中觀論疏 3.26

3.26

「問曰阿毘曇人云諸法從四緣生」下，第二外人舉四緣救義。此救從三處生：一者從八不生。論主引經明八不無生，外人亦引經明法從四緣生。生與無生俱是佛說，破則俱破、申則俱申。若偏破生而申無生，亦應偏破無生而申生。是故經云「寧起身見，不惡取空，不以是身見墮惡道中。」又若破生則無世諦，無世諦云何有第一義耶？二者從上如諸法自性不在眾緣中生，外人云以眾緣中有自性故假緣得生，若無自性雖復假緣終不得生。如《涅槃經》答瑠璃光難云「有漏之法以有生性故生能生，無漏之法無有生性故生不能生。」佛大乘經親說有性假緣得生，汝何故言性不在眾緣中耶？三者從最後長行末生。若言四句求生不得故無生者，今亦明諸法從四緣生故應有生也。問：此論既稱破迷大乘人，應大乘人引四緣救義，云何乃引毘曇立耶？答：關內影法師云「此偈為問，蓋是青目傷巧處耳。所以然者，論主直引四緣遍攝眾師，破四緣生亦遍破眾師。但青目意局，故偏主毘曇。」失在注人，不應問也。今曲為青目通者，凡有八義：一者毘曇通大小。如《阿含》通大小，故迦葉云方等阿含。又《攝大乘論》云「分別大乘義，是大乘毘曇。」羅什云：「吾若造大乘阿毘曇，有勝迦旃延子。」以此推之，則毘曇通於大小。二者此是點同破。如前八不不來不出，顯內若作此立則同外道，今顯大乘人若執四緣實有生則同小乘。故有所得小猶是外道，有所得大猶是小乘。三者部雖二十，而五部盛興於世，五部中薩婆多偏行於世。小乘法中有三藏教，正量部偏弘於律，律是住持佛法之本。上座部偏弘經，經是三藏根本。佛滅後二百年中，從上座部出薩婆多部偏弘毘曇，毘曇是真實法。故佛滅後三百五十年，迦旃延解佛毘曇作八健度，六百年釋八健度造《毘婆沙》。七百年為《婆沙》太廣，故法勝造《毘曇》。為法勝太略，千年之間達磨造於《雜心》。如此皆是薩婆多部毘曇義，故毘曇盛行。問：此部何故盛行？答：此部明三世是有、見有得道，與凡夫心相應故，世多信之。又時數應爾。前五百年多說無相法，後五百年多說有相法，故有正像二時。今是像法中，故多學毘曇有相法也。四者此部唯得人空、不得法空，見諸法有生，不信諸法無生，故障大乘無生。如五百部聞大乘畢竟無生如刀傷心，此皆是薩婆多部之枝流。今破毘曇定實有生，則遍破五百部也。問：此部立四緣生有幾義？答：有二義。一者執小乘生撥大乘無生，大乘無生非佛說，是調達作。余親聞彼僧云：「大乘方等經是龍樹道人作，故不信也。」二執小乘四緣疑大乘經明無生。若言無生者，經何故說從四緣生？如上云聞大乘法說畢竟空即生見疑等也。五者此論破小乘生明諸法無生，即是具申佛大小乘權實兩教。今求生不可得，即知本性無生，故實有生是方便、無生是真實。無生是真實，即顯真實相；生是方便，即開方便門。故《法華》云「諸法從本來，常自寂滅相」，故知本性無生是真實義；「我雖說涅槃，是亦非真滅」，故知生滅是方便也。六者，問：此論何處有斯文耶？答：緣緣章云「真實微妙法，此即可信；隨宜所說，不可為實。」此分明釋《法華》也。七者示破有次第。如《百論》初捨罪次捨福，今亦爾也。外道障小乘，故破外道而申小乘；小乘障大乘，故破小乘而申大乘。所以偏破毘曇也。問：不得法空，小乘不信無生，故破生申無生。如《舍利弗毘曇》明於二空，《成實論》等亦明二空，應不被破。答：無生有二種，一破生明無生、二本性無生。小乘之人先有生，拆之方得無生，非本性無生，是故宜破。故《大品》云「若法先有後無者，諸佛菩薩即有過罪。」問：毘曇先出，可得洗之；成實後興，應不被破。答：但令病同則便被破，何論先後？若先論不破今迷，則古方不治今病也。八者小乘有二：一不可轉入大、二可轉入大，今為可轉人，即轉為大乘人。故《法華》云「為聲聞說大乘」，當知聲聞是迴小入大之人也。不可轉，凡有二人：一聖人，謂斷惑已盡、所得究竟，故不可轉。二凡夫，保小不受於大，又恐喪一生學業失於名利，如此之人憎惡大乘，以大乘好破之。故大乘人不與聲聞而相違背，恒起憐愍心、得神通智慧，當除其小見也。問：大乘人何故不出救義？答：有二種大乘人。一如方廣之流，聞無生乃更增其執心，故不救義。二者有所得大乘，若聞無生便謂是真諦、若聞四緣生便言是世諦，則起生無生二見。如此之流並入小乘救內攝之。又有不空假生大乘人，但言空無性實生、不空假生，亦入小乘救攝。就立中有三：一長行、二偈本、三解釋。長行有二：初立四緣生、次斥無生。問：阿毘曇是佛說，云何秤阿毘曇人耶？此非毘曇人造作四緣，云何作此救耶？答：佛說四緣如炎如夢，故四緣是非緣緣，雖緣非緣，故不引佛說。今聞四緣作緣緣定實而執，故名阿毘曇人。如呵迦旃延無以生滅心行說實相法，生滅心猶是斷常心耳。又小乘名為半字，以但得緣、不得非緣故也。問：阿毘曇文前明六因、後辨四緣，今何故不舉六因但舉四緣耶？答：《毘婆沙》中有種種釋。一解云：四緣是佛說，六因非佛說，但迦旃延子作六因解佛四緣義耳。六因既非佛說，故不引之。今欲引佛誠言以難論主。次解云：六因亦是佛說，但文脫落，故應在《增一阿含》六數法門說也。次解云：六因實是佛說，但佛散說，旃延後集之耳。真諦三藏云：「佛在天上說《六因經》。諸天見旃延欲造毘曇，故送將來。旃延以宿命智，觀知是佛說。然終不定，故不引來也。」第二偈本，凡有三意：上半列四緣名、第二一句明四緣用。四緣總攝有為無為，而但生有為。故《雜心》云「從是六種因，轉生有為法」也。「更無第五緣」者，第三辨四緣體。以四緣攝一切緣盡，即以一切法為體，故云更無第五緣也。故此一偈立三義，謂名、用及體也。又分為二：三句立有生義、第四句明無生義。外人云：我亦有無生義。所言無生者，乃是無第五緣生耳，非無四緣生也。第五緣生，即品初八謬是也。又言「更無第五緣」者，論主欲總攝一切生義。凡有生者並在四緣之中，若四緣生義不成，即一切畢竟無生，故言更無第五緣也。長行從後釋。向前偈中前列名、次用、後體，則自末至本；長行前體、次用、後名，自本至末，各示一體也。又偈正舉四緣救義，前列名、次辨用、後明體；長行示鉤鎖相生，故接後句文仍即解釋。「一切所有緣皆攝在四緣」者，此有二意：一者欲明無外道等所計之緣、二者欲明佛經雖說種種緣並在四緣中。又如《舍利弗毘曇》乃明十緣，亦攝四緣之內。《地持》十因亦爾也。「以是四緣萬物得生」，釋第三句，辨四緣用也。「因緣名一切有為法」，釋上半，列四緣名也。此中帶出體以釋名，非正釋其名字。釋四緣名為二例：初別釋二緣名、次總釋後二緣。別釋初二緣者，以初二緣體有廣狹故也。因緣緣果俱攝三聚。次第緣果通二聚，若心滅心生則緣果俱心，若心滅二定補處則心是緣而果是非色非心也。就心中更有除取。所言除者，除二世羅漢最後心。問：此之二心何故非也？答：有人云過去是已滅心，故非也。現在是羅漢最後心，將入涅槃心，無果可生，故亦非也。有人約成實義，有三句：一緣而非果，即過去無明初念是也。二果而非緣，即羅漢最後心也。三亦緣亦果，從無明第二念已去，至阿羅漢最後第二心，自此中間諸心是也。今並不同此釋。今明此文既稱阿毘曇救，還用毘曇釋之。就文為二：初明所除，謂簡非次第；二所取；辨是次第緣也。言所除者，二世羅漢最後心，但是次第緣果，無後心可生，故非緣也；不言未來羅漢。數人未來世亂，凡聖心都無次第，故不說耳。《智度論》明次第緣有三句：一是次第亦是次第緣，除過去現在羅漢最後心也。二是次第不與次第緣，即二世羅漢最後心是也，又未來欲生心心數法亦是也。三非次第亦不與次第緣者，除未來欲生心心數法，餘未來心心數法是也。問：二世羅漢無後果可生，云何名意根？答：意根當體立名，雖無後果可生，得名為根。如地雖不生草，得名為地。次第緣從果立名，無果可生故不名次第緣。

From “Question: The Abhidharmikas say that all phenomena arise from the four conditions” downward, secondly, the opponent adduces the four conditions to rescue their doctrine. This rescue arises from three sources: First, it arises from the eight negations. The author of the treatise cited sūtras to clarify that the eight negations mean non-arising; the opponent also cites sūtras to clarify that phenomena arise from the four conditions. Arising and non-arising are both taught by the Buddha; if one is refuted, both are refuted, and if one is elucidated, both are elucidated. If one refutes only arising to elucidate non-arising, one should likewise refute only non-arising to elucidate arising. Therefore the sūtra says: “Better to give rise to the view of self than to wrongly grasp emptiness; one does not fall into evil