中觀論疏 3.20

"[Nāgārjuna] answers: 'Phenomena do not arise from themselves...'" From here downward is precisely where the treatise master himself explains the eight negations. It opens into two sections: first, Chapter [1] on "Conditions" explains the beginning of the eight negations; second, Chapter [2] on "Going and Coming" explains the end of the eight negations. Encompassing the beginning and comprehending the end, the middle can be deduced by analogy. Explaining the beginning of the eight negations has three parts: first, two verses present the four approaches to explain non-arising; from "[The opponent] asks: 'The Abhidharma...'" downward is the second part, where the outsider posits four conditions to prove that there is arising; from "Does the fruit arise from conditions..." downward is the third part, refuting the four conditions to reveal non-arising. The old divisions did not hit the mark, so I now correct them. With respect to the two verses, there are two parts: the first verse opens the chapter headings, and the second verse explains the chapter headings. The previous citation of the eight negations marks the core of the Vaipulya; these two verses express Nāgārjuna's wondrous awakening. Because Nāgārjuna examined the four lemmas of arising and found none, he awakened to non-arising; receiving neither arising nor non-arising, and further receiving neither receiving nor non-receiving, with nothing to attain and nothing to rely on, it is called the patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti). Now, to express his realization for the sake of sentient beings, he formulated the four lemmas showing that arising cannot be found. Yet simply reading this text, one might not perceive its wonder: Siṃhanāda praised the Buddha with this verse, for the Buddha was able to awaken to the four kinds of non-arising, which is the Great Awakening. Moreover, these four kinds of non-arising are the mark of signlessness, called the true mark. There are two kinds of four lemmas in all: first, the four such as having no self-characteristic; second, the four such as the unconditioned self-characteristic. Although non-Buddhists refute coarse [views], they cannot eliminate subtle ones; without these four lemmas of non-arising, how could one gather the heterodox to return to the correct and reveal the true mark? Question: Previously there were eight errors, and next there were nine schools; why does the treatise master only refute the four lemmas? Answer: The eight errors do not exceed having a cause and having no cause; three lemmas refute having a cause, and one lemma refutes having no cause, thereby subsuming the eight into the four. The nine positions all posit arising with a cause; now three lemmas refute having a cause, so the three subsume the nine. Question: Who holds the four lemmas such as self-arising? Answer: The assertions made by various people mostly fall into these four. For instance, a sprout has its own substance capable of arising, hence "self-arising"; the principle capable of arising, the definition capable of arising, and the nature capable of arising are of the same pattern of meaning. Although there is a principle capable of arising, it also depends on conditions to arise, which is the meaning of "arising from another." Having a principle capable of arising and also depending on conditions is the meaning of "arising from both." Investigating this arising, its remote origin is avidyā, and avidyā is without cause, which is the meaning of "arising without cause." Since arising possesses the four lemmas, cessation is likewise. If there is a principle capable of cessation so that cessation occurs, this is the meaning of "self-cessation." If it depends on the path of cultivation to cease, this is the meaning of "cessation through another." Having what can cease and also depending on the path of cultivation is called "cessation through both." Having never ceased before and only beginning to cease now due to conditions is the meaning of "cessation without cause." Question: Why does he not refute oneness and difference, or existence and non-existence, but instead refutes self, other, and both? Answer: There are three reasons. First, a subsequent verse states: 'Whatever phenomenon is born of causes and conditions, / That I declare to be emptiness; / It is also provisional designation, / And also the meaning of the middle way.' When the outsider clings to intrinsic nature, he completely forfeits causes and conditions, the middle, and the provisional; if he forfeits causes and conditions, the middle, and the provisional, then all phenomena are destroyed. Therefore, at the very beginning, refuting 'self' allows one to recognize causes and conditions; recognizing causes and conditions is precisely the middle and the provisional, up to having Buddhas, bodhisattvas, and worldly instruments of joy. Second, refuting 'self' encompasses everything, for among all phenomena none goes beyond self: pointing to