditions" explains the beginning of the eight negations; second, Chapter [2] on "Going and Coming" explains the end of the eight negations. Encompassing the beginning and comprehending the end, the middle can be deduced by analogy. Explaining the beginning of the eight negations has three parts: first, two verses present the four approaches to explain non-arising; from "[The opponent] asks: 'The Abhidharma...'" downward is the second part, where the outsider posits four conditions to prove that there is arising; from "Does the fruit arise from conditions..." downward is the third part, refuting the four conditions to reveal non-arising. The old divisions did not hit the mark, so I now correct them. With respect to the two verses, there are two parts: the first verse opens the chapter headings, and the second verse explains the chapter headings. The previous citation of the eight negations marks the core of the Vaipulya; these two verses express Nāgārjuna's wondrous awakening. Because Nāgārjuna examined the four lemmas of arising and found none, he awakened to non-arising; receiving neither arising nor non-arising, and further receiving neither receiving nor non-receiving, with nothing to attain and nothing to rely on, it is called the patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti). Now, to express his realization for the sake of sentient beings, he formulated the four lemmas showing that arising cannot be found. Yet simply reading this text, one might not perceive its wonder: Siṃhanāda praised the Buddha with this verse, for the Buddha was able to awaken to the four kinds of non-arising, which is the Great Awakening. Moreover, these four kinds of non-arising are the mark of signlessness, called the true mark. There are two kinds of four lemmas in all: first, the four such as having no self-characteristic; second, the four such as the unconditioned self-characteristic. Although non-Buddhists refute coarse [views], they cannot eliminate subtle ones; without these four lemmas of non-arising, how could one gather the heterodox to return to the correct and reveal the true mark? Question: Previously there were eight errors, and next there were nine schools; why does the treatise master only refute the four lemmas? Answer: The eight errors do not exceed having a cause and having no cause; three lemmas refute having a cause, and one lemma refutes having no cause, thereby subsuming the eight into the four. The nine positions all posit arising with a cause; now three lemmas refute having a cause, so the three subsume the nine. Question: Who holds the four lemmas such as self-arising? Answer: The assertions made by various people mostly fall into these four. For instance, a sprout has its own substance capable of arising, hence "self-arising"; the principle capable of arising, the definition capable of arising, and the nature capable of arising are of the same pattern of meaning. Although there is a principle capable of arising, it also depends on conditions to arise, which is the meaning of "arising from another." Having a principle capable of arising and also depending on conditions is the meaning of "arising from both." Investigating this arising, its remote origin is avidyā, and avidyā is without cause, which is the meaning of "arising without cause." Since arising possesses the four lemmas, cessation is likewise. If there is a principle capable of cessation so that cessation occurs, this is the meaning of "self-cessation." If it depends on the path of cultivation to cease, this is the meaning of "cessation through another." Having what can cease and also depending on the path of cultivation is called "cessation through both." Having never ceased before and only beginning to cease now due to conditions is the meaning of "cessation without cause." Question: Why does he not refute oneness and difference, or existence and non-existence, but instead refutes self, other, and both? Answer: There are three reasons. First, a subsequent verse states: 'Whatever phenomenon is born of causes and conditions, / That I declare to be emptiness; / It is also provisional designation, / And also the meaning of the middle way.' When the outsider clings to intrinsic nature, he completely forfeits causes and conditions, the middle, and the provisional; if he forfeits causes and conditions, the middle, and the provisional, then all phenomena are destroyed. Therefore, at the very beginning, refuting 'self' allows one to recognize causes and conditions; recognizing causes and conditions is precisely the middle and the provisional, up to having Buddhas, bodhisattvas, and worldly instruments of joy. Second, refuting 'self' encompasses everything, for among all phenomena none goes beyond self: pointing to self constitutes other, and when self is absent, other is absent. Third, he wishes to reveal that all phenomena are fundamentally unarisen of themselves, because all phenomena fundamentally lack their own substance; therefore all Mahāyāna sūtras explain that they are fundamentally unarisen and now also unceasing. As for why he does not refute existence, non-existence, oneness, and difference: arising from own-substance is existence; arising from other is non-existence; arising from both is both existence and non-existence. Positing oneness is self-arising; positing difference is arising from other. Now, refuting self, other, and both subsumes oneness, difference, existence, and non-existence. The eighth [school] posits arising and the ninth posits non-arising, which are still existence and non-existence, entering the approaches of self and other to be refuted. The verse has two parts: the upper three lines directly refute arising; the lower one line concludes by illuminating non-arising. The upper three lines showing non-arising is the meaning of the middle; the lower showing non-arising is the meaning of contemplation; expounding it for sentient beings is the treatise. Hearing the eight negations, the treatise master practiced in accordance with the teaching; now, this one verse is expounded in accordance with practice. Naturally, the middle generates contemplation, and contemplation generates the middle. The middle generating contemplation means that awakening to the middle way gives rise to correct contemplation. Contemplation generating the middle means that when sentient beings see phenomena as self or other, that is not the middle way; now using contemplation to investigate self and other as ultimately unobtainable is precisely contemplating the middle. Furthermore, the upper three lines illuminate the non-arising of phenomena, while the lower line illuminates the patient acceptance of non-arising. Furthermore, the upper three lines are the nature of the objective realm, while the next line is the nature of contemplative wisdom. The myriad meanings, such as the three kinds of prajñā, can be understood in this way. Question: How is there no self-arising? Answer: The prose below explains it itself. Since this is the beginning of Nāgārjuna's verses, it is fitting to set one's mind upon it. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, in explaining the chapter on "Non-arising," says: 'Because sentient beings do not arise, phenomena do not arise. Awakening to both kinds of non-arising is called the patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas.' Sentient beings not arising means that seeking them through these four approaches, they cannot be found, and therefore they do not arise. If within the five aggregates there were a substance of a sentient being, a sentient being could arise from the substance of a sentient being; because within the five aggregates there is no substance of a sentient being, how could a sentient being arise from the substance of a sentient being? Furthermore, if a sentient being arose from the substance of a sentient being, then the sentient being would not depend on the five aggregates; since they depend on the five aggregates, we know that a sentient being does not arise from the substance of a sentient being. 'Not arising from another': when deluded people hear that a sentient being does not arise from the substance of a sentient being, they say that relying on the five aggregates, a sentient being arises. The five aggregates viewed in relation to a sentient being are then 'other', which is the meaning of arising from another. Now we clarify: if within the aggregates there were a substance of a sentient being, it could regard the five aggregates as 'other'; since ultimately there is no substance of a sentient being, what could regard them as other? Therefore they do not arise from another. Furthermore, within the five aggregates there is no person, and depending on the five there comes to be one—this is gathering emptiness into existence! Furthermore, within the five there is no person, and depending on the five a person is formed; within the five there is no pillar, why does it not form a pillar? Furthermore, within the five there is not one that can produce one, nor are there many—why does it not produce many? Furthermore, in five dogs there is no lion—why does it not produce one? 'Not arising from both': when deluded people hear that seeking a sentient being through the preceding two gates fails, they say that within the aggregates there is originally the intrinsic nature of a sentient being, which also depends on the five aggregates to be accomplished, and therefore it is arising from both. Now we clarify: if it were arising from both, it would combine two faults: first, the fault of a sentient being arising from the substance of a sentient being; second, the fault of existence and non-existence, of self and other. Therefore they do not arise from both.