destinies on account of this view of self.” Furthermore, if arising is refuted, then conventional truth does not exist; if conventional truth does not exist, how could the ultimate truth exist? Second, it arises from the above statement that “the intrinsic nature of phenomena is not found within conditions.” The opponent says: because intrinsic nature exists within conditions, [phenomena] are able to arise by relying on conditions; if there were no intrinsic nature, then even though they rely on conditions, they could never arise. As the Nirvāṇa-sūtra says in answering the objection of Prabhāketu: “Conditioned phenomena, because they have the nature of arising, can be arisen by arising; unconditioned phenomena, because they lack the nature of arising, cannot be arisen by arising.” The Buddha's Mahāyāna sūtras directly teach that there is a nature and that [phenomena] arise relying on conditions; why do you say that nature is not found within conditions? Third, it arises from the end of the final prose section above. If you say that because arising cannot be found through the four alternatives there is no arising, now it is also clarified that all phenomena arise from the four conditions, so there must be arising. Question: Since this treatise claims to refute those confused about the Mahāyāna, the Mahāyāna practitioner should be the one to adduce the four conditions to rescue the doctrine; why does it instead cite the Abhidharma to establish it? Answer: Dharma Master [Tan]ying of Guannei said: “This verse as an objection was merely where Piṅgala misapplied his cleverness. Why so? The author of the treatise directly adduced the four conditions to comprehensively encompass all teachers, and refuting arising from the four conditions also comprehensively refutes all teachers. But Piṅgala's view was narrow, so he biasedly attributed it to the Abhidharma.” The fault lies with the commentator; one should not question [the treatise itself]. Now, to accommodate and resolve this on Piṅgala's behalf, there are altogether eight meanings: First, Abhidharma applies to both the Great and Small [Vehicles]. Just as the Āgamas apply to both the Great and Small—hence Kāśyapa spoke of the Vaipulya Āgamas—furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: “Analyzing the meaning of the Mahāyāna is the Mahāyāna Abhidharma.” Kumārajīva said: “If I were to compose a Mahāyāna Abhidharma, it would surpass Kātyāyanīputra.” Inferring from this, Abhidharma applies to both the Great and Small. Second, this is a refutation through pointing out identity. Just as in the preceding eight negations of “neither coming nor going,” it was shown that if an insider maintains this, they are identical to an outsider, so now it shows that if a Mahāyāna practitioner grasps the four conditions as having real arising, they are identical to the Hīnayāna. Hence, one who has apprehension in the Small [Vehicle] is still an outsider, and one who has apprehension in the Great [Vehicle] is still a Hīnayānist. Third, although there are twenty sects, five sects flourished widely in the world, and among the five sects, the Sarvāstivāda flourished exclusively in the world. Within the Hīnayāna Dharma there are the teachings of the Tripiṭaka: the Sammatīya school exclusively propagated the Vinaya, and the Vinaya is the foundation for sustaining the Buddha's Dharma. The Sthavira school exclusively propagated the Sūtras, and the Sūtras are the root of the Tripiṭaka. Two hundred years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, from the Sthavira school emerged the Sarvāstivāda school, which exclusively propagated the Abhidharma; the Abhidharma is the real teaching. Hence, three hundred and fifty years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, Kātyāyana understood the Buddha's Abhidharma and composed the Eight Skandhas; at six hundred years, explaining the Eight Skandhas, the Vibhāṣā was composed. At seven hundred