self constitutes other, and when self is absent, other is absent. Third, he wishes to reveal that all phenomena are fundamentally unarisen of themselves, because all phenomena fundamentally lack their own substance; therefore all Mahāyāna sūtras explain that they are fundamentally unarisen and now also unceasing. As for why he does not refute existence, non-existence, oneness, and difference: arising from own-substance is existence; arising from other is non-existence; arising from both is both existence and non-existence. Positing oneness is self-arising; positing difference is arising from other. Now, refuting self, other, and both subsumes oneness, difference, existence, and non-existence. The eighth [school] posits arising and the ninth posits non-arising, which are still existence and non-existence, entering the approaches of self and other to be refuted. The verse has two parts: the upper three lines directly refute arising; the lower one line concludes by illuminating non-arising. The upper three lines showing non-arising is the meaning of the middle; the lower showing non-arising is the meaning of contemplation; expounding it for sentient beings is the treatise. Hearing the eight negations, the treatise master practiced in accordance with the teaching; now, this one verse is expounded in accordance with practice. Naturally, the middle generates contemplation, and contemplation generates the middle. The middle generating contemplation means that awakening to the middle way gives rise to correct contemplation. Contemplation generating the middle means that when sentient beings see phenomena as self or other, that is not the middle way; now using contemplation to investigate self and other as ultimately unobtainable is precisely contemplating the middle. Furthermore, the upper three lines illuminate the non-arising of phenomena, while the lower line illuminates the patient acceptance of non-arising. Furthermore, the upper three lines are the nature of the objective realm, while the next line is the nature of contemplative wisdom. The myriad meanings, such as the three kinds of prajñā, can be understood in this way. Question: How is there no self-arising? Answer: The prose below explains it itself. Since this is the beginning of Nāgārjuna's verses, it is fitting to set one's mind upon it. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, in explaining the chapter on "Non-arising," says: 'Because sentient beings do not arise, phenomena do not arise. Awakening to both kinds of non-arising is called the patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas.' Sentient beings not arising means that seeking them through these four approaches, they cannot be found, and therefore they do not arise. If within the five aggregates there were a substance of a sentient being, a sentient being could arise from the substance of a sentient being; because within the five aggregates there is no substance of a sentient being, how could a sentient being arise from the substance of a sentient being? Furthermore, if a sentient being arose from the substance of a sentient being, then the sentient being would not depend on the five aggregates; since they depend on the five aggregates, we know that a sentient being does not arise from the substance of a sentient being. 'Not arising from another': when deluded people hear that a sentient being does not arise from the substance of a sentient being, they say that relying on the five aggregates, a sentient being arises. The five aggregates viewed in relation to a sentient being are then 'other', which is the meaning of arising from another. Now we clarify: if within the aggregates there were a substance of a sentient being, it could regard the five aggregates as 'other'; since ultimately there is no substance of a sentient being, what could regard them as other? Therefore they do not arise from another. Furthermore, within the five aggregates there is no person, and depending on the five there comes to be one—this is gathering emptiness into existence! Furthermore, within the five there is no person, and depending on the five a person is formed; within the five there is no pillar, why does it not form a pillar? Furthermore, within the five there is not one that can produce one, nor are there many—why does it not produce many? Furthermore, in five dogs there is no lion—why does it not produce one? 'Not arising from both': when deluded people hear that seeking a sentient being through the preceding two gates fails, they say that within the aggregates there is originally the intrinsic nature of a sentient being, which also depends on the five aggregates to be accomplished, and therefore it is arising from both. Now we clarify: if it were arising from both, it would combine two faults: first, the fault of a sentient being arising from the substance of a sentient being; second, the fault of existence and non-existence, of self and other. Therefore they do not arise from both.