years, because the Vibhāṣā was too broad, Dharmaśrī composed the Abhidharma[hṛdaya]. Because Dharmaśrī's work was too concise, around the thousandth year Dharmatrāta composed the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya. All of these are the Abhidharma doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda school; therefore the Abhidharma flourished. Question: Why did this school flourish so greatly? Answer: This school clarifies that the three times exist, and that seeing existence one attains the Path; because it accords with the minds of ordinary beings, many in the world believe in it. Moreover, the cyclical times necessitated it: in the first five hundred years, markless teachings were mostly spoken; in the second five hundred years, teachings with marks were mostly spoken. Thus there are the two periods of the true Dharma and the semblance Dharma. Now we are in the semblance Dharma, so many study the marked teachings of the Abhidharma. Fourth, this school only attains the emptiness of persons and does not attain the emptiness of dharmas; seeing that all dharmas have arising, they do not believe that all dharmas are without arising, and therefore they obstruct the Mahāyāna non-arising. Just as when the five hundred sects heard that the Mahāyāna teaches ultimate non-arising, it was like a knife wounding their hearts—these are all offshoots of the Sarvāstivāda school. Now, by refuting the Abhidharma's assertion of definite, real arising, one comprehensively refutes the five hundred sects. Question: How many meanings are there in this school's establishment of arising from the four conditions? Answer: There are two meanings. First, grasping Hīnayāna arising, they reject Mahāyāna non-arising, claiming that Mahāyāna non-arising was not spoken by the Buddha, but fabricated by Devadatta. I personally heard a certain monk say: “The Mahāyāna Vaipulya sūtras were fabricated by the monk Nāgārjuna, so I do not believe them.” Second, grasping the Hīnayāna four conditions, they doubt the Mahāyāna sūtras' clarification of non-arising: if you say there is no arising, why do the sūtras say [phenomena] arise from the four conditions? As said above, upon hearing the Mahāyāna Dharma speak of ultimate emptiness, they immediately gave rise to views and doubts. Fifth, this treatise's refutation of Hīnayāna arising to clarify that all dharmas are without arising is precisely the complete elucidation of both the Buddha's expedient and real teachings of the Great and Small Vehicles. Now, seeking arising and finding it unattainable, one knows that by original nature there is no arising; thus real arising is an expedient, and non-arising is the real. Non-arising being the real reveals the real characteristic; arising being an expedient opens the expedient gate. Hence the Lotus Sūtra says: “All dharmas from their origin / are ever characterized by quietude and cessation.” Thus we know that original nature's non-arising is the real meaning. “Although I speak of nirvāṇa, / this too is not true extinction.” Thus we know that arising and ceasing are expedients. Sixth, Question: Where in this treatise is there such a text? Answer: The chapter on the Condition as Object says: “The real and subtle Dharma— / this indeed can be trusted; / what was spoken according with expediency / cannot be taken as real.” This clearly explains the Lotus Sūtra. Seventh, it demonstrates that refutation has a sequence. Just as the Śata-śāstra first renounces demerit and next renounces merit, here it is also like this. Outsiders obstruct the Hīnayāna, so one refutes outsiders and elucidates the Hīnayāna; the Hīnayāna obstructs the Mahāyāna, so one refutes the Hīnayāna and elucidates the Mahāyāna. That is why it refutes the Abhidharma in particular. Question: Not attaining the emptiness of dharmas, the Hīnayāna does not believe in non-arising, so arising is refuted and non-arising is elucidated. But works like the Śāriputrābhidharma clarify both emptinesses, and the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra and others also clarify both emptinesses; should they not be exempt from refutation? Answer: There are two kinds of non-arising: first, refuting arising to clarify non-arising; second, non-arising by original nature. The Hīnayāna practitioner holds that there is first arising, and only by deconstructing it does one attain non-arising; it is not non-arising by original nature, and therefore it ought to be refuted. Hence the Pañcaviṃśati says: “If dharmas exist first and later become non-existent, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas would incur fault.” Question: The Abhidharma appeared earlier, so it can be purged; the Tattvasiddhi arose later, so should it not be exempt from refutation? Answer: As long as the error is the same, it is refuted; what does earlier or later matter? If an earlier treatise could not refute a present confusion, then an ancient prescription could not cure a present illness. Eighth, there are two kinds of Hīnayāna [practitioners]: first, those who cannot be converted to enter the Great [Vehicle]; second, those who can be converted to enter the Great [Vehicle]. Now, for the sake of those who can be converted, they are converted into Mahāyāna practitioners. Hence the Lotus Sūtra says: “Preaching the Mahāyāna for the voice-hearers (śrāvakas).” One should know that voice-hearers are those who turn from the Small to enter the Great. As for those who cannot be converted, there are altogether two kinds of persons: First, noble ones: meaning their afflictions are already exhausted and what they have attained is ultimate, so they cannot be converted. Second, ordinary beings: clinging to the Small, they do not accept the Great, and furthermore they fear losing a lifetime's learning and forfeiting fame and profit; such persons hate the Mahāyāna, yet it is best refuted by the Mahāyāna. Therefore Mahāyāna practitioners do not conflict with voice-hearers; constantly giving rise to compassion and attaining supernormal powers and wisdom, they should eliminate their small views. Question: Why did the Mahāyāna practitioner not come forward with a rescue? Answer: There are two kinds of Mahāyāna practitioners. First, those like the Fangguang school: upon hearing of non-arising, their clinging mind increases even more, so they do not rescue the doctrine. Second, the Mahāyāna practitioners of apprehension: if they hear of non-arising, they think it is ultimate truth; if they hear of arising from the four conditions, they say it is conventional truth; thus they give rise to the two views of arising and non-arising. Such kinds are entirely subsumed within the Hīnayāna rescue. Furthermore, there are Mahāyāna practitioners of non-empty provisional arising who say merely that real arising is empty of intrinsic nature, while provisional arising is not empty; they are also subsumed within the Hīnayāna rescue. Regarding the establishment, there are three parts: first, the prose; second, the verse root-text; third, the explanation. The prose has two parts: first, establishing arising from the four conditions; second, censuring non-arising. Question: The Abhidharma was spoken by the Buddha; why call them “Abhidharmikas”? These four conditions were not fabricated by the Abhidharmikas, so why make such a rescue? Answer: The Buddha spoke of the four conditions as like a mirage and like a dream, so the four conditions are non-conditions as conditions; though conditions, they are non-conditions, so they do not cite the Buddha's teaching. Now, hearing of the four conditions, they take them as definite, real conditions as conditions and grasp them; hence they are called Abhidharmikas. Just as Kātyāyana was rebuked: “Do not use an arising-and-ceasing mental activity to preach the Dharma of the real mark”—an arising-and-ceasing mind is still an annihilationist-and-eternal