Regarding origination without causes: the confused person, having heard that sentient beings are not produced from their own essence, and furthermore do not depend upon the other, the five aggregates, to be produced, thinks that if so, then sentient beings exist without causes. This too is not so: since they are not produced even from these two causes, how could sentient beings exist without causes? Because sentient beings cannot be found when sought in the four alternatives, this is called the unoriginatedness of sentient beings. Awakening to the unoriginatedness of sentient beings is called the patience regarding sentient beings. As for the unoriginatedness of phenomena: we now briefly rely on two types of phenomena. First, phenomena formed by causes, like the four subtle atoms forming a pillar; this is to be questioned analogously to the four propositions above, so there is no need to repeat it. Second, mutually dependent phenomena, like long not being long of itself, but being long by depending on short. Long does not originate from itself, nor does long exist within short, so it is not produced from another. If long existed within short, then it would not be called short. If long existed from both self and other together, it would have the two previous faults: first, the fault of long depending on itself; second, the fault of long existing within short. Furthermore, long is not long of itself, nor is it caused by short, and it is impossible for long to exist without cause; therefore it is not the case that it originates without causes. Since this is so for long and short, so too are all phenomena such as saṃsāra and nirvāṇa unfound when sought through the four gates. Since the origination of phenomena cannot be found when seeking through the four positions, this is the unoriginatedness of phenomena; awakening to the unoriginatedness of phenomena is called the patience regarding phenomena. Question: Why does the author of the treatise only say that phenomena do not originate, and not say that persons do not originate? Answer: Phenomena are difficult to refute, whereas persons are easy to refute. Furthermore, phenomena are the basis of persons. Moreover, this treatise specifically refutes Buddhists, and Buddhists mostly posit the existence of phenomena. In addition, this is to briefly indicate one path. Question: If one clings to origination, it cannot be found when sought through the four gates; if one conceives of unoriginatedness, how is that refuted? Answer: The refutation has many gates. First, one also uses origination to refute it. If there were origination through the four gates, there could be unoriginatedness; but since the thesis of origination through the four gates is unestablished, how could there be unoriginatedness, or even both origination and unoriginatedness, or neither origination nor unoriginatedness? The five propositions collapse of themselves. Only when one has thoroughly realized this is it truly unoriginatedness. Therefore, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, in explaining the patience of the unoriginatedness of dharmas, says: 'Neither origination nor cessation, neither shared nor unshared—this is called the patience of the unoriginatedness of dharmas.' Second, since origination cannot be found when sought through the four gates, unoriginatedness likewise cannot be found when sought through the four gates. If unoriginatedness were from itself, it should not depend on origination; since unoriginatedness is spoken of in dependence on origination, we know it is not unoriginated of itself. If unoriginatedness is spoken of in dependence on origination, then it is unoriginated from another; yet origination and unoriginatedness fundamentally do not have two separate substances, so how could it be another? Origination from both involves two faults: unoriginatedness is not caused by itself, nor is it caused by origination; how could there be unoriginatedness? Since unoriginatedness cannot be found when sought through the four gates, all propositions such as both origination and unoriginatedness, and neither origination nor unoriginatedness, are ruined; thus, when the mind has no affectionate attachment to any phenomenon, one awakens to the patience of the unoriginatedness of dharmas. Within this prose, it only explains the refutation of origination in the four propositions, and does not yet explain the fourth proposition's conclusion of unoriginatedness; only in the prose following the subsequent verse is it explained. Refuting origination in the four propositions consists of four distinct points. Regarding the refutation of origination in the four propositions, there is separation and combination. Separated, they form four objections; combined, they form two junctures. As for the four objections: first, refutation by deprivation of principle; second, refutation by two substances; third, refutation by loss of causes and conditions; fourth, refutation by infinite regress. As for combining them into two objections: the former one is the deprivation, and the latter three are conceded junctures. Regarding 'There is no origination from self-essence': in the Buddha-Dharma, whether Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, there is no origination from self-essence. The Hīnayāna says: ultimately there is no function capable of producing, because it is separated from its companions. The Mahāyāna says: there has never been a single phenomenon that does not originate from causes and conditions. Now, since it is not accepted in either the Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, he directly rejects it. Regarding 'It must depend on multiple causes': the above formulated the deprivation, and this now explains the deprivation. Furthermore, the above clarified the absence of self, and this now borrows the non-self to refute the self. Question: Why does he say 'must depend on multiple causes'? Answer: The outsider merely thinks it is produced from the single cause of its own essence; now, depriving him of this, the myriad transformations depend on multiple causes—how could it be produced solely from the single cause of oneself? As for the 'multiple causes' mentioned: all phenomena have three kinds of causes: first, the primary cause, namely the grain seed; second, the conditional cause, namely water and earth; third, the cause of the characteristic of origination. Since it must depend on these three causes before it can be produced, how could it be produced from its own essence? Regarding 'If it were produced from its own essence': this is the second refutation by concession. Conceding that you are produced from your own essence, then there is an