mind. Moreover, the Hīnayāna is called the “half-word” because it only grasps conditions and does not grasp non-conditions. Question: The Abhidharma texts first clarify the six causes and later analyze the four conditions; why does it now not mention the six causes but only mention the four conditions? Answer: In the Vibhāṣā there are various explanations. One explanation says: the four conditions were spoken by the Buddha, whereas the six causes were not spoken by the Buddha; Kātyāyanīputra merely formulated the six causes to explain the Buddha's meaning of the four conditions. Since the six causes were not spoken by the Buddha, they are not cited. Now he wishes to cite the Buddha's true words to challenge the author of the treatise. The next explanation says: the six causes were also spoken by the Buddha, but the text fell out, so they must have been taught in the numerical doctrinal section of sixes in the Ekottarika-āgama. The next explanation says: the six causes were indeed spoken by the Buddha, but the Buddha spoke them in scattered places, and Kātyāyana later compiled them. Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha said: “The Buddha preached the Sūtra on the Six Causes in the heavens. The devas, seeing that Kātyāyana wished to compose the Abhidharma, brought and delivered it to him. Kātyāyana, through his wisdom of past lives, observed and knew it was the Buddha's teaching. Yet it was ultimately not definitive, so it was not cited here.” Second, the verse root-text has altogether three points: the first half enumerates the names of the four conditions; the second single line clarifies the function of the four conditions. The four conditions comprehensively encompass the conditioned and the unconditioned, but they only give rise to the conditioned. Hence the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya says: “From these six kinds of causes, / conditioned dharmas arise in succession.” “There is no fifth condition” is the third point, analyzing the essence of the four conditions. Because the four conditions encompass all conditions exhaustively, they take all dharmas as their essence; therefore it says there is no fifth condition. Thus this single verse establishes three meanings: namely, name, function, and essence. Furthermore, it is divided into two: three lines establish the meaning of arising; the fourth line clarifies the meaning of non-arising. The opponent says: I also have the meaning of non-arising. What is meant by non-arising is merely that there is no arising from a fifth condition; it does not mean there is no arising from the four conditions. Arising from a fifth condition refers to the eight fallacies at the beginning of the chapter. Furthermore, in saying “there is no fifth condition,” the author of the treatise wishes to comprehensively encompass all meanings of arising: all that arises falls within the four conditions; if the meaning of arising from the four conditions is unestablished, then all is ultimately without arising; hence it says there is no fifth condition. The prose explains starting from the end. In the preceding verse, first came the enumeration of names, next the function, and last the essence, proceeding from branch to root; in the prose, first is the essence, next the function, and last the names, proceeding from root to branch, each illustrating one aspect. Moreover, the verse directly adduces the four conditions to rescue the doctrine—first enumerating the names, next analyzing the function, and last clarifying the essence; the prose shows the interlinked arising, so it follows the final line of text and immediately explains it. “All existing conditions are subsumed within the four conditions”: this has two meanings: first, to clarify that there are no conditions conjectured by outsiders and the like; second, to clarify that although the Buddha's sūtras speak of various conditions, they are all