essence of oneself from which to proceed. If there is a thing from which it proceeds, then cause and effect become dissimilar, and that which is capable [of producing] and that which is [produced] become two distinct entities; how could it be called 'self'? Question: Now, we merely transform the sprout's nature into the actual sprout; how could there be two substances? Answer: If so, just as when hidden it is called Buddha-nature and when manifest it is called the Dharmakāya, it is only one substance, and thus cannot be called 'produced from its own essence.' Therefore, if you maintain one substance, you lose that which can proceed and that from which it proceeds, and the meaning of origination is unestablished; if there are that which produces and that which is produced, then the meaning of origination can be established, but its single substance is lost. Regarding 'If it is apart from other causes': this is the third refutation by loss of causes and conditions. In this text, regarding 'if it is produced from its own essence': previously he questioned that one substance becomes two substances. Now he again refutes its two substances, questioning the substance that produces: does it further proceed from something, or does it proceed from nothing? If it further proceeds from something, then proceeding from proceeding would be infinite regress, falling into the fourth objection. If it proceeds from nothing, then it falls into the third objection of being causeless. What is produced is also like this: if it can further produce another, then producing and producing would be infinite regress; if it cannot produce, then what is produced is also like this. In this text, if it originates independently: the initial objection explained that there is no self-origination, as it must depend on multiple causes; now he explains that if it originates of itself without depending on causes, then causes and conditions are lost. As for the 'other causes' mentioned: if a sprout originates from the substance of the sprout itself, then everything outside the substance of the sprout is called 'other.' The grain is its cause, and water and earth are conditions; none of these would be causes and conditions from which it originates. Regarding 'If an origination further has origination, this would be infinite regress': this is the fourth objection of infinite regress. There are five kinds of infinite regress: first, the infinite regress of proceeding universally from all: if there is no sprout inside the grain and yet it can produce a sprout, then all things also lack a sprout and a sprout should universally proceed from all things. Second, the infinite regress of producing universally: if there is no sprout inside the grain and yet it can produce a sprout, then it also lacks all things and should universally produce all things. Third, regressive infinite regress: since the sprout proceeds from the grain, the grain further proceeds from something else. Fourth, progressive infinite regress: since the grain produces the sprout, it further produces things, and this is infinite regress. Fifth, the infinite regress of constant origination: because the self-essence is ever-present, origination never ceases. Here, there are no two infinite regresses of universal producing and universal proceeding. If viewed in terms of further questioning the two substances, then there are the two infinite regresses, regressive and progressive: regressive is the infinite regress of causes, and progressive is the infinite regress of effects. If taken in terms of the self-essence being ever-present, then it is the infinite regress of constant origination. Since it fundamentally possesses a self-essence and can produce one sprout, this self-essence should further be able to produce an infinite number of sprouts.

Because self-substance is simply self-nature, and self-nature cannot be altered, it would have to arise perpetually. As the 'Examination of Karma' states: 'Having experienced retribution, / One would have to experience it yet again.' If you say that the self-substance, having produced the sprout, then ceases and becomes non-existent, then since that which already existed turns into non-existence, it would follow that what was originally non-existent now exists. Since the substance was originally non-existent and now exists, and the sprout was also originally non-existent and now exists, how could it arise from an original self-substance? If the self-substance existed originally, it would be permanent; and being permanent, it would arise perpetually without end. These two reductios—uncausedness and infinite regress—completely refute the positions of two traditional schools. The first school explains 'beginningless ignorance' by saying: 'Because there is nothing prior to me, it is called beginningless.' This establishes the position that ignorance has a beginning. The refutation states: The second thought-moment arises from the first thought-moment, so it can have a cause; but since the first thought-moment is at the very beginning, it falls into uncausedness. The second school says: Ignorance has no beginning, and therefore it is called beginningless ignorance. If so, while the second thought-moment has a beginning, the initial thought-moment must in turn arise from another, which constitutes an infinite regress. As for 'since there is no self, there is also no other': in the preceding [treatment of] 'self' there were four points, forming two pairs: the first pair was that self is not arising, and arising is not self; the next pair was that if there is a derivation, there is an infinite regress, and if pushed to its limit, there is no cause. Arising from other is likewise: other is not arising, as with oxen, horses, pears, and crabapples; arising is not other, as with clay and a pot, or reeds and a mat. If it arises from another, there is again another it arises from; if there is derivation, there is an infinite regress, and pushed to the limit, there is no cause. The Sanlun tradition refutes 'other' through three approaches: First, the comprehensive approach: no dharma whatsoever is anything other than self, and outside self there is no other; if self is refuted, other is refuted. Second, mutual identity: just as an 'other' is 'self' to itself, refuting self refutes other. Third, mutual dependence, which is easily understood. As for 'arising from both involves two faults': this refutation of 'both' has two parts. First, it demonstrates that there is no 'both'. Originally, the combination of self and other was called 'both'; because self and other exist, 'both' exists; because self and other are non-existent, 'both' is non-existent. Second, even granting arising from both, it merely combines the two faults into the fault of 'both'. As for 'uncaused': Question: What kind of person conceives the view of uncausedness? Answer: Dull-rooted people mostly give rise to the view of causality, while sharp-rooted people, through critical deduction, give rise to the view of uncausedness. Furthermore, those who grasp at attainments hold that the cause itself is uncaused, because their establishment of a cause fails; so although they speak of a cause, it is in fact uncaused. Question: Does our mountain lineage have a doctrine of uncausedness? Answer: The 'cause' and 'uncaused' of others are both exclusively 'cause'—they fail to grasp the uncaused. Failing to grasp the uncaused, how could it constitute a cause? In our view, the cause is simply the uncaused; therefore cause and uncaused are non-dual. Question: How many kinds of uncausedness are there? Answer: There are two kinds. First, positing that there is no cause whatsoever, hence called uncaused. Second, positing that existing causes are uncaused, as the opening section says: 'Existing being can exist; existing being is self-existent,' and thus does not depend on non-being. Refuting the proposition of uncausedness involves four faults: first, the fault of permanence; second, demolition by principle; third, reversal of parity; fourth, inverted fruition. The fault of permanence: since it does not arise from the conjunction of causes and conditions, neither does it cease through the separation of conditions. Neither arising nor ceasing, it is therefore permanent. Furthermore, if space is not from a cause and is permanent, all things not from a cause should likewise be permanent. As for 'this is not so': this is the second, demolition by principle. In the realm of principle, things are not without causes. Thus the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: 'All phenomena truly possess causes and conditions; it is only through delusion that one fails to know them.' Just as someone seeks wind from a fan or fire from wood, how could this be uncaused? As for 'if there is no cause, there is no fruit': this is the third, reversal of parity. Because there is no cause, there is no fruit; it should also follow that because there is a fruit, there is a cause. If there is a fruit without a cause, there could also be a cause without a fruit. As for 'if there is a fruit without a cause': this is the fourth, inverted fruition. In principle, one should say that without bad causes one obtains bad fruits, and without good causes one obtains good fruits; but if this were not so now, a person who upholds the precepts, lacking the cause for hell, should be born in hell, and a person who commits the five heinous deeds, lacking the cause for heaven, should be born in heaven. Furthermore, regarding 'As the self-nature of phenomena': compared to the preceding verse, this verse can have three meanings. First, for the sharp-rooted, merely proclaiming the fourfold non-arising brings understanding; now, for the dull-rooted, the meaning of non-self-arising is discussed again. Moreover, the three verses can correspond to the three capacities: those of superior capacity understand upon hearing the Buddha's eight negations; those of middling capacity understand when the treatise master proclaims the four kinds of non-arising; those of inferior capacity must await the explanation before awakening. Second, the preceding [verse] refuted the doctrine of self-arising apart from causes and conditions, and therefore plainly stated 'not arising from self'. Now it refutes the doctrine of self-arising through causes and conditions, such as the Abhidharma view that there is a self-nature that arises depending on conditions; hence the text says, 'As the self-nature of phenomena does not reside in conditions.' The 'self' of all phenomena does not emerge from either a self that does not depend on conditions or a self that does depend on conditions; therefore these two verses refute it completely. Third, the first verse primarily refutes the erroneous arising from self, other, and so forth, while the subsequent verse expounds provisional arising through causes and conditions. Thus the prose says: 'It is merely through the conjunction of conditions that there are designations.' Question: Why do you not say that the first verse sets forth the chapter's thesis and the subsequent verse explains it? Answer: Because Piṅgala did not frame it as setting forth and explaining a thesis. If we now take it as setting forth and explaining a thesis, this is the second: explaining the thesis. Previously, the treatise master set out the four propositions to explain the eight negations, which is explaining scripture by means of a treatise; now this verse explains the preceding verse, which is explaining a treatise by means of a treatise. In this verse, only 'not from self' is explained, not the remaining three. The reason is that Nāgārjuna took up the eight negations and explained one, and the remaining seven became clear. Although four were listed above, understanding one allows the remaining three to be grasped. Question: Why is this so? Answer: There are four reasons. First, he wishes to show that all phenomena are simply unarisen. All attachments to attainments are notions of arising; although the Buddha spoke of eight negations, they bundle down to a single non-arising. As is commonly said, the surging forth of arising is 'arising'; but cessation merely newly begins to surge forth, so why is it not arising? The fading away of arising is again cessation, so we know that the arising and ceasing of phenomena is just arising. Furthermore, in all phenomena there is the arising of thoughts: if one speaks of the principle of the fourfold transcendence, the thought of fourfold transcendence arises; even hearing words of conception, the thought of conception arises; therefore, within all phenomena there is the arising of thoughts. Now, by refuting arising, all conceptual thoughts do not arise; hence one realizes the anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti. Second, because all sentient beings have arising, they have old age, sickness, death, bondage, and the like; if arising is brought to rest now, then old age, sickness, and death will come to rest; therefore he explains only non-arising. Third, since the dharma of arising is non-existent, the remaining seven collapse of themselves. Fourth, having opened the four gates to refute arising, the remaining seven are analogous. This verse also has three meanings: first, he wishes to show that 'self' encompasses all phenomena; if there is no self-substance, then all phenomena are non-existent.