within the four conditions. Moreover, just as the Śāriputrābhidharma clarifies ten conditions, they are also subsumed within the four conditions. The ten causes of the Bodhisattvabhūmi are also like this. “By these four conditions the myriad things are able to arise” explains the third line, analyzing the function of the four conditions. “The cause-condition refers to all conditioned dharmas” explains the first half, enumerating the names of the four conditions. Here it brings out the essence to explain the name, rather than explaining its name directly. Explaining the names of the four conditions has two patterns: first, explaining the names of the first two conditions separately; next, explaining the latter two conditions collectively. Explaining the first two conditions separately is because the essences of the first two conditions have breadth and narrowness. The cause-condition's condition and fruit both encompass the three categories [of dharmas: matter, mind, and neither-matter-nor-mind]. The immediate condition's fruit applies to two categories: if a mind ceases and a mind arises, then both condition and fruit are mind; if a mind ceases and the two attainments [of cessation and non-perception] succeed it, then the condition is mind while the fruit is neither-matter-nor-mind. Within the mind, there are exclusions and inclusions. As for what is excluded, it excludes the final mind of the arhat in the two times [of past and present]. Question: Why are these two minds not [immediate conditions]? Answer: Some say the past is an already-ceased mind, so it is not; the present is the arhat's final mind, the mind about to enter nirvāṇa, having no fruit to produce, so it is also not. Some, based on the Tattvasiddhi's doctrine, propose three propositions: first, a condition and not a fruit, which is the initial moment of past ignorance; second, a fruit and not a condition, which is the final mind of the arhat; third, both condition and fruit, from the second moment of ignorance onward up to the second-to-last mind of the arhat, all minds between these. Now I do not agree with these explanations. Now I clarify that since this text claims to be an Abhidharma rescue, we should also use the Abhidharma to explain it. In the text there are two parts: first, clarifying what is excluded, meaning eliminating what is not immediate; second, what is included, analyzing what is the immediate condition. As for what is excluded: the final mind of the arhat in the two times is merely the fruit of an immediate condition, having no subsequent mind to produce, so it is not a condition; it does not speak of the future arhat. For the Sarvāstivāda masters, the future time is disordered, and the minds of ordinary beings and noble ones have no sequence at all, so they do not speak of it. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa clarifies that the immediate condition has three propositions: first, what is an immediate sequence and also an immediate condition, excluding the final mind of the arhat in the past and present; second, what is an immediate sequence but not an immediate condition, which is the final mind of the arhat in the two times, and also the minds and mental factors about to arise in the future; third, what is neither an immediate sequence nor an immediate condition, which, excluding the minds and mental factors about to arise in the future, refers to the remaining future minds and mental factors. Question: The arhat in the two times has no subsequent fruit to produce; why is it called the mind sense-faculty (manas)? Answer: The mind sense-faculty receives its name from its intrinsic entity; although it has no subsequent fruit to produce, it still obtains the name of faculty. Just as the ground, though it grows no grass, still obtains the name of ground. The immediate condition receives its name from its fruit; having no fruit to produce, it is not named an immediate condition.