Second, within conditions there is no self-nature, nor are there the remaining three natures; third, there is no self to be depended upon, and therefore there are no three [others]. As for 'As the self-nature of phenomena does not reside in conditions': this line can be explained through three meanings: first, refutation based on provisionality through conditions; second, refutation confronting provisionality through conditions; third, refutation by equivalent deduction. Refutation based on provisionality through conditions: examining within the conditions, there is no self, just as within the five aggregates there is no person, and within the four subtle atoms there is no pillar. When there is not even a self-nature, how can one say that it arises from self-nature? Second, confronting provisionality through conditions: using the conditions, self, and sprout, we dismiss both: if there were a self-nature, it would not depend on conditions; if it must depend on conditions, it has no self-nature. Third, refutation by equivalent deduction: since having an inherent self-substance would not depend on conditions to exist, it would also follow that the self-substance inherently arises without depending on conditions to arise. And in saying 'as [with] phenomena': if phenomena genuinely had intrinsic nature and one said they lacked it, that would not accord with phenomena; but now they truly lack intrinsic nature and one says they lack it, hence it says 'as [with] phenomena'. This shows that the heterodox notion of an intrinsic nature does not accord with phenomena. Furthermore, turning back to your conditions of the five aggregates, there is no substance or nature of a person; hence it says 'as [with] phenomena'. As for 'because of lacking self-nature': the lower half [of the verse] is not a refutation of 'other', but rather reveals that there is no need to refute 'other'. Why is there no need to refute 'other'? Because since self is non-existent, other is non-existent; thus calling this the refutation of other is also admissible. Since within conditions there is no self-nature, pointing to self as other means there is no other-nature; pointing to self and other as both means there is no both-nature; pointing to what exists as non-existent means there is no uncaused-nature. This is a rigorous discussion of the non-existence of the four propositions, and in each case demonstrates the non-existence of the four propositions from the standpoint of the fruit. In a broader discussion: depending on the self of the person, there is the other of the five aggregates; since there is no self of the person, what is there to depend upon so that the other of the aggregates exists? Combining the person and the aggregates is called 'both'; since in the end there is neither a self of the person nor an other of the aggregates, how could there be 'both'? The self of the person is caused by the person, and is further caused by the aggregates, which is termed 'having a cause'; since in the end these two causes do not exist, how could there be 'uncausedness'? Explained from yet another perspective: the first half of this verse uses conditions to refute self, and the second half uses self to refute conditions. The first half uses conditions to refute self, clarifying that if conditions exist, then self does not exist; the second half clarifies that because self is non-existent, conditions are non-existent. Using conditions to refute self is using existence to refute non-existence; using self to refute conditions is using non-existence to refute existence; hence it says 'because self is non-existent, other is also non-existent.' Explained from yet another perspective: this verse is illustrated by taking a fist. A fist exists through fingers, so the fist lacks self-nature. If one says that because the fist exists through fingers it is other-nature, this is also not so. Fingers viewed from the perspective of a fist cannot be 'other', because there is no separate substance. If the fist viewed from the fingers is 'other', and the fist depends on fingers, then since the fist viewed from a pillar is 'other', it should arise from the pillar. Therefore, establishing 'other' loses 'self', and establishing 'self' loses 'other'. Furthermore, a fist in relation to a fist is self, yet the fist lacks self-nature; fingers in relation to fingers are self, yet fingers also lack self-nature; lacking self-nature, there are no fingers—how then could fingers be the 'other' to the fist?